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PROLOGUE TO THE THESIS 
 
In this critical evaluation of the National Policy on Religion and Education 
(Republic of South Africa 2003)1, I will invite a multiplicity of voices and opinions 
from various disciplines and discourses – a Bakhtinian carnival of heteroglossic 
play2.  
As opposed to the official feast, one might say that carnival celebrated 
temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established 
order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchal rank, privileges, norms, 
and prohibitions. Carnival was the true feast of time, the feast of 
becoming, change, renewal. It was hostile to all that was immortalised and 
completed (Bakhtin 1984:10).  
 
In this time of postmodern carnival, official ‘Truth’ is constantly questioned and 
treated with suspicion and replaced by new and unofficial truths (Scott 1986; 
Hiebert 2003). God (if not religion) has been proclaimed dead and yet at the 
same time seems to be more alive than ever. This is a time when ‘all the 
conventional norms and protocols are suspended, as the common life is invaded 
by a great wave of riotous antinomianism which makes everywhere for bizarre 
mésalliances’ (Scott 1986:6).  
And the presiding spirit of blasphemy finds its quintessential expression in 
the ritual of the mock crowning and subsequent decrowning of the carnival 
king – who is the very antithesis of a real king, since he is in fact often a 
slave or a jester. In short, everything is topsy-turvy, and the disarray thus 
engenders an uproarious kind of laughter (Scott 1986:6). 
 
In his presidential address to the American Academy of Religion in 1986 titled 
‘The house of intellect in an age of carnival: some hermeneutical reflections’, 
Scott (1986:7) explores the impact of the “multiplicity and fragmentation and 
diversity” facing ‘the house of intellect’, and identifies the challenge of not 
resorting to the safety of ‘any sort of reductionism, [but] how to understand and 
                                            
1 Hereafter, for the rest of this study, when reference is made to ‘the Policy’, I will be referring to 
the National Policy on Religion and Education (Republic of South Africa. 2003). 
2 In his recent major work on securalism, A secular age, Taylor (2007) uses the carnival as a 
leitmotiv in exploring securalism as the ‘eclipse of anti-structure’ (2007:51) alternating between 
revolution and carnival (2007:53). 
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interpret the multitudinous messages and voices that press in upon us, each 
clamouring for attention and for pride of place’. 
 
After acknowledging the polyphony surrounding  Religionswissenschaft on the 
one hand and on the other hand rejecting any hermeneutical attempts at a 
‘totalistic’ synthesis, Scott proposes moving among the different ‘modalities … of 
interanimation between [the various] modes of discourse’ (Ricoeur quoted by 
Scott 1986:11).  Scott (1986:15) closes his address by appealing for continued 
conversations and dialogue among discourses and ‘scatterings’ of truth (1986:15) 
as a hermeneutical method that would take the plurality and heteroglossia of this 
time in history seriously. 
 
This thesis is an attempt – a personal but also a scholarly and academically 
responsible attempt – to plot many of the voices and contexts that would help to 
evaluate the specific understanding of the role of the study of religion in the 
broader contexts of citizenship in a postmodern age where nationalities, nation 
states and allegiances are constantly in flux and complex.  
 
This thesis is also submitted as proof of the validity of my own voice as one of 
many voices in and surrounding the house of intellect in an age of carnival. 
 
Paul Prinsloo 
17 June 2008 
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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE POLICY 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Central to this research is the Policy on Religion and Education – its content, its 
processes and the public debates and participation in the drafting of the Policy. 
There are a number of equally valid scholarly approaches to engage with the 
Policy in a study such as this.  
 
One possible approach would be to critically evaluate the options and 
alternatives the Policy considered within the context of the educational landscape 
in South Africa (see for example Roux 2000). Another approach would be 
comparative in nature, comparing the Policy to other countries’ approaches, for 
example countries like France and England. An example of such a comparative 
approach in investigating notions and practices of citizenship education is found 
in the work of Kerr (1999). Sterkens (2001) explored the impact of interreligious 
learning in primary education in the context of the Netherlands.  Another equally 
valid approach would have been to analyse and write up the processes leading to 
and surrounding the Policy (see for example Chidester 2003b). This critical 
evaluation of the Policy could also have been equally at home in educational 
studies, religious studies, public policy analysis and political studies. As will be 
explored in Chapter 3, the critical nature of this evaluation is specifically 
embedded in a personal understanding of critical theory and critical pedagogy. In 
this study, I situate this critical evaluation of the Policy within the broader 
discourses of a specific discipline namely Religionswissenschaft3, or the study of 
religion(s). Yet, this choice to locate this study in a specific discipline does not 
indicate a singularity or reduction in focus. While locating the evaluation of the 
                                            
3 The discourses in and surrounding Religionwissenschaft and/or the study of religion(s) will be 
explored and discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Policy from the discourses in and surrounding Religionswissenschaft, these 
discourses form part of a carnival of voices, polyphony in the Bakhtinian sense4.  
 
This thesis’ central concern and focus is the question – How does the Policy 
contribute to the shaping of a critical and autonomous citizenry? In this study I 
will propose that a critical and autonomous citizenry means a citizenry who has a 
certain Mündigkeit in understanding their own religiosity and those of others. 
Such citizens understand religion as the result of a dynamic and complex 
interplay of various societal factors. Religion as social construct also understands 
religion in its dynamic relationship with power. Religion throughout the ages was 
an important ingredient in power-plays, and has perpetuated power- and 
meaning systems and structures that impacted and shaped citizens’ engagement 
with different cultural, socioeconomic, gender, political, and educational issues. 
 
South Africa (since 1994) is a rechtstaat or constitutional state in which the 
constitution is regarded as supreme and the final authority (De Waal, Currie & 
Erasmus 2001). The new South Africa is furthermore a deliberative democracy 
referring to the fact that the Constitution is the result of extensive and painstaking 
processes involving elected representatives from every sector in South Africa. As 
a deliberative democracy, all policies and legislation should be the result of 
deliberative and transparent processes (De Waal et al. 2001). Since 1994 the 
Constitution has been the guiding force and litmus test in the dramatic re-
visioning of South African society. As such, all new policies and legislation must 
adhere to the principles and the spirit of the Constitution. Despite some 
objections against constitutional patriotism (as discussed later in this Chapter), 
constitutional patriotism (in its present South African gestalt) seems an 
appropriate response taking into account the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. 
                                            
4 The Policy itself allows for a ‘defined’ polyphony when it describes the scope of the teaching of 
religion to include religion as phenomenon, organised forms of religion as well as certain 
worldviews (1996:30). The emphasis in this critical evaluation will however focus on the study of 
religion(s). The inclusion of ‘certain worldviews’ in the broad scope of the study of religion(s) will 
be explored in Chapters 6-8. Any reference to ‘religion’ as used by the Policy should be seen 
against the scope as defined by the Policy.  
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Constitutional patriotism is furthermore embedded in the broader discourses of 
the changing role of the nation-state, the impact of globalisation as well as 
increasing need for a cosmopolitan citizenship.  
 
Citizenship and education has historically been in a reciprocal relationship. 
Education was and is historically key to any nation-state’s shaping of prospective 
citizens and their rights and responsibilities. In this study I will critically evaluate 
the Policy as a context-specific response against these broader contexts and 
discourses. I will attempt to theorise and evaluate whether the Policy can be 
considered an appropriate response taking into account the specific socio-
historical context in South Africa as well as the broader discourses surrounding 
religion and citizenship.  As Bakhtin (1981:428) suggests: 
At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions – 
social, historical, meteorological, physiological – that will ensure that a 
word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different 
than it would have under other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in 
that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to 
recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve.  
 
The following sub-questions will guide this study in exploring the Policy as a 
context-specific attempt to contribute to the shaping of a critical and a mündig 
citizenry: 
1. What were the context-specific socioeconomic, educational and political 
histories and processes shaping our new democracy and its educational 
policy framework? 
2. What are the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings and assumptions 
of the Policy argument? 
3. How does the Policy understand religion and the study of religion? 
4. How does the Policy understand the study of religion as a compulsory part 
of the curriculum in preparing learners for citizenship? In other words, how 
will the study of religion prepare learners not only for citizenship in the 
national sense but also for an increasingly cosmopolitan citizenry? 
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In examining these questions, I will do a critical discourse analysis in the broader 
context of a social constructionist approach. I will attempt to show that the Policy 
should be understood and evaluated as a response to and resulting from larger 
discourses and systems of meaning. ‘Constructionism is concerned with broader 
patterns of social meaning encoded in language’ (Terre Blanche & Durrheim 
1999: 149). In preparing to critically evaluate the Policy, this study will interpret 
the social world from which the Policy grew as well as the social world the Policy 
imagines. From a social constructionist point of view the Policy will be examined 
as a specific social construct embedding the ruling discourses of our time as well 
as re-enacting established relational patterns (Terre Blanche & Durrheim 1999: 
152).  
 
The academic rationale for the research question as indicated, can and will be 
motivated and explored. The research question has however also a personal 
history.  From the start of this journey, two questions dominated my research as 
well as ‘defending’ my research in public conversations, namely the ‘why’ and the 
‘how’ of my research project. Interestingly, lay persons (friends, colleagues and 
family) emphasised the ‘why’, while academic colleagues and especially 
colleagues busy with or having completed their doctoral studies immediately 
queried the ‘how’ of my research. Answering the ‘why’ was easier than answering 
the ‘how’.  
 
In following a social constructionist approach, I acknowledge I am a bricoleur – 
selecting sources, including and excluding based on personal and scholarly 
considerations. The act of excluding and including is however not arbitrary. 
Though my choices are personal and subjective, I accept responsibility for 
including and excluding and will provide the rationale for my acts of bricolage.  
 
In sharing this journey with you as reader I am also sharing what is private, in 
public.  Although I adhere to the traditional professional conventions of scholarly 
discourse I will write in the first person in following Webb (1992:747) who said 
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‘The use of the neutral, anonymous third person is deceptive when applied to 
quantitative research because it obliterates the social elements of the research 
process’ (Webb 1992:747). The writing in the first person has become accepted 
in the broader discourses of qualitative research (see for example Berger 2001; 
Macbeth 2001; and Patton 2002a). I share the opinion of Ramsden (2002:12) 
that ‘the narrator has a critical place, indeed an obligation to provide some insight 
into the personal, social and emotional processes which have led to the particular 
intellectual and behavioural outcomes’. Weaving a personal narrative into this 
thesis is however not without its challenges, pitfalls and ethical dilemmas (see 
Patton 2002b). The inclusion of a personal narrative is an essential ingredient in 
any reflexive attempt at making and constructing meaning (Macbeth 2001). 
Writing this thesis using the first person does constitute this research as an act of 
self-authoring (Ellis 2007; Macquire 2006) and a ‘write of passage’ (as explored 
by Noy 2003). Though I will write in the first person and share aspects of my 
personal narratives with you in this journey, this study is not primarily an 
autoethnography. I use the personal narrative throughout this study on the one 
hand as a way to establish rapport with you as reader (Berger 2001) and on the 
other hand to acknowledge my biases, assumptions and beliefs as part of my 
ethical framework for doing and sharing this research (Patton 2002b)5.  
 
In the next section (1.2) I will briefly outline some aspects shaping this thesis as 
the result of and an ingredient in a personal journey.  
 
1.2 A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 
 
The ‘why’ of my research goes back to my own life taking shape due to the 
influences of religion, schooling and notions of citizenship.  I was born in 1959, 
four years after the Freedom Charter was accepted by the African National 
Congress (ANC). I was born 11 years after the National Party came to power. In 
1960, when I was one year old, Police killed 68 people in Sharpville during 
                                            
5 I will plot the ethical dimensions of this personal approach in Chapter 2.  
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protests against pass-laws.  In 1966, when I was seven years old and in Grade 2, 
the Prime Minister of South Africa and architect of apartheid, Dr H.F. Verwoerd 
was assassinated. I remember memorial services and different rumours that the 
Communists were behind the assassination.  
 
My childhood was shaped to a large extent by the heyday of Christian National 
Education (CNE) and the reality of apartheid. During my primary and secondary 
school years I was a good pupil and a good citizen-in-the-making. None of my 
teachers questioned Christian National Education or apartheid. On the contrary. 
During school assemblies many representatives from the Afrikaans churches 
reiterated the fact that the Afrikaner was God’s chosen race and that we should 
never doubt our role in bringing light to dark Africa. Authority, whether at home, 
school or broader society, was never questioned. I accepted uncritically that God 
has selected my race, the Afrikaner, and me for a special purpose.  
 
I grew up in a Christian home and did not know persons of any other 
denomination or belief except some Jehovah’s Witnesses (with whom we were 
anyway not allowed to mix) and Communists (who included basically everyone 
who was not Christian and White). The hegemonic character of the ideology of 
white supremacy and privilege was ‘invisible’, unquestioned and embedded in 
everyday life. My home and school religion furthermore sanctioned a certain 
notion of exclusive citizenship, encompassing citizenship for heaven and on 
earth, this life and the life hereafter. Citizenship and the privilege of staying in 
town (and not in the ‘location’) were fringe benefits of being white. I never 
questioned the fact that a siren would sound at 21:00 at night in my home town 
warning all black people that they should be outside the town’s parameters. I 
never knew (or really cared about) others, whether they were black, of another 
religion or Communist (or a combination of these). In 1976, my last school year, 
my father, the patriarch and cornerstone of our family died. Also in 1976 the 
Soweto uprisings took place. Children my age protested and were killed by 
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police. I did not and could not understand their issues. I was preparing to leave 
home to study theology.  
 
Having left home I increasingly discovered a number of incommensurable 
aspects of my life6. As I progressed through university life, I gradually became 
aware of the Other – those in townships and Bantustans. They were not 
considered to be citizens of the Republic and were objects of different missionary 
outreaches. I never knew any students of colour. I never interrogated my 
whiteness and its benefits. I also became aware of my growing insecurity of 
being male and possibly homosexual7– encountering the reality of the 
incommensurability of being gay and entering the ministry. While I struggled 
intensely with the incommensurability of my gender and my ‘calling’ into the 
ministry, I dared not question the authority of the Scriptures, or the Church or 
societal norms and mores.  I submitted to the will of God, society and the state as 
an exemplary ‘good citizen’. After completing my studies, I was conscripted to do 
my national service (like other white males) in the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF). I had naïve concerns about joining but was advised 
that I should not shy away from serving God and my country. I was assigned to 
32 Battalion as Chaplain, one of the most sophisticated and efficient battalions of 
the SANDF. I saw the sophisticated killing machine of the SANDF in action. 
While I prayed for safety and wisdom, the Colonel of the battalion wanted me to 
pray for victory against Satan and his forces. I completed my term as Chaplain 
and entered the civil ministry. I was awarded the Chief of the Defence Force’s 
medal for outstanding service as well as a Pro Patria medal for serving my 
country8. My experiences of these times still haunt me. Although an exemplary 
                                            
6 Boellstorff (2005) explores incommensurability as a characteristic of the lives and choices gay, 
Muslim men are faced with in Indonesia. The concept of ‘incommensurability’ creates a space for 
me to voice the uncomfortable and liminal spaces I inhabited for a major part of my life. 
7 Homosexuality was a paramount example of being ‘outside’ – outside the Kingdom of God and 
outside the accepted norms and mores of society. While the notion of ‘gay’ has become accepted 
in today’s public discourse, homosexuality was used as a derogative and seen as a deviation 
from what was considered to be normal (and saved).  
8 Prior to the arrival of the democratic dispensation in 1994, these awards were the joy and pride 
of my family and community. After 1994 these awards have become uncomfortable reminders of 
my complicity in Apartheid. 
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citizen and Christian, the incommensurability of the layers or gestalts of my 
identity was becoming intolerable.  
 
In 1994 South Africa became a democracy in a peaceful transference of power 
from the previous regime to a newly democratically elected government. In 1995 
the careful parameters of my being a ‘good citizen’ and a ‘good Christian’ 
disintegrated. I was confronted with deeply traumatic and life-changing choices 
and consequences of my choices. Through a painful process I learned to 
embrace my gayness and left the ministry. I was forced to question the validity of 
my previous structures of making-meaning and embraced atheism. As I gradually 
became conversant with my new identity and its implications (and limitations), I 
was confronted with a new (seeming) incommensurability of being white and 
African, white and South African. The public proceedings of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) shattered my naïve beliefs and assumptions of 
growing up under the apartheid and Christian National Education (CNE) regimes.  
As the new state dramatically re-envisioned society, my history and implications 
of my whiteness often became and still are at times unbearable.  My guilt 
comprised that I never questioned, never knew, never really wanted to know. I 
was a willing, obedient and uncritical ‘good citizen’. While I was a too good citizen 
in the old dispensation, no matter what I do to ‘fit’ in the new dispensation, my 
efforts are often regarded as never being good enough9.  
 
The ‘why’ of my research is therefore linked and grounded in my personal history 
of interrogating systems and structures of meaning-making the private and public 
spheres of my life. As a result I am intrigued by notions, definitions and 
expectations of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa. I am fascinated by the 
role of education in shaping and perpetuating power and systems of meaning. I 
am mesmerised by the role of religion in the lives of my fellow-citizens and the 
increasing visibility of religion in public discourses. I live in awe of a tremendum I 
cannot describe and which I do not understand. It is therefore relatively easy to 
                                            
9 I will explore the dilemmas of personal and collective guilt in Chapter 3. 
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explain the ‘why’ of this research. I am captivated by the proposal that the study 
of religion in schools can somehow assist learners as would-be citizens to 
critically engage in the debates surrounding our new democracy, increasing 
xenophobia and interrogating the reasons for as well as the impact of the visibility 
of religion in the public sphere. 
 
1.3 THE POLICY IN A BROADER PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT  
 
Over the last three years this thesis has taken shape and changed its shape 
many times. Should I again attempt to provide a critical evaluation of the Policy in 
a few years’ time, I may do it differently. But for now, I want to critically evaluate  
the Policy within the context of the broader discourses on postmodernity, post-
secularism and citizenship in the context of the changing role of the nation-state. 
These discourses impact on the roles, functions and gestalt of religion and the 
study of religion.  The discourses in postmodernity and postsecularism also 
impact on the roles, functions and gestalt of educational policy as vehicle for 
shaping particular gestalts of citizenship. The following diagram illustrates a 
critical sense of location for this critical evaluation of the Policy (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The critical evaluation of the Policy in context 
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1.3.1 Postmodernity 
 
Postmodernism is a slippery term, an unstable word with no clear 
referents. The industry which churns out postmodern texts, including 
endless attempts to distinguish the modern from the postmodern, makes it 
clear that theoretical pollution is rampant (Denzin, Geraghty, Green & 
Tenorio 1993:508). 
 
The rationale for starting the locating of this thesis within the broader discourses 
of postmodernity, postsecuralism and globalisation is firstly because I suspect the 
Policy should be understood as a specific local response to the citizenship 
debate post 1994 in the context of the increasingly global crisis-of-identity of the 
nation-state. The Policy-as-response brings to the fore the changing role of the 
nation-state in an increasingly globalised world where identities and cultures are 
increasingly complex and changing. The second rationale for locating my 
evaluation of the Policy against these broader discourses is based on the 
evidence that various authors I will refer to in the course of this study, have used 
(and at times contested) terms like postmodernity and postsecuralism, e.g. 
Habermas and Bauman. Bauman, for example has been regarded as the 
‘prophet of postmodernism’ (Smith 1999) but has since moved away from the use 
of the term postmodernism and prefers to explore the notion of ‘liquid modernity’ 
(Bauman 2000; Bauman & Yakimova  2002). It is therefore necessary to ‘map’ a 
personal framework for my understanding of these terms and concepts. Although 
these discourses function as backdrop to the critical evaluation of the Policy, a 
full critical interrogation of these discourses falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
I prefer to use the term ‘postmodernity’ rather than ‘postmodernism’ as the latter 
seems to suggest agreement among theorists regarding the characteristics of 
this age. Postmodernism also seems to imply a ‘completed fact’. To speak of 
‘postmodernity’ implies that the process of description and analysis is continuing, 
a work in progress – although ‘progress’ seem to imply a linear process in which 
our understanding becomes more complete and more clear as we ‘progress’. 
This is however not the case. While clarity and understanding may increase as 
we proceed, we are not so sure anymore. There are furthermore a number of 
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authors (e.g. Firat & Venkatesh 1995) who propose that there are actually a 
number of different postmodernisms. Hassan (2001) also makes a distinction (or 
several) between postmodernism and postmodernity. Among the distinctions he 
makes, is the emphasis that postmodernism refers especially to the ‘cultural 
sphere’, while postmodernity refers to the ‘geopolitical sphere’. Postmodernism 
furthermore refers ‘to affluent, high-tech, consumer, media-driven societies’ while 
postmodernity ‘refers to an interactive, planetary phenomenon wherein tribalism 
and imperialism, myth and technology, margins and centers – these terms are 
not parallel – play out their conflictual energies, often on the Internet’ (Hassan 
2001). 
 
Several authors provide a history of postmodernism (e.g., Bertens 1995; Jencks 
1996). ‘Mapping’ postmodernity as a description of the times we live in has also 
been undertaken by a number of authors (e.g. Beck 1992, 1996; Best 1998; 
Biesta 1995, 2004; Burbules 1995; Firat & Venkatesh 1995; Gellner 1992; 
Jameson 1991; Kellner 1998; Lee 2005; Matthewman & Hoey 2006; Natoli & 
Hutcheon 1993; Strydom 2002). In the debate on postmodernism, without trying 
to reduce the complexities and richness, it would seem as if the main contested 
issue is whether postmodernity is a continuation of modernity or whether it 
constitutes a complete historical break with modernity. There is, as far as I could 
establish, no real contestation of the characteristics of this present age, whatever 
we call this age ‘late capitalism’ (Jameson 1991), a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992, 
1996; Strydom 2002) or ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman 2000). Firat and Venkatesh 
(1995) provide a helpful overview of postmodernity/ postmodernism by first 
describing what they understand as being the characteristics of modernity. They 
mention the following ‘conditions’ or characteristics of modernity: 
(1) the rule of reason and the establishment of rational order; (2) the 
emergence of the cognitive subject; (3) the rise of science and an 
emphasis on material progress through the application of scientific 
technologies; (4) realism, representation, and the unity of purpose in art 
and architecture; (5) the emergence of industrial capitalism; and (6) the 
separation of the sphere of production, which is institutionally controlled 
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and public, from the sphere of consumption, which is domestic and private 
(1995:240). 
 
One of the main criticisms against modernity was its reduction of the world ‘into 
simple dichotomous categories: subject/object, male/female, producer/consumer, 
culture/nature, signified/signifier, Occident/Orient, and so on’ (Firat & Venkatesh 
1995:240). Firat and Venkatesh (1995:240) call these dichotomies ‘unsuccessful 
historical attempts to legitimise partial truths’. Modernity is furthermore accused 
of developing and canonising meta-narratives as the only representations of truth 
and reality. Postmodernity reacts strongly against the notion that any meta-
narrative can represent the world in its complexities and dynamic diversity (Firat 
& Venkatesh 1995:242; Lyotard 1979). The following diagram (Figure 1.2) is 
adapted from Firat & Venkatesh (1995:241) providing an attempt to map 
postmodernity in relation to modernity10. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: A genealogy of postmodernism, adapted from Firat & Venkatesh 
1995:241 
 
                                            
10 For a different ‘map’ of postmodernity, see Denzin et al. (1993:508-509). 
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After acknowledging that postmodernism is a ‘slippery term, an unstable word 
with no clear referents’ (Denzin et al. 1993:508), they continue to state that the 
term postmodernism is a ‘concept whose day and time have come and passed, 
but a term, for better or worse, which remains, because while it is difficult to take 
it seriously, “it is not easily dismissed”’ (Denzin et al. 1993:509). Hassan (2001) 
supports the notion of accepting the use of the term postmodernism, because 
‘postmodernism has become, consciously or unconsciously, for better of for 
worse, an interpretive category, a hermeneutic tool’, a ‘way we view the world’. 
Denzin et al. (1993:513) conclude as follows: 
We need this deadly term called the postmodern to remind us that we 
have yet to make sense out of the present for the keys to its meanings are 
not in the modernist past. They are in the present, the here and now. As 
long as theorists attempt to make sense of this moment we have hope, 
even if their theories are flawed. And this moment, call it, following 
Lyotard, 'the pastmodern'. The 'pastmodern' is that which comes back on 
the present from the standpoint of the past. But this past is filtered through 
the present, a present that is littered with the past (Jameson's pastiche 
and parody), so that the boundaries between the past, the present and the 
future are now obliterated. 
 
An inauthentic (commodified) Heideggerian temporality defines the 
present. Post and past, before and after, modern and postmodern, now 
slide alongside one another, each longing for a nostalgic footing in a past 
that no longer is. Each seeks a firmly bounded present with certain 
meanings. Firm footings are no longer available and the postmodernism 
that was will remain as a pastmodern moment that has yet to understand 
itself. There is still time to catch the last boat for postmodernism. It 
remains to be seen how cultural studies will locate itself on this Titanic 
vessel (italics in the original). 
 
Bauman (Bauman & Yakimova 2002) proposes a different conclusion. Bauman 
has moved from a position where he was considered being the ‘prophet of 
postmodernism’ (Kellner 1999; Smith 1999), to promoting an understanding of 
the present as ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman 2000; Bauman & Yakimova 2002). He 
explains his move with a number of reasons. I quote and discuss his reasons not 
for the sake of getting involved and choosing in the debate, but as a way to 
explore possible implications for the role of the nation-state and education policy 
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in South Africa. Bauman (Bauman & Yakimova 2002:2) explains his first 
objection to the continued use of postmodernism as follows: 
 To start with, the concept of ‘postmodern’ was but a stop-gap choice, a 
‘career report’ of a search − still on-going and remote from completion. 
That concept signalled that the social world had ceased to be like the one 
mapped using the ‘modernity’ grid (notably, the paths and the traps 
changed places), but was singularly un-committal as to the features the 
world had acquired instead. ‘Postmodern’ has done its preliminary, site-
clearing job: it aroused vigilance and sent the exploration in the right 
direction. It could not do much more, and so it shortly outlived its 
usefulness; or, rather, it has worked itself out of the job... About the 
qualities of the present-day world we can say no more than it is unlike the 
old familiar one. We have, so to speak, matured to afford (to risk?) a 
positive theory of the novelty (italics in the original). 
 
From this Bauman’s first pointer it would seem as if postmodernity11 tried to ‘map’ 
a world that has changed under the influences of technologies, capitalism and a 
reenchantment of consumption (Firat & Venkatesh 1995). It is as if 
postmodernism tried to make everyone notice that things have changed, that the 
map of the world and of society as once was accepted by all has changed. His 
second motivation of opting out of promoting the concept of postmodernism is 
that he feels that  
 ‘Postmodern’ was also flawed from the beginning: all disclaimers 
notwithstanding, it did suggest that modernity was over. Protestations did 
not help much, even as strong ones as Lyotard's (‘one cannot be modern 
without being first postmodern’) − let alone my insistence that 
"postmodernity is modernity minus its illusion’. Nothing would help; if 
words mean anything, then a ‘post X’ will always mean a state of affairs 
that has leaved the ‘X’ behind (Bauman & Yakimova 2002:2). 
 
Bauman (Bauman & Yakimova 2002: 2-3) adds that the same argument applies 
to using the term ‘late modernity’ and ‘reflexive modernity’. He says 
I had (and still have) reservations towards alternative names suggested for 
our contemporaneity. ‘Late modernity’? How would we know that it is 
‘late’? The word ‘late’, if legitimately used, assumes closure, the last stage 
(indeed − what else one would expect to come after "late"?). Very late? 
Post-late? − and so it suggests much more than we (as sociologists, who 
                                            
11 The use of the term postmodernity does not imply that the different authors taking part in the 
discourses surrounding the term are all agreeing or that the concept itself is homogenous, to the 
contrary. For the sake of discussing Bauman however, I will continue to use the term as Bauman 
refers to the term and the concept. 
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unlike the soothsayers and clairvoyants have no tools to predict the future 
and must limit ourselves to taking inventories of the current trends) are 
entitled responsibly to propose. "Reflexive"? I smelled a rat here. I 
suspected that in coining this term we are projecting our own, the 
professional thinkers', cognitive uncertainty upon the social world at large, 
or reforge our (quite real) professional puzzlement into (imaginary) popular 
prudence − whereas that world out there is marked, on the contrary, by 
the fading and wilting of the art of reflection (ours ist [sic] culture of 
forgetting and short-termism − of the two arch-enemies of reflection). I 
would perhaps embrace George Balandier's surmodernité or Paul 
Virilio/John Armitage's hypermodernity, were not these terms, like the term 
'postmodern', too shell-like, too uncommittal to guide and target the 
theoretical effort (italics in the original). 
 
As a way out of the impasse on what to call this present day and age in the light 
of the fundamentally changed society, Bauman proposes using the term ‘liquid 
modernity’ which he motivates as follows – ‘What sets liquids apart from the 
solids is the looseness and frailty of their bonds, not their specific gravity’ 
(Bauman & Yakimova 2002:3). In an earlier essay Bauman (1995) explores the 
impact of the lack or loss of specific gravities on the nation-state and the 
reinvention of identities (to which we will return in the third section of this 
chapter).  
 
Before we proceed to investigate postsecularism as specifically addressing the 
roles and functions of religion in postmodernity or ‘liquid modernity’, it is 
necessary to briefly discuss claims made by opponents to the notion of 
postmodernism, namely 
• the embedded relativism in postmodernism  
• the stark contrast between the general assumptions of postmodernism 
and emancipatory education as a modernist project12. 
 
With regard to the accusation of relativism, Biesta and others see the 
‘abandonment of universalism’ and the proliferation of pluralities as 
                                            
12 The Policy has been accused of relativising doctrinal truths and also of indoctrinating children 
with specific worldviews. It is therefore necessary to provide a literature background for 
interrogating these accusations.   
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characteristics of the postmodern (Biesta 1995:162). The ‘abandonment of 
universalism’ and the reality of pluralism do not imply relativism.   
Postmodernism confronts us primarily with a tension, a tension which 
expresses itself in the unstable relationship between contingency and 
commitment. Postmodernism does not show us the fundamental 
impossibility of any commitment; it only shows us the impossibility of a 
certain type of commitment, namely grounded commitment, a commitment 
based upon universal truth, rationality, or identity, a commitment that 
claims to be in the right automatically (Mouffe, 1989, p. 34).  
Postmodernism means the end of the metaphysical grounding of human 
action; it shows us the fundamental vulnerability of all commitment 
(Laclau, 1989, p. 72) while at the same time making us aware of the fact 
that any commitment can always be offensive (Biesta 1995:166; italics in 
the original). 
 
In a later article, Biesta (2004) reiterates his opposition to the claim that 
postmodernism equals relativism. He states 
I wish to argue, however, that it is a mistake to equate postmodernism with 
relativism. It is first of all a category mistake. The postmodern questioning 
of foundationalism, essentialism, transcendentalism, and other forms of 
objectivism only implies relativism if one believes that objectivism and 
relativism are the only two options available. Yet postmodernism should 
not be understood as operating within the dualistic framework in which 
knowledge is either objective or subjective and where values are either 
universal or relative. We should rather think of postmodernism as an 
attempt to put this very framework into question. … Postmodernism, in 
sum, questions the framework from which relativism derives it meaning; it 
does not question one of the options within this framework. (Biesta 
2004:308-309; italics in the original). 
 
According to Biesta (2004:309) postmodernism has  
a clear and distinct ethical and political agenda, albeit not an agenda in 
which ethical and political questions are reduced to questions about 
knowledge, reality, and truth, but rather an agenda which wants to take 
ethical and political questions in their own terms (Biesta, 1995). Central to 
this agenda is postmodernism's exposition of the totalizing tendencies of 
modernism – in modern life, in modern philosophy, in modern science, in 
modern social theory, in modern education; in order to highlight the 
exclusion and injustice brought about by attempts to articulate a total, all-
encompassing perspective. …To expose and question totalization only 
appears as relativism if we think of it within the modern, binary language 
game, in which everything is either objective or subjective, either universal 
or relative. 
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Burbules (1995) describes the incredulity of postmodernism towards 
metanarratives not as ‘denial or rejection or refutation; it is an inability to believe’ 
(italics in the original). Burbules (1995) traces the sources of this ‘postmodern 
doubt” in three tenets of the present age. The first ‘source’ of postmodern doubt 
is ‘a growing awareness of the radical diversity and potential incommensurability 
of the different cultural forms of life that sustain groups and individuals’ (Burbules 
1995). Although globalisation and different technologies have made contact 
despite and in the midst of all these differences (more) possible, Burbules (1995) 
calls it ‘arrogance’ to assume that ‘continued conversation can be successful in 
uniting or reconciling diverse perspectives and values’. This statement concurs 
with the statements Habermas made regarding the need for citizens to fulfil 
‘epistemic duties’ in the public sphere to make communication possible 
(Harrington 2007:544). In chapter 3 we will explore the implications of Habermas’ 
proposal, but for now it would seem as if Burbules (1995) would argue that it is 
arrogant to believe that ‘continued conversation’ will eventually conquer the 
impact of all differences. The (im)possibility of the success of understanding 
through conversation is impacted by the second source of postmodern doubt, 
according to Burbules. He states that ‘the understanding that certain dynamics of 
asymmetrical power which distort and compromise even the best of human 
intentions are inherent to the institutional and informal patterns of life in which 
humans are engaged’ (1995). Although he does not refer to the work of Foucault 
(e.g.1979), Burbules seems to warn that postmodernism alerts us not to 
underestimate power in its different and often subversive configurations. This 
realisation should  
sensitise us to the power dimensions of even apparently benign acts; to 
the limits of good intentions; to the deep culpability we all have within a 
world society that implicates us in a web of contingencies and interactions 
whose consequences are, to some degree, always harmful to someone; 
and to the dubious adventure of seeking a path toward any utopia that 
promises a better life for all (Burbules 1995; italics in the original). 
 
Burbules’ third source of postmodern doubt is the realisation that language and 
the way we use language ‘colours and shapes our ways of living and being in the 
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world’. While we use language to explain the way we experience the world, not 
only are our experiences different, but also the languages and conventions of 
language in which we express our experiences are different from one another. 
Burbules (1995) states that  
because our languages are diverse, and non-congruent, there will always 
be a limit upon any particular discursive system as a standpoint, in a place 
and time, within which one can try to describe all matters of truth, value, 
and so forth; such matters will always be to some extent the expressions 
of this language, and this place and time. This realisation does not lead to 
relativism, necessarily; for there is usually a good deal of overlap and 
intertranslatibility among different discursive systems. But there are also 
gaps and discontinuities. 
 
 
Postmodern doubt therefore differs from Cartesian doubt which was always 
searching for certainty (Burbules 1995) while postmodernism requires living with 
ambivalence and uncertainty as a permanent feature of modern life. In the face of 
the ‘permanence’ of postmodern doubt, how is education then possible? This 
question is explored by a number of authors among which Beck (1993), Burbules 
(1995) and Biesta (1995). 
 
With regard to the seeming tension between education as emancipation and 
postmodernism, Biesta states that ‘The postmodern affirmation of a radical 
plurality creates the space needed to bring the marginal, the repressed, and the 
unvoiced into view and into hearing’ (1995:163). Though postmodernity has 
‘unmasked the Enlightenment triad of truth, rationality, and identity as a set of 
highly problematic universals’, those populations and groups of humans finding 
themselves on the margins may find themselves ‘neutralised in the flattery of 
publicity and imitation’ (Brooker 1992 quoted by Biesta 1995:164). Biesta 
(1995:165) refers to the fact that critical educators have complained about the 
‘political impotency of postmodernism and the depoliticizing tendencies contained 
in it’. Biesta (1995:165) does not try to resolve the apparent tension in 
postmodernity between an appreciation of the diversity and plurality of life and a 
specific commitment to one form of diversity. To reiterate what he states 
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Postmodernism does not show us the fundamental impossibility of any 
commitment; it only shows us the impossibility of a certain type of 
commitment, namely grounded commitment, a commitment based upon 
universal truth, rationality, or identity, a commitment that claims to be in 
the right automatically. 
 
Postmodernity also precludes metaphysics as foundation of any commitment of a 
universal value, but not metaphysics as foundation for a particular commitment. 
Yet Biesta states ‘Postmodernism means the end of the metaphysical grounding 
of human action; it shows us the fundamental vulnerability of all commitment 
(Laclau, 1989, p. 72) while at the same time making us aware of the fact that any 
commitment can always be offensive’ (Biesta 1995:166). I see no reason why the 
metaphysical should be excluded as foundation for a particular commitment – as 
long as the commitment is not claimed to have validity for all human life. While I 
would create a space that some commitments do claim to have a metaphysical 
foundation, such commitments should bear in mind the contingent nature of 
commitment as well as the possible offensiveness of such a commitment.  
 
Biesta (1995:170) ‘resolves’ the possibility of education as emancipation within a 
framework that  
anyone wishing to realize commitment within a contingent context, must 
abandon the hope that this can ever be done with neutral or nonpolitical 
means. This does not mean that truth, rationality, or identity are 
completely useless; it only means that we should not consider them as 
grand metaphysical narratives that can do the job for us, but only as small 
political ones that we can use in doing the job ourselves. 
 
This framework also requires of us, who still believe in the emancipatory potential 
of education that ‘we will have to give up the idea that there exists one 
emancipatory point of termination that can be reached by a conflict free 
trajectory’. The emancipation of one person or group of persons does also not 
resolve all historically embedded inequalities and power relations (Biesta 
1995:170).  Biesta concludes regarding education as emancipatory project that ‘a 
postmodern emancipatory commitment can not fall back upon the grand 
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narratives of truth, rationality, or identity, but is tied up completely with small 
political narratives, located in the domain of human intersubjectivity’ (1995:176). 
 
After exploring his understanding of postmodernism and its implications for 
pedagogy and a philosophy of education, Beck (1993) plots a number of pointers 
for education within the broader framework of postmodernity. His pointers are as 
follows: 
• Reality is much more complex and contingent than ever realised during 
the heyday of modernism. Our understanding of reality is furthermore the 
result of dynamic interaction between our ideas of the world (as formulated 
in formal and informal ways) and our experiences of the world. 
• Knowledge ‘is neither eternal nor universal’ yet we should not deny 
“continuity and commonality where it in fact exists’ (Beck 1993). 
• Though postmodernity is often proclaimed as the ‘end of metaphysics’, 
metaphysics is one of the ways of relating to and making sense of the 
world. It is, however, no longer the only way of making sense of human 
experiences. 
• Individual identity and ways of thinking and being are shaped by ‘a 
network of beliefs, desires, and emotions with nothing behind it 
…constantly reweaving itself… not by reference to general criteria… but in 
the hit-or-miss way in which cells readjust themselves to meet the 
pressures of the environment’ (Beck quoting Rorty, 1993). 
• Inquiry is no longer seen to ‘uncover a pre-existing reality’ but rather seen 
as ‘an interactive process of knowledge creation’ (Beck 1993). 
 
With this discussion of postmodernity and postmodernism we continue to 
specifically interrogate a postmodern understanding of the roles and functions of 
religion in what is now called a postsecular age.  
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1.3.2 Religion in a postsecular age 
 
‘Religion is dead! Long live religion’ – or so it would seem. Discussing religion 
(and the study thereof) against the backdrop of the broader context of 
postmodernity opens up the tensions, paradoxes and ambivalences that 
postmodernism is characteristic for (at least for some). In exploring the role and 
function of religion in this present age, one encounters a plethora of claims – 
often as contradictory as the phenomena they try to explain. There does seem to 
be agreement amongst a number of authors (e.g., Kyrlezhev 2008, McLennan 
2007, Taylor 2007, Ward 2004) that the modernist claim or expectation that 
religion would disappear as humanity progresses – has been proved wrong. With 
regard to modernity’s claim, Ward (2004:8) writes 
Modernity does not seek to erase the sacred (Weber’s ‘disenchantment’, 
Marx’s ‘opiate’, Feuerbach’s ‘projection’, Freud’s pathological ‘illusion’) – it 
simply displaces it. And as with all displacement – the object being 
displaced then takes on the density of a certain denied concentration. 
 
Religion therefore seems to be alive and well. Ward (2004:3) states ‘What 
characterises this ‘postsecular’ condition is not simply the refusal of religion to go 
away but, more significantly, the new public visibility of religion. And it is at this 
point, the point where religion has a public voice, that religion becomes political 
again’. Ward (2004:5-6) explores this new public visibility of religion (in Europe) 
and identifies three forms of this new visibility namely 
• Religious fundamentalism referring to ‘various militant proselytizing’ 
strands in among others Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Hinduism. 
• The return of religion to the public sphere, where religion was during 
modernity relegated to the private sphere, religion is demanding a 
presence in the once-neutral sphere. 
• The ‘commodification of religion’, referring to the commercialization of 
religion and ‘religion as special effect’, and ‘religion as fetish’ and 
‘symbolic capital’. 
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After exploring these three new gestalts of religion in the public sphere, Ward 
(2004:9-10) states ‘Today, it seems to me, there is a craving to believe the 
unbelievable; to transcend all human limitations and encounter the impossible. 
Perhaps we are no longer capable of unequivocal disbelief, of atheism. And I 
must say I find that dangerous’. 
 
Boeve (2004) proposes the concept of ‘detraditionalisation’ instead of 
postsecularism. He states that ‘Modernisation in Europe has caused a 
transformation of religion, not its disappearance’ (2004:15; italics in the original).  
He discusses three elements regarding religion in the public sphere in the 
specific context of Europe and suggests that (1) the un-churching of Europe is 
continuing; (2) there is a tendency to identify oneself with ‘believing without 
belonging’ and (3) there is a new generation of young people who have never 
belonged to a religion and do not presently belong to a religion. Boeve continues 
to propose that detraditionalisation rather than securalisation gets to the core of 
explaining the changes in society. ‘Detraditionalisation as a term hints at the 
socio-cultural interruption of traditions (religions as well as class, gender, 
traditions), which are no longer able to pass themselves on from one generation 
to the next’ (Boeve 2004:18). Boeve (2004:20) describes and illustrates the 
traditional understanding of the securalisation thesis in Europe as follows (Figure 
1.3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The securalisation thesis according to Boeve (2004:20) 
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In discussing the illustration Boeve (2004:20) suggests the linear progression the 
illustration proposes ‘is far too simplistic a reflection of the current state, even if 
one would substitute the “post-Christian”, or “pluralistic securalist” position, for 
the atheist stance’.  Boeve (2004:20-21) suggests that ‘Christianity has not been 
replaced by a secular culture, but a plurality of life views and religions have 
moved in to occupy the vacant space it left behind as result of its diminishing 
impact’. He illustrates this different understanding of the changed role of religion 
in the public sphere as follows (Figure 1.4): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: The changed gestalt of religion adapted from Boeve (2004:21) 
 
One of the problems in exploring postsecularism is the fact that authors, even 
those claiming to provide an ‘international’ perspective on the role of religion, 
exclude huge parts of the human community. An example of this claim and its 
exclusions is the article by Keddie (2003). She provides a detailed and thorough 
description of the ‘rise and fall of successive waves of secularism in the modern 
era’ (2003:14), but she excludes in her comparative analysis China, Japan, 
Australasia, Africa and the South Americas. Although her discussion of the 
history of secularism and postsecularism of specific regions is extremely 
valuable, her claim that ‘Taking the world as a whole’ (2003:30) severely lacks 
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legitimacy and/or credibility. The ‘major and highly original contribution’13 of 
Taylor (2007) titled A secular age interprets (or re-interprets) history’s so-called 
progression from a position in 1500 where not-believing in God was not even 
considered to the year 2000 where ‘many of us find this not only easy, but even 
inescapable’ (Taylor 2007:25). Taylor, unlike Keddie (2003) does not make 
claims to speak of secularism in the international realm, but specifically deals 
with secularisation in the context of ‘the civilization whose principal roots lie in 
what used to be called “Latin Christendom”’, the West, or the North Atlantic world 
(2007:21). He soberly acknowledges that we live in a world of ‘multiple 
modernities’ and that changes such as secularisation should be studied ‘in their 
different civilisational sites before we rush to global generalisation’ (Taylor 
2007:21). 
Already my canvas is on the verge of being too broad; there are many 
regional and national paths to secularity within the North Atlantic world, 
and I haven’t been able to do justice to them all. But I hope some light can 
be cast on general features of the process nonetheless (Taylor 2007:21). 
 
Keddie (2003:14) warns that investigating secularism in the modern era ‘reveals 
a more complicated and paradoxical picture of trends in Western countries and of 
the impact of these trends on societies struggling to emulate the economic 
success of the modern West’. Keddie (2003) does provide a very helpful 
overview of the history of the term secularism14. Without going into a detailed 
exploration of the historical development of the term ‘secular’, it is suffice to state 
that from the nineteenth century onwards the concept was used to describe the 
‘belief that religious institutions and values should play no role in the temporal 
affairs of the nation-state’ (Keddie 2003:14-15). Keddie further indicates that 
present day use of the term ‘secularisation’ refers to 
• an increase in the number of people with secular beliefs and 
practices; 
                                            
13 According to Alasdair MacIntyre on the back flap of the book. Taylor’s work was also awarded 
the 2007 Templeton Prize. 
14 Keddie’s (2003) historical overview of secularism is scant in comparison with the very detailed 
and rich exploration of the historical development of secularism in North Atlantic countries by 
Taylor (2007).  
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• a lessening of religious control or influence over major spheres of 
life; 
• a growth in state separation from religion and in secular regulation 
of formerly religious institutions and customs (Keddie 2003:16). 
 
Taylor (2007) indicates that the term secularisation in general refers to the 
change from a situation where ‘the political organisation of all pre-modern 
societies was in some way connected to, based on, guaranteed by some faith in, 
or adherence to God, or some notion of ultimate reality’ to a situation where ‘the 
modern Western state is free from this connection’ (Taylor 2007:1). Taylor also 
explores a second meaning of secularisation namely that of the general ‘falling 
off of religious belief and practice, in people turning away from God, and no 
longer going to Church’ (2007:2). Taylor (2007:3) plots a third possibility for 
understanding current secularisation as follows – ‘The shift to secularity in this 
sense consists, among other things, of a move from a society where belief in God 
is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be 
one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace’. 
 
In the discourses in and surrounding postsecularism, Weber’s notion of 
disenchantment and reenchantment plays a significant role (Kalberg 2005). 
Taylor (2007) explores the move from enchanted (pre-modern), to 
disenchantment (modernity/secularism) to a situation where enchantment is 
again an option (postmodernity/postsecularism). Keddie (2003) emphasises that 
the role and function of religion should be seen in the context of socioeconomic 
relations and the role, function and legitimacy of the modern nation-state. These 
interrelations are intertwined and complex. Therefore Keddie states (2003:18) 
‘Nationalism created an ideological basis for nonreligious loyalties and also made 
it easier to extend equal rights to citizens professing different religious beliefs, 
and possible to encourage national networks of production and consumption’. 
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Borrowing from Bauman (1995), it would seem as if the modern nation-state of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (instead of religious institutions) became 
‘the centre that holds’. Modernism at its heyday was a celebration of Newtonian 
science’s ability to order and classify (Bauman 1995:145). Nationalism and the 
modern nation-state became the new glue to hold modernism together. (We will 
return to exploring the changing role of the nation-state and the implications for 
educational policy and citizenship in the next section, section 1.3). Keddie 
(2003:20) states that the two world wars and following regional upheavals 
questioned notions of civilization and progress. ‘The civilised peoples’ capacity to 
commit acts of mass destruction, far worse than anything experienced in the 
nineteenth century, bred pessimism about progress’ (Keddie 2003:20). Keddie’s 
comments about the impact of the world wars on notions of civilization and 
progress reveal her (and others’) myopia regarding the destruction and havoc 
modernisation and ‘civilisation’ created in colonisation and the ‘discovering’ of the 
Americas and Australasia. The experience of the destruction of the world wars 
when the ‘dogs of war’ turned on one another, most probably was a sobering 
experience in thinking about progress and civilisation (from a specific European 
and North American view). Millions of Africans and other peoples however 
experienced the so-called progress and modernization in other registers and 
different vocabulary than the European colonisers15. 
 
                                            
15 Though the results of slavery and colonisation are immense, one should not forget that slavery 
was not only a European or ‘modern’ endeavour. Slavery is as old as humanity. From the earliest 
days of the migration of peoples and specifically the trans-Sahara caravans (Briggs 2004:15), 
was slavery and the exploitation of the weaker tribes and societies an integral characteristic of life 
on the African continent. But Briggs (2004:16) states very clearly 
Nevertheless, the trans-Atlantic slave trade is a singular event in human history, not 
simply because it operated on an unprecedented scale but also because it was so 
ruthlessly well-organised, and so shattering and wide-ranging in its effects. … It is 
estimated that between 12 and 20 million Africans were transported across the Atlantic 
between the late 17th century and the early 19th, a five-week trip in conditions so cramped 
and unhygienic that it was not unusual for a boat to lose half its human cargo in passage.  
 
The mostly European discourses on modernism and civilisation, slavery and the impacts of 
colonisation of the inhabitants of Africa, the Americas and Australasia reveal a crucial and not-
addressed myopia or blind-spot in Western theorising about modernisation and secularisation. 
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Interestingly, Keddie (2003:21-23) not only shows differences between countries 
in the so-called West, but also differences between secularisation in ‘traditional’ 
European countries and new members of the European Union like Turkey. 
Although Keddie does not address the issue of secularisation in previously 
colonised parts of the world, she does acknowledge that while the colonisers 
mostly celebrated secular ideals and values at home, they encouraged active 
roles for religious institutions in their colonies (Keddie 2003:21). Not only did the 
coloniser ‘expect’ religious institutions to partake in the colonising drive, religious 
institutions themselves saw colonisation as a ‘window of opportunity’ to save the 
lost.  
Catholic orders continued to receive French government subsidies and 
support for colonial educational institutions by arguing that local 
nationalists would otherwise take over. Colonial policy sometimes favored 
certain religious groups, thus increasing sectarian strife – but it also 
introduced some leaders in colonised areas to Western thinking about 
secularisation and modernisation (Keddie 2003:21).  
 
Not only does secularisation differ between the colonisers and the colonised, 
secularisation in Islamic countries look different from other gestalts of 
secularisation. Keddie (2003:22-25) explores secularisation in Islamic countries 
such as Turkey, Iraq and Iran and shows the notion of secularisation to be 
complex and interweaved with political and socioeconomic factors. After World 
War 1 in Turkey, for example, there was ‘The need for strong government action 
to establish a secular state [which] was due to the residual strength of existing 
Islamic institutions and the felt need to catch up with a West that had a long head 
start in centralization and modernization’ (Keddie 2003:22). 
 
The official sanction of secularisation in Turkey was furthermore driven by 
Turkey’s ambition to become part of the European union showing a complex 
interplay of economic, political and religious options (Keddie 2003:23). After 
exploring secularism in a number of Islamic countries, Keddie (2003:25) then 
states that  
 
 43
The fatal association of secularism with autocratic rule and Western 
influence helps account for the general trend against secularism in the 
Muslim world; when people want to be free of Western control, they don’t 
generally envision the path to their salvation in the secularist ideas 
sovereign in the West. The creation in recent decades of modernized and 
highly political versions of Islam encourages mobilization of the still-
religious masses and provides the elements of an ideology that seems 
familiar, powerful – and untainted by Western influence. 
 
I suspect an investigation into secularisation in an African context will most 
probably concur with some of the reactions against secularisation as found in 
Muslim countries. In a post-colonial Africa the drive to find an own identity and 
claim ‘back’ cultural and historical histories without the prescriptions and 
classifications of the West impact on the shaping of secularisation, modernisation 
and the democratisation of societies on the African continent.  
 
Towards the end of her exploration of the development of secularisation (with the 
myopic exclusion of Africa, South America and Australasia), Keddie (2003:29) 
starts to explore the new role religion and religious institutions plays in different 
strategies of nation-states to address societal ills and challenges. ‘Some people 
find in revived religious ties and morality a partial or complete solution for such 
[e.g., crime] problems’.  Keddie (2003:30) closes her exploration of the historical 
development of secularism by foreseeing a backlash against secularism will 
produce its own backlash.  
 
Keddie (2003:30) does not attempt to describe the content of the backlash 
against the backlash against secularism. Although the first backlash against 
secularism is understood as postsecularism (as described for example by 
Habermas 2006; Harrington 2007; Lafont 2007), a specific gestalt of the second 
backlash may resemble the so-called militant (or even fundamentalist) turn in/to 
atheism and publications ‘celebrating’ the possibilities atheism or anti-theism 
holds (Gray 2008). While Keenan (2002:280) celebrates the end of the 
‘stranglehold of the secularisation thesis upon sociological imagination’, Gray 
(2008) states ‘An atmosphere of moral panic surrounds religion. Viewed not so 
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long ago as a relic of superstition whose role in society was steadily declining, it 
is now demonized as the cause of many of the world’s worst evils.” The reason 
for this ‘moral panic’, according to Gray, is the ‘sudden explosion in the literature 
proselytizing atheism’ (2008).  Gray mainly refers to the publication of the works 
of Dawkins (2006), Hitchens (2007) and others. Though Gray also acknowledges 
the publication of counter arguments, for example the work by Alister McGrath 
The Dawkins delusion (2007) and Charles Taylor The secular age (2007), Gray 
states ‘The urgency with which they produce their anti-religious polemics 
suggests that a change has occurred as significant as the rise of terrorism: the 
tide of secularisation has turned’ (2008). Gray (2008) quotes the work of Martin 
Amis (as an example of ‘anti-religious polemics’) who wrote ‘Opposition to 
religion occupies the high ground, intellectually and morally’. Gray (2008) closes 
his essay by saying 
Religion has not gone away. Repressing it is like repressing sex, a self-
defeating enterprise. In the 20th century, when it commanded powerful 
states and mass movements, it helped engender totalitarianism. Today, 
the result is a climate of hysteria. Not everything in religion is precious or 
deserving of reverence. There is an inheritance of anthropocentrism, the 
ugly fantasy that the Earth exists to serve humans, which most secular 
humanists share. There is the claim of religious authorities, also made by 
atheist regimes, to decide how people can express their sexuality, control 
their fertility and end their lives, which should be rejected categorically. 
Nobody should be allowed to curtail freedom in these ways, and no 
religion has the right to break the peace.  
The attempt to eradicate religion, however, only leads to it reappearing in 
grotesque and degraded forms. 
From the articles by Keenan (2002) and Gray (2008) it would seem as if the 
current debate on religion and atheism is far from over and, looking at the 
number of publications ‘celebrating’ atheism as a real alternative, the next 
number of years should indicate whether the second or third backlash (Keddie 
2002) is a permanent gestalt of late modernity or postmodernity.16 
McLennan (2007:859) therefore suggests the following:                                               
                                            
16 The liveliness of the debates surrounding religion in the public sphere is also characteristic of 
this age as an age of carnival, as described by Hiebert (2003) and Scott (1986). 
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As with the term postmodern, the ‘post’ in postsecular need not 
automatically signal anti-secularism, or what comes after or instead of 
secularism. For many, the key postsecular move is simply to question and 
probe the concept of the secular, and to re-interrogate the whole ‘faith 
versus reason’ problematic that has so consistently punctuated modern 
thought (italics in the original). 
Kyrlezhev (2008:25) finds the start of the postsecular age to coincide with the  
start of the postmodern age. He says -     
           In the postmodern age, religion returns from the solitary confinement to 
which it was banished by the modern. This is not a return to the old 
‘sacred-profane’ structure, however. The postsecular age does not mean 
desecularisation in the sense of a reversal of the results of secularisation 
and a return to the old. Restoration is impossible. … The world can no 
longer be divided into religious and nonreligious. Both spheres now 
coincide. They mutually penetrate each other to the degree that they are 
indistinguishable. Today, nothing is intrinsically secular or religious. 
Everything can be sacred and everything can be profane.                                                       
 
Kyrlezhev (2008: 26-31) attempts to describe some markers regarding the role of 
religion in this postsecular age.  He refers to the support humans and societies 
find in religion against the uncertainties of the present age; religion ‘has lost its 
status as a universal lawmaker speaking in the name of God the Creator’; the 
role of religion as a ‘marker of tradition’ and belonging in the midst of a 
bewildering diversity. He concludes by stating that ‘God in the postsecular age 
has no normative image’ (2008:28).  
 
Whatever one’s personal preferences in the different layers and textures of the 
debate and accusations of illusions (e.g. Hitchens 2003, 2007) and delusions 
(Dawkins 2006; McGrath 2007) and attempts to describe the (ir)religious 
character of the present age (or as Marty, 2003, suggests to describe the present 
age as ‘religio-secular’, I suggest that, for now, to accept the warning offered by 
Marty (2003:45) that ‘… social scientists have mistaken its [the religio-secular 
world] mixed composition, and underestimated the strength and durability of its 
religious components…’. We should, according to Marty (2003: 48) be very 
careful of ‘applying a single description to cover what has developed, [which] can 
lead to gross miscalculations and bad strategies’. 
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The exploration of secularity by Taylor (2007), although seen as a counter-
narrative in the ‘moral panic’ (Gray 2008), is a more nuanced attempt to account 
for the changing fortunes of religion in this postsecular age. Taylor (2007) plots 
the historical development of secularism through distinctive ‘kairotic moments’ 
each signifying and resulting in a change, for example the Reformation which 
Taylor describes as ‘The rise of the disciplinary society’ (2007:90).  Towards the 
end of his book, Taylor (2007:766-772) speculates regarding the future or demise 
of secularity and contemplates two possible scenarios. The first scenario, 
following the main arguments of the secularisation thesis ‘sees religion shrinking 
further’ but not disappearing altogether (2007:768). The second scenario as 
explored by Taylor (2007:768-769) proposes that humanity will continue to 
explore and seek for ‘modes of fullness’, re-converting to religions and secularity 
as thesis ‘will become less plausible over time’ (2007:770). 17 
 
In preparation for our exploration of the role of educational policy in general and 
specifically the Policy it is important to consider the role of religion in the public 
sphere and within the specific context of democracy. The South African approach 
to envision the role of religion in our new democracy is but one example of many 
secular states trying to plot and regulate religion against the broader context of a 
postsecular society. Within this context, the author who immediately comes to 
mind is Jürgen Habermas (2006). 
 
In discussing the contribution of Habermas to the debate on postsecularism, 
McLennan (2007:866) states that Habermas ‘is the most prominent social thinker 
to take up the notion of postsecularity’. McLennan (2007:866) calls Habermas’ 
approach to postsecularism ‘epistemic dialogism’. As discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, Habermas adopted a ‘methodological atheism’ to engage with the role 
religion plays in modern societies. As has been discussed by McLennan (2007), 
                                            
17 Whether one agrees with Taylor’s exposition or critical evaluation on the future of secularity, his 
account based on a methodology exploring a wide variety of texts and discourses provides for a 
rich and rewarding experience.  
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Harrington (2007), Cooke (2007) and others, Habermas changed his position on 
the role of religion in the public sphere post 9/11. Though exploring the 
parameters of the function of religion in the public sphere, Habermas used to 
believe that ‘in the long run, religious communities will not be able to withstand 
the pressures of some unstoppable cultural and social modernization’ (2006:15).  
This belief in the eventual disappearance of religion from any function in the 
public sphere, shaped Habermas’ previous proposition which involved a certain 
asymmetry and discrimination towards religious citizens who should adapt in 
order to partake in discourse (McLennan 2007:867).  
 
Habermas now proposes that both the religious and the secular should undergo 
a learning process (as explored more in Chapter 3). McLennan (2007:867-869) 
however discusses three ‘residual problems’ with Habermas’ postsecularism. 
McLennan’s first concern is the fact that Habermas seems to equate ‘secular’ 
with ‘non-believing’ which is empirically questionable (McLennan 2007:867). 
McLennan’s second concern is that 
Religion may cultivate a range of social and moral goods, but it may 
equally well poison them too, and meanwhile many of the qualities 
supposedly distinctive of religion – collective morality, existential meaning, 
love, creativity and imagination, social energy, and spirituality – are readily 
encompassed and celebrated within a secular humanist outlook 
(2007:868). 
 
McLennan’s third concern regards Habermas’ proposal for an epistemic learning 
process. McLennan (2007:868) writes   
It is implausible because from within the perspective of secular 
sociological naturalism (broadly conceived), the question of the ‘truth 
content’ of claims about heaven and hell, God’s grace, salvation and the 
rest cannot really be entertained: these items are not candidates for truth 
and explanation (italics in the original).  
 
The conclusion McLennan reaches is that Habermas is ‘backing the wrong horse 
when he seeks to base democratic dialogue on epistemological reflexivity’ 
(2007:868). McLennan calls reflexivity ‘over-rated’ and ‘more effective in matters 
of ethics than of truth, and in relation to life-affecting events rather than 
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propositions’ (2007:868; italics in the original). McLennan proposes a return to 
Habermas’ previous position indicating that religious citizens and religious 
theorists ‘do indeed have a larger cognitive and political burden to bear in secular 
society’ (2007:869). 
 
Although I agree with McLennan’s main ‘residual problems’ with the way 
Habermas resolves the tensions in postsecularism, I disagree with his statement 
that religious citizens have a ‘larger cognitive and political burden’ to bear in the 
secular public sphere. It seems to me that McLennan makes the same mistake 
when he accuses Habermas of defining secular singularly as meaning non- or 
anti-religious. Should secularism mean a clear separation between state and 
religions, there is no reason to expect believers to bear a ‘larger cognitive and 
political burden’. Especially when, and here I agree with McLennan, the public 
discourse does not discuss the truth claims of religions – these claims, as 
McLennan states are not ‘candidates for truth and explanation’ (McLennan 
2007:868). 
 
Now in a post 9/11 world, Habermas proposes a move away from a post-
metaphysical vocabulary in the public sphere because the public discourse ‘is 
impoverished if it loses contact with religious sources of illumination and 
inspiration’ (Cooke 2007:226). In translating religious contributions in the public 
sphere it  
is a matter of rescuing what is valuable from religious traditions while 
abstaining from judgment as to the truth of the validity claims raised by 
religious believers. The point of critical engagement with religious 
traditions is not to cast light on the truth of religious beliefs but to 
contribute to the semantic regeneration of postmetaphysical thinking 
(Cooke 2007:226). 
 
Cooke (2007:227) is uncomfortable with Habermas’ suggestion that religious 
arguments are considered ‘valid’ in the public sphere, although the truth claims 
are not interrogated. Cooke (2007:227) proposes  
 
 49
a kind of state in which reasons that refer to ‘otherworldly’ sources of 
validity are deemed admissible in public deliberations about the validity of 
laws and political decisions, provided the reasoning in question satisfies 
the epistemological and ethical requirements of what I call non-
authoritarian thinking.  
 
Authoritarian thinking according to Cooke (2007:234) is ‘dependent on 
authoritarian conceptions of knowledge and justification’. Habermas, according to 
Cooke (2007:227), does not only ‘describe a secularised social order in which 
religious worldviews continue to shape the identities of many inhabitants; it 
makes a plea for a model of law and politics in which religious arguments are not 
excluded from political debate’ (italics in the original)18. 
 
As a way forward it would seem as if Ward’s (2006:180) suggestion that in 
discussing the function, content and role of religion in a postsecular society, we 
first have to acknowledge that our understanding of religion changes as 
geographical and historical trajectories of culture change. Ward suggests that 
any treatment and discussion of religion is per se ideological and that our 
description of religion should be at best a description of a set of ‘family 
resemblances’ (2006:180). He states, ‘There is no view from no where – religion 
is always studied from embodied perspectives, concrete situations, and specific 
standpoints’ (2006:181). Ward suggests the following trajectories in the future of 
the study of religion (given our previous discussion of postsecularism): 
• Ward foresees firstly a rise (at least in Western Europe) of those who want 
to study religion. Ward foresees that present discourses in Europe 
pertaining to ethnicities and citizenship will encourage people to study 
religion (2006:184). 
• Ward also proposes ‘the assumed relationship between secularity and 
neutrality will be increasingly questioned’ (2006:184). 
• The third trajectory Ward discusses is what he calls the increasing 
‘polarization between those who talk of spirituality and those who talk of 
                                            
18 For a further discussion on Habermas’ views and sources for his views on religion in the public 
sphere see Lafont (2007). 
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faith’. Against the backdrop of new forms of religions and new expressions 
of spirituality, ‘a collection of people will emerge (are already emerging) 
who are unable to tell the difference between orgasm, an adrenalin rush 
and an encounter with God’ (Ward 2006:185). Ward refers to the 
commodification of religion and religion ‘as special effect’ (2006:185).  
 
Against these broader trajectories, ‘faith communities of the future will 
increasingly wish to distinguish between those who are in the way and those who 
may seem as if they are in the way and who are not in the way at all’ (2006:186). 
Ward is quick to state that he does not refer to fundamentalism, but that self-
definition will, according to him, become increasingly important among religious 
groups.  
 
Within the study of religion as discipline against the phenomenon of 
postsecuralism, Plaskow (1999) explores the ‘decentering’ of the study of religion 
since 1970. Plaskow (1999) specifically explores the ‘decentering’ that took place 
in the American Academy of Religion, but I suspect it may have relevance on a 
wider front. Plaskow states that in the 1970s and 1980s the Academy was still 
very ‘western and Christian focused’ (1999:526). In the years following the 
growth of feminist approaches to the study of religion impacted on the centre of 
the study of religion. The centre however remained Protestant and western 
(1999:527). With time ‘Catholics and Jews, lesbians and gay men, Hispanics, 
and Asian Americans’ sought a place in the Academy resulting in ‘different 
visions of collective life’ and the Academy becoming a ‘condensed form [of] the 
wider cultural malaise over the increasing fracturing of, and competition among, 
identities, the concern about where it will all end, and the desire to find something 
that holds us all together’ (Plaskow 1999:528). Plaskow emphasises that the 
study of religion is not and should not be separated from the broader discourses 
on gender, race, sexuality, and economic inequalities in the face of hegemony of 
the Market (1999:533-535).  
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King (2002) attempts to plot the future of religious studies ‘as we know it’ and 
contemplates the impact of postmodern, feminist and spiritual challenges to the 
study of religion. According to King (2002:366) the contemporary challenges 
facing the study of religion are ‘new thinking and new sensibilities’ and secondly, 
‘numerous sociopolitical and institutional changes that affect the development of 
religious studies as an academic field’. King (2002:369) describes the present 
day context of religious studies as follows: 
 The frequent rejection of the notion of the classical, postcolonial critique 
and that of orientalism by contemporary religion scholars, the discursive 
shift from a Eurocentric to a more integrated global approach (though it 
could also be argued that we have moved away from a European 
hegemony to another one, namely, a North American dominance in the 
study of religions), and the widespread shift of interest from the study of 
ancient religions to that of living religious traditions and of new religious 
movements, together with a questioning of the excessive privileging of 
textual sources in the past study of religions, have made space for giving 
greater attention to a wide variety of comparative, oral, and other empirical 
data not taken into account by previous generations of 
scholars. 
 
 
King (2002:369). describes the wider context of present day religious studies as 
‘thoroughly global, cross-cultural, postcolonial, critical, and consciously 
interrogative of previous stances and modes of inquiry’. She (King 2002: 370-
382) continues to analyse specific challenges from postmodernism, feminism and 
new spiritual sensibilities. Despite postmodernism containing ‘destructive and 
nihilistic’ elements, the radical critique against metanarratives in postmodernism 
also ‘provides new opportunities for studying and interpreting religion afresh’ 
(2002:370). 
Postmodernism has dislodged the autonomous subject, but it has also 
undermined the false claims of a disinterested objectivity that has 
distanced and alienated human subjectivity from its very object, from 
specifically human ways of knowing, which are relational and dialogical, 
even when dialogue remains an inner one within the thinking subject (King 
2002:371). 
 
In her concluding reflections, King (2002:382) states that 
 All too often the dominant paradigm in religious studies has been to 
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understand religions through the collection, analysis, and explanation of 
historical, phenomenological, and comparative data, presented as some 
kind of objectified, neutral description, eschewing subjectivity as far as 
possible. For many scholars, this was linked to the aim of at least 
approximating, if not achieving in full, some form of objective, scientific 
knowledge.  
 
In this journey to critically evaluate the Policy, it will therefore be necessary to 
understand the Policy not only against the broader backdrop of postmodernity 
and its (dis)contents and the discourses in the study of religion, but also to 
understand the Policy against the impact of postmodernity and more specifically 
globalisation on the function, identity and roles of the nation-state.  With the 
changed status and role of the nation-state, educational policy is an important 
strategy of the nation-state to shape particular visions of democratic identities.  
 
1.3.3 Educational policy and the nation-state: looking for cohesion and 
allegiance 
 
In Chapter 4 and specifically Chapter 5 we will return to educational policy as a 
strategy in the broader legitimating crisis of the new South African democracy. In 
order to complete this Introduction, it is important to explore notions of citizenship 
against some of the broad features of the changed role and function of the nation 
state. In this section I will take as dialogue partners Zygmunt Bauman’s 
exploration of the nation-state against the broader context of globalisation and 
modernity (1995; 1998; 2000, 2004 and 2006) as well as discussions on 
Habermas’ (2001) proposal for constitutional patriotism as a way to address the 
crisis of legitimacy in the nation-state (Hayward 2007; Müller 2007).  
 
Many nations are in processes of redefining their definitions of citizenship to 
address the increase in complexities and the dynamics of pluralism and migration 
(see for example Kerr 1999, Werbner 2002) but also to address insecurities of 
the nation-state with regard to the changed profile of their citizens. Concepts 
such as nationality, nation-state and citizenship are in flux and are the focus in 
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various discourses and fields (e.g. Bauman 1995, 1998, 2004, 2006; Guibernau 
2007; Habermas 1994a, 1994b, 2001, Kymlicka 2002; Matuštík 1993; Werbner 
2002).  In the South African context Chidester (2003a), Steyn (2003) and 
Pampallis (2008) explore the development of a specific South African notion of 
the ‘good citizen’, while governments around the world are re-visioning their 
requirements and expectations of their citizens and parameters (and cost) for 
citizenship. Examples of the changing gestalt of citizenship in specific 
international contexts include Faulks’ (2006), McLaughlin’s (2000), Pike’s (2007) 
and Travis’ (2008) overview of citizenship debates in England, Clarke-Habibi’s 
(2005) exposition of the role of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Antelava’s (2008) account of the citizenship debate in Kazakstan. Examples of 
explorations regarding specifically the role of religion in notions of citizenship 
include Hoelzl (2004) and Gates (2006).                                                                                             
 
Jackson (2003) situates his exploration of citizenship, education and religious 
diversity against the re-visioning of citizenship in a world of increasing plurality as 
a result of globalisation and postmodernity.  Jackson (2003:2) provides a short 
overview of the history of the notion of citizenship in which he shows some 
changes in prerequisites for citizenship ranging from property ownership to an 
emphasis on rights and duties. His overview does not account for the complex 
power-interrelationships based on socioeconomic, gender, racial and class 
factors. Other authors (e.g. Boellstorff 2005; Bernstein 1996; Fox 2006; Werbner 
2002) have broadened the discussion of the histories of citizenship to include 
different requirements based on class, religion, education, gender, biological and 
racial characteristics19.   
 
In his overview of citizenship education in 16 countries, Kerr (1999:11) identifies 
the following challenges facing citizenship education: 
• the rapid movement of people within and across national boundaries; 
                                            
19 The interrelatedness of gender, religion and citizenship is succinctly explored by Boellstorff 
(2005). He explores the ‘incommensurability’ of gender, religion and citizenship in the specific 
context of lives of gay Muslim men in Indonesia.  
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• a growing recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities; 
• the collapse of political structures and the birth of new ones; 
• the changing role of women in society; 
• the impact of the global economy and changing patterns of work; 
• the effect of a revolution in information and communications technologies; 
• an increasing global population, and; 
• the creation of new forms of community. 
 
Kerr (1999:9-10) found that the countries investigated either had a ‘values-
explicit’ or ‘values-neutral’ approach, with the first mentioned being favoured20. 
Kerr (1999:28) further warns that citizenship education is context-specific and 
what works in one context ‘cannot be simply adopted and expected to achieve 
the same ends somewhere else’.  Kymlicka (2002:284) plots the current debates 
on citizenship as being ‘linked to liberal ideas of individual rights and entitlements 
on the one hand, and to communitarian ideas of membership in and attachment 
to a particular community on the other’.21 Except for certain theoretical 
developments surrounding citizenship, Kymlicka (2002:284) also plots the 
following events and trends that influence the current debates on citizenship: 
• increasing voter apathy; 
• long-term welfare dependency in the United States; 
• the resurgence of nationalists movements in Eastern Europe; 
• the stresses created by an increasingly multicultural and multiracial 
population in Western Europe; 
• the backlash against the welfare state in Thatcher’s England; 
• the failure of environmental policies that rely on voluntary citizen 
cooperation; 
• disaffection with globalisation; and 
• the perceived loss of national sovereignty. 
                                            
20 For a full discussion of different approaches to citizenship education, see Kerr (1999). 
21 Kymlicka (2002) further discusses citizenship theory against the background of the discourses 
in/on utilitarianism, liberal equality, libertarianism, Marxism, communitarianism, multiculturalism 
and feminism.  
 55
 
He summarises that the ‘health and stability of a modern democracy depend, not 
only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes 
of its citizens’ (Kymlicka 2002:284-285) which he lists as 
their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of 
national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and 
work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire 
to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good 
and hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-
restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands, 
and in personal choices which affect their health and the environment. 
Without citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become 
difficult to govern, even unstable (2002:285).  
 
Combine these expectations with the inability of the nation-state to provide 
sustainable healthcare, security and employment opportunities, and we need ‘a 
fuller and yet more subtle understanding and practice of citizenship’ (Cairns and 
Williams quoted by Kymlicka (2002:285).22 Except for locating this critical 
evaluation of the Policy in the context of the broader discourses on defining the 
‘good citizen’, notions of the ‘good citizen’ are intrinsically linked to the changed 
experiences of nationality and the identity crisis in/of the nation-state. 
 
In his 1995 essay, ‘Searching for a centre that holds’, Bauman plots the nation-
state’s insecurity and impotence against on the one hand increasing globalisation 
and on the other hand new tribalism and ‘smaller-scale allegiances – territorial 
and non-territorial, claimed to be natural or self-admittedly contrived’ (Bauman 
1995:152; see also Guibernau 2007). The actual power of present-day nation-
states to control the flow of humans and capital is ‘withering away’ (Bauman 
1998:56). Nation-states increasingly lack ‘real’ authority over internal affairs, and 
find their security in groups of states and alliances buying securities and comfort 
by prescribing to the rules of the game as prescribed by groups like the European 
Union, the International Monetary Fund, and others (Bauman 1998:63). 
The military, economic and cultural self-sufficiency, indeed self-
sustainability of the state – any state – ceased to be a viable prospect. In 
                                            
22 For a discussion on ‘active’ and ‘passive’ notions of citizenship, see Kymlicka 2002:288-291. 
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order to retain their law-and-order policing ability, states had to seek 
alliances and voluntary surrender ever larger chunks of their sovereignty 
(Bauman 1998:64). 
 
Bauman (1998:66) quotes Castoriadis at length who wrote 
In the cabaret of globalisation, the state goes through a striptease and by 
the end of the performance it is left with the bare necessities only: its 
powers of repression. With its material basis destroyed, its sovereignty 
and independence annulled, its political class effaced, the nation-state 
becomes a simple security service for the mega-companies… 
  
The new masters of the world have no need to govern directly. National 
governments are charged with the task of administering affairs on their 
behalf. 
 
Just as the nation-state is withering away, so too are the traditional communities 
that used to provide stability and security to individuals. Individuals are 
discovering more frequently that these communities are nothing more than 
temporal places of safety (Bauman 2000:169-172). In the past nation-states 
relied on a mixture of nationalism and patriotism to shape notions of citizenship 
(Guibernau 2007). Most nation-states had dominant groups with regard to 
language, culture and/or religion that shaped descriptions of citizenship and 
underscored a clear idea of what a ‘good citizen’ looks like.  As the economic and 
political roles of nation-states changed, as well as with the increasing reality of 
pluralities in previously fairly homogenous states, nationalism and patriotism 
have changed and are in flux. In these liminal spaces that nation-states find 
themselves in – between what once was and what needs to be – constitutional 
patriotism as proposed by inter alia Habermas (2001) seems like a viable and 
legitimate option23. 
 
Constitutional patriotism is proposed by Habermas (2001) as a possible ‘centre 
that holds’ in democracies dealing either with traumatized pasts and/or with 
democracies trying to provide a ‘centre’ in the light of increased pluralism24.   
                                            
23 Constitutional patriotism as proposed by Habermas (2001) is part of a broader ‘deliberative 
turn’ in democratic theory as explored, for example by Dryzek (as quoted by Kymlicka 2002:291). 
24 For a discussion on the German specific background to the debate on citizenship and 
constitutional patriotism in particular, see Feldman (2003).  
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Elveton (2003:131) summarises Habermas’ (2001) three claims as follows: 
First, since the nation state is a contingent product of modern history, its 
essential characteristics cannot be assumed to be timelessly prescriptive. 
Second, the pressing challenges of globalisation reveal the vulnerability of 
the nation state to forces over which it ultimately has no control, forces 
that even today signal its eventual demise. Finally, a new, abstract and 
cosmopolitan consciousness is the only politically and ethically acceptable 
alternative to the tensions and contradictions of current international 
economics, politics, and society. 
 
In her discussion of Habermas’ description of constitutional patriotism, Hayward25 
(2007:182) states that democratic states and institutions need democratic 
citizens. Hayward (2007:182) explains this seemingly obvious fact by saying ‘It 
[constitutional patriotism] requires, …citizens who regard one another as political 
equals, who are motivated to engage one another in collective deliberation, and 
who are willing to accept as legitimate the laws that democratic processes yield’. 
 
Citizens in a bounded space like a nation-state need to identify with fellow-
citizens in the same bounded space – often with whom they do not share 
anything but being and living and being committed (often in varying degrees) to 
the same nation-state. Shared citizenship is a reality for citizens ‘only if they feel 
some sense of identification with those strangers: some sense of solidarity with 
them, some sense of sharing with them a collective purpose or collective project’ 
(Hayward 2007:182).  
 
In the search for a cohesive force or ‘centre that holds’ we encounter ‘identity’ as 
a friend but also as a formidable enemy. Discovering and shaping identity 
requires per se ‘practices of other-ing’ (Hayward 2007:182). In defining ‘we’ we 
are by implication also defining those who are ‘not-we’, or the ‘other’. Hayward 
summarises this seeming catch-22 by stating ‘Thus, identity is a problem for 
democracy in the sense that democracy cannot work without it, and yet cannot 
unequivocally embrace it’ (2007:183). Habermas and others therefore search ‘for 
                                            
25 Although I use Hayward (2007) as dialogue partner in exploring constitutional patriotism as 
proposed by Habermas, see also Canovan (2000), Elveton (2003), Feldman (2003), Lupel (2005) 
and Müller (2007),   
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forms of civic identification that meet the democratic polity’s need for allegiance 
and for solidarity, while at the same time fostering tolerance toward those defined 
as outside the civic “we”’ (Hayward 2007:183).  
 
Habermas proposes that constitutional patriotism can be a strong enough 
cognitive as well as affective bond, stronger than individual differences, 
ethnicities and particularities of gender, culture, history and socioeconomic class. 
‘A civic identity rooted in liberal and democratic constitutional principles, he 
suggests, can perform the integrative function that democracy needs without 
becoming vulnerable to strategic exploitation’ (Hayward 2007:183). According to 
Hayward (2007:184) Habermas’ proposition of constitutional patriotism should be 
understood against the discourses on German identity after the Holocaust as well 
as the discourses on identity and ethnicities in the broader context of European 
economic and political integration. In both contexts, namely establishing a 
German identity after the Holocaust and merging a number of identities in a new 
arbitrary administrative, political and economic construct – the European Union – 
the need to find and describe a ‘centre that holds’ is crucial. Such a ‘centre’ 
should not only stand the test of reason but also have an affective dimension. 
 
If I understand Habermas correctly, (and here I am in agreement with Hayward 
2007), Habermas proposes a citizenship that is not based on ‘passive 
inheritance’. Even if it was, citizenship should always be responsive to 
reinterpretation (Hayward 2007:184). Hayward summarises the views of 
Habermas by stating that citizenship is ‘an artifact of political practice’. Except for 
citizenship being an ‘artifact’, Habermas suggests that citizenship is always in 
process. ‘Citizen identity is an affiliation that people continuously create and re-
create through a series of ongoing public conversations’ (Hayward 2007:184). 
Collective political societies are bound to the past – whether this bounding is 
comfortable or not. There are ample examples of a people’s link with the past. 
Germany, and Germans – even those Germans who are recently born or recently 
accepted as citizens, are bound to the legacy of the Holocaust. In the same way 
 59
are South Africans, and more particular Afrikaners, bound to the legacy of 
apartheid. Even though today’s generation feels that they were not responsible 
and that they did not benefit [sic] from the apartheid dispensation, they are bound 
to the past. Notions of nations and citizenship inevitably carry with them a history 
– a constant burden26. ‘Still, Habermas underscores, there is much room for 
collective agency as citizens debate with one another and as they decide 
together how to relate to their past’ (Hayward 2007:184; italics in the original).  
Habermas proposes (2001) that although the past and a political entity’s 
relationship to a past is a fact, that citizens can examine and deliberate how they 
want to relate and remember the past27. Important though, Habermas suggests 
that these analyses and deliberations take place within the specific context and 
framework of ‘constitutional liberal and democratic principles’ (2001). A new 
identity can be collectively and deliberately (in more than one sense) constructed.  
Thus constitutional patriotism, as Habermas conceives it, differs 
substantially from more conventional understandings of patriotic 
attachment. It is a form of identity citizens create and re-create by 
participating in collective deliberation about how to interpret and 
institutionalize principles of constitutional democracy: democratic 
principles of free, equal, and inclusive collective self-determination and 
liberal principles that support human rights (Hayward 2007:185). 
 
Habermas (2001:10) writes ‘in complex societies it is the deliberative opinion – 
and will-formation of citizens, grounded in the principles of popular sovereignty, 
that forms the ultimate medium for a form of abstract, legally constructed 
solidarity that reproduces itself through political participation’. I suspect my 
unease with Habermas’ emphasis on the deliberative nature of democracy is the 
assumption that everyone in the democracy has an equal standing on this 
deliberative platform and that everyone’s voice counts and is listened to. As 
                                            
26 Feldman (2003:257) mentions the often overlooked factor of weariness of the lingering 
negative legacy of the Nazi period. In the debates surrounding the reshaping of a South African 
identity, the weariness surrounding the legacy of Apartheid and continued claims for apology and 
restitution play a similar fatiguing role.  
27 In the book by Goldhagen published in 1996, he explored how the ordinary Germans ‘willingly 
executed defenceless civilians, women, children and old people, simply because they were Jews’ 
(Feldman 2003:261). Although Goldhagen tried to move the debate from collective guilt to 
collective responsibility, the debate surrounding the publication of his book reiterated the 
complexities and dynamics of a people coming to terms with their past (Feldman 2003:262). 
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Hayward (2007:182) indicated, a democracy needs ‘democratic citizens’ – 
citizens that can partake on an equal footing on this deliberative platform. 
Although Habermas (2001) positions this deliberative platform within the specific 
context of constitutional principles, I am not sure that the playing field is leveled 
enough for everyone to take part28. 
 
Hayward (2007) summarises criticism against constitutional patriotism as 
proposed by Habermas in two categories. On the one hand constitutional 
patriotism is regarded as ‘too thin’ – not really inspiring ‘civic solidarity and trust’ 
and severely under-accounting for the affective dimensions of citizenship, and on 
the other hand she suggests that constitutional patriotism is maybe not thin 
enough – not really accounting for the impact of viewing national identity through 
the lenses of ‘particularistic identities’ and the dynamic historic interplay of 
language, culture and other dimensions of societal life. For the sake of our 
reflection on the role of religion and the study of religion in shaping a particular 
national identity in South Africa, it is necessary to take these criticisms as 
proposed by Hayward (2007: 186-189) seriously.  
 
In discussing the criticism of constitutional patriotism as ‘too thin’ or ‘bloodless’ 
(Müller 2007:197), Hayward discusses three dimensions of national identity 
namely 
• ‘For identity to perform the integrative function that democracy requires ... 
citizens need some compelling sense of why it is that they form a political 
“people” with some particular strangers and not with others’ (Hayward 
2007:187). 
• The second dimension Hayward (2007:187) finds lacking is that 
constitutional patriotism is ‘insufficiently constitutive’. Because 
                                            
28 Interestingly, Feldman (2003:260) highlights that the disillusionment following the unification of 
Germany resulted in increased xenophobia and violence. ‘Germans blamed and ostracised those 
on the margins of society to protect a threatened body politic, a response to crisis that comes 
dangerously close to the Nazi practice of blaming, expelling and finally killing the paradigmatic 
outsiders, the German Jews’. To what extent the current increase in xenophobia in South Africa 
can be attributed to certain disillusionment regarding the ‘benefits’ of (or rather lack of shared 
benefits) a new South African identity may enrich the discussion on citizenship. 
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constitutional patriotic identity ‘is arrived at procedurally, through public 
deliberation, [it] cannot be understood to reflect an enduring truth about 
who I am and about my place in the world’ (Hayward 2007:187). 
• The third dimension lacking with regard to national identity as proposed by 
constitutional patriotism is that ‘it is insufficiently naturalised. Even if 
identity is in fact a construct, some critics argue, if it is to perform the 
binding work that democracies require, it must appear to those who bear it 
to be natural’ (italics in the original). Hayward continues to state that civic 
identity must feel like ‘kinship’ and ‘destiny’ (2007:187). She continues, 
‘Democratic citizens must experience identity, more often than not, pre-
reflexively: not as something they consciously create, but as something 
that “just is”’ (Hayward 2007:187). 
 
The counterargument that constitutional patriotism is not thin enough, the issue 
at stake is that constitutional patriotism does not take seriously enough that 
citizens partake in the debate through the lenses of their own ‘particularistic 
identities’.  Hayward writes (2007:187-188)  
There is a dominant language that citizens use when they deliberate. 
There are dominant ethical beliefs and cultural values, which shape the 
terms of deliberation. Hence the narratives that inform the thin political 
culture are necessarily influenced by a thick majority culture. The heroes, 
the holidays, the monuments the political society depends upon as 
mechanisms to foster civic identification are culturally particularistic, and 
inevitably so. Constitutional patriotism needs these mechanisms, the claim 
is. It leans on them to foster identification. Therefore, constitutional 
patriotism cannot escape the identity problem that plagues more 
conventional brands of patriotism. It always relies upon, it always tacitly 
assumes, ‘thick’ particularistic identities. 
 
Habermas (2001: 102) suggests in response to these criticisms that identity 
always is a ‘learning process’ in which people always transcend some aspects of 
local and particularistic ethno-cultural identities.  Elveton (2003:133) writes 
‘Significantly, Habermas views the achievement of a cosmopolitan 
consciousness as a step along the same historical path that led from an earlier 
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period emphasizing cultural homogeneity to the more abstract democratic ideal of 
a self-legislating polity’(Elveton 2003:133). 
 
The formation of collective identities as ‘learning process’ is acknowledged by 
Hayward (2007:189) when she refers to experiments regarding the shaping of 
collective identities proving that collective identities can be learned. Although on 
the one hand providing support for interventions to shape national collective 
identity, it also warns about the ‘malleability of identification’ 29(Hayward 
2007:189).  Elveton (2003:135) further questions the assumption that this 
‘learning process’ as proposed and assumed by Habermas, will necessarily have 
a harmonious outcome, rather than ‘tragically conflicting’. She evaluates the 
issue of ‘compatibility’ and writes ‘The possibility that a harmonious over-lapping 
and expansion of life-worlds can be demonstrated on one or another historical 
scale does not rule out the possibility in principle that some life-world structures 
are ultimately incompatible’ (Elveton 2003:135). 
 
Hayward (2007:189-192) continues then to explore ‘constitutional patriotism and 
its others’. Hayward explores the dilemma (and inherent dangers) in defining ‘us’, 
because in the act of defining the ‘we’, we also define and classify the ‘not-we’, 
the ‘others’. ‘To the extent that principles effectively motivate people to recognize 
some set of strangers as co-citizens, they can promote intolerance of, even 
violence directed at those they define as outside the civic “we”’ (Hayward 
2007:189). There are furthermore enough examples throughout recent history of 
the impact of such classifications, for example in Rwanda, Kosovo and Kenya. 
According to Hayward, Habermas is aware of the fact that even if national identity 
is defined through a deliberative process based on constitutional principles, it will 
also exclude. According to Habermas (Hayward 2007:190) such exclusion is 
legitimate. With regard to the role of constitutional principles, Hayward 
(2007:190) writes ‘Hence they not only set the terms within which citizens 
                                            
29 For critical discussions on postmodern constructions of identity see Hiebert (2003), Bauman 
(2000) and Wilmsen & McAllister (1996). 
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deliberate with one another, but further counsel against intolerance and violence 
in all its forms, including intolerance and violence directed at those who do not 
endorse constitutional principles’. 
 
If I understand Habermas and Hayward correctly, it would seem as if the primacy 
of constitutional principles and their legitimacy is the ‘only’ guarantee against 
abuse. Even so, Hayward points to the fact that these constitutional principles 
exclude ‘others’ on ‘normatively unobjectionable grounds’ (2007:190). 
Furthermore, the protection of such a constitution as well as the advancement of 
international democracy based on such constitutional principles, becomes 
questionable when these principles are used to ‘legitimize aggressive attacks 
against people who do not endorse those principles’ (Hayward 2007:191). 
Hayward continues to provide examples of how constitutional principles are used 
for example in the North-American context to label people and nations as ‘rogue 
states’, ‘terrorists and tyrants’ and to legitimize the policing and surveillance of 
borders and private communications. 
 
Hayward (2007:192) alludes to the fact that the category of citizenship 
unavoidably, ‘delimits an included and an excluded set’. 
If understandings of ‘who we are’ that are rooted in universal constitutional 
principles indeed can motivate citizens to look beyond their private 
concerns and their particularistic identities, and to take into account the 
perspectives of those they regard as their interlocutors in processes of 
democratic deliberation, such identities are susceptible to strategic 
exploitation by elites who urge the exclusion and policing of, even violent 
aggressiveness directed at, those they claim threaten constitutional 
principles. As Habermasians emphasize, the principles that define 
constitutional patriotic identities can serve as powerful resources for those 
who would resist their strategic exploitation. At the same time, however, 
constitutional patriotism’s claims to universality can serve as powerful 
resources for those who would exploit them (Hayward 2007:192). 
 
Hayward (2007:192) therefore concludes that constitutional patriotism should be 
‘less a form of civic identity that solves democracy’s identity problem, than a 
practice of always resisting identification’ (italics in the original). 
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1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS TO FOLLOW 
Chapter 2 will introduce the methodology for this study as a specific social 
constructionist attempt to engage with the systems of meaning that resulted in 
the Policy as well as perpetuate selected systems of meanings.  
 
While Chapter 1 has located this critical evaluation against the broader 
discourses of postmodernity, postsecularism and changing notions of citizenship 
and the role of the nation-state, Chapter 3 will provide a literature review on the 
discourses shaping the debate on the relationship between religion and 
education. The literature review will provide an overview of certain watershed 
debates and contributions in the development of the discourses around critical 
theory, critical pedagogy and Religionswissenschaft. The literature review will 
further attempt to result in a logical and scholarly argument that will successfully 
address the questions of this study. As already acknowledged earlier, throughout 
this study I have made choices. I have not only included and quoted, I have also 
excluded sources and perspectives other studies have included or will include in 
future. In the literature review (and the rest of the chapters) my biases will be 
acknowledged, and scholarly motivated.  
 
In addressing the first question on the context-specific socioeconomic, 
educational and political histories and processes that shaped our new democracy 
and its educational policy framework, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will provide a 
genealogy as well as an archaeology of the political, socioeconomic and cultural 
process that necessitated and shaped the Policy as a context-specific response. 
These chapters will explore the ‘tectonic plates’ (Booth 1999) that shaped the 
need for as well as the processes surrounding and the content of the Policy. In 
Chapter 4 we will start the genealogical exploration of the socio-historical context 
of the Policy against the meta-motifs of memory and forgetting (Booth 1999).   
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Chapter 6 will constitute a policy analysis attempting to answer questions 2, 3 
and 4 as suggested in section 1.1 of this chapter. The questions were (2) What 
are the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings and assumptions of the 
Policy argument? (3) How does the Policy understand religion and the study of 
religion? (4) How does the Policy understand the study of religion as a 
compulsory part of the curriculum in the preparation of learners for citizenship? In 
other words, how will the study of religion prepare learners not only for citizenship 
in the national sense but also for an increasingly cosmopolitan citizenry? 
 
As the Policy provides a framework for the development of the curriculum, 
Chapter 7 will analyse the study of religion as conceptualised by the Revised 
National Curriculum Statement (NCS) Grades R-9, Life Orientation (2002) as well 
as the NCS Grades 10-12 Learning Programme Guidelines, Life Orientation 
(2008) as well as the NCS Grades 10-12 (General) Learning Programme 
Guidelines, Religion Studies (2008) in the Further Education and Training (FET) 
band. 
 
As the concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter 8 will set out to answer the fifth 
and remaining question underpinning this research – How will the Policy 
contribute to a critical citizenry who will have the necessary competencies 
(Mündigkeit) to understand their own religiosity and those of others in the 
dynamic and complex interplay of religion as a social construct resulting from and 
perpetuating power-structures that impact and shape our engagement with 
cultural, socioeconomic, gender, political, educational past, present and future 
environments? 
 
1.5 (IN)CONCLUSIONS 
 
The central figure in the carnival as explored by Bakhtin was the fool, the clown, 
the idiot-savants and savant-idiots (Hiebert 2003:116) who in the blasphemous 
hilarity of the carnival could comment on sacred and profane structures, beliefs 
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and institutions. In this act of humorous but serious play, the fool often acted as 
agent of an ‘anti-structure’ (Taylor 2007).  The fool also translated the 
untranslatable, commented on the incommensurable and provided a new 
vocabulary or language for engaging with the serious and often traumatic nature 
of everyday-life.  
 
During the carnival as diasporic, kairotic time, the fool could assume the role of 
the interlocutor ‘inhabiting – not resolving – incommensurability’ (Boellstorff 
2005:583). As author, I will inhabit a number of incommensurabilities – personal 
as well as academic – in this act of writing this thesis. The carnival as proposed 
by Bakhtin (1984) therefore implies a self-reflexivity (Hiebert 2003:114). This self-
reflexivity and self-critique implied by the carnival necessitates that the one doing 
the analysis can not remain outside of the analysis (Hiebert 2003:114).  
 
In following Hiebert’s exploration of identity in an age of carnival (2003), I will 
assume various identities in performing this thesis as carnival in an age of 
carnival. At times I will be a parrot, ‘enacting someone else’s voice’ (Hiebert 
2003:118), repeating what others have said, often out of context. During this 
thesis I will also become an organ-grinding monkey, ‘dressed in a dapper little 
costume and trained to collect money from passers-by’, and conditioned ‘to 
perform; conditioned out of the possibility of subversion’ (Hiebert 2003:118). In 
this heteroglossic carnival, I will inevitably also become medium – possessed of 
and speaking with many voices, often speaking in voices I don’t understand, 
becoming xenoglossic, speaking a foreign language without having learned it. 
And finally, performing this thesis as a glossolalic and often xenoglossic act in a 
xenoglossic world. Hiebert wrote ‘And the result is a carnivalesque nonsense. 
Not a meaningless nonsense, but an uncertain, gestural participation in which 
nothing makes sense, yet the gesture towards the unintelligible is all that matters’ 
(Goodman quoted by Hiebert 2003:123). 
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This thesis is on the one hand nothing more than a ‘gestural participation’ in the 
debates and future debates and discourses surrounding the Policy. On the other 
hand, this study will provide an example of policy analysis as genealogical 
discourse analysis. This study will provide some pointers to the possibilities and 
opportunities the Policy misses and the possibilities the Policy encompasses. 
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CHAPTER 2  
IN SEARCH OF A METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is called ‘In search of a methodology’ to suggest that selecting a 
methodology for doing this research was not a clear-cut issue. The title further 
proposes a making public of my own thought-processes looking for an 
appropriate methodology. In my selection of a methodology I was looking for a 
methodology that would be personally fulfilling as well as academically or 
scientifically appropriate. As such the search for a methodology became very 
much part of my research. My search for an appropriate and fulfilling 
methodology included exploring general social research methodologies (e.g. 
Babbie, Mouton, Vorster & Prozesky 2005; Terre Blanche & Durrheim 1999), 
discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis as specific methodologies (see 
Schiffrin, Tannen & Hamilton 2001; Van Dijk 1985, 1998) and the theories, 
politics and methods underlying policy analysis and evaluation (e.g. Fischer, 
Miller and Sidney 2007; Moran, Rein and Goodin 2006).  
 
As shared in Chapter 1, the ‘why’ of this research was grounded in my personal 
history and interests, as well as my interests in the academic discourses on the 
role of religion in the public sphere in a postsecular age. The ‘how’ of my 
research was however a more difficult question to resolve. I was passionate and 
determined to explore the possibilities the Policy would open up for a future 
critical and mündig citizenry but I was not quite prepared for the search for an 
appropriate methodology to involve so many choices. Different research 
questions necessitate different methodologies. For example, a comparative 
evaluation of the Policy with other international examples would have 
necessitated a different methodology than for example, if the focus of this 
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research was an empirical exploration on the impact of the Policy on learners’ 
tolerance.   
 
The answer to the question whether the inclusion of the study of religion in South 
African schools can contribute to a more just and compassionate society is 
difficult to establish. Yet, there must have been enough people who had believed 
that the inclusion of the study of religions could in fact contribute to a more 
compassionate and just society for the Policy to have been conceptualised and 
processed. The Policy is the result of a consultative and deliberative process 
which proposed the inclusion of the study of religions as a viable (and necessary) 
option for South Africa with its deeply traumatised past and increasing pluralist 
and cosmopolitan future. While there has been very little if any religious strife in 
South Africa, there is enough evidence that religion played and still plays an 
important role in South African society. The interesting aspect of the adoption of 
the Policy is that the inclusion of the study of religions is not in reaction to a real 
possibility of religious strife, but to prevent religion (as an important cultural 
marker) of becoming a stumbling block in the formation of a new democracy. 
 
To critically evaluate the Policy therefore encompasses taking seriously the 
discourses surrounding and resulting in the Policy. The Policy-as-text is the 
sedimentation of these discourses but the Policy has also included and excluded 
discourses, becoming a discourse on its own. The Policy will also sustain and 
perpetuate certain discourses. A critical discourse analysis of the Policy seems to 
be an appropriate methodology. Policy analysis and evaluation30 is however also 
a separate and distinctive discourse in its own right. Though a critical discourse 
analysis of the Policy would have been a legitimate scholarly activity, an 
evaluation of the Policy seems to call forth that the methods and theories 
underlying policy analysis and evaluation should be taken seriously as part of my 
                                            
30 The two concepts ‘analysis’ and ‘evaluation’ are often used interchangeably in the theories, 
methodologies and practices surrounding policy.  
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methodology. Klein and Marmor (2006:892) say that pinning down a ‘chameleon’ 
concept like public policy  
tends all too often to become an exercise in anatomy rather than 
physiology. The bones are there, right down to joints of the little finger. 
They can be put together, rather like an exhibit in a natural history 
museum. But the creature itself, the sense of what drives it and shapes its 
actions, remains elusive: a victim of the academic drive to taxonomise 
everything in sight. 
 
For the sake of my own understanding of the ‘physiology’ of policy as chameleon, 
I will make a distinction between policy evaluation and policy analysis. I will use 
policy evaluation as the purpose of policy analysis, with the latter taking on a 
more practical dimension. The following diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the 
combination of a critical discourse analysis, policy analysis and policy evaluation 
towards a critical evaluation of the Policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The three elements of the methodology 
 
 
2.2 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST 
APPROACH 
 
The Policy is assumed to be a specific response to the specific context of 
shaping and legitimising of the new democracy in South Africa. The Policy-as-
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response has been shaped by historical systems of meaning and power and as it 
impacts on teachers and learners it will create and perpetuate systems of 
meaning and power. This research therefore necessitates a social constructionist 
approach as explored by Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999) assuming that the 
Policy was shaped by larger discourses but will also shape future discourses. 
The language used in the Policy-as-text is therefore assumed to have resulted 
from certain patterns of social meaning (Terre Blanche & Durrheim 1999:149).  
Babbie et al. (2005:495) quote Slembrouck as having described discourse 
analysis as being ‘(1) concerned with language use beyond the boundaries of a 
sentence or utterance, (2) concerned with the interrelationships between 
language and society and (3) as concerned with the interactive or dialogic 
properties of everyday communication’. 
 
Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999:154) describe discourse analysis as ‘the act 
of showing how certain discourses are deployed to achieve particular effects in 
specific contexts’. These authors distinguish further between how discourses 
operate in the text, the effects the discourses achieve in the texts and the 
broader context in which the text operates (Terre Blanche & Durrheim 1999:154-
156). This three-fold distinction reminds of the three-tier distinction made by 
Fairclough (1989, 1995) of the different dimensions of discourse analysis. He 
distinguishes between text analysis (description), processing analysis 
(interpretation) and social analysis (explanation). Parker (1992, as quoted by 
Babbie et al. 2005: 496) suggests seven criteria for distinguishing discourses 
namely the discourse (1) as realised in text; (2) is about objects; (3) contains 
subjects; (4) is a coherent set of meanings; (5) refers to other discourses; (6) 
reflects its own way of speaking; and (7) is historically located.  
 
Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999:169) state that social constructionist 
methodologies (and discourse analysis as one example) are ‘most attuned to the 
real-world political consequences of texts’. To analyse discourse and make 
explicit the ‘unspoken, lived notions surrounding power’ (Babbie et al. 2005:495) 
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is regarded as a specific gestalt of discourse analysis, namely critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). 
 
CDA ‘is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way 
social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and 
resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (Van Dijk 1998). In her 
exploration of CDA as ‘a research tool’, Janks (1997:329) states that ‘All social 
practices are tied to specific historical contexts and are the means by which 
existing social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests 
served’. CDA, for her, provides ‘multiple points of analytic entry’ that are ‘mutually 
explanatory. It is in the interconnections that the analyst finds interesting patterns 
and disjunctions that need to be described, interpreted and explained’ (Janks 
1997:329). Van Dijk (1998) states that CDA focuses primarily on societal and 
political issues and problems, is multidisciplinary and focuses ‘on the ways 
discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations 
of power and dominance in society’ (italics in the original). Van Dijk (1998) 
furthermore states that since CDA ‘is not a specific direction of research, it does 
not have a unitary theoretical framework’ and therefore there are many types of 
CDA, which may be theoretically and analytically diverse.  Despite this diversity, 
CDA has grown from critical theory and more specifically the Frankfurt Schule 
(Van Dijk 1998).  
 
Janks (1997:330) shares her understanding of Fairclough’s (1989, 1995) critical 
model of discourse interpretation in the following illustration (Figure 2.2): 
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Figure 2.2: Fairlough’s dimension of discourse and discourse analysis 
 
Janks (1997:330) states that Fairclough’s (1995) structure (Figure 2.2) allows for 
multiple entries into the discourse as text, process as well as sociocultural 
conditions in stark contrast to analysis as ‘tidily linear’. In applying Fairclough’s 
(1995) model, she suggests starting with the selected and available text (Box 3 in 
Figure 2.2) moving towards interpreting the text in the light of its function in the 
discourse as well as explaining the text in the light of situational, institutional and 
societal practices and gestalts (boxes 2 and 3).  
 
In selecting documentary sources for this critical discourse analysis, I will focus 
on 
• The Policy on Religion and Education (2003) 
• The Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) Grades R-9, Life 
Orientation (2002a)  
• The National Curriculum Statement Grades (NCS) 10-12 Learning 
Programme Guidelines, Life Orientation (2008a) 
• The National Curriculum Statement Grades(NCS) 10-12 (General) 
Learning Programme Guidelines, Religion Studies (2008b)  
• Correspondence between various stakeholders 
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• Newspaper articles and public documents 
 
In engaging with these data, I will focus on definitions and rationales, binary 
oppositions, recurrent terms, phrases and metaphors as well as themes and 
patterns. In analysing the context of these documents, I will specifically explore 
socioeconomic, cultural and political developments and contexts in the shaping of 
and responding to discourses and ideologies. I will also look for evidence on how 
the discourses changed over time.  
 
2.3 POLICY EVALUATION 
 
Policy evaluation is surrounded by and embedded in discourses of its own 
(Schwandt 2002, 2005). For the sake of this study, I will introduce the basic 
tenets of the discourses on policy evaluation as a broad context. I will then 
proceed to explore specifically Theory-based evaluation (TBE) as the approach I 
will apply in evaluating the Policy (section 2.4). I will then continue to explore the 
nature of policy analysis (section 2.5) and the praxis of doing a policy analysis 
(section 2.6). 
 
Policy evaluation is normally ‘indexed’ within a particular epistemology resulting 
in prescribed methodologies. The majority of expressed thoughts on evaluation 
are within a framework of a ‘Cartesian-Kantian subject-centred, self-assertive 
view of reason’ (Schwandt 2005:76), which allocates to the evaluator the luxury 
of objectivity and a superior disengaged judgment according to normative criteria. 
This epistemology presupposes ‘a dichotomy of the mind… and object’ 
(Schwandt 2005:79) where ‘true’ knowledge of the object requires 
disengagement and the correct application of method (Taylor 1989). This 
epistemology assumes that there  
is a theory of evaluation that should govern all theories of practice; there is 
a ranked order of illegitimate to legitimate forms of evaluation; there is a 
progress and development from less sophisticated and informed 
constructions of evaluation practice  in earlier generations of practice to 
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more sophisticated and informed constructions in later generations 
(Schwandt 2005:78). 
 
Evaluation practices within the above modernist paradigm of reason have the 
following characteristics: (1) true knowledge begins in doubt and distrust; (2) 
engaging in the process of methodological doubting is a solitary, monological 
activity; (3) proper knowledge is found by following rules and method (rules guide 
us towards clear knowing, permit the systematic extension of knowledge, and 
ensure that nothing will be admitted as knowledge unless it satisfies the 
requirements of specified rules); (4) proper, i.e. scientifically respectable, 
knowledge depends upon justification or proof; (5) knowledge is a possession, an 
individual knower is in an ownership relation to that knowledge; (6) in justifying 
claims to knowledge there can be no appeal other than the appeal to reason itself 
(Bernstein 1983; Shotter 1993). 
 
According to the views of Fournier and Scriven, (referred to in Schwandt 
2005:75), ‘the general logic is principally concerned with the problem of how an 
evaluator can reason soundly from empirical premises to evaluative conclusions. 
This epistemological premise is sedimented in four formal steps to be followed, 
namely ‘(1) establish the criteria of merit, (2) construct standards, (3) measure 
performance and compare with standards, and (4) synthesise and integrate data 
on performance into a judgement of merit or worth’ (Schwandt 2005:75). These 
steps have strong links with ‘a philosophical anthropology built on the notions of 
an ideally disengaged subject free to treat the world instrumentally and 
construing society atomistically as constituted by individual purposes, analysably 
discrete events, and so on’ (Schwandt 2005:76). 
 
Schwandt points to an alternative indexing of evaluation, which he calls practical 
hermeneutics (2002, 2005). ‘In practical hermeneutics, the human being is a 
situated, ethical on-going discussion of what we should, could, must be. 
Understanding is a way of being’ (Schwandt 2005:81). He quotes Gallagher 
(1992) ‘Interpretation is not something that I (the epistemological ego) do, but 
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something that I am involved in’ (Schwandt 2005:81; italics in the original). 
Contra to the monological assumptions of the Cartesian evaluation mindset, a 
practical hermeneutics involves an engaged evaluator immersed in plural and 
heterogeneous views and beliefs. Schwandt (2005:82) elaborates by saying ‘A 
critical insight here is the knower does not stand as a solitary, subjective 
spectator over and against a self-contained, self-enclosed object, rather there is 
a dynamic interaction or transaction between that which is to be known and the 
knower who participates in it’.  
 
Not only is the evaluator aware of her embeddedness in a specific context, but 
she is a participant in a dialogue.  Schwandt (2005:82) points to the following 
characteristics of this meeting between the interpreter and that which she seeks 
to understand as follows: 
(1) Interpretation is both constrained and enabled by traditions and 
preconceptions….In the process of interpretation, this tradition itself 
undergoes rearrangement and transformation. (2) The act of interpretation 
is structured as questioning. Questioning opens both the self-
understanding of the interpreter and the meaning of the program, policy or 
project to be interpreted to possibilities and restructuring. (3) Interpreting 
or understanding always involves application. 
 
Gallagher (1992:153) expands this notion to explain that this understanding of 
evaluation implicates involvement of the evaluator instead of disengagement. 
‘We discover that the person who is understanding does not know and judge as 
one who stands apart and unaffected but rather he thinks along with the other 
from the perspective of a specific bond of belonging, as if he too were affected’. 
The object of questioning is not only the event and focus of the inquiry, but also 
the interpreter him or herself.  
The questioning is not just unidirectional or monological; it is reflective or 
dialogical. All understanding is self-understanding. Interpretation is a 
questioning of ourselves not only with respect to the subject matter… it is 
also a questioning of ourselves with respect to ourselves and our 
circumstance (Gallagher 1992:157).  
 
In this dialogue neither ‘the evaluator nor the practitioner is thought to face a 
problem to be solved as much as a dilemma or mystery that requires 
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interpretation and self-understanding’ (Schwandt 2005:84). Gallagher (1992:152) 
explains the difference between a problem and a mystery as follows: 
A problem is something that can be totally objectified and resolved in 
objective terms because the person confronting the problem can 
completely detach himself from it and view it externally… A mystery is 
something that involves the person in such a way that the person cannot 
step outside of it in order to see it in an objective manner. She is caught 
within the situation with no possibility of escape, and no possibility of clear-
cut solutions. Indeed, ambiguity is the rule within a mystery. 
 
In opting for evaluation as practical hermeneutics, it is necessary to resist their 
modernist tendencies, according to Schwandt (2005:85): 
• The tendency to conceive of knowledge only as the acquisition of 
power to control self, society and nature; 
• The tendency to assume that method holds the key to knowledge; 
• The tendency to define the individual knower as in complete control of 
self-nature and social arrangements. 
 
This has a number of implications for the role of the evaluator – whether self-
perceived or seen, namely 
Instead of acting like external consultants, evaluators would seek to make 
their practice continuous with the work of clients and stakeholders by 
becoming partners in an ethically informed, reasoned conversation about 
essentially contested concepts like welfare, health care, education, justice, 
work life and so forth (Schwandt 2005:86).  
 
This requires what Schwandt calls a ‘critical intelligence’. An operational 
intelligence ‘is instruction on the status of means and means-end reasoning; it is 
directed at helping a client get to there from here. Critical intelligence, on the 
other hand, is the ability to question whether the there is worth getting to’ 
(Schwandt 2005:87). Schwandt closes his argument for evaluation as practical 
hermeneutics by saying:  
Practical hermeneutics affords a way of retaining a critical voice for 
evaluators – a voice informed by their special knowledge of what it means 
to evaluate – but it resituates that voice in a different kind of relationship 
between evaluator and stakeholders. Those relationships are reconceived 
as dialogical and aimed at self-transformation. The evaluator engages in 
critique as a second-person participant in a practice, not as a third-person 
neutral observer (2005:88). 
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I would like to use this notion of evaluation as a hermeneutical act as broad 
context for my evaluation of the Policy, and practical hermeneutics as my specific 
location. Demetrio (2001) has defined hermeneutics as ‘a theory, methodology 
and praxis of interpretation that is geared towards the recapturing of meaning of 
a text, or a text-analogue, that is temporarily or culturally distant, or obscured by 
ideology and false consciousness’ (online). He further suggests that 
hermeneutics has three layers of meaning and concerns. There is the theory of 
hermeneutics ‘which is concerned about the epistemological validity and 
possibility of interpretation’, also the methodology of hermeneutics ‘which is 
concerned about the formulation of reliable systems of interpretation’ and the 
praxis of hermeneutics, ‘which is concerned about the actual process of 
interpreting specific texts’.  
 
In a critical hermeneutics, the point of departure is that the text to be interpreted 
is ‘infiltrated with power and forces that are formerly considered extraneous’ 
(Demetrio 2001). The goal of hermeneutics is therefore to ‘diagnose the hidden 
pathology of texts and to free them form their ideological distortions’ (Demetrio 
2001). The goal of hermeneutics and of this act of evaluation is to engage with 
the Policy as text and discover (and expose) the ideologies and assumptions on 
which it is based. It is important to note that this exposé is not an act of 
judgement on the ‘truth’ of the Policy, but rather an act with the purpose to 
understand the possibilities existing in the Policy.   
 
In his proposition of a post-structural hermeneutics, Demetrio (2001) combines 
different elements of dialectical and critical hermeneutics to arrive at his 
description and use of a post-hermeneutical system. In the act of interpreting, the 
interpreter engages not only with the text, but also with the historical and cultural 
context in which the text was produced and in which the interpreter finds him or 
herself. The act of interpreting is furthermore not a one-way action from 
interpreter to text, but also from text to interpreter. Out of this dynamic interaction 
between interpreter, historical and cultural context and text, a meaning 
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transpires, for now. In the following diagram, Demetrio (2001) illustrates a post-
structural system of interpretation (Figure 2.3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Post-structural system of interpretation (Demetrio 2001) 
 
The location of this study is situated in a ‘post-structural’ hermeneutical 
discourse. Post-structural hermeneutics acknowledges that the subject or 
interpreter him or herself, is a ‘mere intersection of point of the various socio-
economic and cultural forces that shape the human individual’ (Demetrio 2001). 
Therefore the interpreter or in this case, evaluator, is him or herself a text, 
engaging another text in a historical and cultural con-text. This results in the 
notion that texts (in more than one sense) may contain ‘an infinity of meaning’ 
(Demetrio 2001). Post-structural hermeneutics is therefore not concerned with 
‘eternal truths’ or value judgements, but with ‘meaning of the here and now’ 
(Demetrio 2001). Post-structural hermeneutics ‘does not only explore the 
parameters of textuality, but also the institutional, social, and political structures 
that define the relationship between truth/meaning and power’ (Demetrio 2001).  
 
Another author proposing an interpretive approach to policy analysis is Dryzek 
(1982:310) who calls for ‘policy analysis as hermeneutic activity’. Taylor (1997) 
echoes the work by Demetrio (2001) and Dryzek (1982) by calling for a critical 
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policy analysis in which contexts, texts and consequences are explored. In her 
approach to policy analysis, Taylor (1997) combines critical discourse analysis in 
engaging with the policy as text, in a specific context and with certain intended 
and unintended consequences. Taylor proposes a ‘political model of policy based 
in a theory of discourse’ (1997:26) and questions the relevance and impact of 
policy analysis over the last ten years (1997:24).  
 
Taylor (1997:26) states that most of the analysis done conveyed ‘no sense of the 
political struggles involved in developing and implementing policy’. She continues 
to emphasise policy documents as texts, which are products of the ‘struggle over 
meaning’ and quotes Fulcher (1989:7) who alluded to policy process and 
documents as a ‘struggle between contenders of competing objectives, where 
language – or more specifically, discourse – is used tactically’ (in Taylor 
1997:26).  
 
Taylor illustrates policy-as-struggle as follows (Figure 2.4): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: A political model of policy based in a theory of discourse 
(Taylor 1997:26) 
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In the above illustration (Figure 2.4) Taylor attempts to illustrate that the policy as 
text is the result of a political struggle in which different discourses clash or 
combine to have distinctive consequences. 
 
Codd (1988:237) shares Taylor’s view and elaborates on the fact that policy texts 
are the results of political struggles over meaning and says: 
…policy documents can be said to constitute the official discourse of the 
state (Codd 1985). Thus policies produced by and for the state are 
obvious instances in which language serves a political purpose, 
constructing particular meanings and signs that work to mask social 
conflict and foster commitment to the notion of universal public interest. In 
this way, policy documents produce real social effects through the 
production and maintenance of consent. 
 
These texts, although embedded in the political discourses, do not have a single 
meaning but ‘produce a plurality of readings’ (Codd 1988:239). Discourse 
analysis is historically known to emphasise the linguistics of and in texts. Taylor 
(1997:27) quotes McHoul (1984:1-2) who calls this linguistic basis ‘narrowly 
formalistic’ and refers to policy texts that ‘constitute nodal points or networks of 
signifying practice generally; networks of discourse which constitute a field of 
power and knowledge…’  McHoul (1984) explores policy texts as ‘conditions of 
possibility… how they come to be’ (as quoted by Taylor 1997:27; italics in the 
original). 
 
In engaging with the Policy it would seem that on the one hand the Policy will 
produce ‘a plurality of readings’ (Codd 1988), but, on the other hand, be as clear 
as possible as ‘condition of possibility’ (McHoul quoted in Taylor 1997) to ensure 
its claims. As I will explore in Chapters 4 and 5, the Policy under scrutiny is a 
specific ideological response in a specific context. Codd emphasises (1988:243-
244) ‘Policy documents … are ideological texts that have been constructed within 
a particular context. The task of deconstruction begins with the recognition of that 
context’ (italics added). Policy documents are further evidence of which issues 
get on the political agenda and which issues are not on the political policy radar 
(Taylor 1997:28). The role of the analyst is to scrutinise a policy document for its 
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use of ‘symbolic language’ and ‘condensation symbols’ (Troyna 1994:70). Troyna 
sourced her use of the concept of ‘condensation symbols’ from the work of 
Edelman (1964, quoted by Troyna 1994:73) who stated that ‘condensation 
symbols’ function ‘to create symbolic stereotypes and metaphors which reassure 
supporters that their interests have been considered. But they are framed in ways 
that the proposed solutions may also be contradictory or ambiguously related to 
the way supporters originally viewed the issue’ (Edelman as quoted by Troyna 
1994:73).  
 
Interestingly, no matter how carefully policies are crafted and phrased, there are 
always ‘slippages between rhetoric and practice’ which Taylor defines as ‘policy 
refraction’ (1997:31, after Freeland, 1981). Policy refraction is not ‘simply a 
matter of a “gap” between policy objectives and implementation. As 
implementation evolves, “older and powerful meanings may emerge” which not 
only impacts on the implementation but, in fact, changes the policy objectives’ 
(Taylor 1997:32). She concludes her approach to analysing policy documents 
and processes as ‘contexts, texts and consequences’ (1997:33) by emphasising 
‘the many layered nature of policy making and the importance of exploring the 
linkages between the various levels of the policy process with an emphasis on 
highlighting power relations’ (Taylor 1997:32). 
 
The aim of this post-structural hermeneutical act is not to judge or evaluate the 
Policy in a modernist sense, but is an attempt to understand, to describe and 
explain the Policy as a particular context-specific response. The final evaluation 
of the Policy will determine to what extent the Policy creates possibilities for 
meaning-making, rather than judging the meaning of the Policy in itself. With this 
evaluation of the Policy set against the background of practical and post-
structural hermeneutics, I will introduce a specific policy evaluation methodology, 
namely theory-based evaluation (TBE). 
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2.4 EXPLORING THEORY-BASED EVALUATION AS HERMENEUTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
‘Theory-based evaluation’ (TBE) originated in the 1970s and ‘can be described 
as the analysis and valuation of the contribution of intervention strategies to 
resolving or controlling social problems’ (Van der Knaap 2004:17). Carvalho and 
White (2004:141) define TBE as follows: 
The theory-based evaluation approach documents the assumptions 
implicit in program design and points to the data required to test these 
assumptions. Collecting and analysing such data through quantitative and 
qualitative techniques enhances understanding of the validity of the 
assumptions and the relevance of key program processes. 
 
Birckmayer and Weiss (2000:408) describe TBE as 
an approach to evaluation that requires surfacing the assumptions on 
which the program is based in considerable detail: what activities are 
being conducted, what effect each particular activity will have, what the 
program does next, what the expected response is, what happens next, 
and so on, to the expected outcomes (2000:408). 
 
TBE first investigates ‘the theories on which a policy is based, and then 
investigates whether the theories on which the program is based are realised in 
action’ (Birckmayer & White 2000:408). Where traditional approaches to policy 
evaluation would only evaluate the success of the activities of the programme, 
TBE suggests that there is a link between the  
objectives and the manner in which these objectives might be attained by 
the deployment of resources. The collection of assumptions on which 
policy measures are based constitutes the policy theory: a system of 
values, norms and assumptions regarding the causal links between 
actions and the results of actions and preferences (Van der Knaap 
2004:17). 
 
TBE has developed from a number of approaches, as explained by both Van der 
Knaap (2004) and Stame (2004).  Van der Knaap describes the development of 
TBE as a constructivist approach versus a more positivistic approach. According 
to Van der Knaap the evaluator can either take a ‘positivist, rational-analytical 
stance’ – therefore seeing evaluation as seeking the ‘truth’ and whether the 
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policy theory was indeed the ‘right’ theory, implemented in the ‘right’ manner. On 
the other hand the evaluator can take a constructivist approach acknowledging 
that there is no universally ‘right’ theory or approach.  
 
Stame (2004) on the other hand categorises the development of TBE from three 
different developments in evaluation praxis namely the theory-driven approach 
proposed by Chen and Rossi (1989), the theory-based approach as developed 
by Carol Weiss (1997) and realistic evaluation by Pawson and Tilley (1997). 
While both theory-based and theory-driven evaluation emphasise the central role 
played by the assumptions and theoretical framework of any policy, realistic 
evaluation states that  
we cannot know why something changes, but only that something has 
changed from status ‘a’ (without stimulus, without programme) to status ‘b’ 
(with stimulus, with programme) in a given case. And that is why it is so 
difficult to say whether the change can be attributed to the programme. 
The realist approach is based on a ‘generative’ theory of causality: it is not 
programmes that make things change, it is people, embedded in their 
context who, when exposed to programmes, do something to activate 
given mechanisms and change… (Stame 2004:62). 
 
 
TBE accepts there are numerous ways to ‘test’ whether a policy will indeed have 
the impact it is presumed to have. Many times however ‘outputs and outcomes 
are not readily observable, either because it is too early for them to have 
occurred or because they are not easily measurable’ (Carvalho & White 
2004:141). According to Stame (2004:63) what makes TBE such an appropriate 
evaluation response is the fact that it has the capacity to deal with complexity. 
TBE treats reality as complex because it is stratified, and the actors are 
embedded in their own contexts; and each aspect that may be examined and 
dealt with by a programme is multi-faceted. Stame (2004:63-64) emphasises that 
it is always difficult to determine the impact of a single input. In most policies or 
programmes of intervention into social problems, policies and evaluators often 
assume a single, linear chain of influence between definite activities and results.  
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It is also often assumed that what works in one context, could be applied in 
different contexts, expecting the same results. For example, what works in one 
context to effectively address poverty or unemployment, is often duplicated in 
other contexts. Needless to say, the fact that a policy or intervention worked in 
one context, does not imply or secure success in another. This is illustrated by 
Stame when she interrogates an intervention to alleviate poverty by means of 
micro-credit in a specific region in India involving the Grameen Bank (Stame 
2004:67)31.  
 
Often when Policies are evaluated, the evaluators find the Policy to be sound, but 
yet cannot understand why the Policy does not have the envisaged effect. Stame 
(2004:69) indicates that often the ineffectiveness of a Policy is the result of a 
dissonance in its implementation theories (2004:69). Often, according to Stame 
(2004:69), a policy acknowledges the fact that a multi-dimensional problem 
requires a multi-dimensional approach. In analysing such a policy’s 
implementation theories, it is often found that the implementation theories 
assume a mono-causal explanation and strategy (2004:69; italics added). 
  
According to Stame (2004:58), the seminal dissonance between the policy theory 
and its implementation theories are to be found in the ‘black box’ of a policy –
‘The black box is the space between the actual input and the expected output of 
the programme’ (2004:58). In investigating a plane accident it is crucial to find the 
plane’s black box. The black box contains the flight detail up to the moment of 
impact, as well as all voice recordings of the conversations in the cockpit. 
According to Stame (2004) and others (e.g. Van der Knaap 2004:17), TBE allows 
an investigation into the so-called ‘black-box’ of a policy. Van der Knaap 
describes ‘policy theory’ as follows ‘The collection of assumptions on which policy 
measures are based constitutes the policy theory: a system of values, norms, 
assumption’ (2004:29).   
                                            
31 For an insightful exploration of the success of the Graneem Bank in India in the micro-credit 
industry see Stame (2004). 
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The following diagram (Figure 2.5) illustrates the underlying role of the 
‘programme theories’ or ‘black box’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The black box of a policy  
 
Stame (2004) therefore proposes that in comparing the ‘input’ of an intervention 
with the realised ‘output’, the ‘black box’ in the middle is mostly unexplored. This 
‘black box’ however holds the key to understanding policy and its implementation, 
or lack of implementation. 
 
The Kellogg’s Model of Logic Development (W.K. Kellogg Foundation 2001) 
looks at the impact of a programme through an analysis of the outcomes, 
outputs, activities and resources used, as illustrated in Figure 2.6: 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The Kellogg’s Logic Development Model (W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation 2001) 
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According to the Kellogg’s Logic Model (W.K. Kellogg Foundation 2001) an 
analysis of each of the first four different elements or steps can explain the 
significance of step 5, the impact of the programme. If we apply Van der Knaap’s 
(2004:17) definition of the black box of policy theory as ‘A system of values, 
norms, assumptions regarding the causal links between actions and the results of 
actions and preferences’ to the Logic Development Model proposed by Kellogg 
(W.K. Kellogg Foundation 2001) the result looks as follows (Figure 2.7): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: An illustration of the role of the black box of policy theory 
 
TBE (as proposed by Stame 2004 and Van der Knaap 2004) claims that all of 
these different aspects are influenced by the ‘black box’ of programme theories 
or put differently, that the black box impacts on all these different elements of a 
policy and/or programme. 
 
According to Van der Knaap (2004:24), a programme theory (the ‘black box’) has 
a number of functions, namely: 
1. It gives focus. ‘It reduces complexity, which enables the policy maker to 
give her attention to the most important issues and to, indeed, develop a 
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clear vision on how to achieve what’ (2004:24).  This also necessarily has 
the draw-back of the danger of tunnel vision and rigidity. 
2. It also provides a frame of reference for argumentation, implementation 
and the learning processes around policy development. 
 
In following TBE, I will therefore not only explore the discourses that surrounded 
the Policy, but specifically the discourses and assumptions that shaped the 
Policy. In opening up the ‘black box’ of the Policy, it is necessary to explore 
theories underlying the practice of policy analysis as well as looking at the ‘how 
to’ of analysing a policy. 
 
2.5 POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
In my initial naïve understanding of policy analysis, I was confused by the fact 
that the literature on policy analysis in general refers to the analysis as 
encompassing policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. According to 
Dunn (1994:75) there are three forms of policy analysis, namely prospective, 
retrospective and integrated. Prospective policy analysis refers to the processes 
before policy actions are initiated, retrospective policy analysis occurs after policy 
actions and integrated policy analysis before and after policy actions. There are 
furthermore different models of doing a policy analysis.  
 
One of the models of doing a policy analysis is the rational model as described 
and criticised by Spicker (2006). Spicker (2006:33) describes the ‘rational model’ 
of policy making as proceeding in the following stages: 
1. Assessment of the environment 
2. Identification of aims and objectives 
3. Consideration of the alternative methods which are available 
4. Selection of methods 
5. Implementation 
6. Evaluation 
 89
 
Spicker (2006:34) criticises the rational model of policy making and says 
although it is ‘systematic and explicit’ it demands more from policy makers ‘than 
may be practical or feasible; the examination of alternative approaches and their 
consequences is time-consuming, expensive and often speculative’. The rational 
model of policy making also gives the impression that ‘there is a smooth 
progression from one stage of policy making to the next’ (Spicker 2006:34). 
Spicker’s third criticism against the rational model is that ‘it ignores the realities of 
policy making. Policy makers learn as they go along, and even if they do not 
learn, the things they do are likely to be changed by the experience of doing 
them’ (2006:34). 
 
Another model of doing policy analysis is the ‘eight-step model’ as proposed by 
Bardach (1996). Acknowledging that his proposed eight-step framework may be 
too mechanistic, Bardach proposes some specific steps to remind the analyst ‘of 
important tasks and choices’ (1996:1). His eight-step process looks as follows: 
1. Define the problem 
2. Assemble some evidence 
3. Construct the alternatives 
4. Select the criteria 
5. Project the outcomes 
6. Confront the tradeoffs 
7. Decide! 
8. Tell your story 
 
Bardach (1996:4) suggests the analyst’s final product to contain the following: 
In a coherent narrative style you will describe some problem that needs to 
be mitigated or solved; you will lay out a few alternative courses of action 
which might be taken; to each course of action you will attach a set of 
projected outcomes that you think your client or audience would care 
about, suggesting the evidentiary grounds for your projections; if no 
alternative dominates all other alternatives with respect to all the 
evaluative criteria of interest, you will indicate the nature and magnitude of 
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the tradeoffs implicit in different policy choices; depending on the client’s 
expectations, you might state your own recommendations as to which 
alternative should be chosen. 
 
He warns however that the problem-solving process is iterative ‘so that you 
usually must repeat each of these steps, sometimes more than once’ (1996:2). 
Dunn proposes that ‘Problem solving is a key element of the methodology of 
policy analysis’ (Dunn 1994:2). Wildavsky (1987:2-3) is however critical of the 
problem-based nature of most policy analysis. He says ‘…formulating the 
problem was more like the end than the beginning of analysis’ (1987:3). He 
continues to state: ‘Policy analysis, however, is one activity for which there can 
be no fixed program, for policy analysis is synonymous with creativity, which may 
be stimulated by theory and sharpened by practice, which can be learned but not 
taught’ (Wildavsky 1987:3). 
 
Dunn (1994:14) proposes a ‘procedural’ five-step model for policy analysis that 
incorporates five procedures, namely ‘definition’ (problem structuring – conditions 
that gave rise to the policy problem), ‘prediction’ (forecasting – the future 
consequences of acting on policy alternatives – including nothing), ‘prescription’ 
(recommendation – the relative or worth of these future consequences in solving 
or alleviating the problem), ‘description’ (monitoring – yields information about the 
present and past consequences of acting on policy alternatives), and ‘evaluation’ 
(provides information about the value or worth of these consequences in solving 
or alleviating the problem).  
 
Dunn (1994:17) illustrates the different policy-analytic procedures to different 
phases of policy-making as follows (Figure 2.8): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: The different phases of policy analysis (Source: Dunn 1994:17) 
 
Let us briefly consider the different phases as proposed by Dunn (1994).  
Problem structuring: According to Dunn the process of actually identifying and 
describing the problem is crucial. Structuring the problem  
can supply policy-relevant knowledge that challenges the assumptions 
underlying the definition of problems reaching the policy-making process 
through agenda setting. Problem structuring can assist in discovering 
hidden assumptions, diagnosing causes, mapping possible objectives, 
synthesizing conflicting views, and designing new policy options (Dunn 
1994:17; italics in the original). 
 
Dunn proposes the following phases of problem structuring namely problem 
search, problem definition, problem specification, and problem sensing (Dunn 
1994:148). He illustrates it as follows (Figure 2.9): 
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Figure 2.9: Problem structuring (Dunn 1994:148) 
 
The ‘problem situation…‘is the recognition or “felt existence” of a problem 
situation’ (Dunn 1994:148; italics in the original).  Dunn describes the 
development as follows: 
In moving from the problem situation the analyst engages in problem 
search. At this stage, the goal is not the discovery of a single problem…; it 
is rather the discovery of the many problem representations of multiple 
policy stakeholders. Practicing analysts normally face a large, tangled 
network of competing problem formulations which are dynamic, socially 
constructed, and distributed throughout the policy-making process. In 
effect, analysts are faced with a metaproblem – a problem-of-problems 
that is ill structured because the domain of problem representations held 
by diverse stakeholders seems unmanageably huge (italics in the original). 
 
According to Dunn (1994:149) the analyst moves from the problem situation to 
acknowledging the metaproblem. Only then does the analyst move to the 
substantive problem defining the problem ‘in its most basic and general terms’ 
(Dunn 1994:149). With regard to defining the ‘substantive problem’, Dunn warns 
(1999:149) that the analyst’s worldview would influence his or her selection and 
definition of the substantive problem. 
 
Once a substantive problem has been defined, a more detailed and specific 
‘formal problem’ may be constructed. The process of moving from substantive to 
formal problem ‘is carried out through problem specification…’ (Dunn 1994:150). 
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According to Dunn (1999:150) the analyst moves from the substantive problem to 
the formal problem through the development of ‘a formal mathematical 
representation (model) of the substantive problem. … Most methods for 
specifying problems in formal mathematical terms are inappropriate for ill-
structured problems, where the main task is not to obtain the correct 
mathematical solution but to define the nature of the problem itself’. 
 
Dunn emphasises the necessity to deal with the various phases of defining the 
policy problem with care. It speaks of ‘errors of the third type (E)’. He explains it 
as follows: 
A critical issue of problem structuring is how well substantive and formal 
problems actually correspond to the original problem situation. If most 
problem situations in fact contain whole systems of problems (messes), 
then a central requirement of policy analysis is the formulation of 
substantive and formal problems that adequately represent that 
complexity. The degree of correspondence between a given problem 
situation and a substantive problem is determined at the problem definition 
phase. Here the analyst compares characteristics of the problem situation 
and the substantive problem, which is often based on implicit assumptions 
or beliefs about human nature, time, and the possibilities for social change 
through government action. Equally important, however, is the degree of 
correspondence between the problem situation and the formal problem, 
which is often specified in the form of a mathematical formula or a set of 
equations (Dunn 1994:151). 
 
He continues to explain the margins for error on the different levels of the 
problem definition.  If analysts, for example, fail to engage with the problem 
search or stop prematurely, they ‘run the risk of choosing the wrong boundaries 
of the metaproblem’ (Dunn 1994:151). Dunn describes Type III error by referring 
to the work by decision theorist Howard Raiffa (Dunn 1994:151). Error of the first 
type is when a researcher rejects the null hypothesis when it is true, or accepts 
the null hypothesis when it is false or ‘practitioners all too often make errors of a 
third kind: solving the wrong problem’. 
 
Only once the problem has been defined does the analyst move to policy 
formulation, which involves forecasting. According to Dunn (1994:151), 
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forecasting ‘can provide policy-relevant knowledge about future states of affairs 
which are likely to occur as a consequence of adopting alternatives, including 
nothing, that are under consideration at the phase of policy formulation’ (italics in 
the original). 
 
‘Forecasting’ as described by Dunn (1994) and Spicker (2006) also involves 
considering non-intervention. ‘Policy analysts routinely have to consider what the 
effects of non-intervention might be, even when non-intervention is not genuinely 
being considered a policy option’ (Spicker 2006:111). 
 
In the language of Bardach’s (1996) eight-step analysis, what Dunn (1994) and 
Spicker (2004) describe under ‘forecasting’, Bardach lists as 
1. Construct the alternatives 
2. Select the criteria 
3. Project the outcomes 
4. Confront the tradeoffs (1996:25). 
 
With regard to selecting criteria, Bardach warns that criteria for choosing between 
policy options should be applied to outcomes not alternatives (1996:25).  Criteria 
usually include comparisons in cost-effectiveness, or benefit-cost analysis, or 
efficiency, or values like equality, equity, fairness, justice. Bardach (1996:45) 
proposes a matrix in which the alternatives and their outcomes are listed and the 
outcomes evaluated against the criteria. His proposal looks as follows (Table 
2.1): 
 
 Criterion 1: 
 
Criterion 2: Criterion 3: Criterion 4: 
Alternative 1: 
Outcome 1 
Outcome 2 
    
Alternative 2: 
Outcome 1 
Outcome 2 
    
Alternative 3: 
Outcome 1 
Outcome 2 
    
Alternative 4:     
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Outcome 1 
Outcome 2 
 
Table 2.1: Considering the outcomes of different policy alternatives 
according to set criteria 
 
According to Dunn (1994:18) only once the alternatives have been considered, 
the analyst gets to ‘recommendation’. ‘Recommendation helps estimate levels of 
risk and uncertainty, identify externalities and spillovers, specific criteria for 
making choices, and assign administrative responsibility for implementing 
policies’ (Dunn 1994:18). ‘Monitoring’ in the implementation phase ‘provides 
policy-relevant knowledge about the consequences of previous adopted 
policies… and helps assess degrees of compliance, identify implementational 
obstacles and constraints, and locate sources of responsibility for departures 
from policies’ (Dunn 1994:19).Policy ‘evaluation…yields policy-relevant 
knowledge about the discrepancies between expected and actual policy 
performance’ (Dunn 1994:19). 
 
In analysing a policy, it is important to demarcate the policy argument which 
functions as ‘main vehicle for conducting debates about public policy issues’ 
(Dunn 1994:66). Policy arguments, according to Dunn (1994) have six elements, 
namely 
1. Policy-relevant information (I): all evidence at the analyst’s disposal. 
‘Information about policy problems, policy futures, policy actions, policy 
outcomes, and policy performance.’ 
2. Policy-claim (C): The conclusion of a policy argument. The claim follows 
on the policy information by implying ‘therefore…’. ‘Hence, policy claims 
are the logical consequence of policy-relevant information’ (Dunn 
1994:66). 
3. Warrant (W): ‘… an assumption in a policy argument which permits the 
analyst to move from policy-relevant information to policy claim’ and ‘The 
role of the warrant is to carry policy-relevant information to a policy claim 
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about which there is disagreement or conflict, thus providing a reason for 
accepting the claim’ (Dunn 1994:66; italics in the original). 
4. Backing (B): ‘additional assumptions or claims or rebuttals form the 
substance of policy issues… The consideration of rebuttals helps the 
analyst anticipate objections and serves as a systematic means for 
criticising one’s own claims, assumptions, and arguments’ (Dunn 
1994:68). 
5. Qualifier (Q): ‘expresses the degree to which the analyst is certain about a 
policy claim’ – expressed in the ‘language of probability’ (Dunn 1994:68)32. 
 
Figure 2.10 illustrates the different elements of the policy argument as Dunn 
proposes (1994:68): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: The different elements of a policy argument (Dunn 1994:68) 
 
In the next section I will tentatively apply Dunn’s (1994) proposal on how to 
analyse the policy argument to the Policy. The following figure (Figure 2.11) 
provides a glimpse of my analysis using Dunn’s proposal. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
32 In my analysis of the Policy in Chapter 6 I will use these elements proposed by Dunn (1994) to 
analyse the Policy-argument.  
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Figure 2.11: An example of applying Dunn’s policy argument schema 
 
 
2.6 ETHICAL AND QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Patton (2002a:542) explores ‘five contrasting, and to some extent competing, 
sets of criteria’ with which to evaluate the quality of a qualitative inquiry. Each of 
those sets of criteria flows from specific perspectives or philosophical frameworks 
for research. Patton (2002a:542) lists the five frameworks as follows: 
• Traditional scientific research criteria 
• Social constructivism and constructivist criteria 
• Artistic and evocative criteria 
• Critical change criteria 
• Evaluation standards and principles (utilitarian). 
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Patton (2002b: 265-266) also states ‘diverse approaches to qualitative inquiry… 
remind us that issues of quality and credibility intersect with audience and 
intended inquiry purposes’ (italics in the original). Patton (2002b: 268-269) 
continues then to list the criteria originating in the five different approaches to and 
frameworks of research as follows: 
Traditional Scientific Research Criteria 
• Objectivity of the inquirer (attempt to minimize bias) 
•  Validity of the data 
•  Systematic rigor of fieldwork procedures 
•  Triangulation (consistency of findings across methods and data sources) 
•  Reliability of codings and pattern analyses 
•  Correspondence of findings to reality 
•  Generalisability (external validity) 
•  Strength of evidence supporting causal hypotheses 
•  Contributions to theory 
 
Constructivist Criteria 
• Subjectivity acknowledged (discuss and take into account biases) 
•  Trustworthiness 
•  Authenticity 
•  Triangulation (capturing and respecting multiple perspectives) 
•  Reflexivity 
•  Praxis 
•  Particularity (doing justice to the integrity of unique cases) 
•  Enhanced and deepened understanding (verstehen) 
•  Contributions to dialogue 
 
Artistic and Evocative Criteria 
• Opens the world to us in some way 
•  Creativity 
•  Aesthetic quality 
•  Interpretive vitality 
•  Flows from self; embedded in lived experience 
•  Stimulating 
•  Provocative 
•  Connects with and moves the audience 
•  Voice distinct, expressive 
•  Feels ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ or ‘real’ 
 
Critical Change Criteria 
•  Critical perspective: Increases consciousness about injustices 
• Identifies nature and sources of inequalities and injustices 
•  Represents the perspective of the less powerful 
• Makes visible the ways in which those with more power exercise and 
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benefit from power 
•  Engages those with less power respectfully and collaboratively 
•  Builds the capacity of those involved to take action 
•  Identifies potential change-making strategies 
• Praxis 
•  Clear historical and values context 
•  Consequential validity 
 
Pragmatic, Utilitarian Evaluation Standards 
•  Utility 
•  Feasibility 
•  Propriety 
•  Accuracy (balance) 
•  Systematic inquiry 
•  Evaluator competence 
•  Integrity/honesty 
•  Respect for people (fairness) 
•  Contributions to program improvements 
•  Responsibility to the general public welfare (taking into account diversity 
of interests and values) 
 
The methodology I propose is situated in Patton’s (2002b: 267) ‘social 
construction and constructivist’ approach, but my approach also borrows 
selectively from the other four approaches. In discussing the possibility of mixing 
perspectives and approaches to research, Patton (2002b: 272) states that 
although various mixes are possible and even desirable in certain contexts, a 
particular research project is often dominated by one paradigm and supported by 
others33.  
 
 The following figure (Figure 2.12) illustrates my approach to these criteria: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
33 For a discussion on the inherent dangers in mixing approaches see Patton (2002b:273). 
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Figure 2.12: Research quality criteria 
 
In this study I hope to provide evidence of the systematic rigour of my thought 
processes and interpretation of data as well as contribute to the discourses in the 
study of religion and the field of policy analysis (traditional scientific research 
criteria).  I also hope that the way I engage with this research has a certain 
aesthetic quality as well as interpretive vitality, that it would provide evidence of 
another way of looking at religion and the study of religion as well as provoke and 
stimulate critical interrogation (artistic and evocative criteria). This research as 
situated in critical theory and critical pedagogy also borrows from ‘critical change 
criteria’ trying to make visible the Policy as the result of power and ideological 
struggles over meaning-making. My historical and reflexive analysis of the 
evolving discourses resulting in the Policy will attempt to provide evidence of 
‘consequential validity’. This Policy analysis is also embedded in the ‘pragmatic 
and utilitarian’ framework and may result in ‘program improvements’.  
 
The criteria flowing from a constructivist approach to research is however central 
in my research. I have already acknowledged my subjectivity and have outlined 
my assumptions and biases. By sharing my biases and personal history, I hope 
to build rapport with the reader as well as increase the trustworthiness and 
authenticity of this account. I have gathered data from a range of sources, official 
documentation, scholarly articles, newspaper articles as well as engagement with 
my supervisors in an attempt to triangulate different opinions and multiple 
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perspectives.  The format and the content of this thesis will speak of a personal 
approach to reflexivity and particularity and will hopefully result in increased 
understanding (verstehen).  Finally I hope this thesis in whatever small way 
should contribute to the dialogues surrounding the Policy and its implementation.  
 
Patton (2002b:277) points to and discusses a number of major developments in 
the field of qualitative inquiry and states that concerns about the ethical 
dimensions of qualitative inquiry was one of the major developments in the last 
two decades. Patton (2002b:278) warns that researchers can never fully foresee 
what impact their research will have on their own lives, and those whom they 
interviewed or observed. Revealing identities and personal communication 
between researcher and research participants can open up spaces of paradox 
and clashing interests. Guillemin and Gilliam (2004) reflect on the importance 
and impact of ‘ethically important moments’ in doing research. These moments, 
according to Guillemin and Gilliam (2004: 264) are the moments when 
researchers are confronted with making a choice regarding information or data, 
whether to reveal or rephrase, to protect or reveal, etc. Ellis (2007), Moore (2007) 
and Coghian (2001) explore the difficult spaces confronting researchers in these 
choices of revealing as well as the impact these choices have on researchers, 
their contexts, their research as well as the often- unintended consequences of 
research.  
 
In doing this research I did not expect many of these ‘ethically important 
moments’. At the start of the research I foresaw the research as a ‘straight-
forward’ analysis of the Policy – its contents and the processes that resulted in its 
formulation and acceptance. Although I had access to ‘insider’ correspondence 
and documentation, I could not foresee that referring to their content would be 
controversial or embarrassing. As my interrogation of the processes and the 
inclusion/exclusion of persons and concepts developed, the more I was 
confronted with ‘ethically important moments’. The Policy as ‘official discourse of 
the state’ (Codd 1988; Taylor 1997) brought to the fore political claims and 
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counter-claims, the impact of personal views and biases of public figures on the 
formulation of the Policy and its processes as well as the dynamic interplay 
between the often ‘invisible’ members of various committees and task-teams.  
 
I was firstly confronted with deciding on the necessity of revealing detail of 
correspondence that provide an interesting picture of the nature of policy 
development in the South African context. Revealing the detail would possibly 
have embarrassed the involved parties. And, as I reflected on the possibilities, 
the revelation does not alter my findings regarding the Policy. The information in 
question was mainly informative in nature and not really critical in the focus of my 
research. I therefore decided not to refer to the information. Should the focus of 
my research have been different, then I may have decided differently or have 
pursued other avenues of addressing these ethical dilemmas. 
 
The second ethical dilemma I faced was how much of my personal history to 
reveal. The inclusion of aspects of a ‘narrative methodology’ (Noy 2003) posed 
the question of deciding on what to share. My decision to include some aspects 
and exclude others was shaped by the specific focus of this research project. My 
choice of research focus specifically dealt with religion and education in the 
context of citizenship. I therefore excluded detail that does not inform my possible 
biases and assumptions.  
 
2.7 NEXT STEPS 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to provide a rationale for choosing a mix of 
methodologies, ranging from critical discourse analysis, theory-based evaluation 
as well as using the different elements of a policy argument as proposed by Dunn 
(1994). The following figure (Figure 2.13) attempts to illustrate the application of 
these different phases or aspects of my approach to a critical evaluation of the 
Policy: 
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Figure 2.13: An overview of the different aspects of the proposed 
methodology 
 
The Policy was formulated as part of a broader strategy addressing specific 
problems in the post-1994 South Africa (as indicated by point 2 in Figure 2.13).  
From a deeply divided and stratified society (as explored in point 1 in Figure 
2.13), education took up the call to prepare children for a specific democratically 
defined citizenship. The broader strategy included the general philosophy of 
Outcomes-based education, the five broad themes running across all the 
curricula, and specifically the inclusion of the study of religions in the Life-
orientation theme (represented by point 3 and the three arrows A, B, and C in 
Figure 2.13). As such the Policy considered a number of alternatives and made a 
number of choices. It is important to note that the Policy was also part of a 
broader strategy in other sectors of government to create a new vision of a 
shared democracy (e.g. the new national anthem and flag; new holidays, etc). All 
these strategies and interventions had one shared purpose and that was and still 
is to embody and strengthen the values as embodied in the South African 
Constitution (Republic of South Africa 1996).  
 
At the start of this chapter I have already motivated that the goal of this study is 
not to estimate the impact of the Policy on contributing to a more critical citizenry 
(point 5 in Figure 2.13). This study will be mainly concerned with points 1-5 in 
Figure 2.13. This critical evaluation of the Policy is focused on how the Policy 
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choices and alternatives (point 3 in Figure 2.13) are shaped by the ‘black box’ of 
the Policy (point 4 in Figure 2.13) in addressing the Policy problem (point 2 in 
Figure 2.13).  
 
The only question to resolve before continuing is to establish the role of the 
literature review in this methodology. Weimer and Vining (1989:309) propose a 
very useful outline of how an analyst can combine a literature review in doing a 
policy analysis (Figure 2.14).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: A policy analysis process (Weimer & Vining 1989:309) 
 
According to the process proposed by Weimer and Vining (1989) the role of the 
literature review in a policy analysis process is a continuing part of the whole 
process. From the usual starting point of deciding to analyse a policy (point 1 in 
Figure 2.14), an initial literature review follows (point 2 in Figure 2.14). As 
Weimer and Vining (1999) suggest, ‘documents lead to documents’, ‘documents 
lead to people’ and ‘people lead to documents’. In Chapter 1 as well as in this 
chapter a literature review was very much part and parcel of this study. As the 
study progressed and the choice of a methodology became clearer, so the focus 
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of the literature review changed accordingly. I often experienced that one literary 
resource led to another. I also found in my interactions with my promoters and 
colleagues, that they often referred me to very valuable literary resources. In my 
frequent meetings with colleagues and supervisors, I also could bring what I’ve 
found to the discussions. The literature review as formal part of this study is 
therefore a reiterative process accompanying this research (point 4 in Figure 
2.14). 
 
Although the next chapter, Chapter 3 will fulfil the formal role of a literature 
review, an exploration of the discourses surrounding and resulting in the Policy 
will require a continuing process of interrogating a variety of sources and data as 
we progress. 
 
Chapter 3 (to follow) will specifically explore three overlapping interests, namely 
critical theory and critical pedagogy, the discourses in and surrounding  
Religionswissenschaft or the study of religion and then finally interrogate the 
notion of a critical study of religion. 
 
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter was called ‘In search of a methodology’ – sharing the insecurities of 
not exactly knowing how to approach the research question, but also sharing my 
journey in finding an appropriate and personally fulfilling methodology. While the 
‘how’ of my research was unclear at the start of this study, the rationale for 
engaging in this research (the ‘why’) was clear from the beginning.  
 
I acknowledged that the research question is on the one hand arising from 
personal experiences of the role of religion and politics in defining my personal 
identity and citizenship, and on the other hand interrogates religion and its role in 
the national and international discourses on redefining citizenship. 
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As this chapter closes, my search for an appropriate and fulfilling methodology 
has been rewarded with a clear picture of how I intend to engage with critically 
evaluating the Policy. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I will share an overview of 
selected literature that will shape my analysis and evaluation of the Policy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL EVALUATION  
 
….no statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not 
be credible in the presence of burning children.  
 
(Greenberg quoted in Wollaston, I. 1992. ‘What can – and cannot – be 
said’: religious language after the Holocaust, Journal of literature and 
theology, 6(1):47-56). 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Starting out on this journey I included ‘critical’ in the title of this thesis34. On the 
one hand, ‘critical’ seemed to be assumed in an academic and scholarly 
enterprise such as doctoral studies and secondly, the act of evaluating in itself 
presumed a certain measure of criticality. This chapter provides a literature 
review in two distinct areas, namely critical theory and critical pedagogy as a 
general framework for a critical evaluation of the Policy. This study is however 
located in the specific domain of Religious Studies. After exploring critical theory 
and critical pedagogy, the focus will move to different approaches to the study of 
religion. In a third change of register, this chapter will then attempt to explore the 
overlaps between critical theory, critical pedagogy and the study of religion.  
 
The following figure (Figure 3.1) attempts to illustrate our journey in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
34 My first introduction into critical curriculum studies was through the works of Peter McLaren and 
Da Silva (e.g. 1993), Henry Giroux (e.g., 1992, 1993), Paulo Freire (1973, 1989), bell hooks 
(1994) and Michael Apple (2004). Each of these authors uniquely contributed to my thinking 
critically about education. All of them trace their own notions of criticality back to one theoretical 
base, namely critical theory. 
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Figure 3.1: An overview of Chapter 3 
 
 
3.2 INTRODUCING CRITICAL THEORY 
 
Critical theory is but one of many of the theories of the 20th century. Sim and Van 
Loon (2004) also mention structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, 
postmodernism, cultural materialism, postcolonialism, feminism, black criticism 
and queer theory. Critical theory, its scope, authors and main aims are also 
contested, discredited and at times severely criticised (Poster 1989; Sim & Van 
Loon 2004)35.   
 
Sim and Van Loon (2004) provide a very basic overview of all the different voices 
and movements within the broad framework of critical theory, Higgs (1995) 
discusses critical theory as one of the ‘metatheories in philosophy of education’ 
and Phillips (2000) engages with critical theory and explores certain 
Grundebegriffe, or ‘grounding concepts’ in critical theory.  Rasmussen (1996) as 
editor of The handbook of critical theory, has selected a number of authors 
exploring different tenets of critical theory while How (2003) approaches critical 
theory in exploring its development in a time-linear fashion from the early days at 
the Institute of Social Research to a discussion of critical theory and 
                                            
35 For a discussion of the crises and challenges critical theory faces see Poster 1989 and Ray 
1993.  
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postmodernism. Authors also emphasise different aspects of the origins of critical 
theory. While Rasmussen (1996) emphasises the origin of critical theory in the 
work of Marx, How (2003) emphasises the shaping of critical theory at the 
Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, while Phillips (2000) traces some of the 
Grundebegriffe of critical theory back to the works of Plato36. Rasmussen 
(1996:11) describes critical theory as 
A metaphor for a certain kind of theoretical orientation which owes its 
origin to Kant, Hegel and Marx, its systematisation to Horkheimer and his 
associates at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, and its 
development to successors, particularly to the group led by Jürgen 
Habermas, who have sustained it under various redefinitions to the 
present day. As a term, critical theory is both general and specific. In 
general it refers to that critical element in German philosophy which began 
with Hegel’s critique of Kant. More specifically it is associated with a 
certain orientation towards philosophy which found its twentieth-century 
expression in Frankfurt.  
 
Apple (2004:182) states ‘…critical theory was an attempt to think through the 
relationship between culture, forms of domination, and society. It began as a 
cultural/political analysis of capitalist mass culture and then stretched beyond 
capitalism and its social forms…’ The different gestalts of critical theory are 
illustrated by an overview provided by Sim and Van Loon (2004:24-25) (Figure 
3.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
36 As I engaged with these different approaches, two concerns became paramount. The first 
concern related to the immensity (and often complexity) of information available in the field of 
critical theory. The second concern related to how to relate this myriad of opinions and voices to 
forming a foundation for my own critical approach. From Marx to Adorno, from Hegel to Plato and 
back to Horkheimer and Habermas I struggled to grasp the essential elements of such a vast and 
complex discourse and how to relate these elements to formulating my own approach to 
evaluation.  
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Figure 3.2: Mapping the origins of critical theory (Sims & Van Loon 2004:24-
25) 
 
This overview provided by Sim and Van Loon (2004:24-25) reveals critical theory 
as multi-facetted and containing many different emphases. To think of critical 
theory as a homogenous theory and its different theorists speaking in ‘one voice’ 
is a non-starter. The non-homogenous nature of critical theory also prevents 
engaging with the Policy from a singular ‘critical theory perspective’.   
 
According to Sim and Van Loon (2004:26, 60) the two major influences in critical 
theory can be attributed to Marx and Freud. Nel (1995), on the other hand 
identifies the contribution by Horkheimer as seminal in the development of critical 
theory (1995:124) and points to the fact that none of the members of the 
Frankfurt School had any political affiliations. Nel (1995:125) also acknowledges 
the influence of Marx on critical theory, but emphasises that the members of the 
Frankfurt School also relied heavily on ‘traditional philosophers’ like Hegel and 
Nietzsche.   
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According to Rasmussen critical theory ‘bears the stamp of the nascent optimism 
of the nineteenth century; a critical theory can change society’ (1996:11). 
Rasmussen quotes Marx who said in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach 
‘Philosophers have always interpreted the world, the point is to change it’ 
(Rasmussen 1996:11). The starting point for this transformation of society was to 
be found in a ‘process of self-reflection’ in which the ‘very agents of that reflection 
to a further task, namely, the transformation of society through revolution’ 
(Rasmussen 1996:11-12). Reflection would allow theory to be allied to praxis with 
a ‘proper political end, namely, social transformation’ (Rasmussen 1996:12). 
Finlayson (2005:3) writes of this element of reflectivity in critical theory and states 
‘A critical theory reflected on the social context that gave rise to it, on its own 
function within that society, and on the purposes and interest of its practitioners, 
and so forth, and such reflections were built into the theory’. 
 
The transformative intentions of critical theory are ‘able to unearth the false 
presumptions that had held humanity in its sway’ (Rasmussen 1996:13). 
According to Rasmussen, Marx used terms like ‘ideology’, ‘fetishism’ and ‘secret’ 
… ‘as if there was some ominous conspiracy against humankind which a certain 
kind of critical and theoretical orientation could unmask’ (Rasmussen 1996:13). 
Although Rasmussen attests that ‘a valid constitutive ground for critical theory 
began with Marx himself’ (1996:14), it is the ‘systematization of critical theory as 
model of reflection’ that owes its life to the Frankfurt School (Rasmussen 
1996:15). In the early days of the Frankfurt School Marxism was ‘the guiding 
principle’ (Rasmussen 1996:16). Finlayson (2005:1-2) states that Hegelian-
Marxism, at that time, was an ‘intellectual minority, opposed to the reigning 
European tradition of neo-Kantianism, and the Anglo-Austrian tradition of logical 
empiricism’. Modern critical theory was sparked ‘by the demise of the working 
class as an organ of appropriate revolutionary knowledge and action coupled 
with the rise of fascism and the emergence of Stalinisation’ (Rasmussen 
1996:17). Horkheimer’s 1937 attempt to define ‘theory’ steered critical theory in 
the direction of epistemology and would ‘change permanently the distinction and 
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approach of critical theory’ (Rasmussen 1996:19). According to Horkheimer, ‘…a 
theory is critical only if it meets three criteria: it must be explanatory, practical, 
and normative, all at the same time. That is, it must explain what is wrong with 
current social reality, identify actors to change it, and provide clear norms for 
criticism and practical goals for the future’ (Bohman 1996:190). Where the 
agency of social transformation since Marx was seen to reside with the 
proletariat, Horkheimer now questioned whether the proletariat has in fact the 
‘correct knowledge’ that would allow them to rise above the imposed social 
structures (Rasmussen 1996:20). 
 
The post-1937 period in critical theory heralded a pessimism ‘about the future of 
the course of rationality, but also a loss of hope in the potentialities of a 
philosophy of history for purposes of social transformation’ (Rasmussen 
1996:22). Reason lost its ‘redemptive and reconciliatory possibilities’ and could 
only ‘be purposive, useful and calculating’ (Rasmussen 1996:22). Where the 
Enlightenment promised emancipation and freedom from domination, now 
Horkheimer and Adorno proposed that the dialectic of the Enlightenment, while 
harbouring the promise of emancipation, forms in certain hands, ‘the basis for the 
domination of other human beings’ (Rasmussen 1996:23). Into this fairly 
pessimistic outlook enters Habermas who found that ‘this unwarranted 
pessimism, blunted the critical aim of social theory’ (Finlayson 2005:7). In his 
appraisal whether Habermas indeed contributed to the critical aspect of critical 
theory, Finlayson states the following: 
Habermas is offering a social theory, and theories do not prescribe 
remedies. … In The theory of communicative action Habermas is frank in 
his assessment that there is no agent, collective or individual that is up to 
the task [of transforming social life]. …Habermas denies that theories can, 
or ever could be, critical in the Marxian sense of precipitating a revolution. 
Habermas has a much more modest conception of what social theory can 
be expected to achieve. Social theories are at best useful diagnostic tools 
that help us differentiate between the harmful and progressive tendencies 
in modern society (Finlayson 2005:58-59). 
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Habermas explores critical theory’s emancipatory project in his work Structural 
Transformation (1989) from the background of the public reasoning forums of 
18th century Europe. These public discussions and participation were 
characterised by voluntary engagement, united in a common aim namely to form 
a conception of the common good (Finlayson 2005:10). In the public sphere 
ideologies somehow induce people to believe in them and according to 
Habermas, they are ‘socially necessary’ (Finlayson 2005:11). Habermas 
continues to chart the gradual disintegration of the public sphere in becoming ‘an 
arena in which public opinion could be stage-managed and manipulated’ 
(Finlayson 2005:13). 
 
Adorno proposed that critical theory’s role was to ‘equip individuals with the 
capacities that would enable them to resist integration into the fateful 
homogenizing institutions of capitalist society’ (Finlayson 2005:14-15). These 
capacities should allow individuals to grow into the Kantian concept of Mündigkeit 
(maturity). Mündigkeit for Adorno meant resistance to coercive forces and the 
commercialisation of education (French & Thomas 1999:2). In a radio discussion 
with Hellmut Becker in 1969, Adorno explored Mündigkeit against its Kantian 
opposite namely Unmündigkeit (French & Thomas 1999:4). Unmündigkeit 
referred to the inability of a person to make choices without direction from 
another. As such Unmündigkeit refers to another Kantian term heteronomy – as 
the opposite for autonomy. The difference between Unmündigkeit and Mündigkeit 
(as proposed by Adorno) is explained by French and Thomas (1999:4) as 
follows: ‘Mature and rational individuals are autonomous, setting their own path, 
the rules they will follow, guided only by responsible consideration and reflection. 
Tutelage, subordination, heteronomy, are the opposite: following the dictates of 
another’. 
 
In the interview between Adorno and Becker, Adorno refers to Unmündigkeit as 
resembling children who cannot act without a guardian or the Kantian metaphor 
of people in tutelage being like domestic cattle ‘dumb, placid, unable to move 
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without direction, comfortable only when wearing a yoke’ (French & Thomas 
1999:4)37.  
  
Habermas, by contrast to Kant and Adorno, ‘wants to identify the social and 
institutional conditions that foster autonomy: emancipation means the creation of 
truly democratic institutions capable of withstanding the corrosive effects of 
capitalism and state administration’ (Finlayson 2005:15). If I understand 
Finlayson’s exposition (2005) of Habermas correctly, it would seem as if the 
creation of truly democratic institutions therefore, according to Habermas, 
depended on a populace who were mature, engaging with one another according 
to the rules of the discourse. Equipping people for this Mündigkeit required 
different kinds of knowledge – theoretical, practical and critical (Finlayson 
2005:18). Each of these three different kinds of knowledge shape different 
frameworks and serve different human interests. 
Theoretical knowledge is based on the human interest in technical control 
over nature; practical and moral knowledge is based on the human 
interest in understanding one another; while critical social theory and 
psychoanalysis are based respectively on the collective and individual 
interest in emancipation, in freedom from illusion, in autonomy 
(Mündigkeit), and the realisation of the good life (Finlayson 2005:18)38. 
 
 
In Habermas’ works The Theory of communicative action (1984, 1987) and Moral 
consciousness and communicative action (1990) he explores the role (and limits) 
of communication and discourse which, if I understand him correctly, forms the 
foundation for institutional democracy. Habermas states that discourse is ‘a 
reflective form of speech that aims at reaching a rationally motivated consensus’ 
(1984:42). Even if no consensus is forthcoming, discourse is always aimed at 
reaching consensus. Habermas (1990:86) establishes certain rules for successful 
discourse. On the first level there are the basic and semantic rules ‘such as the 
                                            
37 For a further exploration of Adorno’s views on Unmündigkeit and Mündigkeit, see the 
discussion of the interview between Adorno and Becker as reported on by French and Thomas 
(1999).  
38 Uljens (2006) plots the discourses surrounding Mündigkeit against the broader background of 
the concepts of Bildung and the relation between education and society.  
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principle of non-contradiction and the requirement of consistency’ (Finlayson 
2005:43). On the second level, there are norms governing procedure, ‘such as 
the principle of sincerity, namely that every participant must undertake to assert 
only what she genuinely believes; and the principle of accountability, that 
participants undertake either to justify upon request what they assert or to 
provide reasons for not offering a justification’ (Finlayson 2005:43). On a third 
level ‘the norms immunize the process of discourse against coercion, repression, 
and inequality’ (Finlayson 2005:43). These rules, according to Habermas, will 
ensure that the ‘unforced force of the better argument wins out’ (1990:89). 
 
I will now turn to critical pedagogy to explore how critical pedagogy shares the 
emancipatory project with critical theory and how these two movements differ.  
 
Apple states that ‘educational institutions provide one of the major mechanisms 
through which power is maintained and challenged’ (Apple 2004: vii). The 
question remains mainly an epistemological one, having changed from “What 
knowledge is the most worth?’ to ‘Whose knowledge is the most worth?’ (Apple 
2004: xix). It would therefore seem that critical pedagogy at least continues the 
epistemological quest of critical theory and in its own way embodies critical 
theory in praxis. 
 
According to Burbules and Berk (1999), critical thinking and critical pedagogy 
share common concerns:  
They both imagine a general population in society who are to some extent 
deficient in the abilities or dispositions that would allow them to discern 
certain kinds of inaccuracies, distortions, and falsehoods limit freedom, 
though this concern is more explicit in the critical pedagogy traditions, 
which sees society as fundamentally divided by relations of unequal power 
(1999:46). 
 
While Apple (2004:27) asks ‘Should schools, guided by a vision of a more just 
society, teach a particular set of social meanings to their students?’ the question 
is actually a non-starter. Schools throughout the ages have taught and shaped 
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generations of young people. To teach is per se a political act as Apple, himself, 
states – ‘…the educator was involved, whether he or she was conscious of it or 
not, in a political act’ (Apple 2004:1). I therefore now turn to explore critical 
pedagogy in my search to define my own criticality39. 
 
3.3 INTRODUCING CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
 
In his introduction to critical pedagogy, Kanpol (1994) links critical pedagogy to 
critical theory by saying that critical pedagogy involves the ‘doing of critical 
theory’ (1994:27). He continues to describe critical pedagogy as follows: 
Critical pedagogy refers to the means and methods that test and hope to 
change the structures of schools that allow inequalities. Critical pedagogy 
is a cultural-political tool that takes seriously the notion of human 
differences, particularly as these differences relate to race, class, and 
gender. In its most radical sense, critical pedagogy seeks to unoppress 
the oppressed and unite people in a shared language of critique, struggle, 
and hope to end various forms of human suffering (1994:27). 
 
Miedema and Wardekker (1999:67) also locate the origins of critical pedagogy in 
critical theory, and specifically in the Frankfurt School. According to Miedema and 
Wardekker critical pedagogy was hailed in the 1970s as a ‘viable and vigorous 
alternative to both the entomological and the interpretive traditions in the social 
sciences’ but it has since met with fierce criticism. The greatest part of the 
criticism was its ‘(supposed) lack of results’ … and in a postmodern era, ‘its 
preoccupation with the emancipation and the wrongs of society seems outdated’ 
(Miedema & Wardekker 1999:68). 
 
Critical pedagogy’s relation to critical theory is defined against the background of 
Horkheimer, for whom ‘only nostalgia and hope remain’, Adorno for whom the 
                                            
39 My journey from reading critical theory to critical pedagogy necessitated a change in reading 
registers. Where the work of most critical theorists was intensely complex and philosophical, the 
work by and on critical pedagogists required working through very ‘shallow’ introductions (e.g. 
Kanpol, 1994), the revolutionary rhetoric and dense and often pedantic writing of McLaren (e.g. 
2001), and the cultural interrogations of Giroux (e.g. 1993, 1996). Most of the works of Giroux and 
McLaren are also specific reactions to the education context in the North Americas. For an 
insightful discussion on the Latin American and Third World context of the work of Freire, see 
Torres (1993). 
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possibility of anger can ‘become the power of resistance’ and critical praxis and 
Habermas who postulates the possibility of reaching consensus in the public 
sphere through communicative action (Miedema & Wardekker 1999:69-71). 
Habermas believed that every ‘human being and hence every child must be 
given the possibility by way of analysis, criticism, and self-reflection to develop 
into a freely self-determining and rationally acting person’ (Miedema & 
Wardekker 1999:74). 
 
Critical pedagogy is specifically concerned with ‘the influences of educational 
knowledge and of cultural formations generally, that perpetuate or legitimate an 
unjust status quo; fostering a critical capacity in citizens is a way of enabling 
them to resist such power effects’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:46). Where critical 
thinking maintains a certain ‘diagnostic aloofness’ in its criticality, critical 
pedagogy takes side ‘on behalf of those groups who are disenfranchised from 
social, economic, and political possibilities’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:46). Burbules 
and Berk (1999:46-59) explore several differences between ‘critical thinking’ and 
critical pedagogy. From their discussions it would seem as if critical theory is 
traditionally firstly an epistemological enterprise analysing truth and knowledge 
claims and exposing falsehood. Critical pedagogy has a different starting point. 
Critical pedagogy’s first concern is not epistemological, but asking the question 
‘who benefits?’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:47). If I understand Burbules and Berk’s 
exploration correctly, it would seem as if critical pedagogy’s emphasis is on 
emancipation from inequalities and injustices while critical theory aims at 
emancipation from invalid truth claims and structures40.  
 
                                            
40 This is a very important point that will be a leitmotiv throughout this study. For example, critical 
religious studies as subject (as proposed by Wood [M.D](2001) does not interrogate the truth 
claims of religions but rather interrogate how religions contribute to inequalities or the fight 
against inequalities.  
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For the sake of this study, I have however decided to explore the tenets of critical 
pedagogy as found in the works of Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux41. There are 
however many other voices to have chosen from (e.g., Aronowitz (1997), 
McLaren and Hammer (1989) and Shor (e.g., 1987, 1992, 1993) but Freire (e.g., 
1973, 1974, 1976, 1987, 1989, 2007) is considered by many to be the founder of 
critical pedagogy and Giroux (e.g., 1983, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 2004) is the most 
prolific author in the field of critical pedagogy. An exploration of the works of 
these two authors should allow us to discover and discuss the central tenets of 
critical pedagogy. 
 
• Paulo Freire 
Burbules and Berk (1999:51) refer to the work of Paulo Freire as the author who 
articulates critical pedagogy in its early origins. Keesing-Styles (2003) states that 
‘any analysis of critical pedagogy must begin with an examination of the work of 
Paulo Freire’ and McLaren (2001:1) calls Freire ‘the inaugural philosopher of 
critical pedagogy’42. Working within the context of promoting adult literacy among 
Latin American peasant communities, Freire was primarily concerned with 
conscienticizao, translated as ‘critical consciousness’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:51). 
Freire describes the two stages of his ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ as follows:  
In the first stage, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and 
through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second 
stage, in which the reality of the oppression has already been transformed, 
this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a 
pedagogy of all men [sic] in the process of permanent liberation (Freire 
1973: 31). 
 
A second central theme in the work of Freire is his particular focus on ‘literacy’. 
‘To be illiterate, for Freire, was not only the lack of skills of reading and writing; it 
was to feel powerless and dependent in a much more general way as well. The 
                                            
41 Both these authors are white and male. Though there are contributions by females in critical 
pedagogy (see McLaren & Hammer, 1989 and Wink, 1997) one of the criticisms against the 
current state of theorising in critical pedagogy is the ‘absence’ of female voices (see Gore 1993). 
42 Other authors who claim to work within the broad philosophies of Freire include bell hooks 
(1994) who claims her ‘engaged pedagogy’ resulted from her relationship with Freire (1994:6); as 
well as the work by Roger Simon (1987).  
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challenge for an adult literacy campaign was not only to provide skills, but to 
address directly the self-contempt and sense of powerlessness that he believed 
accompanied illiteracy’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:52). 
 
The vehicle for emancipatory education according to Freire was to empower 
students to ‘read the word’ and ‘read the world’. ‘The act of learning to read and 
write has to start from a very comprehensive understanding of the act of reading 
the world, something which human beings do before reading the words’ (Freire 
1989: xvii). In her Foreword to Freire’s work Literacy: reading the word and the 
world (1987: xix), Berthoff states that this ‘naming of the world becomes a model 
for changing the world. Education does not substitute for political action, but it is 
indispensable to it because of the role it plays in the development of critical 
consciousness’. Illiteracy (according to Giroux commenting on Freire) ‘is not 
merely the inability to read and write, it is also a cultural marker for naming forms 
of difference within the logic of cultural deprivation theory’ (Freire 1989:3). 
 
Literacy, according to Freire, involves ‘the relationship of the learners to the 
world, mediated by the transforming practice of this world taking place in the very 
general social milieu in which learners travel, and also mediated by the oral 
discourse concerning this transforming practice’ (Freire 1989:106). Literacy 
should however not be understood as ‘the triggering of social emancipation of the 
subordinated classes. Literacy leads to and participates in a series of triggering 
mechanisms that need to be activated for the indispensable transformation of a 
society whose unjust reality destroys the majority of people’ (Freire 1989:106)43.  
All language, according to Freire, works to reproduce dominant forms of 
power relations, but it also carries with it the resources for immanent 
critique, for dismantling the oppressive power structures of the social 
order, and also for articulating a more transformative and liberating vision 
for the future (McLaren & Da Silva 1993:53). 
 
                                            
43 Freire (1989:159) further emphasises the fact that literacy can only be emancipatory and critical 
‘to the extent that it is conducted in the language of the people’. Literacy programmes in the 
dominant language imprison students in a ‘culture of silence’ unable to ‘re-create their culture and 
histories’. 
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Freire’s work on reading involved allowing students to become aware of 
codifications, words that outside their linguistic meanings, also ‘present 
problematic social conditions’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:53). Freire’s literacy 
strategy also involved encouraging students to decode words and linguistic 
practices. In learning to ‘read the word’ students were empowered to ‘read the 
world’. This means a dramatic turn from education as transmission, which Freire 
describes as ‘banking education’ – ‘Education thus becomes an act of depositing, 
in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor’ 
(1973:45). The educator presumes the role of the one who knows, while also 
presuming that students do not have anything to contribute to the learning 
scenario. Learners’ task is confined to ‘receiving, filing, and storing the deposits’ 
(Freire 1973:46)44.  
 
The emancipatory alternative to ‘banking education’ is dialogical ‘problem-posing’ 
education (Freire 1973:53) where  
Through dialogue, the teacher-of-students and the students-of-the-teacher 
cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-
teacher. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one 
who is himself [sic] being taught in dialogue with the students, who in their 
turn while being taught also teach (Freire 1973:53). 
 
Banking education ‘anesthetizes and inhibits creative power, problem-posing 
education involves a constant unveiling of reality. The former attempts to 
maintain the submersion of consciousness; the latter strives for the emergence of 
consciousness and critical intervention in reality’ (Freire 1973: 54; italics in the 
original). Problem-posing dialogical education allows humans to ‘develop their 
power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in 
which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but 
as a reality in process, in transformation’ (Freire 1973:56; italics in the original). 
 
In the light of Freire’s situated, problem-based and dialogical pedagogy, 
‘knowledge’ for Freire remains incomplete and provisional. ‘Emancipatory 
                                            
44 See Freire (1973) for a discussion of his concept of ‘banking education’. 
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knowledge is never fully realized, but is continually dreamed, continually revived, 
and continually transformed in the hearth of our memories, the flames of our 
longing and the passion of our struggle’ (McLaren & Da Silva 1993:59). The 
incubator of such incomplete emancipatory knowledge is the stories and 
narratives of students and educators alike. 
These include the magisterial tropes and master narratives of the empire, 
as well as narratives of refusal searching for co-ordinates outside of the 
binary oppositions that consolidate the Manichean universe of Eurocentric 
time and space and the phallomilitary dynamics of postmodern citizenry 
(McLaren & Da Silva 1993:73).  
 
 
• Henry Giroux 
It is in the work of Henry Giroux that critical pedagogy finds it’s most vocal and 
criticized expression. Kellner (2001) appropriates the unique mix of cultural 
studies and education in the work of Giroux as follows – ‘The result is an 
intersection of critical pedagogy and cultural studies that enhances both 
enterprises, providing a cultural and transformative political dimension to critical 
pedagogy and a pedagogical dimension to cultural studies’ (2001:220). 
 
According to Burbules and Berk (1999:51), Giroux stresses both a ‘language of 
possibility’ and a ‘language of critique’ to be ‘essential to the pursuit of social 
justice’. Giroux sees schools primarily as in service of capitalist relations and for 
the perpetuation of dominant ideologies. He therefore proposes that schools are 
important locations for the formulation of ‘counter hegemonic’ practices in 
schools (Giroux 1983, 1992). Kellner (2001:220) identifies the unique mixture of 
influences in the work of Giroux as follows – ‘[Giroux] included incorporation of 
new theoretical discourses of poststructuralism and postmodernism, cultural 
studies, and the politics of identity and difference embodied in the new 
discourses of class, gender, race, and sexuality that proliferated in the post-
1960s epoch’ (2001:220).  
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Giroux’s early work, Theory and resistance in education. A pedagogy for the 
opposition (1983) gives a very thorough overview of Giroux and critical 
pedagogy’s roots in critical theory as well as defining the role of a critical 
education in the ‘new public sphere’. The publication of Border Crossings. 
Cultural workers and the politics of education (1992) ‘represents a shift’ in the 
work of Giroux (1992:1) with him seeking alliances in the ‘wider movements in 
feminist theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism, cultural studies, literary 
theory, and the arts’ (1992:2). Since then his work focused on identity politics and 
‘a pedagogy of representation and representational pedagogy’ (1993a), the 
decline in the public sphere in the service of the new patriotism after 9/11 (2002a, 
2002b, 2002c) and an exploration of the ‘age of zero tolerance’ (2003). For the 
purpose of this study, I will focus on the early work of Giroux (1983) as a 
foundation for a particular gestalt of critical pedagogy and in conclusion explore 
Giroux’s widening of his theorising into critical cultural studies (e.g. 1992). 
 
Giroux starts his exploration of the grounds for a critical pedagogy in 1983 by 
quoting Marcuse who wrote 
Since the established universe of discourse is that of an unfree world, 
dialectical thought is necessarily destructive, and whatever liberation it 
may bring is liberation in thought, in theory. However, the divorce of 
thought from action, of theory from practice, is itself part of an unfree 
world. No thought and no theory can undo it; but theory may help to 
prepare the ground for their possible reunion, and the ability of thought to 
develop a logic and language of contradiction is a prerequisite for this task 
(quoted in Giroux 1983:2). 
 
 
In quoting Marcuse, Giroux seems to prepare the reader for his intention to 
develop a ‘logic and a language of contradiction’. He says ‘What critical theory 
provides for educational theorists is a mode of critique and a language of 
opposition that extends the concept of the political not only into mundane social 
relations but into the very sensibilities and needs that form the personality and 
psyche’ (1983:5). Giroux continues to explore not only the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Frankfurt School, but also the social and historical context in 
 123
which they developed their critique. In developing a ‘critical theory of education’ 
Giroux analyses the Frankfurt School’s notion of theory, its analysis of culture 
and its analysis of depth psychology (1983:17-34). In his discussion of the 
Frankfurt School’s analysis of culture, he refers to the fact that for the Frankfurt 
School, ‘…changing socioeconomic conditions had made traditional Marxist 
categories of the 1930s and 1940s untenable. They were no longer adequate for 
understanding the integration of the working class in the West or the political 
effects of technocratic rationality in the cultural realm’ (1983:23). Giroux also 
refers to the works of Gramsci (1971), Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) who 
argued that domination assumed new forms. Instead of subjecting people 
through the use and show of force,  
…the power of the ruling classes was now reproduced through a form of 
ideological hegemony; it was established primarily through the rule of 
consent, and mediated via cultural institutions such as schools, family, 
mass media, churches, etc. Briefly put, the colonization of the workplace 
was now supplemented by the colonization of all cultural spheres (Giroux 
1983:23). 
 
Schools should allow students, especially ‘working-class students, women and 
Blacks’ to, in the words of Freire ‘name the world’ (1989:54) by affirming ‘their 
own histories through the use of a language, a set of social relations and a body 
of knowledge that critically reconstructs and dignifies the cultural experiences 
that make up the tissue, texture, and history of their daily lives’ (Giroux 1983:37). 
Schools should allow learners  
…to critically examine the role society has played in their own self-
formation. More specifically, they will have the tools to examine how this 
society has functioned to shape and thwart their aspirations and goals, or 
prevented them from even imagining a life outside the one they presently 
lead (1983:37-38). 
 
Central in the works of Giroux the binary of ‘rage’ and ‘hope’ runs like a leitmotiv 
(also see http://www.perfectfit.org/CT/index2.html). This theme bears witness to 
the dialectical tension between a pedagogy of opposition’ and a ‘pedagogy of 
hope’. In examining and expanding the possible roles schools could and should 
play in providing a ‘counter-narrative’ he builds on the work by Pierre Bourdieu 
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(1977, Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) and later also Basil Bernstein (e.g.1977). 
Where schools were earlier seen as ‘socially and politically neutral’, schools are 
now accepted to be ‘agencies of socialization’ in which the ‘dual curriculum’ 
shaped and socialized them into the dominant culture. The ‘dual curriculum’ 
refers to the overt curriculum of ‘school rationales and teacher-prepared 
objectives’ and the hidden curriculum of the ‘beliefs and values transmitted tacitly 
through the social relations and routines that characterise day-to-day school 
experience’ (Giroux 1983:45). Critiquing the different approaches to dealing with 
the hidden curriculum (1983:48:60), Giroux states that the current work on the 
hidden curriculum says ‘too little about the complex ways in which consciousness 
and culture interact, about how students operating out of the specificities of 
gender, race, and class offer resistance to the mechanisms of social control and 
domination in schools’ (1983:60). 
 
Giroux develops a ‘theory of resistance’ which, according to him, ‘is a valuable 
theoretical and ideological construct that provides an important focus for 
analysing the relationship between school and the wider society’ (1983:107). 
Giroux discusses a number of ‘critical assumptions’ underlying a radical 
pedagogy. The first assumption is ‘the requirement of a mode of analysis that 
captures the dialectical relation between collective agents and the particular 
historical and local conditions in which they find themselves’ (1983:115). As such 
individuals and social classes are ‘both the agents and the products of the larger 
society’ (1983:115). 
 
The second critical assumption of a theory of resistance is that schools should be 
viewed as ‘contradictory social sites, marked by struggle and accommodation’ 
(1983:115). As such schools are ‘neither an all-encompassing foothold of 
domination nor a locus of revolution; thus, it contains ideological and material 
spaces for the development of radical pedagogies’ (1983:115-116). 
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In 1992 Giroux publishes Border crossings, which, according to him, ‘represent a 
shift in both my politics and my theoretical work’ (1992:1). He describes the shift 
as follows: 
While I still believe these sites [sites of teacher education, public schools, 
higher education, and certain aspects of community education] are crucial 
for encouraging students to be educated for critical citizenship, that is, as 
political subjects capable of exercising leadership in a democracy, I no 
longer believe that the struggle over education can be reduced to these 
sites, nor do I believe that pedagogy as a form of political, moral, and 
social production can be addressed primarily as a matter of schooling 
(1992:1). 
 
He confesses to have underestimated ‘both the structural and ideological 
constraints under which teachers labour as well as the prevailing conservatism 
has in shaping curriculum and vision in most schools of education in the United 
States’ (1992:1). In this context he attempts to broaden his theorising in 
movements like feminist theory, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, etc. Despite 
these widening horizons, he remains with his original description of critical 
pedagogy as combining ‘a language of critique and possibility’ (1992:77). 
 
In summarising the contribution of Giroux, Kellner (2001:8) states  
Giroux thus offers a wide-ranging model of cultural studies and greatly 
expands the domain of pedagogy, demonstrating the importance of 
critically engaging the pedagogy of a broad spectrum of cultural artifacts 
often ignored by educators. 
 
 
3.4 TOWARDS A CRITICAL EDUCATIONAL FRAMEWORK  
 
There are strained relations between critical theory and its exponents and critical 
pedagogy; between different strands of critical theory (e.g. Feminist and 
postcolonialism) and critical pedagogy, and between exponents of critical 
pedagogy themselves. Lather (1998:487) comments that in the 1980s critical 
pedagogy was seen as ‘a sort of a “big tent” for those in education who were 
interested in doing academic work toward social justice’. Since these early days, 
the ‘tent’ seems to have become noisier. The relations between proponents of 
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critical theory and critical pedagogy are strained and confrontational. One of the 
critiques against critical pedagogy is that it ‘crosses a threshold between teaching 
criticality and indoctrinating. Teaching students to think critically must include 
allowing them to come to their own conclusions; yet critical pedagogy seems to 
come dangerously close to prejudging what those conclusions must be’ 
(Burbules & Berk 1999:54)45. 
 
One of the main criticisms against critical pedagogy’s proponents is the fact that 
they are all male and white and their discourse being a ‘closed and paternal 
conversation’ (Burbules & Berk 1999:56-57; see also Ellsworth 1989; Gore 1993; 
Lather 1998). Lather (1998:487), for example, judges that critical pedagogy was 
a ‘boy thing’ while the ‘girl thing’ was to use poststructuralism to deconstruct 
pedagogy. Lather comments that the works of Giroux, McLaren and Gur-Ze’ev 
‘exhibit the masculinist voice of abstraction and universalisation’ (1998:487). For 
a discussion on the criticisms against critical pedagogy see the thorough analysis 
of Keesing-Styles (2003) as well as Ellsworth’s feminist critique (1989). 
 
Despite these criticisms and at times opposing voices and often finding itself in 
‘stuck places’ (Lather 1998), Kellner (2003) convincingly motivates a need for a 
critical theory in education. In the face of ‘one of the most dramatic technological 
revolutions in history’ and demographic and socio-political changes in the world, 
with special reference to post 9/11, Kellner proposes developing ‘a critical theory 
of education for democratizing and reconstructing education to meet the 
challenges of a global and technological society’ (2003:51). He acknowledges his 
position as a theorist in the ‘overdeveloped world’ but strives to ‘project normative 
visions for education and social transformation that could be used to criticise and 
reconstruct education in a variety of context’ (2003:52).  
 
                                            
45 The tension between critical pedagogy as emancipatory project and postmodernism was 
discussed in Chapter 1. The criticism against critical pedagogy that it is a form of indoctrination 
should be taken seriously. Though an emancipatory curriculum will aim to contribute towards a 
more just and a more compassionate society, the act of developing a curriculum includes and 
excludes, validates certain systems of meaning and marginalises others.  
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Kellner (2003) continues to lay the foundations for a critical theory of education, 
carefully and eclectically selecting from a range of exponents of critical theory 
including reference to classical sources up to Kant and Hegel. His first reference 
in developing a critical theory of education is a ‘Kantian sense of critique’. 
‘Kantian critique aims at autonomy from prejudice and ill-grounded ideas and 
requires rigorous reflection on one’s presuppositions and basic positions and 
argumentation to support one’s positions’ (2003:52). His second point of 
reference is the need for a ‘Hegelian concept of critique’ which ‘by criticizing one-
sided positions (such as technophobia vs. technophilia) and developing more 
complex dialectical perspectives that reject and neglect oppressive or false 
features of a position, while appropriating positive and emancipatory aspects’ 
(2003:52-53).  
 
Kellner’s third reference point is to draw on Marxian critique ‘stressing the 
importance of critique of ideology and situating analysis of a topic like education 
within the dominant social relations and system of political economy’ (2003:53).  
He continues to state that ‘Marxian critique involves radical examination of 
existing ideologies and practices of education and the need for pedagogical and 
social transformation to free individuals from the fetters of consumer capitalism 
and to help make possible a free, more democratic and human culture and 
society’ (2003:53) 
 
Kellner refers to the work of Reitz (2000) as an example of ‘sustained criticisms 
of the existing system of education as a mode of reproducing the existing system 
of domination and oppression and called for counter-institutions and pedagogies’ 
(Kellner 2003:53). In a later work by Reitz (2004) he succinctly explores the 
brutal gap between rich and poor and states: ‘Inequality is not simply a matter of 
a gap between rich and poor, but of the structural relationships in economic area 
of propertied and non-propertied segments of populations’ (2004). 
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Kellner states ‘A critical theory of education has a normative and even utopian 
dimension, attempting to theorise how education and life construct alternatives to 
what is’ (2003:53). He petitions for a return to the Greek concept and praxis of 
Paideia, ‘the shaping, formation, and development of human beings and citizens’. 
He continues to engage critically with the history of the concept of Paideia, 
alluding to the fact that the ‘good life and good society’ envisaged as a result of 
Paideia ‘was built on slavery’ (2003:53) and used ‘to legitimate slave societies’ 
which ‘underlines for us the ways in which previous models of education have 
been produced within and as discourses of power and domination’ (2003:54-55). 
After exploring the pragmatism of Dewey and the contributions of the 
poststructuralists who ‘emphasise the importance of difference, marginality, 
heterogeneity, and multiculturalism’ and the importance ‘for situated season 
knowledge’, he summarises that ‘a critical theory of education must be radically 
historicist, attempting to reconstruct education as social conditions evolve and to 
create pedagogical alternatives in terms of the needs, problems, and possibilities 
of specific groups of people in concrete situations’ (2003:76-57)46. 
 
Before we turn to explore different approaches to the study of religion, let us just 
look at where we are in this chapter (Figure 3.3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Moving to Phase 2 
                                            
46 Two sobering contributions regarding the possibilities and challenges facing critical pedagogy 
are the works of Lather (1998) and Jones (1999). 
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3.5 THE STUDY OF RELIGION: AN OVERVIEW 
 
3.5.1 The discourses in and surrounding Religionswissenschaft 
 
The link between critical theory and education is overt in the form of critical 
pedagogy. The link between critical theory and religion is less overt, while the link 
between critical theory and the teaching about religion is even less 
straightforward. Critical theory is furthermore a specific interdisciplinary analysis 
of society in which religion and education are but smaller parts. 
 
It is important to note that this thesis is specifically located in the discipline of 
Religionswissenschaft or the study of religion47 and the evaluation of the Policy is 
done from an intellectual understanding of the scope and content of the study of 
religion.  The study of religion or Religionswissenschaft as a discipline has a 
history or rather, a number of histories. The discourses in and surrounding the 
study of religion are immersed in defining and defending the uniqueness of the 
study of religion as sui generis, differentiating it from theology and other 
disciplines as well as clarifying definitions, taxonomies, and its methodologies. 
Although these discourses in and surrounding the study of religion were there 
from its inception in the late 19th century (see Pummer 1972), it is still very much 
part of the discourses today. These different discourses have been and are often 
embedded in the broader discourses between the natural sciences and the 
human sciences, with the human sciences claiming and defending the right to be 
considered a science.  As Pummer (1972:94) states ‘As with every science, the 
best way to acquaint oneself with the Problematik of it, is to study its history and 
development’. 
 
                                            
47 I will use Religionswissenschaft and the ‘study of religion’ interchangeably throughout this 
chapter, but in the chapters to follow, I will use the ‘study of religion’ as encompassing 
Religionswissenschaft, religion studies,  religious studies (non-confessional) and the ‘study of 
religions’. 
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When encountering overviews and introductions like Connolly’s Approaches to 
the study of religion (1999), Pals’ Seven theories of religion (1996), or Braun and 
McCutcheon’s (2000) Guide to the study of religion – it is easy to lose sight of the 
historical development of the discipline and the questions it faced and still faces. 
Without taking cognisance of the dynamic and complex history of the study of 
religion, the distinction between theories, approaches, taxonomies and different 
methodologies confuse and obstruct. Connolly (1999), for example, identifies 
seven approaches to the study of religion, namely anthropological, feminist, 
phenomenological, philosophical, psychological, sociological and theological. 
Connolly (1999:1) claims ‘accurate, objective accounts of religious phenomena 
and religious traditions do not exist in their own right. All accounts of religion are 
accounts by people who approach their study from a particular starting point’. 
Connolly however does not state how he arrived at these specific seven 
approaches and how it fits into the broader discourse(s) surrounding the study of 
religion48. 
 
Pals (1996) distinguishes seven theories of religion which he ‘defends’ as 
‘interpretive paths’ (1996:v) and which he calls ‘classic’ (1996:vi). Pals does not 
indicate why specifically these seven were selected and what criteria he used to 
select the specific seven except to state that those he did include are ‘classic 
interpretive paths’ and the authors of the seven theories he included are 
‘pathfinders’ (1996:v). Pals also does not clarify how a theory of religion differs 
from for example an approach, and what the implications of these theories are for 
example, the methodologies followed. The seven theories Pals discusses are 
• Animism and magic (E.B. Tyler and J.G. Fraser) 
• Religion and personality (S. Freud) 
• Society as sacred (E. Durkheim) 
• Religion as alienation (K. Marx) 
• The reality of the sacred (M. Eliade) 
                                            
48 Connolly (1999) does not include critical approaches (outside feminism) in his seven 
approaches to the study of religion. 
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• Society’s “construct of the heart” (E.E. Evans-Pritchard) 
• Religion as cultural system (C. Geertz) 
 
On judging between these seven theories, Pals states (1996:269) that ‘It is much 
more likely that parts of an interpretation will be rejected and pieces of its 
argument questioned, while in other aspects it may be accepted, amended, or 
even usefully combined with other views’. With regard to ‘judging’ between 
theories, Pals (1996:269) suggests that any theory should be evaluated on five 
aspects or questions, namely 
(1) How does it define the subject? What concept of ‘religion’ does it 
start from? 
(2) What type of theory is it? Since explanations can be of different 
kinds, what kind of account does the theorist offer, and why?  
(3) What is the range of the theory? That is, how much of human 
religious behaviour does it claim to explain? All of it? Or just some? 
And in that light, does it actually do what it claims? 
(4) What evidence does the theory appeal to? Does it try to probe 
deeply into a few facts, ideas, and customs or does it spread itself 
widely to embrace many? Is the range of evidence wide enough to 
support the range of the theory? 
(5)  What is the relationship between a theorist’s personal religious 
belief (or disbelief) and the explanation he chooses to advance? 
(italics in the original) 
 
Smart (1996: 1) suggests that in investigating religion as a phenomenon, we 
should look for ‘patterns in the way religion manifests itself’ with the purpose ‘to 
understand how it functions and vivifies the human spirit in history’. Smart 
therefore acknowledges his point of departure as being phenomenological and 
an attempt to describe a ‘morphology of religion, incorporating a theory’ (1996:1). 
He furthermore does not work with a strict definition of religion, but explores the 
dimensions of religion in the broader context of worldviews (1996:2). He 
acknowledges that the term ‘worldview’ could be ‘too cerebral’ and therefore uses 
the term in an ‘incarnated’ sense ‘where the values and beliefs are embedded in 
practice’ (1996:2-3). Smart (1996:10-11) suggests religion as worldview to have 
seven dimensions namely 
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• The ritual or practical dimension involving activities such as ‘worship, 
meditation, pilgrimage, sacrifice, sacramental rites and healing activities’ 
• The doctrinal or philosophical dimension. ‘For different reasons religions 
evolve doctrines and philosophies’. Some religions also ‘are keener on 
doctrinal rectitude than others… Religions are by no means 
equidimensional’. 
• The myth of narrative dimension. ‘Every religion has its stories’. 
• The experiential or emotional dimension referring to key experiences in 
the historical development of a religion, for example the enlightenment of 
the Buddha, and so on. 
• The ethical or legal dimensions. ‘A religious tradition or sub-tradition 
affirms not only a number of doctrines and myths but some ethical and 
often legal imperatives’. 
• The organisational or social component referring to the way the religion 
takes shape and is embedded in society.  
• The material or artistic dimension. ‘A religion or worldview will express 
itself typically in material creations, from chapels to cathedrals to temples 
to mosques, from icons and divine statuary to books and pulpits’. 
 
Smart (1996:15) acknowledges that these ‘various dimensions are not set in 
concrete’ and states ‘The question is not whether my approach is the only one, it 
is whether it is fruitful. Clearly there can be more than one fruitful ways of 
analysing religions, and more generally, worldviews’. Where Connolly (1999) 
suggested that religion is ‘always’ studied from a particular point of view, e.g. 
anthropological, or psychological, Smart suggests that these dimensions of the 
sacred ‘relate to various disciplines within the academic market-place’ (1996:15). 
The various dimensions Smart proposes relate to the following disciplines namely 
textual and philological studies, anthropology and sociology, psychology and 
psychoanalysis, history, philosophy, art history and the material dimension, 
theology, political science and economics and various exchanges (Smart 1996: 
15-21). 
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To make sense of these different foci and introductions to the study of religion, it 
is necessary to ‘plot’ briefly the historical development of the study of religion as 
a science sui generis. Although the science of religion dates back to the late 
nineteenth century, in 1972 Penner and Yonan asked ‘Is a science of religion 
possible?’ And in 1987 Pals addressed the question ‘Is religion a sui generis 
phenomenon?’ Neither do these questions differ much in intensity and in focus 
from current questions in the field of the study of religion (see for example Smith 
1996; and Braun & McCutcheon 2000), nor do these questions differ from the 
succinct exploration of Religionswissenschaft by Goodenough already in 1959! 
 
In his 1959 article, Goodenough acknowledges the futility of any attempt to reach 
agreement on a definition of religion and continues to compare the description 
and analysis of religions as often painful (for the adherents of the specific belief 
as well as for the one doing the analyses). In this regard Goodenough (1959:79) 
quotes the Canon Sanday of Oxford who exclaimed, ‘We kill in order to dissect’.  
Goodenough traces the history of the study of religion back from the times when 
History of Religions was a part of Religionswissenschaft (1959:6) to the interest 
other disciplines took in the phenomenon of religion. In contrast to the study of 
religion from other disciplines (e.g., sociology, psychology, etc), Goodenough 
petitions for the study of religion sui generis – the ‘function and goal of 
Religionswissenschaft is to come better to understand the homo religiosus’ 
(1959:86). The core focus of Religionswissenschaft according to Goodenough is 
humankind facing and negotiating with the tremendum. ‘Here seems the essence 
of religion, the problem of how man [sic]49 can live over against the great 
unknown, the tremendum’ (Goodenough 1959:87). 
 
                                            
49 In discussing the contribution of Goodenough (1959) I will not make a note every time 
Goodenough uses the male pronoun to signify the whole of humankind. When I quote an author 
using the male pronoun to denote the whole of humankind, I will use [sic] when quoting the author 
for the first time only. 
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Goodenough (1959:87) continues to explore ways humankind has treated being 
confronted with the ‘chaos of the tremendum’ and writes 
Most commonly man has screened himself off from the tremendum by 
mythical accounts of the origin and nature of things, by rites which would 
placate its unpredictable lightnings and whirlwinds, by holy places and 
seasons, by divinely given codes of laws. In all these ways man has tried 
to protect himself from what is, to him the chaos of the tremendum. Man 
has draped curtains about him, with fine paintings in perspective on them. 
This perspective could give him the illusion that he lives in the tremendum 
itself while the curtains actually only protect him from its impact. The 
patterns on other people’s curtains are, of course, myths; those on our 
own are theology. 
 
Continuing the metaphor of the curtained tremendum, Goodenough (1959:90) 
writes regarding the task of a new science of religion: 
It no longer hides its head, ostrich fashion, in myths asserting that the 
tremendum is less perilous than it is; it no longer surrenders to the 
tremendum, and asks to be reabsorbed into it. Instead, refusing to run 
away or to surrender, it accepts the tremendum, and the individual’s 
helplessness and insignificance before it. It drops no curtain, but faces the 
overwhelming within and without, while it seeks to find relationships and 
meaning as far as it can by its own new method.  
 
 
Goodenough petitions therefore for scientists of religion to face the tremendum 
‘with quiet eyes, astonished, reverent, but unafraid’ (1959:91).  He continues 
For we can hardly call ourselves scientists of religion if we systematically 
define religion so as to leave out this great approach to the tremendum 
going on all about us, and refuse ourselves to share it. In the mid-twentieth 
century we will seem ridiculous to our generation if we call ourselves 
scientists, but do not examine our data in the same factual and calm spirit.  
 
Although the variables scientists of religion face are tremendous, confronting the 
tremendum is what science is all about (Goodenough 1959:93).  All scientists, 
including scientists of religion, are faced with the tremendum, and should ‘try 
methods never used, join the hitherto unconnected, break all the rules as they 
seem inadequate, even though earlier men had found those rules useful’ 
(Goodenough 1959:93). Goodenough (1959:93) refers to the experiences of a 
young geologist who realised that he was confronted with ‘the vastness of 
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unknown nature. But he does not drop his tools to generalise about it. He works 
on his own specific problem’. Where scientists of religion are often overwhelmed 
by the tremendum, Goodenough suggests 
But we must face the tremendum qua tremendum, not reject old curtains 
only to put up new curtains of hasty generalisations. Most of us will be 
technicians, turning up carefully verified hypotheses about small and 
isolated problems. We also will have our reward. Always, however, we 
shall hope that the new Curies and Einsteins will come in our field to use 
what we have been doing, and go far beyond it into a new dimension.  
 
 
As such scientists of religion should hold the scalpel as ‘a sacramental 
instrument’ (Goodenough 1959:95) dissecting religion (even though painful) in 
order to understand more fully humankind’s relation to the tremendum.  
Goodenough (1959:95) closes his exploration by quoting the admonition of the 
ancient Rabbi: ‘If you grasp much, you grasp nothing; if you grasp a little, then 
you really grasp’. If I understand Goodenough (1959) and Krüger (1982, 1995) 
correctly they both acknowledge the input from other disciplines into the 
Religionswissenschaft, but both of them petition for the study of religion as sui 
generis.  Before turning specifically to Krüger (1982, 1995), let us first discuss the 
question Penner and Yonan (1972) ask ‘Is a science of religion possible?’ Where 
Goodenough (1959) seemed to ask ‘Is a science of religion necessary?’ the 
question Penner and Yonan ask highlights another dimension of the development 
of science of religion as a unique and separate field of inquiry. 
 
In exploring their question, Penner and Yonan (1972) warn that the continuing 
uncertainty regarding the scope and focus of Religionswissenschaft is partly due 
to ‘a lack of clarification concerning the exact meaning of the key terms [like 
definition, reduction, explanation] being employed’ (1972:107). Interestingly, in a 
footnote Penner and Yonan (1972:107) distinguish Religionswissenschaft from 
other disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, or sociology ‘since their 
primary concern is not the analysis of religious data’. Penner and Yonan 
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(1972:108) also plot the debate in Religionswissenschaft against the broader 
debates between the so-called ‘Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften’.  
 
Already in 1912, Leuba published forty-eight definitions of religion (Penner & 
Yonan 1972:110). Penner and Yonan (1972:111) very interestingly state that 
there is an assumption that ‘a definition must win universal acceptance and also 
remain unchanged in the future’. They continue 
This axiom rests on the questionable assumption that it is both necessary 
and sufficient that a definition be acceptable to everyone and that such a 
definition be constituted by a multiplicity of methods. We wish to argue, on 
the contrary, that a definition of religion acceptable to everyone entails one 
valid method, and that a multiplicity of definitions implies a multiplicity of 
methods (Penner & Yonan 1972:111). 
 
Penner and Yonan (1972:115) follow Copi who stated that definitions normally 
have the following purposes namely to (1) to increase vocabulary, (2) to eliminate 
ambiguity, (3) to clarify meaning, (4) to explain theoretically, and (5) to influence 
attitudes.50 The reason why Penner and Yonan (1972:133) feel so determined to 
clarify concepts like definition, reduction and explanation, is because they ‘are 
convinced that without valid definitions and theories, a science of religion is not 
possible’.  
 
Pummer (1972) provides a very useful overview of the development of 
Religionswissenschaft and also explores the choice between 
Religionswissenschaft and Religiology. According to Pummer, already in 1887 
P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye stated that Religionswissenschaft is a new 
discipline and in the process of establishing itself and that ‘it has to fight for 
recognition of its rights’ (Pummer 1972: 91). As Pummer (1972:91) indicates 
eighty-four years after Chantepie de la Saussaye mentioned this new discipline, 
the ‘Method, status, and academic study of Religionswissenschaft are still 
subjects of discussions by representatives of that discipline…’ Pummer (1972:94) 
traces the origins of Religionswissenschaft as separate discipline to the Age of 
                                            
50 For a full discussion on clarifying the role and function of definitions see Penner and Yonan 
1972.  
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the Enlightenment with ‘the scholarly interest in non-Christian cultures, beginning 
with the discoveries, on the one hand, and the idea of religious tolerance on the 
other.  Religionswissenschaft from its origins to the present day ‘vacillate 
between a religious-theological or philosophical and a philosophical-historical 
pole’ (Pummer 1972:94). The early representatives of Religionswissenschaft like 
F.M. Müller, P.C. Tiele, N. Söderblom, G. van der Leeuw and others were, 
according to Pummer (1972:95) ‘non-professional historians of religions [who] 
were hardly or not at all influenced by theological doctrines, but they were 
dependent on contemporary anthropological theories'. 
 
Very early in the history of Religionswissenschaft up to the present day it was 
and still is very important to have an ‘initial definition of religion’ as part of 
justifying the autonomy of the discipline (Pummer 1972:95). By the time of writing 
his article in 1972, Pummer (1972:96) indicates that defining religion is a 
‘problem for which no satisfactory solution has been found yet’. Oscillating 
between definitions and descriptions, various attempts have been made to 
describe the essential elements or dimensions of religion (see for example 
Krüger 1982, 1995; Penner & Yonan 1972; Pals 1987; Pummer 1972; Smart 
1996). Every attempt to define or describe the essential elements, has been 
confronted by the ‘boo-words’, reduction and reductionistic (Penner & Yonan 
1972:109). Pummer (1972:99) refers to Bourgault who explained the crisis of 
definition of the new science of religion as follows: 
… Religionswissenschaft became first the successor of theology and then 
of philosophy of religion, and in this process it became less and less 
religious and more and more historical, then it was less and less interested 
in the history of the mind and more and more in philology, and finally it 
was divided into a multitude of philologies, archaeologies, and disparate 
and incoordinable human sciences. 
 
 
In discussing the various terminologies surrounding  Religionswissenschaft or 
science of religion, Pummer (1972:103) makes an interesting remark that the 
English translation of Religionswissenschaft as science of religion is ‘not 
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generally accepted’ since the German Wissenschaft ‘designates every kind of 
disciplined research and not only natural science’. Pummer (1972:103) then 
continues to make the important remark that ‘Humanistic studies are therefore 
regarded as sciences without their being modelled on the natural sciences’ 
(italics added). The terms Pummer (1972:103-106) discusses are 
Religionswissenschaft, science(s) of religion(s), comparative (study of) 
religion(s), history of religions, religion, religious studies and religiology. It is the 
last term, namely religiology that some authors propose to be the ‘correct’ 
translation of Religionswissenschaft. Pummer (1972:106) however judges that 
the two terms namely religiology and Religionswissenschaft do not refer to the 
same approach to the study of religion.  Pummer (1972: 106-109) continues by 
suggesting two main divisions in Religionswissenschaft, namely a ‘history of 
religions in the narrow sense’, and a ‘systematic Religionswissenschaft’. The first 
division ‘history of religions in the narrow sense’ can further be divided into a ‘so-
called general history of religion and the histories of specific religions’.  The 
systematic Religionswissenschaft refers to a ‘thematic’ study of religion and has 
a very strong comparative element in it (Pummer 1972:107).  
 
Pummer (1972:122) concludes that Religionswissenschaft is much wider than 
just a history of religions should the aim of the science be to arrive at ‘a fuller 
understanding of religious man [sic]’. With regard to making a choice between 
Religionswissenschaft and religiology, Pummer (1972:121) is of the following 
opinion: 
If religiology is taken to mean that kind of religious studies that wants to be 
at the same time historical and theological, theoretical and applied, a clear 
borderline has to be drawn between it and Religionswissenschaft. The two 
are not at all to be identified. They are distinct from each other because 
the historical-philological study of religion on an empirical basis is not the 
same as theology, or philosophy of religion, or pastoral and ecumenical 
concerns.  
 
Pals (1987) states in his article Is religion a sui generis phenomenon? that the 
question had been central to the discourse on the viability of  
Religionswissenschaft as a distinct discipline. He petitions that ‘reduction’ arises 
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‘from the essential (and laudable) desire of all science for simplicity in the face of 
complexity, its search for singularity in the presence of multiplicity’ (1987:261). 
After exploring contributions by Kraemer, Otto, Eliade and Schleiermacher, Pals 
(1987:278) stakes his claim that religion is a sui generis phenomenon by stating 
‘In religion, as in other fields of inquiry, the interpreter has the right to insist that 
phenomena are best explained by appealing to factors which lie within its zone 
as opposed to those which lie outside it’. Pals (1987:278) affirms the status of 
religion as being sui generis ‘if it is conceived in the same heuristic terms that 
apply to other disciplines and if it is employed as an axiomatic guide for 
research’. 
 
Let us turn now to take as conversation partner in exploring the discourses in and 
surrounding Religionswissenschaft the work by Krüger (1982, 1995 and 2003). 
Krüger (1982) starts his proposal for a methodology of science of religion with 
quoting Waardenburg who warned that science of religion is much more than 
only an exploration of the history of religion in dealing with ‘dead facts and things 
of the past’. Waardenburg (as quoted by Krüger 1982:1) suggests also engaging 
with the new gestalts of religion – ‘stand at their cradles and to notice even their 
incomplete development; to be able to do that, we have to observe all the details 
of their environments with a tireless and sympathetic curiosity, and to sharpen 
our direct vision’. This quote by Waardenburg is used by Krüger not only to open 
an exploration on the specific focus of the study of religion but also something of 
the methodology itself – namely to adapt a ‘tireless and sympathetic curiosity’.  
 
Krüger (1982:9) then provides a short overview of the history of science of 
religion and indicates that ‘It has been called science(s) of religion(s), 
comparative (study of) religion(s), history of religions, religion, religious studies 
and religiology’ – all ‘equivalents’ to the German term Religionswissenschaft. 
Krüger furthermore petitions for science of religion as ‘one coherent body, 
culminating in a systematic theory of religion’ despite science of religions’ two 
subdivisions namely history of religions and phenomenology of religion. While 
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proposing one ‘systematic theory of religion’ Krüger acknowledges possible 
overlaps with other subjects like sociology and states that it is ‘inevitable and in 
any event a good thing’ (1982:9). He explains the implication of the overlap as 
follows – ‘Thus science of religion and sociology have an area of overlap, where 
sociology concentrates on religion as social phenomenon (thus becoming the 
sub-discipline sociology of religion) and where science of religion looks at the 
social dimension of religion’ (Krüger 1982:9). 
 
Krüger (1982:10) therefore proposes that  
the name ‘science of religion’ be reserved for the tightly-knot concentration 
on religion as human phenomenon (as distinct from theology), and on 
religion as religion (as distinct from for instance sociology, which examines 
it as a social phenomenon, and psychology, which examines it as a 
psychological phenomenon). There is an overlap between, say, sociology 
of religion and science of religion, but there is a difference in perspective: 
sociology of religion studies society, and sees religion under the aspect of 
society; science of religion studies religion, and deals with the social 
dimension of human life under the aspect of religion, not society. The 
primary category and basic referent of sociology is society; the primary 
category and basic referent of science of religion is religion itself (italics in 
the original).  
 
Having said that, Krüger states that there are ‘no tightly-closed gates’ between 
science of religion and its ‘neighbours’ and that ‘Cross-fertilization between the 
various disciplines is vital’ (1982:10). Continuing towards formulating a scientific 
and ‘systematic theory of religion’, Krüger finds inspiration in five ‘metascientific 
positions’ (1982:11-23). He motivates this by stating that ‘Scientific methods 
ultimately rest on philosophical grounds’ (1982:11). Krüger discusses logical 
empiricism, critical rationalism, critical theory, phenomenology and the 
hermeneutical school. After discussing these five metascience positions, Krüger 
explores the implications of studying religion specifically from one of these 
positions or from moving between these positions (1982:23). The danger of 
working eclectically is that selections are done in an arbitrary way. Krüger 
concludes (1982:23) ‘The important thing is to appreciate the wealth of more 
traditions than one, to respect the unique contributions of each and to be on the 
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lookout for possible points of convergence which might help to do one’s own 
particular job better’. 
 
Of particular worth for this critical evaluation of the Policy, is Krüger’s exploration 
of self-awareness and subjectivity in the study of religion (1982: 36-46). Krüger 
suggests (1982:37) a move away form logical empiricism’s approach and claim to 
objectivity and suggests ‘Objectivity is to be established in the heart of 
subjectivity’. Krüger quotes Spiegelberg when he continues ‘There is no escape 
from subjectivity. The only cure for subjectivistic subjectivity is more and better 
subjectivity, more discriminating subjectivity, and more selfcritical subjectivity, 
which will show the very limits of subjectivity’ (1982:37). 51 In a later work, Krüger 
(1995) shares his understanding of religion as ‘the dream and effort found in all 
cultures to look at our ordinary world sub specie aeternitatis, in the widest horizon 
possible’. In the light of the insecurities and ambivalences of the modern age, 
Krüger (1995:6) suggests 
On a tightrope there is no standing, only walking or falling. All we can do 
on the knife edge between totalising order and scattered fragmentation is 
listen to the voices of the prophets and visionaries coming down to us in 
the history of religions, trust the depth within ourselves, and sound the 
contexts in which we find ourselves as we feel our way forward. 
 
 
In 1995 Krüger proposes ‘conditionalism’ as a theoretical framework for the study 
of religion. ‘The advantage of the term “conditionalism” is that it is relatively 
neutral, allowing for some free interplay among existing schools of thought’ 
(1995:21). Krüger (1995:22) describes conditionalism as follows: 
The principle of ‘conditionality’ implies a religious philosophy that would 
replace the psycho-socio-religious syndrome of separateness, substituting 
the notions of togetherness and relatedness for the notion of division at 
the very core of reality: togetherness of humans, of humans with nature, 
and of both humans and nature with God; more than that, humans, nature 
and God understood as being constituted by relatedness and the dynamic 
interplay of relations. ‘Conditionalism’ speaks of plurality and coherence in 
                                            
51 For a further discussion on dimensions of objectivity, subjectivity and reflexivity in the study of 
religion, see Krüger 1982: 36-46. 
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the same breath, the one qualifying the other. Plurality without coherence 
would leave us with a world chaotically shattered into fragments; 
coherence without pluralism would leave us with yet another closed 
monolithic world, only bigger than the many little worlds of apartheid. 
‘Conditionalism’ seeks an alternative to both centrism and the mere scatter 
of fragmentation (italics in the original). 
 
Krüger (1995) petitions for an understanding of religion and an understanding of 
the understanding of religion as being embedded in a plurality of relations with an 
inherent (if not foundational) coherence signifying a togetherness in the midst of 
distinctions and different characteristics. Religious meaning in this sense 
therefore should be sought and understood ‘in terms of the plurality of specific 
events, cohering in expanding circles and merging with wider fields of events’ 
(Krüger 1995:22). He continues by stating ‘Religious studies explore the spaces 
between and around the various religions, without arguing from the belief-
presuppositions of any particular religion as axiomatic points of departure in its 
theorising’ (Krüger 1995:27). He petitions for an explicit empiricist and naturalistic 
stance in engaging religion following Whitehead’s epistemological argument that 
‘empiricism would argue that there is no fulcrum outside this world on which any 
human claim to absolute truth may rely for leverage’ (Krüger 1995:30). The 
implications of such a stance are that science of religion 
confines itself to experiential knowledge, accessible to every normal 
person via natural cognitive processes. A further implication of the 
empiricist approach for academic inquiries into religion is that none of the 
religions examined will be afforded any special, supernaturally sanctioned 
status (Krüger 1995:31). 
 
 
Concrete experience is the only ‘foundation’ for a study of religion. Krüger 
(1995:34) furthermore proposes that there are three ways of ‘discovering the 
religious meaning of things’ as revealed in the world:  
• ‘descent into the depths of one’s individual existence’ through meditation; 
• ‘the investigation of nature, human and non-human’ through science; 
• ‘attentive listening to the voices of humankind’ through hermeneutics. 
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The notion of the individual, according to Krüger (1995:35), is an abstract and 
what we see and construct as the individual is actually a web of relations 
emanating from and surrounding the individual as he or she acts upon the world 
and find him or herself being acted upon (Krüger 1982: 26-35; 1995:35). 
Throughout the ages these actions and being acted upon became sedimented as 
cultural patterns of which religion is a part. As such, ‘The historical religions are 
answers which have been evolved in an attempt to tame the confusing, 
threatening aspects of life by incorporating them into coherent patterns. Chaos 
becomes cosmos’ (Krüger 1995:56).’In the ongoing process of finding meaning, 
times of search are followed by times of maintaining what has been found, and   
invariably these are followed by times of destruction of what has been 
maintained’ (Krüger 1995:57-58). 
 
Studying religion should therefore take cognisance of religion as interweaved 
patterns of making-meaning – as sedimented and changed through the ages but 
also as a living and dynamic patterning. Krüger (1995:58) therefore proposes that 
religion should not be seen (and studied) as  
a separate sphere with a separate object of experience, but as 
interconnected with various provinces of experience…Religion is not a 
separate province of experience. …It is just exceptionally deep 
experience. Religion is not to be found only in holy places such as 
churches and temples, in sacred ceremonies such as initiation rites, or in 
holy books. It is the experience of the boundary where the ordinary and 
the banal are contrasted with the deeply mysterious. 
  
 
The historical religions, according to Krüger (1995:59), ‘are concretised forms of 
these frontier experiences; the landmarks, through many millennia, of human 
beings’ intuitions of ultimate reality, truth, beauty and goodness. There is 
therefore every reason to treat such forms with great respect’. Krüger then 
deems it necessary to delineate religion from what he considers to be 
phenomena that fall outside his proposal for understanding religion. He describes 
two groups of phenomena that would fall outside religion, namely ‘phenomena 
that are open to religious understanding [experiences of the grandeur of nature, 
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love, humour, death, or hope; on another level, science and art; some 
manifestations of modern atheism], and phenomena that obstruct the process of 
radical transcending and totalising [nihilism]’ (1995: 61).   
 
Up to now Krüger emphasised that religion is not a separate ‘province’, but a 
human process of making meaning and referring to ages of previous meaning-
making, embedded in dynamic relations between individuals, nature and society. 
Religion, as described so far by Krüger, involves recognising and describing 
patterns of meaning, even those patterns of meaning found in the liminal spaces 
between religions. From this evidently ‘open’ approach to religion as a dynamic 
human construct embedded in webs of relations, Krüger then ‘closes’ his 
description of religion by stating what falls outside the parameters that he 
suggested. He specifically mentions nihilism as falling outside as well stating that 
‘obstruction is antireligion’ (1995:61). These distinctions would suggest that we 
are actually dealing with three phenomena namely religion, the not-religious or a-
religious and the anti-religious.  
 
If it is true that ‘religious forms are landmarks left from other people’s journeys’ 
(Krüger 1995:118), then the distinction Krüger makes between ‘good and bad 
religion’ (1995:119) needs further exploration. The first that comes to mind in 
judging religious expressions and journeys would be having clarity on the criteria 
for stating that a specific expression is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Criteria in a postmodern 
sense are neither universal nor neutral – but are always embedded in 
genderised, socioeconomic, class and political webs of meaning. According to 
Krüger the criterion to establish ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is ‘the degree to which it relies 
on either authority (auctoritas) or force (potestas)’. Although Krüger 
acknowledges that ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is ‘a constant possibility in religion’ (1995:119), 
the classification of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is often applied from the vantage point of 
historical separation to the actual events, or if judged in real time – face the 
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possibility of being judged differently as time elapses or if the gender, 
socioeconomic and/or political affiliation of the judges change52.  
 
In a later work (2003) Krüger explores religious change in a very specific context 
and specific time-frame, therefore raising interesting methodological questions 
regarding the broader notion of Religionswissenschaft. He specifically ‘declares’ 
his hermeneutical instrument as ‘involving, on a historical sociological level, the 
dimensions of normal scholarly work, such as factual correctness, emphatic 
understanding, and theoretical explanation – that is the discovery of connections 
and correlations in patterns of relationships’ (Krüger 2003:9).  
 
He plots his study using the metaphor of music and his specific exploration being 
flanked by other instruments and sounds (2003:9). He then asks ‘Does the 
scholar restrict himself to “facts, facts, facts” when people are buried under the 
rubble of the collapsed heavens?’ In Krüger’s earlier work (1995), he petitions for 
an understanding of religion never isolated from its contexts, but also never 
isolated from the sui generis focus of the study of religion, namely homo 
religiosus. Religion, according to Krüger (2003:13) is the ‘primordial need for a 
radical and comprehensive orientation’. Krüger (2003:14) even goes so far as to 
propose ‘to avoid the word “G-o-d”. Most of the time, at least in Western religious 
history, and particularly in popular forms of theology, it affirms Being in a thick 
sense, denying its opposite, which makes it problematic’. Krüger (2003:14) 
therefore proposes ‘pursuing a meta-theistic path’.  
 
Krüger (2003:38) further proposes as methodological ground in approaching 
religion and religious expressions to ‘proceed from a radically experientially 
perspective. It cannot be clothed in the authoritative, protective uniform of any 
imperial religious tradition, but must stand exposed to the critical view of all, 
unprotected by dogma and sacred institution’. 
                                            
52 The rules for discourse as proposed by Habermas (1984) are vital in the discourses regarding 
the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ possibilities of religion.  
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Krüger (2003:48-49) opts for a wide understanding of the term ‘religion’ and uses 
‘world-orientation’ as alternative. He proposes four substantive uses of the term 
‘religion’: 
• Firstly, in line with common usage: Krüger uses the terms ‘religion’ in 
reference to ‘Hinduism’, ‘Judaism’ and so on. 
• As reference to organised religion e.g. churches as well as including 
‘groups such as Theosophy and Scientology’. 
• As synonymous with ‘worldview’ (Weltanschauung) – ‘as the most 
inclusive framework of culture, and its practical implications’. 
• The ‘classical’ forms of religion like Judaism and Christianity as civil 
religion – ‘that is the religious urge as expressed in the beliefs, rituals, 
myths, pantheon of saints, shrines and so on of a nation or other political 
entity. A civil religion provides the political aspirations of such a group with 
“ultimate’ meaning”’ (Krüger 2003:49).  
 
Dealing with the richness of such a wide description of ‘religion’, Krüger 
(2003:55) suggests approaching the plurality of religions  
not… as merely a scatter like a handful of stones randomly strewn on the 
ground, but as a complex gestalt – a sort of a milky way, a large social 
vortex with a collective gravitation towards a centre, or a swing away from 
it.  … I find the mental picture of a vortex (a galaxy, or a cyclone) helpful 
as a heuristic instrument to map the various changing constellations over 
time, and as an alternative to the two dominant master symbols in the 
interpretation of social life, namely ‘conflict’ and stable ‘system’. 
 
This constellation as proposed by Krüger is shaped by power relations resulting 
in ‘structures of dominance’ (2003:55); and groups’ quest for self-identity, 
resulting in the immolating of others (2003:56). ‘In a conditionalistic perspective, 
real, historical, concrete religions are composites, putting-together from various 
sources. Technically speaking, they are all syncretistic’ (Krüger 2003:60). 
 
In closing these brief explorations of the discourses in and surrounding 
Religionswissenschaft or the science of religion, I find the remarks made by 
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Flood (2006) helpful, if not illuminating.  Referring to the general fragmentation in 
the discourse, Flood (2006:48) states 
We need to overcome the inadequate choice of using either problematic 
universal categories in understanding religions or a relativistic reversion to 
purely area-specific study which relegates the study of ‘religions’ to 
departments of Anthropology, Sociology, or whatever and excludes 
theologies of traditions from the secular academy. We need to promote 
Religious Studies as a field of inquiry that gives hospitality to traditions and 
their self-representations, allows for discussion across subdisciplines such 
as the Anthropology of Religion, Sociology of Religion, Philology, and so 
on, and interfaces with a public discourse.  
 
Flood (2006:51) expresses his sympathy for the view by Fitzgerald that religious 
studies ‘is not unified by a method and if not unified by an [sic] shared object, 
“religion” then is indeed an administrative fiction’. On the other hand Flood 
(2006:52) states  
The issue is more complex than a choice between religion as a sui generis 
category, outside of culture and closed to history, and religion as a 
manufactured academic discourse that constructs its field from diverse 
social and political elements in the unconscious service of a hegemonic, 
liberal ideology. 
 
Therefore, between these two options as defined by Flood (2006), I would like to 
side with Goodenough (1959) and the contributions from Krüger (1982, 1995, 
2003) in expressing my comfort with taking (for now) a wide description of 
religion and the study of religion as science (as described by Krüger 1995, 2003 
and Pummer 1972). Two descriptions that made an impression on me as I 
attempted to orientate myself in the discourses in and surrounding the study of 
religion was Goodenough’s (1959) description of the tremendum and Krüger’s 
(1995) description of religious forms that are landmarks left from other people’s 
journeys, interweaved and patterned in complex and dynamic interrelations 
between power, socioeconomic and political discourses.  
 
To my mind, the study of religion as proposed by the Policy should empower 
students with a Mündigkeit to be comfortable with being uncomfortable with the 
numinous, the tremendum. Religion education should allow students to critically 
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interrogate the paintings on the curtains – to describe, to analyse and compare; 
but also to venture behind the curtain and confront the ultimate, the tremendum. 
The Policy should allow learners to become aware of religious forms and 
traditions (especially their own) as part of a dynamic and lively constellation, 
recognising patterns, evaluating answers and phrasing new questions.  
 
The study of religion is much more than just an administrative category (Flood 
2006), much more than studying religion as social problem (Robbins 1985), much 
more than defining and interrogating the definitions (Platvoet 1990), more than 
describing taxonomies (Smith 1996) or plotting the history of religions (Eliade 
1961). Studying religion is taking homo religiosus seriously – facing the 
tremendum qua tremendum’ (Goodenough 1959) with ‘tireless and sympathetic 
curiosity’ (Waardenburg as quoted by Krüger 1982:1). In this scientific study of 
the tremendum, we should ‘not reject old curtains only to put up new curtains of 
hasty generalisations’ (Goodenough 1959:94) and use the ‘curtainless 
procedures of science’ and respect our scientific inquiry as a ‘sacramental 
instrument’ (Goodenough 1959:95). 
 
3.5.2 Approaches to the study of religion 
 
Connolly states ‘Accurate, objective accounts of religious phenomena and 
religious traditions simply do not exist in their own right. All accounts of religion 
are accounts by people who approach their study form a particular starting-point’ 
(1999:1). Connolly continues to discuss seven approaches to the study of 
religions of which ‘each has a different emphasis and each brings a distinctive set 
of assumptions to its inquiries’ though each of these approaches ‘embraces a 
variety of perspectives within it’ (1999:2). Each of these approaches interprets a 
‘methodological agnosticism’ ‘which means that students should bring to their 
inquiries neither a commitment to the truth or accuracy of one or more religious 
views of the world nor a conviction of their falsity or inaccuracy’ (Connolly 
1999:2). In approaching different religions, students are either being ‘insiders’ or 
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‘outsiders’ to the religion in question. Each of those positions brings with it a set 
of challenges and dangers.  
 
I will now continue to briefly explore the seven approaches proposed by Connolly 
(1999) and add an approach not covered by Connolly namely critical approaches 
to the study of religions as presented in the work by Wright (2004) and Wood 
(2001). The following figure illustrates the eight different approaches to the study 
of religion (Figure 3.4).  
 
From Figure 3.4 it is apparent that none of the eight different approaches are 
‘closed’ from other approaches and that there may be overlaps between these 
different approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Approaches to the study of religion 
 
3.5.2.1 Anthropological approaches 
 
Examples of recent anthropological approaches to the study of religion include 
Bowie (2000), Firth (1996) and Glazier (1999). Glazier describes an 
anthropological approach as follows: 
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The anthropological approach to the study of religion, which focuses on 
the nature of the symbolic or cultural self, uses the insights and 
contributions of psychological, phenomenological, and 
hermeneutic/semiotic perspectives and analyzes how cultural/social 
integrity is maintained through the sacred or supernatural integration of the 
symbolic self (Glazier 1999:514). 
 
In discussing early anthropological approaches to the study of religions, Gellner 
(1999) refers to the works of Frazer, The golden bough (1890) and Durkheim’s 
The elementary forms of religious life (1912).  In contrast to the work by Frazer 
who narrated examples from across the world with little regard for the original 
context, Durkheim proposed a binary of sacred and profane as underlying 
experiences of the religious (Gellner 1999: 12-15). These early works resemble 
evolutionary approaches, while Marx and Malinowsky took a functionalist 
approach to explaining the role of religion in society (Gellner 1999:16). While 
Malinowsky’s functionalist approach was based on ‘the biological needs of 
individuals, Radcliffe-Brown’s focused on the needs of society’ (Gellner 1999:18). 
‘In the structural functionalist view, religion was seen as the cement of society: it 
was analysed so as to show how it contributed to maintaining the social structure 
of the group’ (Gellner 1999:19). The works of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Clifford 
Geertz continued an interpretivist functionalist approach to the study of religion’s 
role in society. According to an interpretivist approach, the key idea is to ‘be able 
to interpret events in the way that people themselves do’ (Gellner 1999:29 
quoting Geertz). 
 
Although Geertz (1973:90) questions whether definitions establish anything, he 
states that ‘in themselves they do, if they are carefully enough constructed, 
provide a useful orientation, or reorientation, of thought, such that an extended 
unpacking of them can be an effective way of developing and controlling a novel 
line of inquiry’. He proceeds by providing his definition of religion: 
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, 
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by (3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz 1973:90). 
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Gellner (1999:35-38) closes his essay on anthropological approaches by pointing 
towards some issues in an anthropological approach to the study of religion. 
Among these issues are a ‘transcultural religious or spiritual sphere… which is 
apprehended by people all over the world in different ways’; should all religions 
be interpreted in the ‘same way’; is ‘religion an inherently or predominantly 
conservative force’ or can religion be ‘revolutionary’? (Gellner 1999:36-37).  
 
3.5.1.2 Feminist approaches 
 
In feminist approaches gender is introduced as ‘a primary category of analysis’ 
(Morgan 1999:42). Morgan describes the ‘critical transformation’ aim of feminist 
approaches as follows:  
The critical dimension confronts religion with its historical perpetuation of 
unjust, exclusionary practices that have legitimated male superiority in 
every social domain. The transformative aspect subsequently 
reappropriates the central symbols, texts and rituals of religious traditions 
so as to incorporate and affirm the neglected experiences of women 
(1999:42). 
 
Morgan continues to describe Anglo-American religious feminism in the 
nineteenth century as having been dominated by two major issues: ‘the debate 
over equal access to the ministry and biblical criticism’ (1999:43). She states that 
Religion formed a powerful factor in the shaping and direction of American 
feminism. This was largely due to the strong ideological connections 
between the women’s movement and the anti-slavery campaign, or 
abolitionism, a cause fuelled by evangelical zeal for reform (1999:45). 
 
Other feminist authors whose work Morgan discusses include Rosemary Radford 
Reuther (1974, 1975). Reuther coined the phrase ‘misbegotten male’ for a female 
(Morgan 1999:47). Reuther configured patriarchy as a series of historically 
constructed, sinful social structures open to revision through feminist political 
struggle (Morgan 1999:48-49). Feminist approaches to the study of religions 
therefore addressed the issue of using masculine pronouns for deities, and 
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challenging the gender specific implications of symbols and rituals (Morgan 
1999:52-53). 
Rereading the sacred literature of Christianity, Judaism, Islam and other 
world religions involves an awareness not only of narrative content, but the 
entire hermeneutical or interpretative process only through which that 
content is understood as normative. Recognition of male authorship, 
transmission and canonisation of the scriptures renders the Jewish and 
Christian feminist hermeneutical approach one of profound suspicion 
(Morgan 1999:53). 
 
Morgan alludes to the fact that feminist approaches to the study of religion warn 
that ‘gender’ and more specifically womanhood not to be ‘the same’ for all 
women of all cultures across the world and across religious experiences 
(1999:61).  From the early stages of feminism, feminist scholars have now moved 
to the stage where they are ‘devoted to the constructions of … a more inclusive 
gender system which recognises the interrelatedness of female and male 
identities as central to theoretical analysis’ (Morgan 1999:64-65). 
 
For other examples of feminist approaches, see the works of Benland (1987) and 
Simpson (1993). 
 
3.5.1.3 Phenomenological approaches 
 
In an essay on phenomenological approaches to the study of religion, Erricker 
(1999) states that ‘The meaning of the term phenomenology has never been 
unequivocally established in relation to the study of religion’ (1999:73) – and he 
does not attempt to do it and pleads for caution to those that do attempt it. In 
attempting to provide a historical overview of the development of 
phenomenological approaches, Erricker discusses the works by Waardenberg, 
Lévy-Bruhl and Mircea Eliade (1999:74-76) and states ‘The phenomenological 
approach thus originated as an attempt to construct a coherent methodology for 
the study of religion’ (1999:76). Erricker (1999:76) traces phenomenological 
approaches back to Hegel’s belief that ‘essence (Wesen) is understood through 
 153
investigating appearances and manifestations (Erscheinungen)’ and the work of 
Husserl on epoche and eidetic vision.  
These two terms … reveal both the scope of the method and the tensions 
within it. Epoche involves the restraint or suspension of judgement. It has 
also been referred to as ‘bracketing out’. …Eidetic vision relates to the 
ability to see what is actually there. It presupposes epoche, introduces the 
capacity to see ‘objectively’ the essence of the phenomenon, but also 
addresses the issue of the subjectivity of perception and reflection 
(1999:77). 
 
 
Erricker acknowledges that the presumption of eidetic vision is that there is 
‘something’ actually there that can be ‘objectively’ reported on (1999:77). 
Kristensen, according to Erricker (1999:80) believed that a ‘systematic grouping 
of characteristic data’ of religious phenomena would reveal ‘the essential and 
typical elements of religion. This task was descriptive, not interpretative’ (Erricker 
1999:80). Kristensen also insisted ‘on the importance of understanding a religion 
from the viewpoint of the believer, a principle that became axiomatic in many 
later phenomenological studies’ (Erricker 1999:80). 
 
According to Erricker (1999:82) phenomenological approaches to the study of 
religion can be divided into two categories, namely descriptive and interpretive 
phenomenology as the two positions on either end of a continuum (1999:83). As 
examples of phenomenological approaches, Erricker refer to the work by William 
James (1902), Mircea Eliade (1959) and Ninian Smart (1971). According to 
Erricker, Smart is ‘concerned with the organic development of religion in human 
history, characterised by the traditions and their institutions on the one hand and 
the dimensions of religion on the other’ (1999:85). What is interesting about the 
work of Smart with specific regard to my evaluation of the Policy is Smart’s 
extension of the parameters of the study of religion to ‘include ideologies that 
exhibit similar characteristics to religions, such as Marxism and humanism’ 
(Erricker 1999:86). Of this expansion of the parameters of the study of religions, 
Erricker says – ‘As a result, what was conceived as a phenomenological study 
restricted to institutionalised religion, with global significance, becomes the study 
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of worldviews that spans religious and non-religious understandings in relation to 
existential issues and experiential perceptions’ (1999:88). 
 
3.5.2.4 Philosophical approaches 
 
In his exploration of philosophical approaches to the study of religion Fisher 
(1999:105) admits to a ‘crisis of identity’ as philosophical approaches to the study 
of religion do not have a ‘single home’ and secondly, that there is no agreement 
on what a philosophical approach to the study of religion entails.  He identifies 
five possible positions with regard to the relationship between philosophy and 
religion namely (1) philosophy as religion; (2) philosophy as the handmaid of 
religion; (3) philosophy as making room for faith; (4) philosophy as an analytic 
tool of religion; and (5) philosophy as the study of the reasoning used in religious 
thought (1999:116).  
 
As a way out of, or into the dilemma, Fisher proposes following John Hick (1983) 
in identifying four branches in a philosophical approach to the study of religion 
(1999:118-122). These four branches are: 
(1) An exploration of the logic inherent in religious thought.  This implies the 
interrogation of ‘all aspects of the arguments a religious believer advances’ 
(1999:119). 
(2) An exploration of the philosophical activity of metaphysics in dealing with 
ontological, epistemological and cosmological questions (1999:120). 
(3) Combined with logic and metaphysics, philosophy as epistemological inquiry. 
(4) The ethical dimension of philosophical enquiry.  
 
Current issues and debates in philosophical approaches to the study of religion 
according to Fisher (1999:122) can be clustered into three areas namely (1) a 
cultural-linguistic understanding of religion; (2) the problem of evil; and (3) the 
problem of God’s action in the world. 
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3.5.1.5 Psychological approaches 
 
Psychological approaches to the study of religion find itself ‘very much on the 
periphery of mainstream psychology’ (Connolly 1999:135).  As a way into 
defining the variety of approaches on this periphery, Connolly proposes to 
distinguish between the psychology of religion and religious psychology.  
The former would then refer to the application of psychological methods 
and data to the study of religious beliefs, experiences and behaviours; the 
latter to the use of psychological methods and data by religious people for 
the purpose of enriching and/or defending religious beliefs, experiences 
and behaviours (1999:137) 
 
Although such a distinction may be valid and useful, it does not offer a ‘complete 
solution, for there is inevitably a hazy border zone between the two activities’ 
(Connolly 1999:137). Tracing the historical development of psychological 
approaches to the study of religion, Connolly explores inter alia the contributions 
of Freud (1927) and Jung (1875-1961). According to Connolly, Freud ‘describes 
religion as an individual response to the pressures of life’ and assists humans in 
making ‘helplessness tolerable’ (1999:150).  For Freud, religion ‘inhibits 
psychological and emotional maturation’ (Connolly 1999:151). Jung, according to 
Connolly (1999:151) was not as negative about the role religion plays in the lives 
of groups and individuals. Jung viewed religion ‘as a vehicle for channelling the 
symbolic communication between the unconscious and the conscious minds’. As 
such a religious outlook ‘is essential for psychological well-being in the second 
half of life’ (Connolly 1999:151). 
 
Religion, according to Jung, ‘was fundamentally psychological in nature’ 
(Connolly 1999:155). Connolly continues to discuss the various contributions of 
Abraham H. Maslow, Carl Rogers, B.F. Skinner and John Schumaker who saw 
all religion as ‘cumulative traditions of reality distortion whose purpose is to keep 
the specters of mortality and chaos at bay’ (Connolly 1999:172). Connolly closes 
his discussion of psychological approaches to the study of religion by referring to 
the different valuations of the role and function of religion in the lives of 
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individuals and communities. Connolly states that, so far, there is not clear 
evidence regarding the relation between mental health and religion; that 
researchers employ different definitions of ‘being religious’ and that most 
research in this field are ‘methodologically and conceptually deficient’ (1999:183). 
 
3.5.1.6 Sociological approaches 
 
The uniqueness of sociological approaches to the study of religion is their 
specific attention and focus to the different aspects of the relation between 
society and religion.  
 
The basic presupposition of the sociological perspective concerns the 
social structuring and construction of human experience and culture, 
including religion. Objects, knowledge, practices and institutions in the 
social world are viewed by sociologists as the products of human 
interaction and social construction. Religion is one form of social 
construction (Northcott 1999:193). 
 
Sociological approaches to the study of religion emphasises the aspect of 
immanence instead of transcendence in their exploration of the social forces and 
processes of religion as well as ‘the generative power of religious organisations 
and doctrine in the social world, and to the distinctive shape and characteristics 
of the life worlds which religious communities represent in both primitive and 
modern societies’ (Northcott 1999:194). 
 
Northcott traces the historical development of sociological approaches to the 
study of religion back to the work of Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim. 
Durkheim, according to Northcott, postulated ‘Religion is therefore a source of 
social and moral order, binding members of society to a common social project, a 
set of shared values and beliefs’ (1999:196). Durkheim further proposes that as 
modern societies evolve, that the social solidarity and commitment to the 
common good of society would be eroded as society increasingly depended less 
on gods and religions and more on empirical reason (Northcott 1999:196-197). 
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In exploring sociological approaches to the study of religion, Northcott also refers 
to the contributions of Marx, Gramsci and Max Weber (1999:198-201). Like 
Durkheim, Marx regarded ‘religion as a social product and as an agent of social 
order in premodern societies’ (Northcott 1999:198). Northcott (1999:198) states 
‘According to Marx religion acts as a collective smoke screen which obscures the 
true nature of things from the mass of people, mystifying the origins and reality of 
their oppression, and representing the rights of the rulers over the ruled as 
elements of a divinely ordained social order’ (Northcott 1999:198). 
 
Antonio Gramsci alluded to the ‘potential of religion as a generator of social 
change as well as of social cohesion’ (Northcott 1999:199). With regard to the 
contributions of Max Weber to sociological approaches to the study of religion, 
Northcott refers to the fact that  
Religion in a Weberian perspective is in different contexts both a source of 
social change and challenge and a source of social order and legitimation 
of the status quo. However Weber also believed that religion would 
gradually fade in social significance as a consequence of the 
rationalization of modern social and economic organisation (1999:199).  
 
Identifying current issues and debates within sociological approaches to the 
study of religion, Northcott identifies several (1999:214-220). On the one hand 
there is the influence of securalism by which ‘religion loses its dominance or 
social significance in society’ (Northcott 1999:214) involving 
• Declining participation in religious activities and ceremonies 
• Declining membership of religious organisations 
• Declining influence of religious institutions in social life and institutions 
• Diminishing authority of and belief in religious teachings 
• Reduced private devotion, prayer, belief 
• Declining authority of traditional religiously sanctioned moral values 
• Reduced social significance of religious professionals, reductions in 
vocations, and in some countries anti-clericalism 
• Privatisation or internal secularization of religious rituals and belief 
systems (Northcott 1999:214) 
 
On the other hand there are indications of a ‘return of religion’ with increasing 
fundamentalisms worldwide to such an extent that many sociologists who 
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have for many years ‘discounted the social significance of religion are 
increasingly recognising the growing role of religion in movements of cultural 
and ethical resistance in late or postmodern societies in both the developed 
and developing worlds’ (Northcott 1999:219-220).  
 
3.5.1.7 Theological approaches 
 
Whaling (1999:226) states that the relationship between theology and the study 
of religion to be ‘a highly complex one’. This situation is further exacerbated by 
the fact that there is no ‘simple, monolithic meaning that can be given to either 
theology or religious studies’ (Whaling 1999:227). After exploring the historical 
development of theology, Whaling concludes that theology  
has to do with God or transcendence, whether seen mythologically, 
philosophically, or dogmatically. Second, although it has many nuances, 
doctrine has always been a significant element in its meaning. And third it 
is essentially a second-order activity arising from ‘faith’ and interpreting 
faith (Whaling 1999:228-229). 
 
 
Religious studies, on the other hand, ‘is wide in its remit’ referring to the major 
traditions like Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish and Muslim; the minor traditions 
such as Jain, Sikh, Taoist and Zoroastrian; dead traditions such as the Gnostics, 
the Manichaeans; new religious movements like the Baha’is and a variety of 
indigenous traditions; and even ‘secular religions’ as proposed by Ninian Smart 
to include nationalism, humanism and Marxism (Whaling 1999:229). Theology 
also seems to be centrally concerned with doctrine, while religious studies 
emphasise conceptual elements, social practices, rituals, aesthetics, spirituality, 
myth, symbol, and ethics (Whaling 1999:230). 
 
After his attempt of differentiating between theology and religious studies, 
Whaling states ‘It is a part of the task of religious studies to be aware of, and to 
understand, the separate theologies of the separate religions’ (1999:236). 
Different religious traditions ‘tend to differ on the basis of a core of doctrines that 
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are more-or-less “given”’ (Whaling 1999:237). Religious traditions are however, 
also not homogenous in doctrine, processes and rituals. There are significant 
theological differences within religious traditions (Whaling 1999:238).  Whaling 
continues to state that there are furthermore four different types of theology 
within each tradition (1999:239). He defines the four types as follows (1999:239-
240:  
(1)  The ‘descriptive, historical, positivistic type of theology … who attempts to 
describe what is the case doctrinally in a functional way without passing 
over into value judgements’; 
(2)  A ‘systematic type of theology attempts to summarise the doctrines of the 
faith community in a confessional sense’; 
(3)  ‘The philosophical type of theology attempts to engage with other positions 
at a philosophical level by taking them seriously and reacting to them’ and 
(4)  A ‘theology of dialogue’ which ‘involves the deliberate desire to understand 
others for their own sake, not just for apologetic reasons’.  
 
Whaling concludes that the scholar of religion ‘is interested in exploring the 
theologies of different religions in order to understand their core concepts, the 
different types of theology within each tradition, and the different theological 
viewpoints within each tradition’ (1999:243).  
 
2.5.1.8 Critical approaches 
 
Both Andrew Wright (2004)53 and Mark Wood (2001) are examples of a critical 
approach to the study of religion.  They do however differ in defining their 
criticality. The work of Wright (2004) is explicitly based on critical realism54, while 
Wood’s exposition of a critical approach to the study of religions is based on a 
Marxist and Gramscian analysis of the role the study of religion can and should 
                                            
53 Wright (2004), like Jackson (1997, 2004) is an example of educationists working on the study 
of religion. 
54 For further information on critical realism, see for example Hiebert (1999) and essays of Roy 
Bhaskar in Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie (1998).  
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play. I will first very briefly refer to the work of Wright (2004) and then continue to 
interrogate the work of Wood (M.D) (2001)55.  
 
Wright establishes his approach within the domain of critical realism (2004:53). 
He suggests that critical realism, ‘together with alteristic forms of post-modernity, 
suggests a way of progressing towards deeper and more truthful knowledge of 
ourselves, and of our place in the ultimate order-of-things, however provisional, 
limited and contingent such knowledge might be’ (2004:64).If I understand Wright 
correctly, then it would seem as if he, on the one hand accepts the possibility that 
all knowing is provisional and contingent, but then on the other hand, Wright 
seems to suggest that our knowing is progressively getting closer to knowing the 
‘ultimate order-of-things’. He seems to suggest that such an ultimate order-of-
things exists as ultimate truth, and secondly, that academia and education should 
strive to attain the ‘ultimate truth’. He goes further to state that the ‘integrity of 
religious education, that is to say, is rooted in its pursuit of ultimate truth’ 
(2004:221).  
 
Within the context of an ‘alteristic freedom’ Wright states the following about the 
truth-claims of religions: 
The truth claims of religion are vital, ambiguous and unavoidable: vital 
because it matters how we live out our lives, ambiguous because we are 
faced with a host of conflicting and competing meta-narratives, 
unavoidable because we live our lives in a framework of meaning, whether 
modern or post modern, religious or secular (2004:224). 
 
Wright closes his exposition of his proposal for critical religious studies by stating: 
 Our exploration of the interface between religion, education and post-
modernity has produced a high view of education as a process of honest, 
open, wise and truthful struggling with the ultimate mystery of reality and 
striving after the ultimate truth of the order-of-things. The universal 
challenges facing humanity urgently require the establishment of a public 
religious literacy that is open, honest, truthful and wise. Despite the 
dangers of a narrowly conceived post-modern meta-narrative, a post-
modernity resistant to the premature closure of our ongoing wrestling with 
                                            
55 For the sake of the formulation of my own criticality, the work by Wood (M.D)(2001) was 
stimulating and opened vistas of what criticality in the study of religion can mean. 
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the ultimate order-of-things, and open to the horizon of alterity, difference 
and the Other, has much to teach the religious educator (2004:231).  
 
 
In stark contrast to the approach by Wright (2004) we find the work of Wood 
(M.D)(2001). Wood (M.D)56 explores the content and role of the study of religions 
against the backdrop of a Marxist and more specifically a Gramscian analysis of 
labour, capitalism and society. Academia, according to Wood, is not an ivory 
tower as many would (like to?) believe, but ‘microcosmically represents’ the 
conflicts found in wider society and also contributes to the ‘macrocosmic 
development’ of these conflicts (2001:131). Academia is also  
an institution integral to the expanded reproduction of capitalist relations of 
production and consumption – relations that are producing grotesque 
socioeconomic inequalities between and within nations; leaving a growing 
proportion of humanity jobless, homeless, and desolate; and threatening 
the biological viability of the earth itself (2001:132). 
 
Wood refers to the work by Loy (1997) who named capitalism as ‘the first truly 
world religion’ (as quoted by Wood 2001:133) and therefore, academia and the 
study of religion cannot afford ‘the luxury of neutrality’. Neutrality is neither 
possible nor desirable (Wood 2001:133). As such the study of religion should 
‘take side in the struggle to create a life-enhancing global society’ (2001:133). 
 
Against this background, Wood continues to define a critical organic approach to 
religious studies to encompass ‘…analysing the existing global social order, 
imagining life-enhancing alternatives, and fostering the construction of these 
alternatives’ (2001:134). This will require religious scholars and teachers to 
‘…break with corporate versions of multiculturalism that reduce the overarching 
ethical project of religious studies to aiding students in their ability to appreciate 
cultural and religious diversity rather than to engage with religious life as integral 
to this analytic, imaginative, and constructive project’ (2001:134). 
 
                                            
56 For the rest of the discussion, Wood (2001) refers to Mark D. Wood and not Wood, E.J.) 
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Wood locates his proposal for critical organic religious studies against the 
requirement in transnational and global companies ‘to be able to work in contexts 
that are culturally, ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse’ (2001:135). There 
is also an increasing ‘commodification of diversity, that is, the transformation of 
diversity, including religious diversity, into exchange values sold on the global 
capitalist market (e.g., religious greeting cards, calendars, and spiritual quotation 
and self-help books)’. The effect of these developments on the one hand 
‘supports our efforts to pique student interest in the study of religion’ and also, 
simultaneously ‘compels us to work harder to present that the world’s religions 
represent something more than merely more commodities for consumption in the 
global spiritual shopping mall’ (2001:136). 
 
The well-known quote of Marx that religion is ‘the opiate of the masses’ continues 
to state that religion is ‘an expression of real suffering and a protest against real 
suffering’ (quoted by Wood 2001:139). Hegemony, as proposed by Gramsci, 
maintains its power ‘by encouraging the powerless to think, feel, and act in ways 
that support the existing social order as if it were natural and, if possible, 
desirable’ (Wood 2001:139). Using the concepts proposed by Gramsci does not 
‘radically alter the project of religious studies’ (Wood 2001:140). 
By exploring how religions contribute to the formation of hegemonic as 
well as counterhegemonic habits, sensibilities, and world-views, religious 
studies as critical organic practice makes it possible for students to 
appreciate the entirely this-worldly relevance of religion to matters of 
personal, social, and planetary well-being (2001:140). 
 
As exponent of a genealogical materialism, Wood is of the opinion that Foucault’s 
theory of power ‘proves inadequate to enable religious studies scholars and 
teachers to contribute to the improvement of the human condition’ (2001:142).  In 
paragraph 3.2 I alluded to the fact that Wood is uncomfortable with Foucault’s 
description of power. For the sake of my exploration, Wood quotes Foucault as 
having said: 
[Power] is not which makes the difference between those who exclusively 
possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it. Power 
must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
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which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or 
there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or 
piece of wealth. [Rather,] power is employed and exercised through a net-
like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; 
they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting targets; 
they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, 
individuals are the vehicles of power, not its point of application (as quoted 
by Wood 2001:143).  
 
Wood compares a Foucauldian and Marxist analysis of power by stating 
Whereas Marxist analysis illuminates what must be done by working 
people in order to gain and use power as a means of building a 
democratic society, a Foucauldian analysis suggests that what must be 
done is to displace the dominant discursive regime by resisting localized 
sites of its specific operations in a never-ending process of discursive 
displacements (2001:143). 
 
On the one hand I suspect that Wood underestimates power to corrupt and use 
whatever vehicle for articulation and application, and on the other hand 
sympathise with Wood that the moment you locate localized sites of power, in a 
‘never-ending process of discursive displacements’ – the focus of any struggle for 
a more just and compassionate society becomes almost unattainable. Wood 
attests to this by saying  
… if no one owns power-producing machines (e.g., manufacturing plants, 
communication networks, agricultural equipment), if everyone is done by 
and does power, then it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to say that an 
individual or class of individuals, say, for example, the ruling economic 
class, is exploiting another individual or class of individuals, say, for 
example, workers whose labour produces the machinery of power (Wood 
2001:144).  
 
He adds later that that a Foucaultian approach to power does not allow citizens 
to confront the inequalities in society which ‘provides every person access to the 
resources required to develop fully their talents and abilities’ (2001:145). I 
suspect that Foucault would have empathised with Wood’s notion of the broader 
project of ‘an ecologically sustainable and socially responsible global society’. 
Foucault’s concern would have been with Wood’s suggestion that citizens of the 
world should ‘acquire and utilize various forms of power’. I further suspect that 
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Foucault’s ‘distrust’ of using power to counter unequal power distribution is if not 
more cynical than Wood’s beliefs, then more sober? 
 
Where Wright (2004) uses the ‘pursuit of truth’ and the’ “ultimate order-of-things’ 
as design principles for a critical religious studies, so Wood (2001) uses ‘labour’ 
in the context of global capitalism as design principles for a critical theory of 
religion. He expresses concern that ‘students lack even a rudimentary knowledge 
regarding how capitalism works, whom it works for and whom it works against, 
and how it is related to nature and their own lives’ and that the education they 
received was ‘appropriate for empire’ (2001:148). Students lack theoretical tools 
to analyse and explain the social causes of capitalism abusing humans and the 
environment. Against this background, there is a need for insurgent productive 
pedagogical relations which involves ‘connecting course material to the local and 
global problems that constitute the social, political, and economic world in which 
we live’ (2001:150). Although Wood does not refer specifically to the pedagogical 
practices proposed by Freire (as discussed in section 3.3), he does refer to the 
practice of ‘banking’ education, which, according to Wood ‘remains bankrupt as a 
means for generating individuals who are capable of investigating and 
transforming the world’ (2001:150). Again in reaction to the proposal of Freire 
(although Wood does not mention Freire), Wood criticizes the emancipatory 
approach’s intention to allow students to discover and develop their ‘own voices’. 
Wood comments that ‘…while many students lack the ability to speak, even more 
lack the basic knowledge of history, politics, science, literature, morals, ethics, 
and religion, including quite often knowledge of their own faith traditions’ 
(2001:150). He further laments that should students voice their opinions, these 
opinions often sound ‘like the voice of syndicated right-wing radio talk show 
hosts’ (2001:150). Wood then proposes that  
Critical pedagogy ought to be less oriented by a concern with helping 
students find their ‘own’ voices (particularly if the concept of ‘voice’ is 
depoliticized, that is abstracted from its socially embedded context as a 
socially produced, politically interested voice) than concerned with helping 
students appreciate the ways in which voices are linked to and quite often 
supportive of the status quo and with helping students develop their 
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capacity to challenge the conditions that obstruct our efforts to build a just, 
democratic, and humane global society (2001:151). 
 
Wood’s critical religious study should not only challenge existing social relations, 
but also be rewarded for challenging the status quo (2001:152). For the 
development of critical organic religious studies, Wood foresees ‘…providing 
theoretical resources required for students to analyse the societal forces that 
currently determine the development of sensuous labour, to imagine alternative 
possibilities, and to develop strategies by which to realize these possibilities’ 
(2001:153). 
 
The critical religious studies as proposed by Wood, therefore has three elements, 
namely to analyse, to imagine and to develop strategies. These three elements 
should be developed ‘within the context of global capitalist realities’ (2001:153).  
In this critical organic praxis, Wood proposes that students become engaged in 
community projects – not only to address immediate problems confronting 
society, but also to build ‘organizations that can challenge the forces that create 
these problems in the first place’ (2001:156).  In closing his proposal for critical 
religious studies, Wood admits that ‘Developing religious studies as critical 
organic intellectual practice is very much a work in progress’ and he expresses 
his hope that a critical religious studies 
…makes a useful contribution to the larger task of forging a mode of praxis 
that enables faculty, students, and community members not merely to 
interpret the world in so many different religious ways but also become 
critically, creatively, and compassionately engaged in the task of building a 
just, democratic, and humane global society (2001:159).  
 
We now move to the third stage in this chapter’s journey by turning to the overlap 
between critical theory and the study of religion.  The following figure (Figure 3.5) 
allows us to locate ourselves in our journey towards defining the parameters for a 
critical evaluation. 
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Figure 3.5: Mapping our progress 
 
3.6 CRITICAL THEORY, EDUCATION, AND THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
 
We are now moving towards an integration of three distinct aspects namely 
critical theory, education and the study of religion. My intention is not to attempt a 
complete exposition of critical theory’s relation to and critique of education, 
religion and the study of religion. It is furthermore impossible for a number of 
reasons. As stated earlier, critical theory is neither a homogeneous theory nor do 
many authors in the field of critical theory address education, religion and the 
study of religion explicitly. For the purpose of this study, I will start by exploring as 
backdrop for this journey the eschatology of the Frankfurt School and specifically 
Ernst Bloch. I will then continue to harvest some indicators regarding the role of 
education from the work of Adorno, Habermas and Giroux. Once we have 
clarified some pointers regarding the role and content of education according to 
some authors in critical theory, I will explore the implications for the study of 
religion. 
 
3.6.1 The eschatology of the Frankfurt School as reference point 
 
Ewert (1991) starts his exploration of Habermas’ view on education by stating 
Critical theory starts with the assumption that each historical situation is a 
distortion of the utopian vision that was the initial normative basis for the 
existing social structures and beliefs. Whereas empirical and interpretive 
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social sciences describe the world as it is, critical theory tries to 
understand why the social world is the way it is, and more importantly, 
through a process of critique, strives to know how it should be. Critical 
theory starts from a critique of ideology, defined as distorted knowledge, to 
enable individuals to become self-consciously aware of knowledge 
distortions. This self-consciousness awareness of knowledge distortion is 
enlightenment, a necessary precondition for individual freedom and self-
determination. The individual becomes emancipated when, on the basis of 
his or her enlightenment, he or she takes freeing action that changes the 
social system to permit the realisation of his or her unique human potential 
(Ewert 1991: 345-346; italics in the original). 
 
To understand critical theory’s ‘discontent’ with history, Mendes-Flohr (1983) 
suggests that one should understand as response against feelings of 
‘homelessness’ that modern humans experiences since the First World War 
(1983:632). Mendes-Flohr critiques ‘the radial individualization of humankind, 
leaving it bereft of genuine community and fellowship’ resulting in feelings of 
social and cosmic homelessness (1983:632). 
 
The disillusionment that followed after the First World War caused a ‘mood of 
existential concern and redemptive longings [that also] deeply affected Jewish 
intellectuals’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:632). As a way of dealing with this pessimism, 
the intellectuals like Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer and Bloch adopted Marxism, 
not necessarily, according to Mendes-Flohr as ‘a dogmatic ideology, but rather as 
a method which regards social and cultural reality not as static, but as being flush 
with dynamic, dialectic possibilities, which, alas, have been generally ignored or 
missed’ (1983:633). This ‘Marxist imagination and passion is the vision of 
Redemption’, which is celebrating the ‘time of now’ – ‘a junction at which history 
at last comes to a halt and redemption will embrace time’ (Mendes-Flohr 
1983:634). Within this Jetztzeit, the present as the ‘time of now’, Adorno and 
Horkheimer defined the ultimate truth as ein ganz Anderes, ‘an entire other’. This 
ganz Andere ‘is not in heaven but in the future’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:635)57. 
Mendes-Flohr quotes Horkheimer who endowed this truth with ‘the hope that the 
                                            
57 Ernst Bloch (1986), in ‘The principle of hope’ explored the eschatological content and function 
of hope extensively.  
 168
earthly horror does not possess the last word’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:635). This 
hope for redemption and for emancipation ‘permits one to utter a confident No to 
the existent order’ and looks at social reality ‘from the standpoint of redemption 
(Erlösung)’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:635). This longing for a totally new, unknown 
dispensation, ‘Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen’ impacts on the experience of 
the ‘present’ as being both ‘having become and becoming’. Critical theory seeks 
to ‘…illuminate the future through an understanding of the dialectical possibilities 
of the present. The rendering of the future as an object of dialectical thinking 
permits them [critical theorists] to employ the future (qua higher stage of truth and 
justice) as a criterion for judging the past and present’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:636). 
The future therefore in being anticipated, impels humans  
to act as active collaborator in the dialectical advance of history. These 
images of the future, however, are not generated by the dialectic itself, but 
by man’s primordial capacity to hope, or rather to prefigure the future. The 
prescient apprehension of the future, which is meant to guide the 
dialectics of history, ultimately is best articulated in religion (Mendes-Flohr 
1983:636-637). 
 
According to Mendes-Flohr (1983:637), Bloch calls for ‘metaphysics of the 
future’. This longing for the ‘still unnamed’ Bloch calls ‘hope’ which is ‘thus an 
ontological principle and, peculiarly linked to the flux of being, anticipates the 
fulfilment of this process, the absolute future’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:640). Bloch, 
according to Mendes-Flohr places hope at the centre of our epistemology which 
prevents ‘the limits of reality to reign supreme’ and the forfeiture of the ‘very 
essence of our being: to be hopeful’ (1983:641). Bloch continues to distinguish 
between ‘hope’ and ‘idle desire and wishful expectation’ – 
Hope probes the future and thereby illuminates the possibilities of the 
present, hope tells us that our present existence is not ultimate and that 
there is an alternative. Hope permits us to transcend the painful present by 
anticipating a utopian future – a kind of reality that has never been 
(1954:312), nonetheless, it is a vision of a possibility that might be 
realized. Historically, according to Bloch, such visions were most forcefully 
articulated by religion (Mendes-Flohr 1983:641). 
 
According to Mendes-Flohr, Bloch explored the notion that religion does not only 
open humankind for a totally different dispensation, but ‘also inhibits the 
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realisation of man’s [sic] hope’ (1983:642). So, on the one hand Yahweh 
‘quickens man’s utopian vision, heightening his awareness of the imperfections of 
the present. Yet God leaves man suspended – sinisterly, Bloch would suggest – 
waiting for an ever-receding redemption’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983:642). Mendes-
Flohr states, ‘Marxism provides man with docta spes, begriffene Hoffnung – hope 
that seizes, comprehends, and transforms reality, realizing its dialectical 
possibilities’ (1983:643). This hope does not rely on a Messiah or metaphysical 
redemption but allows humankind to deal with ‘the darkness of the lived 
moment… buoyed by a hope…’ (Mendes-Flohr 1983: 644).   
 
3.6.2 Critical theory and the role and content of education  
 
The eschatological tension and passion as found in the work of Bloch provides 
the background for my exploration of the role and content of education according 
to some proponents in critical theory. Adorno petitions that education should 
empower citizens ‘to come to know the mechanisms that render people capable 
of such deeds, must reveal these mechanisms to them, and strive, by awakening 
a general awareness of those mechanisms, to prevent people from becoming so 
again’ (1998:192). Central to the educational project is to increase humans’ 
ability to critically self-reflect (Adorno 1998:192). Adorno calls human autonomy 
in the sense of self-determination as the ‘single genuine power standing against 
the principle of Auschwitz’ (1998:194). Adorno continues to petition against an 
‘educational goal of hardness’ which often results in authoritarian personalities 
developing, which are able to manipulate and not take care for inhumane acts 
towards others. ‘The inability to identify with others was unquestionably the most 
important psychological condition for the fact that something like Auschwitz could 
have occurred in the midst of more or less civilized and innocent people’ 
(1998:198). In the light of the call that Auschwitz should never happen again, 
education ‘should transform itself into sociology, that is, it must teach about the 
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societal play of forces that operates beneath the surface of political forms’, 
(Adorno 1998:200)58. 
 
 3.6.3 Critical theory and the study of religion59 
 
The relation between critical theory and the study of religion is contested – 
depending on the author.  In an earlier work, Mendieta (2002) states that a 
critique of religion as developed by the ‘first generation of the Frankfurt School 
has remained unexecuted, because of the transdisciplinary, or adisciplinary, 
character of such a critique’ (2002:5). He continues to state ‘Their work did not 
fall within the category of the study of religions, sociology of religion, or even 
philosophy of religion. Nor could it have been assimilated to theology, 
notwithstanding repeated accusations that critical theory was really masked 
theology’ (2002:5). According to Mendieta, there were two central motives in the 
Frankfurt School’s approach to religion namely  
That religion retains an ineradicable philosophical and conceptual 
importance, without which criticism of actuality and society is unthinkable. 
And second, that insofar as religion means belief in an absolutely 
transcendent God who hovers above history as ultimate judge, then the 
promise of justice and hope that is not exhausted by any social institution 
is kept alive (Mendieta 2002:7). 
 
Horkheimer referred to the Frankfurt School’s relationship to religion as ‘an index 
of resistance’ (Mendieta 2002:7). Mendieta (2002:10) summarises Adorno’s and 
Horkheimer’s reflections on religion as follows: 
First, enlightenment is catalyzed by religion. We cannot understand the 
critique of myth without understanding how religion itself, and in particular 
the Christian and Jewish traditions, are forms of demythologization. 
Second, religion, despite having accelerated the process of its own 
assimilation and secularization, is never divested of both its social and 
philosophical role: as the call to universality and the promise of an 
inextinguishable negativity that renders all claims to completeness and 
fulfilment questionable and partial. Third … religion remains both a 
                                            
58 Giroux (2004) in an essay titled ‘Education after Abu Ghraib, takes Adorno as conversation 
partner in exploring the American negation of the scope and horror of American abuse and torture 
of Iraqi detainees.  
59 This section should also be read in the light of the discussion on postsecuralism in Chapter 1.  
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reservoir and a compendium of humanity’s most deeply felt injustices and 
yearned for dreams of reconciliation. Fourth, insofar as Critical Theory is a 
bringing together of different research tools, which ought to allow for the 
use of reason against reason, its approach to religion is guided by a 
‘methodological scepticism’ that ought to render one ever vigilant to facile 
and glib dismissals of certain social phenomena. Religion is not to be 
dismissed simply because a certain school of sociology has discovered, 
given its methodological orientation, that religion has become functionally 
superfluous. Fifth, and finally, the Frankfurt School’s critique of religion, 
which is less a rejection and more a reappropriation, refuses to answer in 
favor of one or the other side of the dyad: Athens or Jerusalem? One is 
unthinkable without the other. Reason is impossible without anamnesis, 
and memory remains ineffective if it were not married to universality: 
remembrance of what and for whom? Memory of suffering by whom and 
for whom?  
 
According to Mendieta (2005) religion and the study of religion was ‘central’ to 
the research agenda of critical theory. In contrast, Beckford (2000) states that 
critical theory had greater impact on theology than on the study of religion. And 
Meyer (1995) questions Habermas’ so-called turn-around on the role of religion in 
modern society. For the purpose of this study, it would have been helpful if the 
link between critical theory and the study of religion was as clear as Mendieta 
(2005) proposes. Even though the link between critical theory and the study of 
religion is disputed, critical theory as philosophy already provides some critical 
pointers towards educational policy and for evaluating and shaping the study of 
religion. I will shortly provide an overview of the points made by Mendieta (2005), 
Beckford (2000) and Meyer (1995) before attempting to develop some critical 
pointers for the evaluation of the Policy. 
 
Mendieta (2005:2) further states that ‘it is almost impossible to think of Western 
culture today without the tradition of inter-disciplinary, critical, and philosophically 
informed social research developed by the eponymous called Frankfurt School’. 
Pointing to the centrality of ‘cultural studies’ in the theoretical and research 
agendas of the Frankfurt School, Mendieta also states ‘…as the Frankfurt School 
sought to understand how culture contributed to the domestication and 
pacification of the masses, it also sought to understand those products that both 
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mediated and gave expression to yearning and hopes not exhausted and totally 
commodified by the culture industry’ (2005:3). 
 
Central to the ‘agenda” of the Frankfurt School ‘we find not just an incidental or 
ancillary attention to religion, but a central, deliberate, and explicit confrontation 
with both religion and theology’ (Mendieta 2005:8). Religion, like art and the 
culture industry, ‘becomes a site for the negotiation of critique, remembrance, 
and emancipatory projections’ (Mendieta 2005:8). The Frankfurt School treated 
religion ‘as a heterogeneous phenomenon that intersects at many different levels 
with social existence’ (Mendieta 2005:8). Religion was ‘viewed as a fundamental 
part of the lifeworld’, and as providing societies with ‘lingua francas, common 
languages through which to address their hopes and discontents’ (Mendieta 
2005:8). The Frankfurt School also expressed a concern ‘with the way in which 
religion provided the fertile soil for ideas of autonomy, authority, power, and 
development of critical thinking…’ and how religion became ‘indoctrinated into 
the service of new and more acute forms of domestication and pacification’ 
(Mendieta 2005:9). ‘In the Frankfurt School’s critique of religion, religion offers 
not just consolation, but also the conceptual and epistemological elements with 
which to criticize a world that has made humanity disconsolate and superstitious’ 
(Mendieta 2005:10). Mendieta (2005:11) summarises the Frankfurt School’s 
critical theory of religion as being a 
dual confrontation with the religious sources of modern, European, and 
Western Culture, sources that unleashed a fateful dialectic of introjected 
and sacrificial violence, and an attempt to rescue what makes the religious 
not just a source of alienation and negation of the world, but also of 
remembrance, hope, redemption, and utopia (Mendieta 2005:11).  
 
 
Beckford, in evaluating critical theory’s relation to the study of religion, provides a 
different standpoint to Mendieta and he judges the contribution of critical theory 
to the scientific study of religion less optimistically (2000:485). He states 
‘…neither Horkheimer nor Macuse nor Benjamin conducted or inspired research 
on religion…’ Meyer continues to state ‘Thus, although religion could easily have 
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lent itself to analysis in terms of late capitalism’s capacity to seduce and deceive 
people into conformity, surprisingly few attempts were made to deploy Critical 
Theory for this purpose’ (Beckford 2000:485). Beckford concludes that the impact 
of critical theory ‘was probably greater on theology than on the scientific study of 
religion’ (2000:486). It falls outside the scope of this study to evaluate critical 
theory’s contribution to the study of religion, but the contrast between the views 
of Mendieta (2005) and Beckford (2000) begs further thought. Looking at the 
‘evidence’ Mendieta (2005) assembles to ‘prove’ that religion and the study of 
religion was, in fact, central to the research agenda of the Frankfurt School, one 
finds among the essays he collected specific reflections on the Third Reich 
(Bloch), the dogma of Christ (Fromm), the way Luther, Calvin and Kant perceived 
‘authority’ (Marcuse), reason and revelation (Adorno), Horkheimer on ‘Theism 
and Atheism’, Benjamin on ‘Capitalism as religion’, Habermas on ‘Faith and 
knowledge’ and Arens on ‘religion as ritual, communicative and critical praxis’. It 
is not my intention to ‘judge’ between the views of Mendieta (2005) and Beckford 
(2000), but to find ‘pointers’ in the domain of critical theory as framework for a 
critical study of religions. 
 
In his essay Faith and knowledge (in Mendieta 2005:327-337), Habermas states 
that with the attacks on the World Trade centre on 11 September 2001, ‘the 
tension between secular society and religion exploded…’ (2005:327). He then 
postulates that ‘Only if we realize what secularization means in our own 
postsecular societies can we be far-sighted in our response to the risks involved 
in a secularization miscarrying in other parts of the world’. Religion continues to 
provide meaning for millions of people in contrast to and in the midst of ‘ongoing 
secularization’ (2005:329). In her discussion on Habermas’ changing views on 
religion Chambers (2007) states 
Religion’s failure to conveniently disappear (or to remain fully private and 
personal) has forced many to come to terms with the idea of a world in 
which philosophy (particularly in the guise of liberal rationalism) and 
religion must live side by side in public culture. The fact that many people 
continue to find religion persuasive is part of the fact of pluralism and has 
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prompted some to start talking about postsecularism: a rethinking of 
securalism that makes room for religion (Chambers 2007:211). 
 
 
Habermas proposes ‘a triple reflection of the position of believers on their 
position in a pluralist society’ which has the following implications for ‘religious 
consciousness’, namely 
Religious consciousness must, first, come to terms with the cognitive 
dissonance of encountering other denominations and religions. It must, 
second, adapt to the authority of the sciences which hold the societal 
monopoly of secular knowledge. It must, last, agree to the premises of a 
constitutional state grounded in a profane morality (2005:329). 
 
Habermas, according to Enns (2007:890) states that religious arguments ‘must 
undergo abstraction, or some form of generalization, in order to have legitimacy 
within the public sphere’. Citizens therefore have a duty to engage in epistemic 
self-reflection and translating their beliefs and religious arguments ‘into 
arguments acceptable within the public sphere’ (Enns 2007:891). 
 
Harrington voices his concern (2007:548) that conflict and the breakdown of 
communication and Habermasian ‘epistemic duties’ might ‘be conceptually more 
primordial than this’. Differences among religions, according to Harrington, are far 
more foundational than ‘equally valid ultimate views of the world’ (2007:548).  
Habermas draws a firm distinction between faith and knowledge maintaining that 
post-metaphysical thinking proceeds from agnostic premises, which ‘abstains 
from judgment over religious truths’ (Harrington 2007:549). Habermas therefore 
proposes a “methodological atheism” which denotes ‘not a personal avowal of 
non-belief in the existence of God but only a methodological maxim that, in the 
practice of their research, social scientists should make no assumption that God 
exists’ (Harrington 2007:549). 
 
Meyer (1995) evaluates the so-called change in Habermas’ view on the public 
role of religion and states that although Habermas ‘has gone from a complete 
dismissal of religion to an acceptance or even affirmation of religion as a source 
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of consolation in the face of life’s existential crises’, this change is ‘not of great 
significance because Habermas still denies the public character of religion’ 
which, according to Meyer, is due to his ‘continued denial of the cognitive claims 
of religion and metaphysics’ (1995: 372). Shaw (1999:638) describes Habermas’ 
early view on religion as one of ‘impatience’ and not of ‘hostility’. According to 
Shaw,  
Religious belief, Habermas argues, survives as a relic of an essentially 
premodern form of consciousness; with the advent of modernity, its 
valuable moral core has been purged of its mythic and metaphysical 
trappings and sublated into the reflexive and differentiated procedures of 
communicate action (Shaw 1999:638). 
 
 
Habermas is, according to Shaw (1999:638) not anywhere close to embracing 
religion but his exploration is more a case of ‘grudging acceptance’ (Shaw 
1999:638). Habermas admitted, according to Meyer (1995:375) that his ‘earlier 
dismissal of religion was too hasty’ and now suggests that ‘religion is 
indispensable and irreplaceable, as long as it continues to offer an inspiring and 
consoling message that helps people cope with the existential crisis of life’ 
(Meyer 1995:375-376). Meyer quotes Habermas saying that religion ‘is still 
indispensable in ordinary life for normalizing intercourse with the extraordinary’ 
(quoted in Meyer 1995:376). Even though Habermas acknowledges religion to 
play a role, he ‘still denies its cognitive claims and, hence, still denies its public 
role’ – and this, according to Meyer, indicates actually no significant change in 
Habermas’ views on religion. It would seem that acknowledging religions’ role ‘to 
speak validly of the “whole” of reality’, a fourth validity claim is raised which is 
metaphysical (Meyer 1995:390)60. 
 
For the sake of this study it would seem as if the following starts to form as 
pointers for use in the critical evaluation of the Policy. Firstly, that religion did and 
still does play a big role in the shaping of knowledge canons and social 
                                            
60 For a further discussion on Habermas’ view of the role of religion in the public sphere, see 
Chambers (2007).  
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stratagems worldwide, whether in the ‘West’, Africa or the East. Prothero (2007) 
states that religious symbols and narratives have become very much part and 
parcel of a general if not universal vocabulary without which engagement in 
public discourses seem almost impossible. Though there may be a presumed 
superiority about the impact of the Christian narratives on a ‘universal’ vocabulary 
(depending on where you are located), it is possible to state that in whichever 
format religions have shaped and still shape communication in the public sphere. 
Even from an a-religious point of view one has to acknowledge that ‘religion 
remains both a reservoir and a compendium of humanity’s most deeply felt 
injustices and yearned for dreams of reconciliation’ (Mendieta 2002:11).  
 
A further aspect that I suspect will serve me well in my evaluation of the Policy is 
the ‘methodological scepticism’ proposed by the Frankfurt School. Interestingly, it 
is not only religion which should be treated with a healthy dose of scepticism, but 
all truth claims. ‘As a consequence of the recognition of the plurality of religious 
forces, there ensues a reflective relationship to the particularity of one’s own faith 
within the horizon of the universality of the religious as such’ (Habermas in 
Mendieta 2002:70). In an increasingly pluralist world, encountering other 
traditions according to Habermas should be seen as  
a chance to become more fully aware of one’s own roots… . As long as 
participants inhabit the same discursive universe, there is no hermeneutic 
impulse to reflect on otherwise self-evident, unarticulated background 
motivations. This spur to reflection doesn’t prevent intercultural 
understanding: indeed it is what makes it possible in the first place 
(Habermas in Mendieta 2002:155-156).  
 
And lastly, religion is a possible ‘index of resistance’ in a world continuously 
longing for a more just and compassionate dispensation. Though it is undisputed 
that some of the worst atrocities in the history of humankind have been 
committed in the name of one or another religion, religion also has been an index 
and compendium of and for resistance for humankind. In agreement with 
Habermas, religion in its essence is a ‘protestational form of thinking’ (in 
Mendieta 2002:60). 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
In proposing the title for this thesis, I did not foresee that the inclusion of ‘critical’ 
in the title, would invite me on a journey through the discourses in and 
surrounding critical theory, critical pedagogy and critical religious studies.  After 
exploring these discourses, I am more than ever sure that the inclusion of ‘critical’ 
in the title is valid and essential.  
 
This critical evaluation of the Policy is not interested in ascertaining the truth 
claims of either the Policy or the Policy’s understanding of the role of religion in 
the public sphere. In the chapters to follow (and specifically in Chapter 8) I will 
evaluate to what extent the study of religion as proposed by the Policy empowers 
students with a Mündigkeit to be comfortable with being uncomfortable with the 
numinous, the tremendum. Shaped by the discourses explored in this chapter, 
this evaluation will question to what extent the study of religion (as envisaged by 
the Policy) allows students to critically interrogate the paintings on the curtains (to 
use the analogy proposed by Goodenough 1959) to describe, analyse and 
compare experiences of the numinous. I will also explore how the Policy 
encourages learners to venture behind the curtains of the known and confront - in 
their own personalised ways – the ultimate, the tremendum. According to a 
critical understanding of the study of religion, the Policy should allow learners to 
become aware of religious forms and traditions (especially their own) as part of a 
dynamic and lively constellation, recognising patterns, evaluating answers and 
phrasing new questions.  
 
In her exploration of the need for a critical pedagogy Wink (1997) shares the 
following poem illustrating the need for an education that will allow learners to 
question the way society is. She writes 
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Often, 
those who have more, silence those who have less; 
those who are from the dominant European American culture silence 
those from non-European American cultures; 
boys silence girls; 
men silence women. 
 
Often, 
men don’t know it; 
boys don’t know it; 
European Americans don’t know it, and 
those with more don’t know it. 
(Wink 1997: 68)  
 
In the next chapters, I will explore the questions underlying the main research 
focus namely 
1 What were the context-specific socioeconomic, educational and political 
histories and processes shaping our new democracy and its educational 
policy framework? 
2 What are the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings and assumptions 
of the Policy argument? 
3 How does the Policy understand religion and the study of religion? 
4 How does the Policy understand the study of religion as a compulsory part 
of the curriculum in preparing learners for citizenship? In other words, how 
will the study of religion prepare learners not only for citizenship in the 
national sense but also for an increasingly cosmopolitan citizenry? 
 
Central to my understanding of a critical study of religion will be exploring the 
spaces the Policy creates for shaping learners’ Mündigkeit. Mündigkeit, as a key 
criterion in this evaluation involves critical reflection, epistemic duties towards the 
Other, conscienticizao in the Freirian sense, critical literacies, and the study of 
religion as a language of rage and hope.  
 
Maybe the final criterion in this specific critical evaluation of the Policy is whether 
the Policy allows and encourages an eschatological passion and hope as 
envisaged by the Frankfurt School. According to Mendes-Flohr, ‘Marxism 
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provides man with docta spes, begriffene Hoffnung – hope that seizes, 
comprehends, and transforms reality, realizing its dialectical possibilities’ 
(1983:643). Or in the words of Adorno, ‘Every debate about the ideals of 
education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: never again 
Auschwitz’ (1998:191)61.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
61 In interactions with my promoters, I realised how my own taxonomies of making meaning were 
shaped by distinctive Jewish-Christian sentiments and concepts. In developing a personal version 
of criticality towards a critical evaluation of the Policy, I discovered that I was somehow lost to 
think outside the parameters of my own roots in Jewish-Christian taxonomies. The possibilities to 
engage with ‘hope’ outside these taxonomies should be investigated and may enrich the debate.  
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CHAPTER 4 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
(PRE-1994 TILL CURRICULUM 2005) 
 
Forgetting and memory both seem vital to our common life, and it is equally 
possible that we may have too much of either. An excess of forgetting would 
turn us into leaves to be scattered by the winds, mere neighbours passing 
one another by in little more than a community of interests. Too much 
memory would be lead in our wings, denying us a future and closing off the 
possibility of openness to others who are not part of our community of 
memory (Booth 1999:259). 
 
The tectonic layers of our lives rest so tightly against earlier events in later 
ones, not as matter that has been fully formed and pushed aside, but 
absolutely present and alive. I understand this. Nevertheless, I sometimes 
find it hard to bear. Maybe I did write our story to be free of it, even if I never 
can be (Booth 1999:260). 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 2 I suggested that the Policy is a specific response to the specific 
context of the shaping and legitimising of the new democracy in South Africa.  As 
such the Policy has been shaped by historical systems of meaning-making and 
power. In sharing this socio-historical overview with you, I was looking for insight 
into understanding the rationale and context of the Policy. Why was there a need 
for it? What were the specific processes that resulted in the Policy? Who were 
the stakeholders? Why was there such a public furore about the introduction of 
the study of religion in schools? 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide a descriptive socio-historical overview of the context of 
curriculum development in South Africa. Jansen (2004) refers to four ‘curriculum 
moments’ that signify watershed moments in educational policy and curriculum. 
These ‘moments’ were responses to the preceding socio-economic, historical 
and political environments as well as interpreting the dynamic interplay of various 
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factors at that specific moment. For the next two chapters I propose analysing 
these ‘curriculum moments’ through the lenses of national and cultural acts of 
remembering and forgetting as explored by Booth (1999). Analysing these 
watershed moments through the lenses of remembering and forgetting provide 
an interesting perspective on the understanding of citizenship in a constitutional 
democracy as found in the curriculum62.  
 
Booth (1999) explores the impact of memory and forgetting on citizenship in an 
article titled Communities of memory: on identity, memory and debt63. On reading 
Booth (1999) and Muller (1996) I realised that any attempt to understand each of 
the ‘curriculum moments’ (Jansen 2004) without taking seriously our new 
democracy as a community or memory of forgetting, will impoverish this 
evaluation of the Policy. Each of those ‘curriculum moments’ constituted and 
responded to specific notions of identity, memory, debt, wholeness, forgetting 
and loss. 
 
Booth (1999:249) states that the democratic regimes that emerged in Eastern 
and Central Europe as well as in Latin America all share the characteristic of 
confronting the past in order to define the future. Booth finds in these 
confrontations with the past an invitation to ‘consider what we understand by 
identity, by the idea of a community of memory, with debts to and inheritances 
from the past’ (1999:249). In engaging with re-imagining citizenship, Booth 
explores the ideas of Habermas (1990, 1994) on identity, memory and forgetting 
and its implications for citizenship. Booth (1999:254) indicates ‘… the 
constitutional project and its related citizenship practices are deeply embedded in 
a community of memory and in the sort of identity that such intergenerational 
communities have at their core’. One option to engage with societies in transition 
                                            
62 Exploring possible socio-historical watershed moments that have shaped and still shape an 
understanding of the role of education in a new democracy is complementary to the description 
and analysis of constitutional patriotism in Chapter 1. Remembering and forgetting provides a                            
heuristic framework in exploring a selection of socio-historical moments. 
63 Also see Muller’s (1996) article Dreams of wholeness and loss: critical sociology of education in 
South Africa. 
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is to explore the genealogical character of this process as Foucault did (1971, 
1972). Although exploring the genealogical character of the past may give ‘the 
present a certain particularity, both in individual and collective identities’ – the 
past in this sense, does not ‘weigh on us… it is not a burden’ (Booth 1999:254).   
 
Reflecting on the implications for defining German identity, Booth (1999:255) 
refers to Stürmer (1987) who said that a history obsessed with the National 
Socialist years, ‘with the Holocaust at their core, would make a life in common 
next to impossible’. Booth (1999:255-260), referring to Habermas (1997) and 
Améry (1977), states that the past is something ‘given to us, into which we are 
“thrown”’ (Booth 1999:255). Booth (1999:255) states ‘We are given the totality of 
our past, whether as individuals or as members of a community, and although 
our comportment to its varied parts may differ, sometimes applauding, other 
times repudiating, it is intertwined with our identity in its entirety’ (italics added). 
 
This past is present among us, ‘woven’ into the fabric of our daily lives, and 
present in ‘those chosen moments when, by deliberate decision, we put the past 
into words, monuments, days of remembrance’ (Booth 1999:255). In this 
‘archaeology of political identity’, the past is however more than the above, it is 
also ‘the well-spring of accountability: burdening us, giving us pride or shame, 
making us accountable’ (Booth 1999:255) 
The presence of the past is here moral and not genealogical or traditional. 
Because it is ours, it is with us always, even through the changes we undergo 
in the passing of the years. The past and the dead (like those yet to be born) 
make claims on the living, long after they and the events around them have 
entered the historical past (Booth 1999:255). 
 
Memories of South Africa’s past permeate South African discourses on identity 
and citizenship, allegiance, patriotism and various claims of entitlement. There is 
a growing number of younger people in South Africa who claim not to have been 
part of the atrocities and the divisions of the past; or who claim a certain 
entitlement to be the beneficiaries of attempts to rectify the imbalances of the 
past. The younger generation or those who claim that they never ‘knew’ wants to 
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disown the past and they refuse to take responsibility for it. The past ‘is not 
theirs’. The past, for them, is an albatross around their necks and the stench 
permeates their dreams of wholeness, belonging and loss. On the other hand, a 
large percentage of the population in South Africa ‘was there’, and were 
contemporaries of apartheid and the struggle – whether as part of the struggle for 
or against democracy64.  
 
Whatever the emotions and memories attached to our collective past, whether 
‘we [would like to] push the past away from us, divest ourselves of it, and seek to 
expunge its remnants from our midst’ (Booth 1999:256) or whether we either 
actively or passively accept our collective past, Booth explores a number of ways 
of engaging with the act of remembering. For example, he suggests ‘the 
importance of memory lies not in atonement but in its ability to help us avoid 
repeating the injustices of the past’ (Booth 1999:256). This results in a 
relationship with the past that is ‘instrumental and pedagogical, that is, it is 
something from which we can learn and not a moral burden woven into our 
identity’ (Booth 1999:256; italics my own). This then allows us a ‘language of 
responsibility’ that ‘allows for a way of addressing the presence of the past that 
invokes tradition not as a stained character, not as an irreversible source of 
shame and an object of remembrance, but as a cultural artefact’ (Booth 
1999:256; italics mine). 
 
Booth points out ‘We do not make or construct the past. It is there, remembered 
or submerged, here and present or awaiting a triggering event to bring it back…’ 
(1999:258). Booth proposes an ‘ethics of remembrance’ which ‘invites us to 
consider how difficult, or impossible, it is to escape our embeddedness in the 
community extended through time, the community of remembrance (and 
anticipation) that is the basic temporal/narrative fabric of a common life and 
shared identity’ (Booth 1999:258). Booth, however, adds to his ‘ethics of 
                                            
64 The work by Goldhagen (1996), Hitler’s willing executioners. Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust, is a chilling account of the ‘burden of the past’. For a discussion of the debates around 
Goldhagen see Hayward (2007). 
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remembrance’, an ‘ethics of forgetting’ (1999:258) which he explains as follows – 
‘Perhaps there is an ethics of forgetting as well, one that on occasion may trump 
the duty to remember. We have been told that forgetting is as necessary to 
existence as is memory, perhaps more so, and that a surfeit of memory, or an 
obsessive absorption with the past, can be destructive of life’ (Booth 1999:258-
259). 
 
A ‘voluntary amnesia, cruelly systematic’ may be required by individuals and 
communities realising that the duty to ‘remember must be weighted against the 
imperatives to let the dead bury the dead. And just perhaps, although we cannot 
choose our cradle, we can will to forget it and its legacy to us’ (Booth 1999:259; 
italics added)65. In closing his essay, Booth refers to two novels illustrating the 
paradoxes of forgetting and remembering. The first novel he refers to is Der 
Vorleser, ‘The Reader’ by Schlink (1995) and the second one Heiratmuseum, 
‘The Heritage’ by Lenz (1981). In the novel by Schlink the character is confronted 
by the ‘weight of the past, and the stains left by it, [which] are never entirely 
removed’ (Booth 1999:260). Booth quotes the character Michael who says ‘The 
tectonic layers of our lives rest so tightly against earlier events in later ones, not 
as matter that has been fully formed and pushed aside, but absolutely present 
and alive. I understand this. Nevertheless, I sometimes find it hard to bear. 
Maybe I did write our story to be free of it, even if I never can be’ (Booth 
1999:260) 
 
This Kafkaesque description of the past as ‘tectonic layers’ which are never fully 
formed and set aside, but which are ‘absolutely present and alive’ is for all South 
Africans a daily reality. In providing an overview of the socio-historic context of 
the Policy, I suggest it is important to take note of these ‘tectonic layers’ – without 
understanding these layers as they still move and groan, the Policy – its 
                                            
65 In the South African context, the practicalities surrounding addressing the vast legacy of 
apartheid negates in toto any attempt to suggest ‘an ethics of forgetting’. 
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rationale, its processes and the debates surrounding the Policy – will be 
weakened. 
 
In the other novel by Lenz as referred to by Booth (1999:260) the narrator burns 
down the local museum because it resulted in prejudice and a ‘denseness’ of 
memory from which a ‘radical and menacing particularism emerges’. Booth 
(1999:261) closes his exploration of ‘communities of memory’ by referring to ‘the 
explosion of local memories in countries where the regions were absorbed in the 
process of nation-building’, and ‘Gone are the days when there was a seamless 
web of memory uniting the entirety of the national community in a common 
narrative of the past…’ 
 
4.2 TOWARDS AN ARCHEAOLOGY OF IDEOLOGIES  
 
There are a number of accounts detailing the history of education in South Africa 
and specifically the period post-1994 (e.g. Chisholm 2005a; Greenstein 1997; 
Jansen 2004; Kumar 2006; Sayed 2002; Swartz 2006). The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore not to repeat what is already recorded, but an attempt to give 
an archaeological overview of the broader educational developments in South 
Africa and specifically the ‘tectonic plates’ (Booth 1999) that resulted in the 
Policy. Foucault, although often treated as a philosopher, social theorist, or 
cultural critic, was also a keen ‘historian’. According to Gutting (2005:32), 
Foucault’s choice of a title for his chair at the Collège de France was ‘Professor 
of the History of Systems of Thought’. In his works Foucault explores the hidden 
or tacit structures of meaning and meaning-making in society. Foucault refers to 
his work as an ‘archaeology’ and later as a ‘genealogy’ as he attempted to 
describe, rather than to explain (Gutting 2005:45). 
 
In Foucault’s work Madness and Civilization (1967) he analyses the history of 
madness, not from a psychiatrist’s view but as the development of ‘knowledge 
invested in the complex system of institutions’ (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004:37). In 
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this specific work, Foucault explores the development of the notion of ‘madness’ 
through the different historical eras and indicates that in each of these periods, 
‘madness’ was defined in service of power(s) and also perpetuated descriptions 
and gestalts of power. Although he was accused of trying to describe a ‘general 
epistemological theory’, he was, according to Gutting (2005:40) ‘trying to 
construct the general mode of thinking (episteme) that lay behind what was no 
doubt a very diverse range of beliefs and practices’. Foucault continues this 
methodological socio-historical analysis or archaeology in his next major work, 
The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences (1970).  He calls this 
systematic uncovering of three different periods in history namely the 
Renaissance, the classical era and the modern era - an ‘archaeology’.  
Archaeology’, as the investigation of that which renders necessary a 
certain form of thought, implies an excavation of unconsciously organised 
sediments of thought. Unlike the history of ideas, it doesn’t assume that 
knowledge accumulates towards any historical conclusion. Archaeology 
ignores individuals and their histories. It prefers to excavate impersonal 
structures of knowledge (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004:64; bold in the original) 
 
It is important to note that Foucault’s archaeology is not an attempt to interpret 
certain gestalts of knowledge and power with the purpose to arrive at a ‘deeper 
meaning’. He treats the texts of different, specific time-periods ‘not as documents 
but, in the manner of an archaeologist, as monuments’ (Gutting 2005:34; italics 
added). Texts are therefore treated as sedimentary deposits or monuments of 
whatever was possible within the ‘conditions of possibility’ for thought in a 
specific period. In The order of things Foucault (1970) analyses each period’s 
episteme and resultant taxonomies (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004: 65-77). His specific 
form of analysis developed into a change in focus from ‘epistemes as the 
dominant principle in history and asserts discourse’ (Horrocks 2004:86; bold in 
the original). Foucault explores discourse in his next work, The archaeology of 
knowledge (1972). He analyses discourse not as ‘linguistic systems or just texts 
– they are practices… and statements  ...’ (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004:86; bold in 
the original). Foucault states that there are three rules forming discourse, namely 
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• Surfaces of emergence: social and cultural areas through which 
discourse appears, e.g. the family, work group or religious community. 
• Authorities of delimitation: institutions with knowledge and authority, 
like the law or the medical profession. 
• Grids of specification: a system by which different kinds of madness, 
say, can be related to each other in psychiatric discourse (Horrocks & 
Jevtic 2004:87; bold in the original). 
 
For my own approach in providing this overview, I accept Foucault’s suggestion 
that history is a ‘document’ of the past and that we should treat these documents 
‘like monuments – not for their historical validity, but for themselves’ (Horrocks & 
Jevtic 2004:87). In Archaeology of knowledge (1972), Foucault introduces the 
term ‘genealogy’ to attempt to ‘reveal discourse at the moment it appears in 
history as a system of constraint’ (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004:87). Such a genealogy 
would reveal discourses as ‘systems which dominate one another and not some 
single idea struggling for its self-realisation’ (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004:98).  
 
The following figure (Figure 4.1) attempts to provide a bird’s eye view of my first 
attempt to draw a time-line from pre-1994 to 2003 when the Policy was finally 
signed. In providing an overview of these developments it made sense to treat 
the information in a chronological sequence starting with the period pre-199466. 
The dispensation pre-1994 shaped and continues to shape the events post-1994. 
As a heuristic framework I took the three ‘curriculum moments’ as described by 
Jansen (2004). Chisholm (2005b) agrees with these three definitive moments, 
but calls them ‘three main waves’ (2005b:193).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
66 The linear format of Diagram 1 does not allow the showing of specific artefacts as Foucaultian 
‘monuments’ of ‘intersecting systems'. 
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Figure 4.1: The three ‘curriculum moments’ 
 
The diagram (Figure 4.1) was my first attempt to visualise a ‘map’ not only of 
significant moments which impacted on the Policy. As I continued my exploration 
I continued to add to the diagram. I added significant developments pre-1994 that 
I suspect impacted on later developments. The period between 1994 and 1997 
also became ‘crowded’ with 1995 heralding the White Paper on Education and 
Training and the Hunter Report. 1996 saw the birth of the South African 
Qualifications Authority’s (SAQA), and in the political domain the Reconstruction 
and Development Plan (RDP) of 1994 was replaced by the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. In 1998 Outcomes-based Education (OBE) 
was introduced and there were immediate calls for a review. 
 
Archaeology as process (as used by Foucault, 1971) describes finding different 
layers of development in structures of meaning making. Some of these layers are 
distinctly separate and at other times the archaeologist is frustrated by the fusion 
of layers. I therefore changed the historical time-line as depicted in Diagram 1 
into mapping different broad socio-historical layers as ‘tectonic plates’ (Booth 
1999). Some of these “layers” were rich in artefacts – giving a very complete 
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picture of what the issues during that period were. Other time periods are 
compressed and there are only but traces left of artefacts – but so incomplete 
that one cannot make definitive statements about that period. In archaeology the 
‘not yet’ is a constant reminder that what we find at an excavation site are but 
glimpses of a civilisation. And when a specific layer ‘feels’ incomplete, one often 
has the feeling that the incompleteness is temporary.  
 
Figure 4.2 is an attempt to give an overview of the ‘tectonic layers’ (Booth 1999) 
and different ‘monuments’ (Foucault 1971). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Archaeology of the Policy – early years till 1998 
 
 
Chisholm (2005b) suggests that there are two main hermeneutic methodologies 
for interpreting curriculum policy and development in South Africa. The first 
approach focuses on curriculum as policy and the second approach focuses on 
curriculum as knowledge (2005b:194). She (2005b:194) describes the ‘curriculum 
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as policy’ approach as follows – ‘In the curriculum as policy lineage, scholars 
have focused on the “symbolic” aspect of policy and its essentially political 
character, on descriptions of the origins and unfolding of policy, conflicts between 
theory and practice, and the relationship between curriculum and identity’. 
 
The second approach, ‘curriculum as knowledge’ is concerned with ‘how 
knowledge is constructed and what the role of the school is in teaching and 
learning’ (Chisholm 2005b:194).  While Chisholm (2005b:194) identifies Jansen 
with the ‘curriculum as policy’ approach, she seems to locate herself in the 
second approach with what she calls a ‘Foucaultian perspective on power 
relations as they play out in the making of the curriculum’ (2005b:195). Such an 
approach ‘helps to make sense of the multiplicity of dynamics, lobbies, and 
interests impacting on and shaping the curriculum’ (Chisholm 2005b:195). 
 
4.3  A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT PRIOR 
TO 1994 
 
In his discussion of the transformation process towards post-apartheid South 
Africa, Henrard (2002:18) states that ‘…events, policies and mechanisms related 
to the apartheid era …explain not only the heightened sensitivity in post-
apartheid South Africa to certain concepts and techniques but also certain 
reactions and attitudes of the Afrikaner, coloured and Indian population groups’. 
 
Several authors (e.g. Bosch 1986, Ehlers 2003, Henrard 2002, Krog 1999; 
Krüger 2003) explore the different roots of the 1948 election victory of the 
National Party in the early segregationist policies of colonialism, the Afrikaner 
nationalism in and after the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), as well as the 
sometimes precarious relationship between white Afrikaners and the white 
English speaking population.  Henrard (2002:19) describes apartheid as ‘a 
pervasive system of affirmative action for the white population and especially for 
the Afrikaners’.  In exploring periods as long ago as the 1920s and before that, I 
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look for patterns; patterns and/or trends that will help me to understand 
curriculum as a specific educational response by a dominant discourse or 
hegemony to a specific socio-historic context. Prinsloo (2007) describes 
‘curriculum’ as  
…an occasioned, transitional, temporal space in which learners have 
integrated, authentic, multidimensional learning-experiences. A curriculum 
results in the transformation of the individual and society. A curriculum 
flows from, perpetuates and results in socioeconomic and political belief-
systems and structures. 
 
A curriculum testifies to the ‘tectonic layers’ beneath it, never fully formed and 
pushed aside but continuously evolving and being interpreted (Booth 1999). My 
assumption in looking back at curriculum history in South Africa is that we may 
see some patterns and/or trends emerging that would assist us in understanding 
not only the need for a Policy on Religion and Education, but also help us to 
understand the specific content of the final Policy. In the next section we will look 
briefly at 
• The early development of human life and religion in South Africa (4.3.1) 
• The content and impact of Native and Bantu Education (4.3.2) 
• The role Christian National Education played (4.3.3) 
• Strategies to dismantle apartheid education starting prior to 1994 (4.3.4) 
• A brief discussion of transition through transformation (4.3.5) 
 
This will bring us to a major defining moment in post-1994 South African history 
namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (4.4). Not only was the 
TRC a specific negotiated response to the transition to democracy, but it was 
also mapping for South Africa an ‘ethics of memory and forgetting’ (Booth 1999). 
The TRC, its mandate, its processes, its theology and its vocabulary not only 
defined South Africa’s transition, but still influences the academic discourses and 
public debates on nation building and citizenship. From an exploration of the 
possible impact of the TRC on educational policy and the discourse on 
citizenship, we will look at the ‘cleansing’ of the curriculum (4.5) in preparation for 
the first ‘curriculum moment’ (Jansen 1997). I will conclude this chapter with a 
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discussion of the first ‘curriculum moment’, namely Curriculum 2005 (4.6). The 
following diagram (Figure 4.3) presents an overview of the journey that lies 
ahead.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Overview of Chapter 4 
 
A possible problem in this diagrammatic representation is that the different 
‘boxes’ may easily be seen to illustrate distinctive, clearly separated periods. For 
example, it is almost impossible to discuss Native and Bantu education (4.3.2) 
without taking into account the role that Calvinism and Christian National 
Education (4.3.3) played in contributing to its philosophical and ontological 
foundation. These different ‘boxes’ should therefore be seen as temporary foci of 
‘intersecting systems’ in a discourse (Foucault 1967). We start our exploration by 
going back, or trying to, to the ‘beginning’. 
 
4.3.1 In the beginning 
 
The Policy somehow has its roots at the dawn of a creation and the creature 
modern science later called homo sapiens. This creature is also distinctly homo 
religiosus who is the object (and subject) of Religionswissenschaft or the study of 
religion (Goodenough 1959:86). Lewis-Williams and Pearce (2004) and Krüger 
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(1995) suggest (to name but three authors) that religion as we ‘know’ it today, is 
linked to the early ‘roots of spirituality’ (Lewis-Williams & Pearce 2004:25). As 
Krüger (1995:174) states  
To most South Africans of non-African extraction (and to many indigenous 
South Africans too) the centre of religious and cultural gravity lies 
elsewhere – in Rome, Canterbury or Heidelberg, in Jerusalem, Benares or 
Mecca. Africa happens to be the locality where prostrations are made in 
those other directions from which the various religions and cultures have 
been imported. Yet Africa claims her own. 
 
 
In their study of San spirituality Lewis-Williams and Pearce (2004: xxiv) refer to 
religion ‘not as an empirical given’, but as a ‘malleable construct that changes 
through time’. Lewis-Williams and Pearce (2004:36) describe San spirituality and 
their religious experiences ‘closely linked [to their] understanding of the cosmos, 
[and] are situated in the functioning of the human nervous system’. Whether we 
locate homo religiosus in the ‘human nervous system’ (Lewis-Williams 2004) or in 
Krüger’s (1995:202) view that religion was an attempt ‘to cope with coming into 
being and perishing of things’, is not important. From the earliest communities of 
homo sapiens on the African continent, spirituality or ‘religion’ was a way of 
dealing with life and death, dealing with one another and the ‘Other’ and dealing 
with food and scarcity67.  
 
Religion was from the start an integral part of being human, in contrast to the 
views that Africa had no spirituality before being introduced to Christianity and 
Islam (Lubbe 1998:4). Krüger (1995:119-220) states ‘religion was inseparable 
from their sociocultural existence as a whole, without any trace of the modern 
Western distinction between “sacred” and “profane”’68. Krüger (1995:258) 
petitions for an ‘inclusive history of religions [that] would show no trace of 
religious or cultural triumphalism’, but ‘a theoretical framework, comprehensive 
and encompassing, capable of interpreting the entire religious heritage of South 
                                            
67 For an interesting discussion on the burial practices of the San and what it tells us about their 
structures of making (ultimate) meaning, see Lewis-Williams and Pearce (2004).  
68 For a historic overview of the development of homo religiosus, see Krüger (1995). 
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Africa, from the earliest forms up to the present – an integrating view of that 
religious complex’ (Krüger 1995:257)69.  
 
It would therefore seem that the Policy is but the ‘latest’ chapter in a very long 
and complex history of religious pluralism which, in the words of Lubbe (1998:4), 
‘has always been a feature of society in South Africa’ (emphasis mine). This 
study therefore has as focus the Policy as a government-initiated and sponsored 
educational exploration of systematised gestalts of an age-old human way of 
making meaning.  
 
 4.3.2 Native and Bantu Education 
 
Jansen (1990b) describes the curriculum as political phenomenon and although 
Black education went through distinct phases, Jansen (1990b) describes how 
context shaped the curriculum and how the curriculum shaped its context. 
Jansen’s study (1990b) indicates that Black educational history went through five 
major periods, namely traditional African education, slave education, mission 
education (during the 1800s), native education (from the 1920s) and Bantu 
education, introduced in 1953. Jansen’s (1990b:196-201) description of these 
different phases illustrates the function curriculum played on the one hand 
legitimising the political dispensation as well as sustaining inequalities. For 
example, in 1854 the curriculum changed towards ‘industrial training’ which 
aimed at ‘providing blacks with skills for manual labour’ which applied to all four 
provinces (Jansen 1990b:198). Jansen (1990b:198) quotes Welsh (1971:222) 
who asserted ‘[T]he general effect of industrialisation was to place whites and 
nonwhites in a more acutely competitive situation, and education, depending on 
                                            
69 Such a theoretical framework as Krüger proposes above will include a reassessment not only 
of the myths Europe and specifically Victorian Europe created and sustained about Africa and 
Africans as explored for example in Brantlinger (1985) and Charles (1995); but also redress the 
study and status of African Religion from ‘underground praxis to recognised religion’ (Mndende 
1998:115). 
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its content and the extent to which it was made available to the different groups, 
might promote or prevent this competition’ (italics added by Jansen). 
 
Three factors led to a differentiated curriculum by 1889, namely 
• Afrikaners increasingly feared being forced into subservience to the 
British. 
• White Afrikaners increasingly competed with Blacks for employment. 
• The drought of the 1880s ‘intensified the need among Afrikaners for an 
educational system that could afford them improved economic and political 
status over the Blacks’ (Jansen 1990b:198). 
 
It is important to understand the role of curriculum as a response to a specific 
context but also as a vehicle to sustain the hegemony of white and specifically 
Afrikaner superiority. Bosch (1986) sounds a sobering note when he describes 
the Afrikaners during those years as ‘unsophisticated and, in fact, barely literate. 
The Bible was often the only book they had, and they tended to interpret it 
literally, not only as the revealed word of God but also as the final source of all 
knowledge’ (1986:205).  
 
It is during the period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that the Afrikaner 
found ‘their identity and security, in a literal and figurative sense, in the laager, 
where their ox-wagons, drawn into a circle, would protect them against the 
outside world’ (Bosch 1986:207). With the advent of the Union of South Africa in 
1910, the four self-governing provinces therefore excluded Blacks from socio-
political participation. The ‘apartheid curriculum’ formalised and further 
systemised the growing racism. Jansen (1990b:200) states that ‘For many years 
White politicians and educationists in South Africa have recognised the vital 
connection between curriculum content and the ideological and material interests 
of a racially stratified political economy’. 
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This curriculum is a prime example of a Foucaultian ‘monument’ showing the 
interest and power-plays of ‘intersecting systems’ (Foucault 1971).  The 
apartheid curriculum of the four republics in the Union of South Africa was a 
unique blend of Afrikaner nationalism and religion70. Bosch (1986:209) explores 
the influence of the Dutch theologian Kuyper on the Afrikaner’s ‘laager’- 
mentality.  
For the first time in South African history, one now encountered sustained 
theological (or ideological) arguments according to which Afrikaners 
should neither fraternise with foreigners nor break down the walls of racial 
separation instituted by God. Like Israel, the Afrikaner’s salvation lay in 
racial purity and separate schools and churches. 
 
 
Bosch (1986:212) points out that the exclusionary notion of citizenship was 
influenced by Afrikaner men who studied in Germany in the 1930’s. Bosch 
(1986:212) points to the fact that ’In the 1930s and 1940s, the conviction grew 
that the ethnic purity of a nation had a metaphysical base. It was, therefore, 
divinely ordained and commanded’ (italics added). Educational policy was a 
monument, a sedimentation of the hegemony of white supremacy71.  
 
Jansen (1990b:201) points out that since the 1950s, ‘…the use of the curriculum 
as political tool has been less critical to sustaining White supremacy in South 
Africa since the 1950s’ because apartheid had become normal and 
institutionalised.  White supremacy and distinct roles and socioeconomic futures 
have by that time already been institutionalised into the curriculum. Textbooks 
and learning materials embodied the ‘normalised’ ideology of apartheid and 
segregation. Jansen (1990b:202) also refers to the ‘institutionalisation of 
educational inequality’. Although the curriculum between white schools and black 
schools at this stage was the same, it did not change the impact of a ‘skills-
                                            
70 It is important to notice that the study of religion (during these years only the Christian religion) 
was in service of a certain concept of exclusionary citizenship. This curriculum was sanctioned 
and shaped by the direct influence of the white Afrikaans churches.  
71 In Chapter 8 I will address the question how the Policy is the sedimentation of current 
assumptions and norms regarding citizenship. While the Policy and the resulting curriculum 
includes, it also excludes. 
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oriented curriculum’ and it did not ‘change or challenge the broader social and 
political White power structure of apartheid society’ (Jansen 1990b:202). 
Education policy and curriculum were monuments of ‘the institutionalisation of 
societal racism’ which through various pieces of legislation e.g. the 
Apprenticeship Act of 1922, ‘effectively excluded qualified Blacks from 
meaningful economic participation’. Jansen (1990b:203) concludes that his 
historical overview proves the ‘…power of the curriculum as a political 
phenomenon in which a dominant group regards the curriculum as embodying 
the values and interests that sustain and reproduce its hegemonic control’. 
Jansen (1990b:203) also states that a curriculum can only function within its 
contextual limitations – ‘A curriculum is only as good as its context. The limiting 
extracurricular factors that determine the meaning and potential of the curriculum 
must, therefore, be confronted simultaneously with curriculum revision’. 
 
Christie and Collins (1982) propose a Marxist analysis of the context in which 
Bantu education developed. They state ‘Marxists argue that the system can only 
be fully comprehended if analysis is situated within the broad set of economic 
interests underlying the present structure, i.e., class analysis’ (Christie & Collins 
1982:60). Christie and Collins’ analysis (1982) explores that though racism and 
apartheid definitely contributed to the vast disparities and injustices, an analysis 
of the reproduction of socioeconomic classes within a capitalist system needs to 
also be taken into account. They seem to propose that it was not just racism and 
White superiority but that the reproduction of labour played an important role in 
shaping educational policy and practice72.  
 
So far the following seems to be emerging as trends with regard to the role of 
curriculum in shaping notions of citizenship: 
• Education is always in service of a dominant view of society,  
• Education perpetuates the dominant group’s view of society. 
                                            
72 For a full discussion of the intersection between education and labour policies see Christie and 
Collins (1982). 
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• Although education has a major impact in shaping discourse, education is 
shaped by its context. 
• Education in South Africa sustained taxonomies informed by race and 
socioeconomic inequalities. 
• Religion played a seminal role in shaping education policy and the study of 
Christian religion sanctioned exclusionary views of citizenship. 
 
4.3.3 Christian National Education 
 
Christian National Education (CNE) as a specific ideological response is not a 
unique event in world history. The history of religions pays testimony to the fact 
that religion used (and uses) a variety of educational and political means to 
promote itself. For example, Cook (2005:6) illustrates how a murky mixture of 
religious and territorial expansion and conquests shaped early Islam. Mamdani 
(2005:5) retells the history of the modern nation state and its relationship with 
religion, culture and notions of superiority73.  
 
In referring to the role of religion and a ‘laager’ mentality of the Afrikaner, Bosch 
says 
For many decades, the National Party and the Dutch Reformed Churches 
were seen as jointly responsible for keeping the laager intact, buttressing 
the weak spots and keeping up the morale of the people. After the 
National Party came to power in 1948, the entire legislative machinery was 
harnessed with this one purpose in mind, namely, to safeguard Afrikaner 
identity once and for all so that it would never again be exposed 
defencelessly to the onslaughts of the outside world (1986:208). 
 
CNE has its historical, philosophical and ontological roots in what Krüger 
(2003:104) calls, ‘Afrikaner Christian Nationalism’. Krüger (2003:104-105) is in 
agreement with Bosch (1986) in describing the influence on the theology of 
Abraham Kuyper as well as German romantic nationalism. Krüger (2003:104) 
quotes General J.C. Smuts who referred to the faith of the Afrikaner, which was: 
                                            
73 For an interesting discussion on the intersection between politics, education and religion in the 
realm of and definition of citizenship through the ages see Mamdani (2005) and Harris (2005).  
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‘at the same time and necessarily a faith in their own great destiny’. These words 
are echoed by the words of Dr D.F. Malan who said ‘The history of the Afrikaner 
reveals a determination and a definiteness of purpose which make one feel that 
Afrikanerdom is not the work of man [sic] but a creation of God. We have a 
Divine right to be Afrikaners. Our history is the highest work of art of the Architect 
of the centuries’ (Bunting 1969). 
 
Krüger (2003:104) continues to describe Christian Nationalism as follows: 
Christian Nationalism developed from an ethnic religion to a civil religion in 
the full sense of the word; from a mere insistence on the right to govern 
themselves to an insistence on the right to govern the whole of South 
African society; from a mere insistence on the divine right of the Afrikaners 
to separate racial and political existence to an integral system which 
aimed at the regulation of the entire nation; from a rather unsystematic 
emphasis on mere segregation to an emphasis on a strong central 
integration of power in the apartheid state. 
 
 
This ‘insistence’ grew into the educational vision of CNE. Nell Marquard (1959) 
comments on a 1948 pamphlet issued by the Institute for Christian National 
Education in which the following are stated (as translated by The Black Sash 
1959) as some broad principles of CNE: 
Our Afrikaans schools must not merely be mother-tongue schools; they 
must be places where our children will be saturated with the Christian and 
National spiritual cultural stuff of our nation. The dual medium struggle has 
opened our eyes, and there is going to be a struggle about the realisation 
of these ideals. We want no mixing of languages, no mixing of cultures, no 
mixing of religions and no mixing of races… (1959:4). 
 
 
This 1948 pamphlet refers to 15 articles describing the principles of CNE. The 
Black Sash has translated some of the articles as follows: 
 
Article I – 
All white children should be educated according to the view of life of their 
parents. This means that Afrikaans-speaking children should have a Christian-
Nationalist education, for the Christian and the National spirit of the Afrikaner 
must be preserved and developed. By Christian, in this context, we mean 
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according to the creeds of the three Afrikaner churches; by Nationalist we mean 
embued [sic] with the love of one’s own, especially one’s own language, history 
and culture. Nationalism must be rooted in Christianity. 
 
Article II – 
The key subject in school should be religious study of the Bible and the three 
Afrikaner churches and the religious spirit should permeate all staff and the entire 
school. 
 
Article VI – Content of education: 
(i)… All God’s creation and Man’s [sic] work must be studied. But the spirit of all 
teaching must be Christian-Nationalist; in no subject may anti-Christian or 
non-Christian or anti-nationalist or non-nationalist propaganda be made… 
(iii) Bilingualism cannot be the aim of education. 
(v) Geography: Every nation is rooted in a country allotted to it by God. 
Geography should aim at giving the pupil a thorough knowledge of his 
country… in such a way that he will love his country, also when compared 
and contrasted with others, and be ready to defend it, preserve it from 
poverty, and improve it for posterity. 
(vi) History: History should be seen as the fulfilment of God’s plan for 
humanity… God has enjoined each nation its individual task in the 
fulfilment of His purpose. Young people can only undertake the national 
task fruitfully if they acquire a true vision of the origin of the nation and of 
the direction of the national heritage. Next to the mother tongue the history 
of the Fatherland is the best channel for cultivating the love of one’s own 
which is nationalism. 
 
Article VII – Discipline: 
(ii) Discipline: All authority in school is borrowed from God. The Christian-
Nationalist end should be kept in view. 
 
Article VIII - 
(i) Lays down that there must be separate, single-medium schools for 
Afrikaans and English-speaking children. In each there should be the right 
relationship between home, school, church and state. 
(iii) The Home: Education is the right and duty of the parents, who must 
decide, in collaboration with Church and State, what spirit shall animate 
the school. The parents in community (not as individuals) must establish, 
maintain and control schools which will foster their own view of life, they 
must appoint teachers and keep a watch on the teaching. 
(iv) The Church: The church must exercise the necessary discipline over the 
doctrine and lives of the teachers. The vigilance must be exercised 
through the parents … In normal circumstances, the church should not 
erect schools, but may be compelled to do so (a) if the existing schools 
are unchristian and unnationalist and (b) in the heathen world. 
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(v) The State: The state must ensure a proper scientific and moral stand in 
education, and enforce law and right in school life. It may not, however, 
determine the directing spirit of education provided that, as judged by 
God’s law, it is not harmful to the state. … 
 
Article XII – The teacher: 
(i) Being a substitute for the parent, the teacher does the parent’s work as 
the parent himself would do it were he able. Unless, therefore, he is a 
Christian, he is a deadly danger to us. 
(ii) Our substitutes should be properly trained in Christianity, and in the 
secular subjects, especially pedagogy. Training College personnel should 
be Christian and Nationalist. 
 
Articles XIV and XV deal summarily with Coloured and native education, neither 
of which should be financed at the expense of the White. The task of the  
Afrikaner is to Christianise the non-White, to teach him to be happy and  
separate, and inculcate the Boer nation’s view of life. 
 
 
In commenting on the text of the pamphlet, Nell Marquard (1959:4) states that  
‘God has allotted South Africa to the Afrikaners, to carry out His allotted  
Nationalist purpose. What that is, apart from Christianising the heathen, is  
nowhere specified’. 
 
In the light of the above, it is almost an understatement when Chidester 
(2003b:264) writes that the current Policy ‘represents a dramatic departure from 
the religious education, instruction, or indoctrination of the past’. He refers 
(2003b:264 quoting the Department of Didactics, Unisa 1990:30) to the manual 
for Biblical instruction, which had as objective that ‘Children must personally 
accept, and trust for their personal salvation, the triune God introduced to them in 
the Bible’.  Chidester (2003b:264) also states that the old dispensation was 
driven ‘by a particular kind of Christian confessionalism and triumphalism, a 
confessionalism that required pupils to embrace prescribed religious convictions 
and a triumphalism that explicitly denigrated adherents of other religions’. 
Although public schools were encouraged to show ‘tolerance and respect for 
differing doctrinal convictions’ this was only allowed ‘as long as there is no denial 
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of Jesus Christ as the Messiah’ (Chidester 2003b:265 quoting the Department of 
Didactics, Unisa 1990:19). 
 
Bantu education and CNE did not die ‘natural deaths’, but came to an end due to 
the 1994 transition to a democratic dispensation. The history of education in 
South Africa illustrates on the one hand education’s role in maintaining notions of 
white supremacy and on the other hand education as powerful tool to struggle 
against white supremacy (Baloyi 2004:151). As we will explore in the sections to 
follow, education policy was central to the re-imagining of South Africa even 
before the political processes towards transformation started. I will firstly explore 
various aspects of the drive to dismantle apartheid in its educational gestalts, and 
then continue to explore the political dimensions of dismantling apartheid. 
 
4.3.4 Dismantling apartheid education 
 
In exploring the role of popular mobilisation in the regime transitions in South 
Africa and El Salvador, Wood (E.J) (2001) refers to the transition as ‘an insurgent 
path to democracy’. In her exploration of the transition process in South Africa, 
she explores the ‘intersecting systems’ (Foucault 1972) of ‘popular mobilization, 
economic interests and regime transition’.  Education and specifically CNE was 
central to the apartheid regime’s segregation and exclusion (Dube 1985). It 
comes therefore as no surprise that education, and specifically teachers and 
students would play a critical part in the mobilisation against apartheid and it’s 
dismantling (Baloyi 2004; Dube 1985). Schools became ungovernable and the 
radical rhetoric during the struggle years often sabotaged educational reforms in 
the run up to the 1994 elections (Ramphele 2001:7) 
 
The period of 1989-1993 is described by Unterhalter (1998:355) as ‘a process of 
moving two steps forward and one step back, [in which] the apartheid regime 
began to move into consultation with social forces demanding the complete 
overhaul of the apartheid state’. What is significant for our exploration of the 
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processes and forces at play in the educational reforms resulting in the Policy are 
the changes in agendas and the emergence of stakeholders defining the process 
and its contents. In this period (1989 -1993) educational change was viewed by 
the ‘bureaucrats in the administration, representatives of corporate interests in 
civil society, white trade unions and senior managers in large firms…in terms of 
economic rationality’ (Unterhalter 1998:356; italics my own). Social justice, the 
disparities between certain segments in the markets, the gendering of skills are 
not addressed at all and the state (at that stage) is seen as a ‘neutral facilitator of 
co-ordination’ (Unterhalter 1998:356). In 1991 the government introduced the 
Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) ‘which was an attempt to move away from 
apartheid education’ (Sedibe 1998:270). The report was however criticised ‘…for 
its vague recommendations about the governance and administration of the 
education system and its silence about issues of class, race, religion, gender and 
inequalities in education’ (Sedibe 1998:271). The ANC and Congress for South 
African Trade Unions (Cosatu) on the other hand saw education and training not 
only in terms of ‘improved productivity and economic rationality, but [also] to the 
broader goals of democratisation and redress of past injustices, which were seen 
as intimately connected with ideas about economic regeneration’ (Unterhalter 
1998:358). Another role player in this period is the Centre for Education Policy 
Development (CEPD), which advanced ‘universalist notions of human rights’ 
(Unterhalter 1998:359). 
 
Unterhalter (1998:360) describes the period 1994-1996 as ‘a honeymoon for 
South Africa’. Unterhalter identifies two currents that infused those years. The 
first current was ‘enormous optimism’ and putting structures in place for the 
implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
the second current was that of ‘reconciliation and compromise’. What is 
significant is the fact that Unterhalter (1998:361) identifies the role of the big 
corporations during this period as being ‘the major vehicle for these negotiations’ 
(italics my own). While the White Paper on Education and Training (WPET) in 
1995 still mentions education and training as basis for human rights, documents 
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published thereafter ‘have even fewer references to social justice’ (Unterhalter 
1998:363). By the end of 1996, Unterhalter points to the fact that as RDP was 
replaced by GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), the emphasis was 
placed ‘on securing capitalist growth as a precondition for redistribution, rather 
than the reversal of that linearity expressed in the RDP’ (1998:365). 
 
Unterhalter’s exploration (1995) confirms the role economic interests played in 
mobilisation towards the regime transition as suggested by Wood (E.J) (2001)74.  
Wood (E.J) (2001:883) concludes that the regime change in South Africa was 
possible because ‘…insurgency was sustained long enough to create the 
structural conditions for the resolution of conflict: It constituted an insurgent 
counterelite with whom negotiations proved necessary and it directly threatened 
the interests and opportunities of economic elites…’ 
 
Any analysis of the development of educational policy in South Africa should 
therefore take into consideration the multiplicity of layers, and the content and 
often changes of agendas and stakeholder lobbies. After analysing the 
constitutional negotiation processes that resulted in the Congress for a 
Democratic South Africa (Codesa) as well as agreement on a two-stage process 
that resulted in the final Constitution, Henrard (2002:22) states that these 
developments and processes ‘confirmed that compromise politics was one of the 
forces of the process securing its eventual success’ (italics mine). 
 
As we continue our exploration of the tectonic layers underlying the Policy, 
evidence of ‘compromise politics’ (Henrard 2002) and ‘political bargains’ (Wood 
2001) will continue to make an appearance in the drama of processes resulting in 
and surrounding the Policy. 
 
 
 
                                            
74 For a discussion of the insurgent processes towards democracy see Wood (E.J) (2001).  
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4.3.5 Transition through transformation 
 
The transition from apartheid to democracy has often been described as 
miraculous (e.g. Tutu 1994) and prescribed as a ‘model’ to other deeply ravaged 
societies.  CNE (as described in the preceding section) was just the educational 
strategy to entrench apartheid. The number of laws and vast legislation that were 
necessary to uphold the social and political order and segregation as envisaged 
by the Afrikaner white minority was immense. Krüger (2003:207-265) narrates 
the immense social engineering process since 1948 in the city of Pretoria. No 
part of the city or the lives of its inhabitants were left untouched by apartheid. The 
murder of Dr H.F. Verwoerd in 1966 signified the ‘beginning of the end of high 
apartheid. The stiff logic began to unravel’ (Krüger 2003:210). The trauma 
caused by this ‘unravelling’ of apartheid and the increased opposition, nationally 
and internationally to the white minority government, resulted in ‘an insurgent 
path to democracy’ (Wood, [E.J] 2001)75.   
 
Giliomee (1995) analyses the different pressures for liberalisation from 
Boereplaas to ‘an inclusive, multiracial state’ (Giliomee 1995:85) and then 
suggests that the only way the De Klerk government could get the white 
electorate’s support was to present the negotiations as a process of ‘controlled 
transformation’ (Giliomee 1995:940). What is important for the rest of our 
exploration towards understanding the processes resulting in the Policy, is the 
fact that the De Klerk government presented the option to the white electorate as 
a ‘fail-safe affair: even if a future ANC government would entertain radical 
measures, whites would retain sufficient power to block such moves’ (Giliomee 
1995:95; italics mine). 
 
                                            
75 Giliomee (1995) describes three options that were considered as the need for transformation 
became impossible to ignore. The one was a ‘transition through transformation’, but equally 
possible (maybe not as viable) was ‘transition after regime breakdown’ and ‘transition as 
transplacement’. 
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Formal negotiations started in December 1991 in an all-party Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (Codesa). Giliomee states that in the debates ‘the 
requisites of broad-based economic development and national homogeneity have 
been stressed’ (Giliomee 1995:98). For a successful transition to democracy, 
both of these were seen to be crucial. It would seem to be important for our 
further exploration to take note of the economic power the Afrikaner had at the 
time of the negotiations.  
In 1946 more than half of the Afrikaners were struggling farmers or 
workers in blue collar and other manual occupations; they were dependent 
on government protection. By 1992 by contrast, more than 80 percent of 
Afrikaners were in high or middle-income categories, and the group as a 
whole was more open to the liberalisation of the political order (Giliomee 
1995:99). 
 
The first concern to the democratisation process was to immediately address the 
racial configuration of economic well-being of the majority of black citizens. The 
second concern of the multi-party negotiations was to move to ‘national unity’ 
from a deeply divided and ethnicised past (Giliomee 1995:100). Giliomee 
(1995:104) concludes by saying in 1995 that 
No country that became democratic since the mid-1970s laboured under 
the same ethnic and racial divisions and the lack of broad-based economic 
development as South Africa. The ruling group has not been defeated and 
presently considers power-sharing as an instrument for protecting group 
interests and values (italics mine). 
 
 
In 1994 very few South Africans, however, could have realised how painful, 
insecure and long this transformation process will take. After the euphoria was 
over, South Africans and especially the Afrikaner were confronted with, in the 
words of Karl Jasper’s Die Schuldfrage (1946), ‘the question of guilt’ (as referred 
to by Booth 1999:255). South Africans had (and still have) in the words of Muller 
(1996) ‘dreams of wholeness and loss’76.  
 
                                            
76 See Goldhagen 1997. 
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Little did we know, in 1994, that our journey into ‘the heart of darkness’ (Conrad, 
1973) have just started. While many remembered the atrocities and trauma, 
many wanted to forget, or claim amnesia. This reminds of two witnesses 
testifying in Rwanda in 2001 in the gacaca hearings dealing with the atrocities of 
the 1994 genocide. The witness is quoted to have stated ‘Nothing, I remember 
nothing’, the middle-aged witness insisted to the court. ‘I was sick during the 
genocide…’ The next witness claimed to have been watching her cows from her 
window when two girls were murdered outside her home (Stansell 2007:1) 
 
4.4 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC)  
 
‘My wife was sitting next to me in the front pew. She was wearing a long 
blue coat’. As he said this his voice started to break. He let go of his tears 
and, speaking through uncontrollable sobs, he continued, ‘I want you to 
tell me if you saw her. Do you remember firing at my wife? If you don’t 
remember I’ll accept it, but I want to know if you saw her, if you remember 
firing at her’. 
 
[John Ackerman addresses the men from the Azanian People’s Liberation 
Army (APLA). The men applied to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) for amnesty for a 1993 grenade attack at St James 
Church, Cape Town. John Ackerman’s wife was killed in the attack.] (as 
quoted in Gobodo-Madikizela 2002:24). 
 
There are many accounts of South Africa’s transition from apartheid into 
democracy. These accounts include from laudatory narratives celebrating the 
birth of the ‘rainbow nation’ (Tutu 1994, 1999) to critical accounts of the lack of 
distributive justice (e.g. Maluleke 1997, 2001).  Central to the public and political 
discourses following the successful elections in 1994 was the question posed by 
Kymlicka and Norman (1994, as quoted by Enslin 2003:73) ‘what is it to belong to 
a particular society, and what kind of life is possible to live in this form of society?’ 
 
The new democratic state indeed faced many challenges and claims. In 
discussing the demands that faced the new democratic state after 1994, Sayed 
(2002:38) states that 
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First, it was expected to deliver a more just and humane society in a 
climate of rising expectations and hopeful promise. Simultaneously, the 
state was expected to provide conditions for economic growth and 
development… Second, it was presumed that the state would unify a 
divided society without threatening the white population. Therefore 
restitution was to take a limited form. Third, the state was expected to be 
responsive to the will of the people and to guarantee increased 
participation and extend democracy in society.  … The new South African 
state was therefore expected to fulfil at least three different functions, 
namely, ensure distributive justice, provide the conditions for capital 
accumulation, and ensure greater responsiveness and participation in 
forging unity/nationhood (the rainbow nation/state). 
 
The TRC was our new democracy’s first institutionalised reckoning with the past. 
As such it constitutes an important tectonic layer in understanding the Policy in 
the context memory and forgetting. 
 
4.4.1 A short overview 
 
Although the final report of the TRC was handed over in 1998 to Pres Nelson 
Mandela, the TRC and its processes, the successes and failures, remains a 
vibrant and often uncomfortable presence in contemporary South Africa. In 2007 
the Public Prosecutor decided to prosecute some of the previous regime’s 
Defence Force and Police Forces for alleged crimes committed prior 1994. Du 
Toit (2007) asks whether this process will open up old wounds, or have those 
wounds in fact remained open?   
 
The TRC was for South Africa’s newly fledged democracy a defining moment. 
Not only did South Africans come face to face with ‘three centuries of fractured 
morality’ (Krog 1999:68), but we were confronted with the abyss of what we all 
have become – whether we were victims, oppressors or classified ourselves in 
the contested category as ‘bystanders’. We all have become inhumane – whether 
as a result of being treated as such or losing our humanity by treating other 
humans as less-than-human. Maluleke (1997:326) points to two factors that 
impacted on the TRC’s successes and failures, namely that it ‘was part of the 
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political settlement which catapulted the ANC into power without having been 
militarily victorious; and secondly that the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 defines and puts significant limits to what the 
TRC can/should do and achieve’. 
 
I would like to propose that the TRC hearings and the different population group’s 
reactions to the narratives formed on the one hand the foundation of the 
realisation of the scope and complexity that the social re-engineering of South 
African society will require; and on the other hand explain many of the public 
discourses on shared values and ‘the will of the people’ as is claimed in public 
debates on the death penalty, gay marriages and the rise in xenophobia. 
 
As Swartz (2006:552) explores, the ‘rebuilding of the fractured society’ started by 
being confronted with the wounds, first. I do not intend to comprehensively 
discuss the TRC, its processes, the narratives and the different outcomes or lack 
thereof. This has been done by many authors, including Maluleke (1997); Sarkin 
(1996) and Verwoerd (1999). In looking at the TRC’s processes, narratives and 
some of the different critiques on the TRC, I will endeavour to look for patterns 
that may provide insight on how certain groupings within the broader South 
African society see amongst other things justice, diversity, equality and cultures. 
 
The statement by Henrard (2002: 18; italics my own) explores the relationship 
between education and reconciliation in historic perspective: 
Reconciliation involves not only telling the truth about the past and 
forgiveness, but also requires reparation for material and other forms of 
deprivation and the restoration of a human community in a spirit of respect 
for human rights and democracy. Indeed, it also necessitates the creation 
of a society within which the chances of reoccurrence of the kinds of gross 
violations of human rights that occurred in the past are reduced to a 
minimum. 
 
The TRC was established in terms of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995. The title of the act already hints at a dual 
purpose, namely ‘national unity’ and ‘reconciliation’. The mandate of the 
 210
commission was to provide a platform for witnesses, victims and perpetrators to 
come forward and share their narratives with the explicit assumption that the 
sharing of these testimonies would result in reconciliation, possible redress for 
the victims and/or the families of the victims and amnesty for the perpetrators. In 
establishing the Commission, the Minister of Justice stated the purpose of the 
Commission to ‘ensure that we put our country on a sound moral basis … and [in 
order] to humanise our society we had to put across the idea of moral 
responsibility’ (Dullah Omar as quoted by Krog 1999:8). A number of 
commentators (e.g. Krog 1999, Maluleke 1997, and Swartz 2006) emphasised 
the fact that apartheid dehumanised us and that the TRC was the first step in a 
humanising project77. 
 
The TRC made ‘findings on 36 000 alleged gross violations of human rights in 
around 20 300 statements from victims or survivors of these violations… On 30 
June 1998, of a total of 7 127 amnesty applications, 2 684 still had to be finalised’ 
(Verwoerd 1999:303-304). When the Commission presented its final report on 
October 28, 1998, the Commission condemned both sides for committing 
atrocities. 
 
4.4.2 Reactions to the TRC: glimpses of developing patterns 
 
I would like to now share some ‘glimpses’ of what I sense have developed out of 
the TRC that (I suspect) have impacted on either the rationale for, the processes 
of or the final content of the Policy78. The following figure (Figure 4.4) provides an 
overview of these nine glimpses. 
 
 
                                            
77 For an overview of the different committees of the TRC and their different scopes, see Henrard 
(2002).  
78 I chose the word ‘glimpse’ consciously and deliberately. These glimpses represent stolen 
glances, prolonged and anguishing personal reflections. These glimpses do not claim any 
legitimacy or even empirical validity. These glimpses are further offered by someone who fought 
against the ANC. Therefore these glimpses are part of my own making sense not only of my own 
‘perpetrator’ behaviour, but also as my identity as Afrikaner. 
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Figure 4.4: An overview of the nine glimpses of developing patterns 
 
Glimpse 1: The TRC as religious ritual 
After the elections of 1994 and the official inauguration of Pres Nelson Mandela 
as first president of the first democratically elected government in South Africa, 
the TRC was the first public event where the new democracy faced its demons 
and its possible futures.  And in shaping the TRC the chairperson and many of its 
commissioners and staff, turned to religion to facilitate a process of national 
remembering and forgetting79. 
 
The TRC was clothed in religious, and specifically Christian taxonomies and 
rituals (Mamdani 1996:3)80. Although Smit (1995:3) states that the church ‘has 
naturally been in the business of truth and reconciliation, and guilt and 
forgiveness form [sic] its beginnings’, the same can not be said of the 
government or its institutions. Smit (1995:13) later comments on the ‘Christian’ 
character of the TRC and states that the Commission ‘is after all a juridical and 
public instrument, not a spiritual and Christian instrument’. Mamdani (1996:3) 
points to the specific religious roots of the vocabulary used by the TRC, words 
like ‘confession’, ‘repentance’, ‘conversion’, and so forth. In referring to the work 
of the TRC Petersen (1996) uses terminology like ‘a politics of grace’. In 
                                            
79 As religion was a crucial element in sustaining notions of white supremacy in South Africa pre-
1994, religion again was called upon to play a role in not only dealing with the past, but also in 
envisioning a future that will contribute to the shaping of a more just and compassionate society.  
80 Interestingly, though different religions played a role in the ceremony of the inauguration of 
Pres Nelson Mandela, the TRC took on a distinctively Christian character.  
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reflecting on the work of the TRC, a number of authors have also used 
references to the Bible to either condemn or praise the work of the TRC. 
Maluleke (1997:324), for example, quotes from the Old Testament in a title to an 
article asking whether the TRC dealt ‘lightly with the wound of my people?’81. 
 
The distinct use of religious vocabulary and ritual during the hearings may also 
refer to a particular and state-sanctioned view on the function of religion in the 
process of nation-building. This functional view of religion may have contributed 
to the need for and the formulation of the Policy. 
 
Glimpse 2:  Not enough 
Jenkins (2000) explores the dilemmas of the TRC to contribute to the 
reconstruction in South Africa from a Human Rights perspective. Jenkins 
(2000:415) quotes Judge Mohamed who said 
Generations of children born and yet to be born will suffer the consequences 
of poverty, malnutrition, of homelessness, of illiteracy and disempowerment 
generated and sustained by the institutions of apartheid and its manifest 
effects on life and living for so many. The country has neither the resources 
nor the skills to reverse fully the massive wrongs. It will take many years of 
strong commitment, sensitivity and labour to ‘reconstruct our society’ so as to 
fulfil the legitimate dreams of new generations exposed to real opportunities 
for advancement denied to preceding generations… 
 
 
The TRC process in itself was seen by the drafters of the Act to be ‘…a form of 
reparation in the widest sense of the term’ (Jenkins 2000:462). For 90 percent of 
the 21 000 people who made statements to the TRC about gross human rights 
violations, only 10 percent got the opportunity to relate their experiences at public 
hearings (Jenkins 2000:462-463)82.  
                                            
81 I could not find any comments from other of the major religions in South Africa on the distinctly 
‘Christian’ character of the TRC, its vocabulary and its processes. On the one hand, with the 
majority of South Africa’s population professing to be Christian, with most of the perpetrators and 
victims professing to be Christian, the distinctive Christian character of the TRC may be deemed 
functional.   
82 Jenkins (2000: 465) quotes Meiring who reflects on the needs of those who testified. Meiring 
writes 
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In a footnote, Jenkins (2000:465-466) quotes Wendy Orr who suggested that the 
request for ‘symbolic reparation may have simply reflected victims’ 
embarrassment at asking for money at a public hearing’. Later Jenkins 
(2000:467) refers to her again commenting on the fact that victims had to wait 
years for some relief, while perpetrators ‘felt the benefit of a positive amnesty 
decision at once’.  Though this may be true for those who did receive amnesty, it 
is not a generally known fact that the ‘vast majority of the nearly 7 000 amnesty 
applications received by the TRC have been rejected’ (Jenkins 2000:467, 
footnote 239). 
 
Commenting on the fact that ‘the Act does not require amnesty applicants to 
apologise’ or to make personal amends, Jenkins (2000:479) questions the TRC’s 
validity of the ‘shame and reintegrate’ model of restorative justice. There were 
even applicants who indicated that they do not regard their acts as wrong and 
that in the same circumstances they would do it again (Jenkins 2000:480). 
Jenkins concludes chillingly by quoting Mrs Charity Kondile whose son was 
murdered by former security forces – ‘It is easy for Mandela and Tutu to forgive… 
They lead vindicated lives. In my life nothing, not a single thing, has changed 
since my son was burnt by barbarians… nothing. Therefore I cannot forgive’. 
 
Maluleke (1997:329) refers to the ‘massive undercurrent of scepticism about the 
TRC in the black community’ and the fact that the TRC was referred to as the 
                                                                                                                                  
Nearly everybody wanted information, wanted to know what had happened to them or 
their loved ones, and why. Others requested that photographs and other personal 
possessions confiscated at the time should be returned, or that the mortal remains of a 
husband or a child be brought home for reinternment. Some requested gravestones, 
which they could not afford at the time of death. Mrs Mgwinya requested the TRC to 
assist her in returning the cutlery and chairs that she borrowed from her neighbour the 
day she lost all her possessions. Twelve witnesses requested help to keep their children 
at school. Others raised the point of medical care and housing, or talked about the need 
for a special day of reconciliation in the country. The strangest, and saddest, request 
came from Mrs Mhlawuli, who wanted her husband’s hand, which was severed by the 
police at the time and kept as a deterrent in a bottle of formalin, to be returned to the 
family. They wanted to bury it. 
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‘Kleenex Commission’ and the ‘Tears and Reconciliation Commission’. While 
authors like Gobodo-Madikizela (2002) refer to the feelings of remorse, 
forgiveness and healing that some narratives evoked in the traumatic interplay 
between perpetrators and victims, ‘black people are more interested in the 
fulfilment of the promises made to them at election time as well as a material 
demonstration of remorse and restitution by all white people in the country’ 
(Maluleke 1997:329). 
 
The ANC and organisations that supported the struggle against apartheid, felt 
that they had fought a ‘just war’. The TRC however made a distinction between a 
‘just war’ and ‘unjust means’ (Krog 1999:433). The Government’s reaction to the 
final report echoed the same sentiments. The Minister of Education according to 
Krog (1999:87) said ‘…the Truth Commission will not be able to fulfil its implicit 
mandate to create a more moral order, if it does not make a distinction between 
those who fought against apartheid and those who defended it’.83 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is a legitimate concern that most of the White population has never ‘owned-up’ 
to what really happened under apartheid. The situation is exacerbated by the fact 
that this distinction of ‘those who fought against apartheid’ and those who did not 
or who benefited, runs like a leitmotiv throughout the social re-engineering from 
1994 up to the present.  While the majority of whites want to forget and get on 
with their lives, the rest of the population claim restoration and justice84.  
 
The need for restorative justice, with the emphasis on re-engineering the socio-
economic structural leftovers of apartheid points to the need for the Policy to also 
                                            
83 This is a significant remark. Though the scope of the TRC was to establish a foundation for a 
more moral dispensation, this moral dispensation has been qualified and continues to be qualified 
in terms of ‘those who fought against Apartheid’ and those who defended or benefited from 
Apartheid. 
84 I suspect that like Goldhagen’s (1997) attempt to explore the role of the ‘ordinary’ Germans in 
the Holocaust, a similar exploration of the role of the ‘ordinary’ white in apartheid will not change 
the self-perceptions of whites (and especially Afrikaners).  The reaction to such an exploration 
may be very much the same as the reactions to the publication of the Goldhagen book, as 
described by Hayward (2007). Also see Krüger’s (2003) exploration of guilt. 
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address the role religion played in apartheid as well as the role religion can play 
in restoring human and socio-economic dignity to South Africans. Without doing 
so, the Policy will miss a crucial point in the quest for a more just, moral and 
humane society. 
 
Glimpse 3: Too much – a witch hunt  
It is something of a pity that, by and large, the white community failed to 
take advantage of the Truth and Reconciliation process. They were badly let 
down by their leadership. Many of them carry a burden of guilt which would 
have been assuaged had they actively embraced the opportunities offered 
by the Commission; those who do not consciously acknowledge any sense 
of guilt are in a sense worse off than those who do. Apart from the hurt that 
it causes to those who suffered, the denial by so many white South Africans 
even that they benefited from apartheid is a crippling, self-inflicted blow to 
their capacity to enjoy and appropriate the fruits of change (Foreword by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu to the Final TRC Report 2003).  
 
A small group of whites (of which the majority will most probably be Afrikaners) 
still refuse to apologise for any wrong-doing during the apartheid years. In their 
view, the atrocities that were committed were in service of a ‘higher calling’. Most 
Afrikaners and probably most whites feel that the past should be forgotten as 
soon as possible and that South Africans should embrace the future. Most of 
these confess of never ‘knowing’ about the atrocities and the inhumanness of 
apartheid as system. This collective amnesia reminds of the witnesses (quoted at 
the end of Section 4.2) of reasons for not remembering witnessing the genocide 
in Rwanda – ‘I remember nothing’, the middle-aged witness insisted to the court. 
‘I was sick during the genocide… ‘The next witness claimed to have been 
watching her cows from her window when two girls were murdered outside her 
home (Stansell 2007:1). 
 
Petersen (1996:62) discusses the constant complaints from whites regarding 
victims’ need for restitution (and socioeconomic redress) while they demonstrate 
‘very, very little self-reflection, let alone self-criticism’ for the atrocities committed 
and for the systems which made these atrocities possible. There may be many 
reasons for this ‘apathy’ (Tutu 2003) or lack of self-criticism (Petersen 1996). 
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Krog (1997:10) postulates the possibility that the truth does not ‘automatically 
liberate’ but may overwhelm and numb. 
 
Marx (2002:50) points to the fact that instead of  
analysing how Vlakplaas became possible, the problem becomes 
anthropologised by individualising the evil, as manifested in the naming of 
Eugene de Kock as ‘Prime Evil’. In contrast, the banality of human coldness, 
avarice and pathetic assumptions about racist superiority, as manifested in 
the electoral behaviour of the white minority during the apartheid years, are 
excluded …. By remembering selectively the monstrosities, and by leaving 
out the everyday activities of white employers, the pettiness of the 
‘madams’, or the permanent terror of the pass laws, any discussion of 
apartheid as a system is circumvented. The one-sidedness of forgiving 
without any adequate response in the form of regret can be explained 
through this separation of physical violence from the repressive structures 
that carried it out. It is like the call into an empty room – the addressees, the 
former supporters of apartheid, do not feel addressed. 
 
While the Afrikaner has in their history also experienced gross violations of 
human rights, it would seem that this does not give them a bigger scope for self-
reflection and self-awareness85. In his discussion of Afrikaner Christian 
Nationalism, Krüger (2003:106) says ‘The supreme irony of this religion is that its 
burning sense of the injustice done to the Afrikaners by the British did not prevent 
it from becoming co-responsible in committing gross injustices to others’. 
 
As I will explore in the next chapter (Chapter 5) Kader Asmal’s outspokenness 
with regard to the need for redress and justice, has influenced the ‘laager’s’ 
perception when it was Asmal who launched the ‘onslaught’ against the 
Christendom (read Afrikaner) as petitioned by Ferreira (2003:17) in an article in 
the Kerkblad Die nuwe onderwysbeleid: aanslag teen die Christendom, (‘The 
new education policy: onslaught against Christianity’). 
 
                                            
85 Taking into account the exploration of Bosch (1986) and Krüger (2003) of the Afrikaner’s sense 
of being ‘chosen’ and being the ’greatest work of art’ as D.F. Malan has been quoted to have said 
(Bunting 1969), the Afrikaner’s lack of remorse or amnesia may indicate a pathological 
preoccupation with survival and a ‘laager’ mentality (Bosch 1986). To admit any wrong-doing 
would effectively render the ‘laager’ defenceless. 
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 Glimpse 4:  The cost of ‘the gift’ 
Glimpse 2 explored the criticism that the TRC did not do ‘enough’ to restore 
dignity or justice, whether due to its legal framework, the time parameters in 
which it functioned or the impossibility of forgiveness without substantial 
restoration. The TRC on the other hand created a space of possibilities, where 
victims could narrate abuses and ask for reparations, perpetrators could tell their 
side of the story and in some cases ask forgiveness. The TRC was in the ‘grace’ 
business – whether to comfort and assist in healing, of in giving amnesty which, 
in effect, meant forgiveness and starting with a clean state (whether the victims 
agreed with the amnesty or not). There are many who warned that the TRC was 
on the verge of making grace ‘cheap’ (see the discussions of Meiring 2006 and 
Petersen 2004), or dealt ‘lightly with the wound of my people’ (Maluleke 1997). 
There were also legitimate remarks that forgiveness follows repentance and the 
rejection of innocence (as explored by Boesak 1977). 
 
When we enter the space where victim and perpetrator meets, and forgiveness 
or atonement as ‘gift’ is either given or refused, then we realise that our 
expectations of and views on forgiveness, repentance, remorse, justice, 
resentment and remembering are much more complex than generally perceived.  
Victims and perpetrators discovered the uncomfortable and often 
incommensurable space created by claims for justice to be done, the Christian 
imperative to forgive, and dealing with resentment and memory. 
 
Marcel Mauss’ The gift (1990) is an uncomfortable partner in reflecting on the 
TRC and its implications for educational policy. In his conclusion to his essay, 
Mauss (1990) declares after studying exchanges in archaic societies, that there 
is no such thing as a ‘free gift’. ‘There are no free gifts; gift cycles engage 
persons in permanent commitments that articulate the dominant institutions’ 
(Mary Douglas in the Foreword to Mauss 1990:xii). The exchange of gifts was 
also much more than economic or socio-political acts. These exchanges were 
permeated with mana, honour, prestige or ‘authority’. In his ethnographic 
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research, Mauss found that the objects exchanged were not “dead” but embodied 
(sometimes literally) a ‘life-force’ or ‘authority’ – ‘the thing received is not inactive. 
Even when it has been abandoned by the giver, it still possesses something of 
him’ (Mauss 1990:15). There are furthermore obligations to give, obligations to 
receive and the obligation to reciprocate. ‘To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just 
as to refuse to accept is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of 
alliance and commonality’ (1990:17). 
 
Although the TRC opened a space for reconciliation and restitution, the aftermath 
of the TRC is permeated with feelings of disappointment.  Those who forgave 
looked for something in return. It was as if the TRC invited victims and 
perpetrators to a round table as symbol of a ‘common store of wealth’ and 
goodwill (Mauss 1990:106) and many perpetrators and more specifically the 
Afrikaner and their churches either did not accept the invitation, or came with 
provisos and disclaimers. The ‘gift’ and givers found no recipients. When the 
invitation to join the majority at this ‘round table’ was accepted, it was not to 
listen, share or receive, but to stake claims, justify, negate86. 
 
Forgiveness further may not be the most appropriate action in some 
circumstances. Jirsa (2004:14) states that there may be cases where ‘the act of 
forgiveness is not the proper response at all. If the act was by its scale and extent 
so evil that it produced such deep humiliation, forgiveness is already not a 
morally good act’ (italics added). He continues to explore the options for justice 
and dealing with resentment ‘when we do not forgive’ (2004:23). He therefore 
suggests that ‘feelings of resentment are thus nothing to be embarrassed about’ 
(2004:26) and that ‘it is not necessary to consider this feeling as something 
morally wrong and which has to be overcome at any cost’ (2004:27). Hamber and 
                                            
86 In exploring the relationship between the need for justice and forgiveness Jirsa (2004:12) says, 
‘…being forgiven means not being freed from responsibility and the demands of justice’ (italics in 
the original).  Mamdani (1996:5) makes the disconcerting remark that should the ‘gift’ of 
forgiveness and reconciliation not provide some “returns” for the majority of South Africans, that 
there is a real risk of “turning disappointment into frustration and outrage, creating room for a 
demagogue to reap the harvest…”  
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Wilson (2002:46) state ‘It is critical that victims are not expected, either implicitly 
or explicitly, to forgive the perpetrators, or forget about the past because some 
form of reparation (or a comprehensive report on the nature and extent of past 
violations) has been made’. It may be that the public nature of their narratives 
and their grief and reliving the trauma, brought with it, implicitly, some pressure to 
forgive – as it would have been seen by the audiences as ‘the right thing to do’, 
or even ‘the Christian thing to do’. Revenge and the expression of such desire to 
avenge the wrongs are often ‘regarded as low and unworthy emotion because its 
deep moral hold on people is rarely understood’ (Hamber & Wilson 2002:47). 
‘The demands of some survivors for retributive justice need to be seen as just as 
legitimate a path to “reconciliation” as forgiveness’ (Hamber & Wilson 2002:48). 
Verwoerd (1999:305) quotes a witness who said: 
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is that they are 
putting pressure on us to forgive. For most black South Africans the TRC 
is about us having to forgive… I don’t know if I will ever be ready to 
forgive. I carry this ball of anger inside me and I don’t even know where to 
begin dealing with it… The oppression was bad, but what is much worse, 
what makes me even more angry is that they are trying to dictate my 
forgiveness.  
 
Educational policy will therefore have to take seriously the ‘ball of anger’ many 
South Africans carry with them. Reconciliation without justice or justice without 
reconciliation may have the same outcome namely revenge (Mamdani 1996:5). If 
one considers the TRC’s parameters, taxonomies and processes as the result of 
a negotiated compromise, one should rather not be surprised when the results of 
the TRC also have a negotiated compromised character.  
 
From this brief excursion it has however become obvious that ‘national healing’ 
and ‘reconciliation’ comprise uncomfortable paradoxes that can not be resolved 
with a dose of ‘cheap grace’. The Policy should therefore not be tempted into 
‘cheap’ solutions and ‘tricks’ but should systematically develop spaces and 
taxonomies which will empower learners to speak out on their resentment, rage 
and hope, but also to explore new and different options for being human, 
together, in South Africa. 
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Glimpse 5:  Public participation 
The public participation in the hearings, processes and findings of the TRC can 
either be celebrated as indeed a national event, or an event that allowed actually 
very few people to tell their stories. The TRC and its proceedings was 
broadcasted on national television, was extensively reported on in daily news 
reports and newspapers and was, for its duration, in the public domain.  Looking 
at the 17 commissioners divided into three committees, investigating the 
applications of 20 000 victims and 7 000 amnesty seekers (Maluleke 2001:190) – 
one realises that the TRC was a major attempt in providing a space for public 
participation in service of nation-building. The TRC made ‘findings on 36 000 
alleged gross violations of human rights in around 20 300 statements from 
victims or survivors of these violations… On 30 June 1998, of a total of 7 127 
amnesty applications, 2 684 still had to be finalised’ (Verwoerd 1999:303-304). 
For 90 percent of the 21 000 people who made statements to the TRC about 
gross human rights violations, only 10 percent got the opportunity to relate their 
experiences at public hearings (Jenkins 2000:462-463).  
 
Although the actual public participation is insignificant compared to the scale of 
apartheid mass removals and mass humiliation, the TRC did, however, provide a 
very public space for ‘the nation’ to come to terms with some elements of its past, 
however limited.  But then again, as Hamber and Wilson (2002) explore, the 
expectations relating to the TRC’s ability to reconcile ‘the nation’ are based on 
the assumption that the ‘the nation’ as an entity exists. Hamber and Wilson 
(2002:36) remind us that ‘Nations do not have collective psyches that can be 
healed, nor do whole nations suffer post-traumatic stress disorder…’. They warn 
against the psychologising of an abstract entity like ‘the nation’. They quote 
(2002:36) Michael Ignatieff who wrote 
We tend to invest our nations with conscience, identities and memories as 
if they were individuals. It is problematic enough to vest an individual with 
a single identity: our inner lives are like battlegrounds over which uneasy 
truces reign; the identity of a nation is additionally fissured by region, 
ethnicity, class and education. 
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Truth commissions cannot therefore ‘heal the nation’ as if it is a homogenous 
entity with a homogeneous past. According to Ignatieff (as quoted by Hamber 
and Wilson 2002:36) such commissions ‘can only provide a frame for public 
discourse and public memory. They can help to create a new public space in 
which debate and discussion on the past occurs. Beyond this they can do little…’. 
Hamber and Wilson (2002:48) conclude ‘There is not a single process of dealing 
with the past that restores the ‘national psyche to good health’ and that 
commissions such as the TRC ‘can provide a useful framework in which new 
rituals or spaces can be provided for the enactment of closure’. As such the TRC 
allowed for ‘performances of memory’ (Hamber & Wilson 2002:49). The effect of 
these public and broadcasted ‘performances of memory’ ‘was a growing 
awareness amongst South Africans of the extent of the atrocities committed and 
the role of societal structures in perpetuating them’ (Swartz 2006:553). 
 
Glimpse 6: Diversity and reconciliation 
In an article titled, Can lions and rabbits reconcile? Maluleke (2001) explores the 
complexities of reconciliation given the diversity in South Africa. The many forms 
of the fable of the Lion (strong but not very clever) and the Rabbit (small and 
clever), provide Maluleke with a basis to attempt a nuanced overview of the 
different claims and counterclaims in South Africa. After exploring various 
versions which will suit either ‘black’ or ‘white’ listeners, Maluleke states that ‘it is 
not always clear who is the Lion and who is the Rabbit’ (2001:193). 
 
The TRC’s hearings revealed that religions did not per se play a role in the 
atrocities committed during apartheid. Perpetrators and victims both referred to 
the role their religion played in either legitimising or enduring oppression.  In the 
South African context, religious intolerance has never played a role in conflict 
outside of either supporting opposition to apartheid or legitimising apartheid 
(Gouws & Du Plessis 2000:2).  
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These authors’ research refers to international studies, which found that active 
participation in a religion often corresponds to political and religious intolerance 
(2000:4). These studies also found that non-religious people were in general 
more tolerant than their religious counterparts (2000:4-5). Gouws and Du Plessis 
found (2000:6) that ‘the majority of people are very intolerant’ regardless of 
whether adhering to a religion or not. They further argue that their findings 
indicate ‘religion is not contributing to making people more tolerant. Religious 
beliefs do not inspire people to “love their neighbours”’ (2000:7; italics added). 
They conclude that tolerance ‘does not reside in the hearts and minds’ of South 
Africans, regardless of religious adherence or affiliation (2000:15). These authors 
propose that churches and religious institutions ‘can take on a new role as agents 
of socialisation’ including acknowledging the ‘right to proselytise’ (2000:15)87. 
 
Racism, xenophobia or whatever other ‘gestalt’ of prejudice and discrimination 
are based on a classification of the ‘Other’ as different from ‘us’, whether it is skin 
colour, culture, religion, etc. (Duncan, Rey and Braam 2001). Duncan et al. 
(2001) assert the theory that racism is an ‘ideology that justifies domination and 
marginalisation’. Domination and marginalisation are not only confined to the ‘big’ 
categories of ‘white’ and ‘black’, but increasingly applicable to practices of 
xenophobia, homophobia and other forms of prejudice and discrimination. The 
ideology of racism is institutionalised in ever-changing forms and gestalts 
(Duncan et al. 2001:10). These authors refer to ‘realistic conflict theory’ (RCT) 
which proposes a  
…group-based understanding of the causes of racism. RCT basically 
suggests that incompatible goals or competition between racial groups 
over scarce resources lead to hostility and conflict and that superordinate 
goals of co-operative activities between these groups induce social 
harmony (Duncan et al. 2001:13). 
 
                                            
87 Recent accounts and explorations of genocides in Rwanda (Mamdani 1996) and East-Central 
Europe (Esbenshade 1995) provide chilling evidence that genocide can take shape overnight 
between people of the same race, religion and history, as illustrated in the 1994 Rwandan 
genocides (Mamdani 1996:4).  
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Educational policy and more specific the Policy should take seriously RCT and 
other indicators that point to the nonnegotiable fact that social and economic 
justice be an integral part of any multicultural or cultural pluralism program. 
Education policy should do much more than to celebrate and promote ‘diversity 
as ethos’ as Bakker (1999:58) suggests. In the debate on the possibility to use 
education to address issues of diversity and reconciliation, we would benefit from 
taking seriously the warning of Bauman (2002:115) that racism is much more and 
much more profound than just ‘a variety of inter-group resentment or prejudice’. 
Some ‘otherness’ seems so deeply ingrained in perceptions and notions of race, 
like Jewishness, that there ‘is no escape’ (Bauman quoting Hannah Arendt) from 
ontologically being part of that category (Bauman 2002:114). Bauman uses a 
medical metaphor when he explains that ‘one can train and shape “healthy” parts 
of the body, but not cancerous growth. The latter can be “improved” only by being 
destroyed’ (2002:117). The Holocaust and other genocides testify to the scary 
possibility that one’s ‘otherness’ can at a moment’s notice become a death 
sentence. 
 
Searching for and the celebration of ‘common ground’ (Bakker 1999:72) without 
fundamental socio-economic redress may perpetuate the criticism against 
multicultural education that it does not impact on the structural and 
institutionalised nature of inequality and racism, or address the multiple 
dimensions of intergroup conflict (Bornstein 2003; McLaren 1997; Shor 1992:13, 
46). We would do well, however, in developing educational policy, not to 
underestimate difference.  
 
Glimpse 7: Minority versus majority 
Henrard (2002) illustrates the negotiated and compromised nature of the process 
that eventually resulted in Codesa and the 1994 elections. During these 
negotiations the white population as minority suddenly discovered how 
vulnerable they really were and in a number of instances, e.g. language and 
education and self-determination, the Volkstaat and minority rights, demanded 
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compromises (Henrard 2002: 25-33)88. Minority groups claimed protection by the 
Constitution and more specifically the Bill of Rights to protect their languages, 
religions and the right to mother-tongue education, to mention but three 
contested areas. On the other hand, there are increasingly claims that the 
feelings of the majority of people regarding for example the death penalty and 
gay marriages should be tested through a national referendum. It would seem as 
if the public discourses in South Africa often nurture a sense of entitlement and 
not necessarily the values as embodied in the Constitution. 
 
It is therefore unclear to what extent the TRC’s processes and findings really 
impacted on the values held by the majority of South Africans. Though the TRC 
embodied the spirit of the new Constitution of South Africa and the values that 
people lived and died for, the general population still has very little understanding 
of the full implications of the rights and responsibilities in a constitutional 
democracy. 
 
Glimpse 8:  ‘Ubuntu’ as contested discourse 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu (during and after) the TRC proceedings exalted 
ubuntu as not only the principle which made the narratives heard by the TRC 
possible, but also to provide the only real possibility for reconciliation for a future 
South Africa (Marx 2002). Marx (2002:52) states that the way the TRC used the 
term ubuntu reveals a specific ‘Christian-inspired ideology of healing and nation 
building as the Commission propagated it’. Marx (2002:52) continues by stating 
that although ubuntu has become  
…the main signifiers of African identity, there is significantly no historical 
evidence [that] has been produced to substantiate this alleged community 
value. … In this way, the various power structures, different forms of political 
rule, repression, and the exploitation of women, slaves and clients are left 
out of the picture. 
 
                                            
88 Ironically, the same minority when in power did not care about the rights of the majority but in 
the turning of the tables, demanded to be respected and protected. 
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Marx (2002:52) states that Tutu ‘Christianised Ubuntu into a form of human 
compassion, which as a Christian commandment, could be contrasted to the 
divisiveness of the apartheid state’ (Marx 2002:52). Since then this notion of 
ubuntu has become embedded in the public discourses surrounding nation-
building and the values that would make a more just and equitable society 
possible. Ubuntu as concept is also very prominent in the Government’s 
Manifesto on values, education and democracy (Department of Education 2001b) 
as well as one of the values mentioned specifically in the Policy. It is therefore 
crucial to take a moment to explore the hype as well as the possibilities of ubuntu 
as value. 
 
There are several authors exploring the notion of ubuntu. Some of these authors 
celebrate ubuntu as a (if not the) unique African contribution to South Africa and 
the world (e.g. Coertze 2001, Louw 1998, Mbigi 1995, Teffo 1994, Tutu 1994). 
Other authors are more circumvent about the term and its currency in the 
discourse on nation-building and reconciliation in South Africa (e.g. Maluleke 
1997, 2001; Marx 2002). Maluleke (1997:343) writes 
Although the notion of ubuntu has now become fashionable,,, it is by no 
means a self-explanatory idea. The notion of ubuntu is a fiercely contested 
one and it is not yet clear in whose hands it will finally land. Nor is it yet 
clear what this notion will be used for. It has been connected to theology, 
the purported African renaissance, management theory, educational theory, 
ethics and now the TRC. 
 
 
There is a celebration of ubuntu as a ‘gift to share with the world, … that essence 
of being human in which my humanity is caught up in your humanity, where a 
person is a person through other persons because we are made for family, for 
togetherness, for friendship, for harmony, for sharing, for generosity and 
hospitality’ (Tutu as quoted by Maluleke 1997:325). Petersen (1996:63) calls 
ubuntu ‘an essential element in the politics of grace’. 
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Marx (2002:53) warns that the use of ubuntu in the nation building rhetoric 
‘emerges as a formula that at one and the same time excludes and includes, 
integrates and rejects. On the goal of unity and harmony, the practice of 
exclusion and separation follows inevitably, because identity can only be 
established through difference’. From its ‘mandate from the concepts of Ubuntu 
and Africanism, the government is able to interpret any criticism of its actions as 
evidence of its critics’ own limitations’ (Marx 2002:54). In his article Marx (2002) 
continues then to draw parallels between Afrikaner nationalism and Africanism 
and the use of ubuntu in the nation building discourses. In the heydays of 
Afrikaner nationalism, the individual’s salvation and fulfilment was linked to his or 
her integration into the nation, in his or her self-denial as individual (Marx 
2002:56).  
Outside the community and the communication with other human beings the 
human being is not really human. Because he is a social being by nature he 
[sic] is and becomes truly human only within human community. … The 
human being is not just a social being; he is also a national being (Nicholas 
Diederichs (1930) as quoted by Marx 2002:57). 
 
 
With the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument Dr D.F. Malan called the 
Afrikaner the ‘greatest work of art by the Architect of all centuries’ (Bunting 1969). 
In similar vein did Tutu in 1988 invoke God as the One who commissioned the 
struggle – ‘our marching orders come from Christ Himself and not from any 
human being. Our mandate is provided by the Bible and the teachings of the 
church, not by any political group or ideology, Marxist or otherwise’ (as quoted by 
Marx 2002:58).  
From this perspective, nation building is not simply an exercise that 
corresponds with the will of God. Nation building becomes instead a project 
embarked upon according to God’s will… . … the fundamentalist right to 
resistance becomes the commandment to reconciliation in the higher 
interest of nation building (italics in the original). 
  
Ubuntu therefore ‘becomes the guiding star of nation building’ (Marx 2002:58-59). 
In stark contrast to the community aspect of ubuntu, Marx then points to the stark 
rise in xenophobia at the same time as the ‘triumphalist nationalism of the post-
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apartheid era’. Critics of the new regime criticised ubuntu.  ‘Ubuntu is an invented 
tradition, whose task it is to minimise historical chasms and fractures’ (Marx 
2002:59). Ubuntu is furthermore used to contrast societies in Africa with the 
individualised ‘West’. 
 
The discourse on ubuntu in the context of nation building is one that needs 
critical debate and deconstruction. It would seem as if ubuntu is part of a 
campaign to romanticise an ‘idealised, ahistorical, pre-colonial Africa’ (Marx 
2002:60). Marx points to the fact that not one traditional Chief appeared before 
the TRC (2002:63) and postulates then that the ‘function of the Chief is removed 
form all historical contexts and treated as if it were part of a timeless culture. … 
The message is clear: whoever resists the power of the Chiefs is a traitor to his 
own culture, i.e. to the nation’ (Marx 2002:63). 
Ubuntu in the wider discourse on nation building and the African renaissance 
should therefore be carefully used. Ubuntu as the ‘light’ that Africa (as if it is a 
uniform entity) can bring to the world may actually reproduce many of the 
colonialist assumptions, evoking an image of chimerical uniformity rather than 
treating the cultural diversity of Africans as an asset (Marx 2002:65). 
 
 
There has yet to be an ethnographic and/or anthropological study providing a 
clear picture of ubuntu as Marcel Mauss did with his ethnographic study of 
reciprocal giving (1990). Most of the accounts dealing with ubuntu are examples 
of romanticised notions of life on the African continent before colonialisation (or 
as a result of it e.g. the work of Charles, 1995, and Brantlinger, 1985). This does 
however not preclude the possibility that the term and concept of ubuntu to be 
given a new ideological content and praxis89. To what extent ubuntu as concept 
can provide an effective alternative to what McLaren calls ‘traumatised 
capitalism’ (1994:1), and De Jongh and Prinsloo (2005:5) call ‘rampant’ and 
‘triumphant’ capitalism; and broader context of the ‘re-enchantment of 
consumption’ (Firat & Venkatesh 1995:251) still needs to be seen.  
                                            
89 For a critical exploration of semantic shifts in the term ubuntu and its implications for the current 
use of the term see Coertze (2001). 
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Ubuntu, as it is currently used by politicians and educational policies should 
however be deconstructed and critically interrogated before it can be part of the 
strategy to create new taxonomies of democracy, memories and forgetting. This 
brings us to Glimpse 9. 
 
Glimpse 9: New taxonomies of victims and perpetrators, beneficiaries and those 
left behind 
Taxonomies of citizenship in the public domain are often the results of comments 
from politicians, public figures but also the result of determined strategies of the 
dominant discourses. A recent example of how terms and concepts are 
introduced and used is the reference to the existence of ‘two nations’ by Mbeki in 
1998 (Nattrass & Seekings 2001). Mbeki attempted to describe the continued 
existence of inequality in South Africa and referred to two nations, the one white 
and rich and the other black and poor. As Nattrass and Seekings indicate 
(2001:47) rich and poor are no longer synonymous with black and white. They 
propose  
three broad classes, not two racially defined nations: an increasingly 
multiracial upper class, comprising not just high-profile corporate figures 
but much more broadly the professional, managerial, and business 
classes; a ‘middle’ class of mostly urban, employed workers; and a 
marginalised class of outsiders, comprising many of the unemployed as 
well as workers in agricultural and domestic employment (Nattrass & 
Seekings 2001:66). 
 
 
More than ten years into the new democracy, taxonomies of who you are and 
who you were during the apartheid years continue to impact on the public 
discourse. Immediately following 1994 all race classification were abandoned, but 
then later re-introduced (Kahn 2004). Through various pieces of legislation 
Affirmative Action and Employment Equity sanction the classification of people 
according to their status as ‘previously disadvantaged people’ (PDP). There are 
also debates on who may consider him or herself an ‘African’ and recently 
Roberts (2006) has categorised South Africans according to their ‘native 
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intelligence’ (Robinson 2007:3).  But taxonomies are nothing new to South Africa. 
As Maluleke (2001:193) stated ‘apartheid was the great simplification of a rather 
complex society’. The ‘simple’ classification of your race determined where you 
could live, till how late you could be in which parts of town, the curriculum you 
were taught and the options you had after Matriculation (if you got so far). South 
African society will for many years to come be shaped by the specific taxonomies 
of victims and perpetrators as used by the TRC. 
 
The TRC not only institutionalised certain terms and concepts but also 
contributed to the emergence of taxonomies of transformation. Borer (2003) for 
example, speaks of ‘a taxonomy of victims and perpetrators’. But the taxonomies 
include not only categories of role-players in the apartheid years it also gives 
existence to categories of ‘being’ in the new South Africa.  Marx (2002:53) points 
to the fact that victims’ openness to forgive their perpetrators was proclaimed and 
perceived as ‘a self-evident product of their Ubuntu’.  He warns however, that 
‘within this process, the victims, because of their moral superiority, became 
representative of the “Nation”, and were consequently “anonymised” once again’. 
On the other hand, deficits ‘in the present order are thus ethnicised, and 
attributed to Western individualism by nearly all authors writing on Ubuntu’ (Marx 
2002:53). 
In her thorough exposition of the taxonomy of victims and perpetrators, 
Borer (2003) states that we often talk of/in these categories as if they are 
on the one hand homogenous and secondly, as if these categories are 
mutually exclusive.  She expresses her discomfort with the way these 
categories were used by the TRC (2003:1089) and states that ‘the reality 
on the ground is rather more complicated and much less clear, and that a 
fair amount of “muddying the waters” is warranted’90.  
 
 
Borer (2003:1092) reports that the terms ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ were ‘neither 
nuanced nor contextual’. This resulted in the ANC (for example) being identified 
as a ‘perpetrator’ in the final report. The report simply states ‘ the ANC and its 
organs… committed gross violations of human rights in the course of their 
                                            
90 For a detailed discussion on the taxonomies of victim and perpetrator see Borer (2003). 
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political activities and armed struggles, for which they are morally and politically 
accountable’ (TRC Final Report 5, 239 as quoted by Borer 2003:1093). The ANC 
disagreed and was angry that ‘the TRC was not properly distinguishing between 
the morality of the violence perpetrated by the state versus that perpetrated by 
those fighting against the state’ (Borer 2003:1093; italics mine)91.  
Borer (2003:1094) continues to show that not only did the ANC find their 
classification as ‘perpetrator’ offensive but Mbeki also rejected the term ‘victims’ 
to be used for those who died and suffered during the struggle. As quoted by 
Borer (2003:1094) Mbeki said ‘Our fighters were liberation heroes. Do not 
demean them by calling them victims’ (italics in the original). 
 
Borer (2003:1095) continues in a poignant way to show how this classification of 
‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ disrupted expectations. She describes how ‘perpetrators 
became heroes’ referring to those who fought against apartheid and were 
considered by the then government to be criminals; ‘heroes who became 
perpetrators’ describing the position of those in the security forces and police 
forces who fought against the struggle and were often hailed as heroes. In the 
eyes of the new dispensation they were now ‘perpetrators’, their deeds 
criminalised. Borer (2003:1096) furthermore shows that not only did the heroes 
change into criminals, but they were suddenly also blamed in public for killing not 
only terrorists and insurgents, but ‘heroes’, and ‘innocent civilians’92.  
 
Borer (2003:1096) continues by pointing to a further classification namely those 
‘perpetrators who were victims’ referring to the ‘phenomenon of innocent 
informers’. The TRC ‘became aware that one of the most destructive legacies of 
apartheid was the labelling of sometimes innocent people as “informers” or 
                                            
91 Though the ANC objected that the gross violations done in the name of the struggle differed 
from those committed by the apartheid regime, the TRC held that ‘Just war does not legitimate 
the perpetration of gross violations of human rights in pursuit of a just end’ (TRC Final Report 5, 
at 210 as quoted by Borer 2003:1094). As Marx (2002:58) pointed out, the struggle (and 
whatever violence it used) was somehow in obedience to God and therefore above reproach.  
 
92 Krog (1997:10) refers to this trauma of changing from heroes into villains to be overwhelming 
and numbing. 
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“collaborators”’. The TRC heard how these informers and often their families 
were ‘killed, assaulted, harassed and ostracised as a result of their 
stigmatisation’ (Borer 2003:1096-1097). Borer (2003:1097) also documents the 
fact that many “victims” did not come forward because they could not identify with 
being a ‘victim’ but considered themselves ‘heroes’93. 
 
In concluding her comprehensive overview of the taxonomy used by the TRC, 
Borer refers to the position of Mandani (referred to by Borer 2003:1112) who 
suggests a further category namely ‘beneficiaries’. This category includes all 
those who, while never engaging in direct perpetration, turned ‘a blind eye to a 
system which impoverished, oppressed and violated the lives and very existence 
of so many of their fellow citizens’ (quoted by Borer 2003:1112). While Mandani 
categorises the majority of whites under being ‘beneficiaries’, she also warns that 
because of ‘gross systemic outcomes like those of pass laws and forced 
removals, abuses which racialised both poverty and affluence’ should be taken 
seriously in any nation building strategy (Borer 2003:1113). Which brings us to 
the question do we need taxonomies for dealing with the past? Does it make the 
task of redressing the inequities of the past easier to be able to ‘identify’ the 
category of the person or his or her community? As Borer (2003:1115) says ‘Are 
there hierarchies of pain and responsibility? 
 
On the one hand we do need a vocabulary to deal with and confront the ‘banality 
of evil’ (Arendt 1994), in whatever category we would place ourselves. This will 
require more than just the need to ‘forge a vocabulary of peace and 
reconciliation’ as proposed by Gobodo-Madikizela (2002:20). South Africa needs 
                                            
93 It falls outside the scope of this study to discuss in detail Borer’s further classification of the 
categories of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ (2003:1101-1109). Suffice to indicate that she 
distinguishes further between direct and indirect perpetrators, individual and group perpetrators 
and ‘perpetrators by default’. This last category is described as those who failed to oppose the 
injustice around them (2003:1104). In trying to provide a nuanced interpretation of these 
categories of perpetrators and victims, Borer reports that the TRC tried to distinguish between 
‘degrees of accountability’ ranging from ‘bystander complicity’, ‘politically and morally 
accountable’, ‘guilty through apathy’ and ‘directly accountable’ (2003:1107). 
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vocabulary to describe the indescribable, the unmentionable, and the horror that 
lurks inside each one of us. Educational policy is an important vehicle in not only 
creating new taxonomies, but also critically evaluating past and current 
taxonomies, whether describing race, position during the struggle or religious 
denomination. 
 
4.4.3 Implications for the role of education post-TRC 
 
There is a real expectation that education should and could provide new 
possibilities and taxonomies that could contribute to preventing the atrocities of 
apartheid from happening again. These new taxonomies should also ‘contribute 
to citizenship and democracy education through more than formal education’ 
(Enslin 2003:80). As Enslin documents (2003:80) the South African Schools Act 
of 1996 confirmed the ‘participatory notion of citizenship’ by providing for 
democratic governance of schools, with representatives from learners and 
parents playing crucial roles.  
 
Before continuing our journey, let us just briefly recap our journey so far. The 
following Figure (Figure 4.5) illustrates what we have explored up to now and 
what lies in store for us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Locating ourselves in Chapter 4 
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I have, so far, attempted to identity some of the tectonic layers of the Policy.  
Among the tectonic layers of the Policy, I postulate that the TRC was a major 
event which shaped and still will continue to shape educational policy in years to 
come. The TRC was the first major public event to deal with South Africa’s past – 
not only what we remember, but how these memories shape our future.  
 
4.5 PREPARATION FOR THE FIRST CURRICULUM MOMENT – 
CLEANSING OF THE CURRICULUM 
 
In August 1994, following the first democratic elections in South Africa the 
Minister of Education, Sibusiso Bengu, undertook the first direct intervention to 
impact on education in a post-apartheid South Africa. A series of advertisements 
were placed in newspapers inviting public inputs on possible changes in the 
school curriculum. As Jansen (1999:57) states in his account of this intervention, 
the intention was to ‘purge the apartheid curriculum of its most offensive racial 
content and outdated, inadequate subject matter’. 
 
Henrard (2002:18) states that after the TRC, whatever its successes and failures, 
there was a strong agreement that everything possible should be done to create 
a society in which the ‘chance of occurrence of the kinds of gross violations of 
human rights that occurred in the past are reduced to the minimum’. Although 
there are many accounts of the processes that resulted in Curriculum 2005 and 
its Review (e.g. Chisholm 2005a; Jansen 2004), there are not many accounts of 
the events shaping the educational discourse in the period immediately following 
the first democratic elections. Jansen (1999:57) provides an insightful overview of 
the period stating that the syllabus alterations that followed ‘reflected, and 
deepened, a crisis within the state that had little to do with changing the school 
curriculum and much more to do with the politics of transition since South Africa’s 
first non-racial democratic elections in April 1994’. As Weiler (1990:16) puts it: 
The emphasis of many curriculum reforms on the symbolism of change 
and innovation and on legalisation, expertise, and participation reflects the 
concerns of decision-makers over the legitimacy of the decision process, 
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and is designed to contribute, in a compensatory fashion, to the 
restoration of that legitimacy. 
 
Weiler discusses the different influences of the work of Max Weber (1978), 
Jürgen Habermas (1975) and Offe (1976) on the state’s need (whether perceived 
or real) for legitimation (1990:16). 
In other words: the precariousness (real or perceived, latent or actual) of 
the state’s legitimacy is likely to lead the maker of policies to a decision 
mode which is determined not only by the overt objectives of the policy… , 
but also by the policy’s suitability as a means of restoring the state’s 
legitimacy more generally – independent of, or in addition to, any specific 
policy outcomes (Weiler 1990:17). 
 
The need for legitimation ‘should lead the analysis of policy to pay greater 
attention to the modalities (as distinct from the substance) of policies and to the 
nature of the policy process…’ (Weiler 1990:17). The need for legitimation as an 
important factor in the process and formulation of policies becomes even more 
important when the policies in question deal with curriculum reform. Weiler 
(1990:17) writes ‘In a very real sense, curricula…are the most tangible 
codification of the objectives a society wants to reach through its educational 
system, and of the skills and values it wishes to instil in future generations 
through its schools’.  
 
Weiler (1990:18) then quotes the work of Kirst and Walker (1971), ‘The 
determination of the public school curriculum is not just influenced by political 
events; it is a political process in important ways’. Weiler (1990:19-23) lists a 
number of elements, which are characteristic to ‘curriculum reform as 
compensatory legitimation’. These are  
• The invocation of legal norms: ‘statutorisation’ and ‘parliamentarisation’. 
Weiler (1990:21) states that ‘Where sensitive matters such as curricular 
objectives are concerned, the Court sees policy decisions as being in 
need of particularly high levels of legitimation – levels which require, at a 
minimum, the statutory authority of duly elected legislatures’. 
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• The utilisation of expertise: planning and evaluation. Weiler discusses the 
need for a ‘comprehensiveness and orderliness of the approach and the 
transparency and rationality of the process’ (Weiler 1990:22). 
• The discourse of participation. Where curricula were ‘developed and 
decreed by administrative authority and bureaucratic fiat’ in the past, 
participation by teachers, students and parents play a role alongside the 
‘intra-administrative or extra-administrative experts’ (Weiler 1990:22). 
Weiler (1990:22) writes, ‘It is this notion of ‘legitimation by procedure’ that 
opens the theoretical door to a variety of participatory arrangements in the 
making of curricular decisions’. 
 
Jansen (1990a) explores the applicability of ‘curriculum reform as compensatory 
legitimation’ in post-colonial states/ developing nations. Jansen (1990a:30) refers 
to a paper by Weiler and Gonzalez (1982) which found an additional (to the 
previously mentioned three aspects) instrument at work in educational reform as 
legitimation in the Philippines and in Tanzania, namely what they have called 
‘external legitimation’ referring to ‘policy strategies which mobilise certain 
participants in the international system in order to bolster the legitimacy of the 
state in a given society’ (as quoted by Jansen 1990a:30)94. 
 
Curriculum reform as compensatory legitimation as explored by Jansen (1990a) 
points to the possible paradox of the new state’s need for legitimation (with the 
blessing of an international community), but also between what Jansen 
(1990a:31) calls ‘socialist policy and social practice’. Here the new state is 
confronted with ‘inherited structural conditions, ethnic rivalry, international 
capitalism and regional conflict as conditions undermining socialist practice’ 
(Jansen 1990a:31-32). The paradox that arises from ‘unaltered material 
conditions’ and socialist ideals results in what Ake (1985, as referred to in Jansen 
                                            
94 In discussing curriculum reform in the context of post-colonial Zimbabwe, Jansen found the 
discourse of participation (as used by Weiler 1990) to take on a different format in Zimbabwe. 
‘Centralised curriculum planning in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, assumes that the new state is 
representative, a perception gained as a result of the successful revolutionary struggle…’ 
(1990a:31; italics in the original). 
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1990a:32) calls ‘defensive radicalism’95. In summarising his exploration of 
Zimbabwe curriculum reform as ‘compensatory legitimation’ Jansen (1990a:32) 
concludes that both ‘the notions of “external legitimation”; and “policy as 
defensive radicalism” are powerful constructs within third world settings’. 
 
In exploring South African school curriculum since apartheid, Jansen (1999a) 
confirms the notion that all curricula are ideologically laden and politically 
motivated (see also Petrina 2004). Jansen (1999:57) points furthermore to the 
symbolic values that change in school curriculum hold in ‘transition societies’.  
In this framework [of transition societies], curriculum reform is not primarily 
concerned with what it claims – learning objectives, content to be covered, 
teaching strategies, assessment procedures, and so forth – but with 
addressing political constraints, conflicts and compromises in and around 
the state (Jansen 1999:58). 
 
 
Education was very much part and parcel not only of apartheid policies and 
legislation, but also in the struggle against apartheid and the violence that 
erupted in service of the struggle and different oppositional forces, whether 
factional, ethnically related or a complex mixture of elements in the heady days of 
the struggle (Ntshoe 2002:62). Ntshoe (2002:62) states that the ‘numerous 
student protests in the 1970s and 1980s were followed by an alternative 
education system called “People’s Education for People’s Power” which 
generated debate and challenged the apartheid regime’. While apartheid used 
the education system to ‘indoctrinate and subordinate the African “natives” [into] 
servants of the colonial system’ (Ntshoe 2002:63), the forces opposing apartheid 
were using schools, teacher colleges and universities as localities of opposition 
and protest. 
During the 1970s and 80s education became the center of political 
struggle in South Africa when fierce and often violent anti-apartheid 
protests were held in school throughout South Africa. ‘Liberation before 
Education’ was the protest mantra that became the battle call throughout 
South Africa (Ntshoe 2002:64). 
                                            
95 For a full discussion on ‘defensive radicalism’ in the context of Zimbabwe education, see 
Jansen (1990). 
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While Ntshoe (2002:63) refers to the fact that apartheid created ‘a taxonomy of 
racial classifications’, I suspect that the struggle created its own taxonomies and 
epistemologies. Ntshoe (2002: 64) refers to the ‘culture of violence that arose in 
schools as part of the resistance movement carried over into the learning climate 
and the way schooling was viewed’. These taxonomies, epistemologies and 
‘culture of violence’ were not shelved after the democratic elections of 1994. 
These taxonomies and epistemologies influenced the debates immediately 
following 1994 as well as impacted on the processes, drafts and final Policy96. 
 
Jansen (1999:58) traces the call for public input into the school syllabus in an 
initiative that was already launched in 1992 with The National Education and 
Training Forum (NETF) and its sub-committee, the Curriculum Technical Sub-
Committee (CTSC). The CTSC chaired by Mary Metcalfe proposed ‘short-term 
syllabus revisions as one means for intervening in the education crisis’ (Jansen 
1999:59). This initiative ‘lasted into the post-election period’ and under the 
direction of the Minister proposed ‘essential changes to syllabuses as quickly as 
possible [which] should not make it necessary to introduce new textbooks’ 
(Jansen 1999:60 quoting the Daily News 4 August 1994). Jansen (1999:60–63) 
continues to explore the political reasons for this haste and its consequences. 
One of the consequences Jansen (1999:61) reports on is the role the ‘powerful 
lobby of the white education constituency … and through political parties [which 
will] press for the status quo as it affected all education matters, including 
curriculum.’ 
 
As would become characteristic of the public outcry around the Review of 
Curriculum 2005, the proposal to take out ‘The Creator Clause’ created uproar.  
The clause was referred to in the science syllabuses which declared as objective 
                                            
96 Taking into account the role education played in Apartheid as well as in the struggle against 
Apartheid, it comes as no surprise that Jansen (1999:58) refers to the fact that the state ‘was 
increasingly vulnerable in its most volatile sector, namely education, during the immediate post-
election period’. 
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(as quoted by Jansen 1999:62) – ‘that the child become aware of the majesty of 
creation through his [sic] acquaintance with the wonder and order of Creation … 
in this way develop a sense of awe and reverence of the Creator’. 
 
The removal of the clause was directly in opposition to the thrust of CNE prior to 
1994. Although the removal of the clause would not, according to Jansen 
(1999:62) have affected what was anyway taught in science classrooms, and 
was mainly ‘symbolic’, no consensus could be reached on the matter. The debate 
surrounding the removal of ‘The Creator Clause’ seems to point to the fact that 
what seems to be a (mere) ‘symbolic change’, represents for others (inter alia the 
Christian Right) a fundamental move away from the confessional curriculum as it 
was embodied in CNE.  
 
Jansen (1999:63) summarises the consequences of these superficial and 
circumvent changes to the syllabi by stating ‘The more serious consequences of 
the process are political in nature. The process procured short-term political 
legitimacy for a crippled Ministry without having to demonstrate the need for 
substantial change’. The process furthermore  
…set in place, and consolidated, a pattern of curriculum change which is 
context-blind, i.e. de-linked from the dynamics and complexities of school 
and classroom contexts, teacher development and support, systematic 
assessment reform, genuine grassroots participation and textbook 
development (Jansen 1999:64). 
 
Most disturbingly the ‘process has generated a public understanding that 
minimalist revisions to school subjects are both acceptable and workable’ 
(Jansen 1999:64). Almost in mitigation, Jansen (1999:64-65) explores several 
aspects that influenced this process. He mentions the fact that these changes 
were initiated within the context of ‘the constitutional and bureaucratic constraints 
of political transition under a Government of National Unity’; the vulnerable and 
weak leadership of the Ministry; the pressure of civic and political forces that 
resulted in these changes (or lack thereof), and lastly the fact that the revision 
process ‘was made possible by a weak political challenge from the educational 
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community on the educational terms of this project’ (Jansen 1999:65; italics in the 
original). At this stage, Jansen (1999:65) concludes that the ‘the proverbial 
“balance of forces” was firmly entrenched in favour of the apartheid curriculum 
and its settled bureaucrats’. 
 
4.6 THE FIRST CURRICULUM MOMENT – CURRICULUM 2005 
 
Soudien and Baxen (1997:449) sketch the daunting background of the process to 
formulate a new curriculum in 1997 as follows: 
During apartheid, education was used not only to achieve social 
separation but, insofar as it was built around a social philosophy, it was 
also the legitimating arena for White supremacy and for the complex 
system of racial and cultural ordering that evolved around it. Within the old 
order’s traditional educational institutions, the hidden and explicit curricula 
were configured to produce, reproduce, and validate racial separation and 
hierarchy. Presumptions of European superiority and African inferiority 
within this canon were commonplace – indeed, they were established as 
modern truths about human process and development. These truths 
provided the ideological foundation upon which apartheid education was 
built. 
 
The first ‘curriculum moment’ according to Jansen (2004:59) was immediately 
following the elections of 1994. The values guiding the curriculum post-1994 
were ‘non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equity and redress’ (Jansen 2004:59; 
italics in the original). He continues to state that these values  
…were not really put into operation in curriculum terms, for there was no 
curriculum. Instead there was a set of broad policy options that would 
guide decision-making once a new government took power. These values 
were, if anything, signals or symbols of change that were not at all 
contested for they floated free of the public school curriculum and were not 
translated into the kind of ‘content’ that would redefine the substance of 
teaching and learning in South African schools (2004:59). 
 
 
Jansen refers to the White Paper on Education and Training (1995:22) which 
required ‘…the active encouragement of mutual respect for our people’s diverse 
religious, cultural and language traditions, their right to enjoy and practice these 
in peace and without hindrance, and the recognition that these are a source of 
 240
strength for their own communities and the unity of the nation’. Greenstein 
observes (rightly so in the opinion of Jansen 2004:59) that ‘...the authors of the 
document chose not to enter this difficult and problematic area for fear of 
alienating one constituency or another and disrupting the cosy existence 
provided by the framework of “national unit”…’ (1997:132). 
 
Jansen (2004:59) defines the first curriculum moment as the introduction of 
Curriculum 2005 and Outcomes-based education (OBE).  The criticism against 
Curriculum 2005 had ‘very little to do with the content of the new curriculum and 
much more to do with its technical implementation and effects in the classroom’ 
(Jansen 2004:60). As Soudien and Baxen (1997:450) state ‘…those calling for a 
new national curriculum … sought to almost entirely re-imagine the architecture 
of the country’s learning apparatus at every level of its operation, from the formal 
to the most informal areas of education’. 
 
OBE as an appropriate ‘vehicle’ to achieve such a total re-imagination of the 
eduscape was heralded by local as well as international proponents of OBE. 
They claimed that OBE has the capacity to meet the needs of all students 
regardless of their race, their background, their culture, and prior experiences (or 
lack thereof) in education (Soudien & Baxen 1997:450). The historical roots of 
OBE have been well-explored and documented (e.g. Jansen 1997, 2004; 
Soudien & Baxen 1997)97.   
 
While Jansen (1997) very specifically criticises OBE’s chances of success due to 
mostly its hasty introduction without sufficient training and without seriously 
considering the state of teaching and schools in South Africa, other authors like 
Soudien and Baxen’s (1997:449) question not only who was ‘spearheading and 
                                            
97 For Jansen’s opinion regarding why he believes OBE will fail, see Jansen (1997). Jansen 
(1997) closes his critical analysis of OBE with the statement: 
Not a single official interviewed in the Department of National Education believed that 
OBE should be introduced so soon, yet they all work feverishly toward implementation at 
all costs in 1998. There is no other way of understanding such behaviour outside of a 
political analysis of state and curriculum in the South African transition. 
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managing the reform process and how’, but also ‘…what philosophical and 
pedagogical truths are being established in this process; what identity-producing 
mechanisms are at work; and what notions of a South African identity are being 
shaped as a result?’ 
 
Soudien and Baxen (1997:452) state that the processes resulting in the adoption 
of OBE as well as the curriculum framework and content, were not ‘entirely 
innocent’. This is not to suggest the existence of any conspiracy theories but to 
state the obvious that any curriculum process and framework flows from very 
specific political, cultural and socioeconomic hierarchies and structures and 
either replaces these with others, or perpetuates their existence (Prinsloo 2007). 
As Weiler (1990) and Jansen (1990a) indicate, the discourse of participation in 
the ‘curriculum as legitimation’ were formulated by the new government and 
included and excluded as the new regime saw fit. As stated by Soudien and 
Baxen (1997:453), ‘The strong hand of the formal bureaucracy in the crafting of 
educational reform and its content has been evident from the very beginning of 
the reform process. The entrenched South African educational bureaucracy not 
only facilitated the process, but also managed and conceptualised it’98. 
 
From the criticisms as expressed by Jansen (1990a, 1997) and others (like 
Soudien & Baxen,1997) it would seem as if Curriculum 2005 did not take 
seriously the ‘complex manifestations of difference and inequality and therefore 
of equality and equity’ (Soudien & Baxen 1997:457). It would seem as if in the 
aftermath of the ‘failed’ impact of the TRC to really deal with trauma and need for 
justice, Curriculum 2005 was a hasty attempt in nation-building.  
 
                                            
98 Soudien and Baxen (1997:453) furthermore refer to the role played by international forces like 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and international education experts 
proposing specific OBE models, like the Scottish model. Soudien and Baxen (1997:457) also 
express their concern about the role and impact of ‘longstanding, White-dominated “old-boy” or 
“old-girl” networks of the apartheid era’. This results in questions about the ownership of the 
reform process and the perception that the process was hijacked by ‘an elite group of experts 
funded by government authorities’ (Soudien & Baxen 1997:457). 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 I started this chapter with a quotation from Booth (1999:259): 
Forgetting and memory both seem vital to our common life, and it is equally 
possible that we may have too much of either. An excess of forgetting would 
turn us into leaves to be scattered by the winds, mere neighbours passing 
one another by in little more than a community of interests. Too much 
memory would be lead in our wings, denying us a future and closing off the 
possibility of openness to others who are not part of our community of 
memory. 
 
In exploring the new South Africa as a community of memory and forgetting, this 
chapter revealed some of the ‘tectonic layers of our lives [which] rest so tightly 
against earlier events in later ones, not as matter that has been fully formed and 
pushed aside, but absolutely present and alive’ (Booth 1999:260). The purpose 
for exploring these tectonic layers (some of which are still ‘present and alive’ was 
to understand, not to judge. In Chapter 8 I will attempt a critical evaluation of the 
Policy against the background of these tectonic layers. I will evaluate the Policy 
as a response to these layers and as a sedimentation of discourses of 
legitimation and in a sense as a monument to a specific vision of citizenship.  
 
Curriculum 2005 was an introduction to new possibilities, new taxonomies and 
new ontologies. Curriculum 2005 heralded the discourse on values in education 
which resulted in the Policy. In the chapter to follow, Chapter 5, we will explore 
the values movement and the processes, debates and discourses that resulted in 
the final Policy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 4 we started a socio-historical overview of different processes and 
watershed moments that resulted or impacted in one way or another on the 
processes, content and discourses surrounding the Policy. Chapter 4 also 
explored the archaeology of various ideologies from the perspective of ‘memory 
and forgetting’. In this chapter we will explore the apparent move away from 
memory and forgetting, to imagining a new South Africa based on the values 
embedded in the Constitution.  
 
In this chapter we will explore ‘conflicting notions of social membership’ 
(Ramphele 2001:6) in different events and processes that were aimed at arriving 
at a shared understanding of citizenship in the South African context. The 
‘tectonic layers’ explored in Chapter 4 still influenced these events and processes 
but the impetus shifted towards re-visioning citizenship. Examples in the 
international domain of countries re-envisioning notions of citizenship as 
societies-in-transition include the debates in Germany after the Holocaust and 
after unification (as explored in Chapter 1) as well as the debates in Eastern 
Europe before and after 1989 (Esbenshade 1995). 
 
Esbenshade (1995) describes various attempts of re-visioning democracy and 
citizenship in a context permeated by memories and ‘counter-memories’, 
‘counter-narratives’ and name-changes as new regimes tried to ‘lobotomise’ 
memory in Prague in 1989 (Esbenshade 1995:73-74). Eastern Europe in 1989 
witnessed ‘the seeming triumph of memory-as-resistance, the long struggle 
vindicated by official reburials; impromptu shrines; and the resuscitation of 
banned works, taboo issues, and blacklisted individuals’ (Esbenshade 1995:75). 
As ‘the state falsified history and manipulated collective memory’, individuals and 
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groups rejected ‘the state narrative’ (Esbenshade 1995:76-77). Esbenshade 
concludes, ‘Between starry-eyed idealism and the black future of the “tribal’” 
view, the region’s own dynamics and history will determine the patterns in the 
fabric of future memories’ (1995:89). 
 
In this chapter I will provide an overview of the processes and the discourses that 
resulted in and accompanied the processes surrounding the Policy. I will identify 
the different voices and claims of different stakeholders in this process against 
the background of constant tension between memory and forgetting, between the 
past and the future. I propose that the Policy should be understood against 
various legitimising processes of the newly elected government. To assist in our 
understanding of the Policy-as-response, I will locate the Policy within a 
framework of an analysis of the state as constitutional, cultural, transformational 
and symbolic. I will then continue to outline the process that resulted in the 
Policy. I will close this chapter by identifying some patterns and trends that may 
assist us in firstly understanding the Policy-as-compromise and secondly, 
providing a heuristic framework for a critical evaluation of the Policy in Chapter 8.  
 
5.2 LOCATING THE POLICY 
 
The background and processes resulting in the Policy have been well-
documented (e.g. Chidester 2003; Roux 2000; Walsh & Kaufmann 1999). Halevi 
(2002) analyses the transformation to a democratic state and refers to the 
possibility and reality that the new dispensation had to accommodate ‘competing 
narratives’. It would seem therefore necessary to analyse the Policy as a 
compromised response to competing narratives. The Constitution on the one 
hand celebrates diversity and encourages pride in culture and religion but also 
protects individuals and communities from coercion and discrimination. The 
Constitution (and the Policy) in more than one sense are ‘accommodating 
competing narratives’ (Halevi 2002). 
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The following has (so far) transpired as discourses or patterns surrounding the 
development of the Policy: 
• The competing narratives, the compromises and negotiated settlements 
preceding the 1994 elections as well as the acceptance of the 
Constitution. 
• The role education played in the previous dispensation as well as its 
envisaged role in realising the re-imagination of South Africa. 
• Educational reform as compensatory legitimation as described by Weiler 
(1990) and the “invocation of legal norms: ‘statutorisation’ and 
‘parliamentarisation’, ‘utilisation of expertise: planning an evaluation’ and  
the ‘discourse of participation’ (Weiler 1990:20-23) 
• Educational reform as symbolic process and action (Chisholm 2005a; 
Jansen 1999). 
 
Chidester (2006) locates the Policy within an exploration of three ‘gestalts’ of the 
state, namely the state as constitutional, cultural and transformational state. As 
the three “curriculum moments” proposed by Jansen (1990a) assisted us to 
navigate through the multiplicity of layers and developments pre- and post 1994, I 
will use these three characteristics of the state as proposed by Chidester (2006) 
as hermeneutical framework to locate the processes and development of the 
Policy. 
  
In his analysis of the processes and debates surrounding the formulation of the 
Policy, Chidester (2006) points to the fact that all of the discussions were based 
on interpretations of the new Constitution. Where debates in the past surrounding 
the relationship between religion and education mostly relied on the different 
confessional documents of the respective religions, now the debates claimed 
legitimacy on the basis of the Constitution (Chidester 2006:63). As Chidester 
(2006) and others (e.g. Sachs 1993) state, the Constitution was ‘the product of a 
negotiated revolution’ (Chidester 2006:63) and a document accommodating 
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competing narratives and claims (Halevi 2002). Chidester (2006:63-64) 
comments on three features of the Policy namely 
• ‘the role of religion in public education had to be clarified in terms of the 
provisions, but also in the light of the values, enshrined in the 
Constitution’; 
• the Constitution itself was explicitly founded on certain values. This 
tension between the commitment to a culture of human-rights and the 
commitment to promote and protect cultural rights has required the South 
African state to be both a constitutional and a cultural state; 
• ‘its engagement with the long, difficult, and contested process of 
transformation from apartheid oppression to [a] democratic dispensation’. 
 
Chidester (2006:64) locates the processes resulting in the Policy as well as its 
content in the discourses of ‘state-hood’ stating ‘Becoming a nation just when 
nations were supposedly going out of style, as national sovereignty was allegedly 
being swept away by global market forces, the new South Africa was faced with 
crucial dilemmas of nation building and social cohesion’99. He succinctly states 
(2006:64) that the Policy was much more than a ‘public-relations exercise in 
building a new nation as an imagined community’. The Policy should not only be 
understood as only about nation building but also ‘about state-making’. In order 
to understand the processes surrounding and resulting in the Policy it is 
important to locate the Policy against the broader discourses of the new 
democratic state as constitutional, cultural and transformational (Chidester 2006). 
After discussing these three locations as proposed by Chidester (2006), I will add 
and discuss a fourth state, namely the ‘symbolic’ state (following Jansen 2004). 
The following figure (Figure 5.1) illustrates this location of the Policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
99 For a discussion on the changing role and gestalts of nation-states see Chapter 1. 
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Figure 5.1: Locating the Policy 
 
 
5.2.1 The constitutional state 
 
The apartheid government since 1948 saw itself as a ‘Christian state’. A specific 
version of the Christian religion ‘was drawn into reinforcing racist legislation and 
segregation on the basis of racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious signs of 
difference’ (Chidester 2006:65). It is significant that in the processes and debates 
resulting in and surrounding the Policy, the Constitution and its interpretation by 
various stakeholders played a crucial role. Chidester (2006:68) writes that in ‘less 
than 10 years [of democracy], the provisions and protections of the new 
Constitution provided the framework for adjudicating religious interests within a 
secular state’ (Chidester 2006:68). Chidester (2006:70) also comments on the 
fact that ‘even those who rejected the policy accepted the Constitution’100.  
Chidester (2006:78) summarises that while  
the supremacy of the Constitution, as the rule of law, became established 
in South Africa within a remarkably short period of time, the cultural and 
transformational politics of the country have persisted in exposing the 
tensions between the many and the one, between the old and the new, in 
an emerging nation.  
 
                                            
100 The Policy has (up to now) not been challenged in the Constitutional Court. 
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As I will explore later in this chapter, both supporters of and opponents to the 
Policy called on the Constitution for their support. The Constitution and its 
embedded values were used as interpretive framework for various strategies and 
processes of the new government to re-imagine citizenship. As explored in 
Chapter 1, the Constitution and its values and principles is also the foundation for 
the shaping of a unique South African constitutional patriotism. 
 
5.2.1 The cultural state 
 
The crux of the competing narratives in a post-apartheid society is to be found in 
the national motto !KeE.IXarra (Unity in Diversity).  There is on the one hand a 
commitment to promote a profound appreciation for diversity and different forms 
of being South African, and on the other hand there are distinct strategies and 
interventions to promote a ‘one-ness’. 
 
Chidester (2006:70-774) points to the role the ‘cultural state’ played in the 
processes leading up to the Policy as well as in the content of the Policy. 
‘Essentially, the policy was a cultural project about culture, seeking to create an 
attitude of informed respect for the many religious cultures of South Africa’ 
(Chidester 2006:71). Chidester refers to many instances where the South African 
government ‘intervened directly in the arena of culture, and a human-rights 
culture – while seeking to draw support from people of all the many cultures in 
the country’ (2006:71)101. Exploring the cultural character of the Policy, Chidester 
(2006:71) discusses for example the unique differences between affording equity 
on the national broadcaster and the equity afforded to different religions in the 
Policy. He refers to the fact that equity in the broadcasting domain implied that 70 
percent of religious broadcasting was to be Christian. While the Policy allowed 
equal access by all religious affiliations after school hours, the official curriculum 
treated all religions as equal. Chidester (2006:72) refers to several of the state’s 
cultural initiatives leveraging concepts such as ubuntu, the ‘rainbow nation’ and 
                                            
101 For a discussion of these instances, see Chidester (2006). 
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the ’African Renaissance’, as well as revisiting  public holidays, commissioning 
new monuments, emblems, and a variety of other visual and symbolic 
elements102.  
 
The new cultural state also allowed for a resurgence of ethnic and cultural pride 
and claims of entitlement (see Wilmsen & McAllister 1996), as well as strategies 
to contribute to feelings of ‘oneness’, where individual and group differences do 
not matter. I will return to the issue of public holidays, emblems, name changes, 
and so forth under discussion of the ‘symbolic state’. 
 
5.2.3 The transformational state 
 
The new Constitution had also mandated a politics and poetics of 
transformation – a politics based on the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights and a poetics of memory and imagination, remembering 
the inequities of the past, redressing them in the present, and ensuring 
that they would never happen in the future (Chidester 2006:74) 
 
According to Chidester (2006), the state’s commitment to deal with the past and 
to protect and structure a society based on human-rights, characterises the state 
as a ‘transformational state’. Chidester (2006:74) refers to a statement made by 
Constitutional Court Justice Kate O’ Regan that the Constitution ‘…compels 
transformation. The Constitution recognizes that for its vision to be attained, the 
deep patterns of inequality that scar our society, and that are the legacies of 
apartheid and colonialism, need to be addressed urgently’.  
 
Among the initiatives that Chidester (2006) describes are the ‘Moral summit’ in 
1998, the Values in Education initiative (2000), the Moral Regeneration 
Movement (MRM) launched in April 2002 as well as Freedom Park. Chidester 
(2006:75-76) refers to Freedom Park in religious terms – as a ‘sacred site’, a 
‘ritualised bridge from the cultural nationalism of the old regime to the cultural 
                                            
102 The different strategies of the newly elected government resemble the critical discussion of 
Esbenshade (1995) of the cultural domain in new states as the battleground for memory and 
forgetting, for new identities and lobotomising unwanted memories.  
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nationalism of the new government’, ‘a heritage site for pilgrimage’, and a site for 
‘purification rituals’. Chidester (2006:76) locates the processes of the Policy 
within the broader context of the ‘transformational state’ and its attempts to 
celebrate and nurture a distinct sanctioned religiosity103.  
 
5.2.4 The symbolic state 
 
In an essay on the changes in educational policy, Jansen (2000:86) asks for a 
theoretical understanding of ‘policy as political symbolism’. He continues ‘Every 
single case of education policy-making demonstrates, in different ways, the 
preoccupation of the state with settling policy struggles in the political domain 
rather than in the realm of practice’ (Jansen 2000:94). Policy changes often not 
really intend to change practice, but to represent ‘a search for legitimacy’ (Jansen 
2000:98). The symbolic changes that take place when regimes are replaced 
often augment attempts of the new regime to institutionalise victory by changing 
the symbols and myths of the previous regime by creating new symbols, new 
myths and new and often different public processes of legitimisation. 
Esbenshade (1995:72) quotes James Young who said ‘Memory is never shaped 
in a vacuum; the motives of memory are never pure’. 
 
The transformational state (Weiler 1990) must also claim symbolic spaces, 
replacing old myths with new ones and often creates totally new ones. The issue 
at stake is not ‘truth’ but function104. In his exposition of the role of memory in 
East-Central Europe before and after 1989 Esbenshade (1995) quotes Milan 
Kundera who cites the five different names of the same street in Prague, before 
1989: ‘They just kept changing its name, trying to lobotomise it’ (1995:74). 
Kundera is also quoted (Esbenshade 1995:74) as having said ‘… and the names 
                                            
103 We will return to this ‘distinct sanctioned religiosity’ during the evaluation of the Policy in 
Chapter 8. 
104 The recent debates surrounding the proposed name change of Pretoria to Tshwane illustrate 
the emphasis on ‘function’, rather than the historical veracity of the existence of a chief named 
Tshwane (News24a, News 24b 2007). The same could be said of the myths surrounding the Day 
of the Vow (see Liebenberg (1988) and Ehlers (2003). 
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of the people who rose up against their own youth are carefully erased from the 
nation’s memory, like a mistake from a homework assignment’. These symbolic 
changes and ‘lobotomisation’ is a determined counter-narrative to the narratives 
that were accepted before the regime change. But these changes as counter-
narratives also result in ‘memory-as-resistance’ (Esbenshade 1995:75). 
This is the crux of the memory problem in the postwar East-Central 
European context. The state falsified history and manipulated collective 
memory. But the response of individuals, rejection of the state narrative 
and assertion of an untainted, “primal,” and collectively remembered past, 
falters when confronted with personal memory, which is alternately 
unreliable and all too reliable in dredging up a highly compromised past 
(Esbenshade 1995:76-77).  
 
 
Those who claim to be ‘in the business of remembering’ in opposing name 
changes and other initiatives, will do well to acknowledge how myths were 
created in the service of white Afrikaner nationalism. I refer specifically to the 
myths surrounding the events of 16 December 1838. As Liebenberg (1988), 
Ehlers (2003) and others have postulated, the Battle of Blood River/Ncome and 
the Day of the Vow were surrounded by carefully created myths. The victory was 
retold as a result of Divine intervention and also symbolised the triumph of 
Christianity over heathendom. The victory furthermore illustrated that the 
Afrikaner had been selected by God as his chosen.  Liebenberg states that ‘All 
[of these] are myths [which] have the common purpose of supporting Afrikaner 
nationalism’ and the further deduced claim that ‘God desires white supremacy in 
South Africa’ (Liebenberg 1988:17). Ehlers (2003) states that the Battle of Blood 
River/Ncome ‘was an important element in the master narrative of the Afrikaners 
as God’s holy chosen people with a mission to Christianise and civilise a barbaric 
country given to them by God’. 
 
It is important to note that the factual historical occurrence of the day was never 
contested or questioned. It reminds of the quote by Esbenshade (1995:72) who 
quotes James Young who said ‘Memory is never shaped in a vacuum; the 
motives of memory are never pure’. As Liebenberg (1988) and Ehlers (2003) 
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indicate, the creation and sustaining of myths surrounding the day clearly 
illustrates these myths as being in service of Afrikaner nationalism. Interestingly, 
Ehlers (2003) states ‘By 1994 the hold that these myths and the accompanying 
master narrative had had on Afrikaner historical consciousness seemed largely 
broken, leaving a vacuum in Afrikaner historical thinking’. I agree with Ehlers 
(2003) that the hold of the ‘master narrative’ may be broken for the Afrikaner, but 
there seems to be a resurgence and growth in ‘memory as resistance’ 
(Esbenshade 1995). 
 
In 1994 the Day of the Covenant was changed to the Day of Reconciliation. It 
was a major attempt of the newly elected government on the one hand to try to 
erase divisive elements from the calendar and focus on nation building and it was 
also a deliberate attempt to consciously address the ‘master narrative’ of the 
Afrikaner105. Contra to the envisaged outcome of the new gestalt of the 16th 
December, Ehlers (2003) indicates that it would seem as if the Day of the 
Reconciliation ‘…has taken on a new meaning appearing in a guise quite 
unintended by those who initiated the project: that of a symbol of or rallying point 
for protest against developments in the New South Africa which they dislike or 
reject’. 
 
The day has become a ‘symbol of resistance and the commemoration of an act 
of defiance’ (Ehlers 2003).  The debates surrounding the Day of Reconciliation, 
the right to mother-tongue education as well as the resurgence of ‘protest songs’ 
in Afrikaans, indicate that ‘memory-as-resistance’ and nostalgia are elements of 
‘counter-memory’ and reaction to a state endorsed ‘lobotomisation’ (Esbenshade 
1995)106. The resurgence of ‘memory-as-resistance’ especially among the 
                                            
105 For an interesting and often chilling account of the formulation and impact of this ‘master 
narrative’ see Ehlers (2003).  
106 For a discussion on the function of ‘memory-as-resistance’ in Afrikaans culture, see 
Groenewald (2007) and Steyn (2007). Memory, counter-memory and various acts of 
lobotomisation played and still play significant roles during the documentation of South African 
history.   
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Afrikaner may also resurrect and sustain the master narrative of defiant white 
supremacy. Suffice for the purposes of this study just to refer to what Wilmsen 
calls ‘the dialectic nature of ethnicity’ (Wilmsen 1996:5) in which a group’s self-
definition as ‘politics of marginality’ forms ‘the basis for mobilisation and collective 
assertion’. Pieterse (1996:31) quotes Brass who says ‘The choice of the leading 
symbol of differentiation depends upon the interests of the elite group that takes 
up the ethnic cause’. In response to the government’s concerted efforts to create 
and establish symbols of national unity and reconciliation, the celebration of 
specificity in a group’s culture and self-perception becomes rallying points for 
resistance (Norval 1996:68). Sharp states that these rallying points often entail a 
claim to ‘absolute primordial continuity with the ‘precolonial past’ (Sharp 
1996:91)107. Within the broader discourse and praxis of nation building, the 
‘resurrection’ and use of struggle songs like ‘umshini wami’ (Naki 2007:3); the 
slaughtering of a black bull in the beginning of summer in a festival called 
Ukweshwama (Oliphant 2006:2); the slaughtering of an animal by Tony Yengeni 
after his release from prison (Matshiqi 2007:14); the re-institution of virginity rites 
(Terreblanche 2006:2; Makhanya 2007:2), or ‘official reburials; impromptu 
shrines; and the resuscitation of banned works, taboo issues, and blacklisted 
individuals’ (Esbenshade 1995:75), are all part of the symbolic legitimisation of 
the state, and memory-as-resistance’. 
 
Pedagogy and curriculum are also part of the broader legitimation discourse and 
praxis. According to Bernstein (1996), pedagogy is permeated with symbolic 
control and the shaping of identities. Pedagogy ‘translates’ ‘official knowledge’ in 
the classrooms (Bernstein 1996:39). Weiler (1990) would concur as he referred 
to curricular reform as compensatory legitimation and Jansen (1999) referred to 
the often symbolic changes in curricula that signify a change of values and 
direction.  
 
                                            
107 For a discussion of the function of the ‘primordial’ in claims and counter-claims, see Sharp 
1996.  
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The first education reform post-1994 was therefore the ‘cleansing’ of the 
curriculum. Commentators agree that these changes were cosmetic and did not 
really address issues like race and gender and that the intervention was mainly 
symbolic. Chidester (2006) suggests that the state entered the cultural domain by 
imagining a particular version of South African or African identity, necessitating 
the state’s symbolic entity as discussed by Jansen (2004). It is as symbolic state 
that the Policy signifies a major departure from the previous dispensation.  
 
Preceding the debates surrounding a new dispensation for religion and 
education, there were several symbolic gestures that the new state not only 
respected the diverse religions but regarded them as equal. The opening of 
Codesa (Sachs 1993) as well as the inauguration of Pres Nelson Mandela as the 
first President of a democratic South Africa, gave South Africans a taste of what 
is to come. Not only was the stage shared by representatives of the major 
religions in South Africa, equal opportunity was given to them to pray or perform 
a ceremony. These ceremonies also introduced the majority of white South 
Africans to the role and function of praise-singers. 
 
5.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESSES RESULTING IN THE POLICY 
 
In providing this chronological overview of the debates and processes resulting in 
the Policy, it is not my intention to provide an account of every nuance of each 
debate and process as well as the input of every stakeholder. This falls outside 
the scope and intention of this study. This overview has a specific purpose to 
enrich our understanding towards a critical evaluation, culminating in Chapter 8.  
The sources available in providing this overview range from articles in scholarly 
journals, articles in the public press, correspondence between various 
stakeholders (public and private) as well as conversations with some 
stakeholders involved in the process.  
 
 
 255
5.3.1 The processes preceding 1994 
 
Religion has always been part of life on the southern tip of Africa (as explored in 
Chapter 4) and the Policy is but the latest gestalt of the role of religion in the 
public sphere in South Africa. For the purposes of tracing the roots of the Policy 
to the processes accompanying the transition to democracy, I propose to take 
1992 as the starting point108. Also in 1992, Religion in public education: Policy 
options for a new South Africa, (Omar, Chidester, Mitchell, & Phiri 1992) was 
published109. 
 
In preparation for the democratic transition, the National Education Policy 
Initiative (NEPI) explored alternatives to the system of religious education as 
endorsed by the apartheid regime. NEPI had consensus that the previous 
dispensation had to change and three options were considered. 
• Option 1: Eliminating religion entirely from the school curriculum. ‘NEPI 
concluded that neglecting such a principal feature of South African life 
would not do justice to the importance of religious diversity in the nation’s 
history and society’ (Chidester 2006:66). 
• Option 2: Establishing parallel programs in religious instruction, developed 
by the different groups themselves. This option was also not considered to 
be viable as it would entrench a kind of ‘religious apartheid’ and students 
would be required ‘to study a single-tradition religious education program 
devoted to particular religious interests’ (Chidester 2006:66). 
• Option 3: Introducing a program of multi-religion education that would 
teach students about religion ‘rather than engaging in the teaching, 
                                            
108 In 1992 the Technical Sub-committee of the National Education and Training Forum, chaired 
by Mary Metcalfe proposed the removal of the ‘creator clause’ (see Chapter 4).  
109 It is acknowledged that both NEPI and the publication by Omar et al. (1992) flowed from 
processes not covered in this study. The publication by Omar et al. was published as Chidester, 
D., Mitchell, G., Phiri, I.A. & Omar, A.R. 1994. Religion in public education: Options for a new 
South Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press.  
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confession, propagation, or promotion of religion’ (Chidester 2006:66; 
italics in the original)110. 
 
Another piece of evidence that could shed light on the thinking in this period is a 
lecture by Albie Sachs (1993) at a workshop hosted by the Institute for 
Comparative Religion in South Africa (ICRSA) in November 1992. The purpose 
of the workshop was to facilitate discussion around the future education and 
religion policy debates. Sachs (1993:170) traces the question on how to cope 
with the religious diversity in a democratic dispensation by reflecting on the 
arrangements for Codesa regarding the opening of these events with prayers 
from different denominations and religious affiliations. Deciding on how to open 
the event was shaped by the organisers’ intention to ‘find something that would 
bring out the variety that exists in South Africa in a way that was natural and 
comfortable and would make everyone feel at home’ (Sachs 1993:170). At the 
first Codesa, the arrangement was made for a variety of prayers from a number 
of faiths. This arrangement produced ‘extreme discomfort’ for some (Sachs 
1993:170). For the second Codesa, it was decided to open the proceedings with 
prayers from Jewish and Christian representatives, and close the proceedings 
with prayers from Hindu, Muslim and Christian faiths. This also was found not to 
be acceptable for some (Sachs 1992:170). In reflecting on these arrangements 
as well as the reactions surrounding it, Sachs relates that it was their objective to 
‘create a context of comfort, but not at the price of discomfort for some’ 
(1993:170).  
 
Sachs (1993:171) indicates that a strict separation between religious and public 
life would have resulted in severe discomfort, because religion ‘bound us 
together and gave us a sense of strength and comfort’. In choosing between the 
different options of a theocratic state where religion and state overlap, or a strictly 
secular state where these two domains are separated, Sachs (1993:171) opted 
                                            
110 A compromise between Options 2 and 3 was considered at that stage (Chidester 2006).  
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for a third possibility where state and religion are recognised as separate 
spheres, but with ‘a considerable degree of cooperation and interaction between 
the two’ (1993:171).  
 
Interestingly, Sachs’ motivation for choosing the third cooperative model provides 
insight in the later formulation of the rationale for the Policy. Sachs (1993:171) 
states that the majority of South Africans belong to one or other faith.  
It is not something that one wants to deny or lament. It is an important part 
of our reality. If an appropriate relationship can be established, it can be a 
source of tremendous upliftment for the whole of society, and a means of 
helping us to establish the maximum input for tackling and resolving the 
considerable problems facing our country (Sachs 1993:171). 
 
 
Sachs (1993:171) also mentions a fourth possibility where the state would 
actually suppress, or try to deny or eliminate religious organisations. This, 
according to Sachs (1993:171) would have been ‘unthinkable’111.  Of these four 
options, Sachs (1993:171-172) maintains that a cooperative model would be the 
best taking into account the specific South African context. He continues to 
explore the challenges inherent in a cooperative model, like the danger that 
religious bodies might feel that in cooperating with the state they are actually 
being co-opted. He also explores the dilemma of criticising the state in such a 
cooperative model (Sachs 1993:172).  
 
With regard to religious education, Sachs (1993:173-174) admits that though the 
right to education is a basic right, religious education is ‘a tricky area’ (Sachs 
1993:174). He suggested leaving a decision regarding the format of the role of 
religion in schools to a collective. 
 
                                            
111 The sensitivity shared by Albie Sachs (1993) in evaluating different options, is in stark contrast 
to what has been portrayed by the Apartheid regime in respect of the ANC as ‘atheist’, ‘Satanistic’ 
and the ‘anti-Christ’. As the processes around the Policy unfolded, these allegations kept making 
a comeback in the public debates regardless of a vast body of evidence that would contradict 
such allegations.   
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This is something new to South Africa. We are not used to trusting people 
with making decisions about their own lives and entering into real 
dialogue. We are much more used to secret committees, sitting in the 
background somewhere, working out what they think is best and then 
selling it, either clandestinely, not even trying to promote what they are 
doing, or just doing it, in a covert way, or else using all the mechanism of 
the modern state, all the forms of bribery and inducement, to try to impose 
a certain kind of policy. That is very wrong (Sachs 1993:174). 
 
In conclusion Sachs (1993:174) suggests two principles to be followed in working 
out the practicalities of the role of religion in education and public life, namely that 
the process should be democratic and participatory, and that ‘we should think in 
terms of phases and transition’. In the light of the second principle, Sachs states 
that the transition to a democratic dispensation is ‘very disruptive for many 
people’ and that religion is for many people an anchor and giving ‘people a sense 
of comfort in the midst of transformation and disruption’ (1993:174).  
It might be that changes in the role of religion in public education will be 
experienced by many people as [a] little destablising. However, provided 
that there is honest debate within the ranks of the communities, rather 
than policies imposed from outside by the state or government 
departments. I think the process of change will be less destabilising, than 
important (Sachs 1993:174). 
 
 
Sachs (1993:174) petitions for a ‘programme for religion in public education [that] 
can be worked out that will provide essential comfort’112.   
 
In 1997 Krüger (1997) submitted an article to the Challenge magazine on Models 
of religious education. In the article, Krüger (1997) refers to the formation of the 
Independent Forum for Religion in Public Education in October 1993. The group 
consisted of ‘about thirty representatives form various churches and various 
departments of Religious Studies and Biblical Studies at universities and 
teachers training colleges in various provinces’ (Krüger 1997:1). The purpose of 
the group was to discuss ‘the future of religious education in South African 
schools’ as well as ‘to promote the formation and implementation of a new Policy’ 
                                            
112 In the same edition of ‘South African Outlook’ (1992:175-178) there is an overview of the 
ICRSA report on ‘Policy options for a new South Africa’. 
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(Krüger 1997:1)113. Krüger (1997:1-3) describes points of departure which 
acknowledge religion as a ‘given’ in South African society; the power of religion 
‘to motivate and inspire people, and to provide vision and hope’; religion as part 
of the identity and security of individuals and groups of people; the multi-religious 
nature of South Africa. The location of the responsibility for religious nurturing lies 
with parents, while it would be unfair to expect of parents to provide information 
regarding religions different from their own. Though there is an undisputed need 
for ‘technical education’, a number of African countries have included the study of 
religion as part of the official curriculum; in ‘well-rounded holistic education’ the 
study of religion is justified; officialising the study of religion will protect religion 
‘against misinformation, misrepresentation and denigration in all schools’; and the 
necessity to ‘deploy professionally trained, capable and well-respected teachers’ 
to implement the curriculum.  
 
The article contemplates four possible models (Krüger 1997:3): 
A The secular model, completely banning education in religion from public 
schools. 
B The mono-religious model, adopting one religion as the official or unofficial 
state religion and reflecting that in the educational system. 
C The particularistic model, differentiating education in religion to the extent 
that learners will have access to the study of one (their own) religion only. 
It differs from (B) in that a plurality of religions is accommodated in the 
school system as a whole, but that any learner will study only one of them. 
D The integrated-pluralistic model, offering one subject, in which a learner 
will be educated in major religions in South African society114. 
 
The article (Krüger 1997:5) concludes that the solution ‘at this juncture in our 
national history lies in a combination of (C) and (D). The article then proposes a 
model where education in religion ‘should comprise two disciplines: “Religious 
Education”, and “Studies in Religion”’ According to Krüger, (1997:5) 
 
                                            
113 The article (Krüger 1997) does not indicate whether the content of the article, published in 
1997, reflects the proposals of the Independent Forum for Religion in Public Education or whether 
the article is the reflection of the author on and since the discussions during the meeting of the 
Forum.  
114 For a discussion of these different models, see Krüger (1997).  
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RELIGIOUS EDUCATION should be generally formative in character (with 
strong emphasis on factual information, and the nurturing of pupils by the 
way of developing appropriate attitudes and values).  STUDIES IN 
RELIGION should provide the specialised hermeneutical, historical, 
comparative and critical intellectual and interpersonal skills necessary for 
a wide range of careers in the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors: for example social workers, health workers, peace workers, 
teachers and other educators, clergy and community leaders would all 
benefit from having done the subject (capitals in the original). 
 
Krüger (1997:5-6) further defines the parameters of these proposals for Religious 
Education and Studies in Religion.  
(a)  Religious Education should be introduced as an examinable 
subject, offered in all school years. 
(b) The content and method of this subject should: 
(i) Give pupils the opportunity to examine their own religion in 
an educational (non-proselytising, non-catechetical way) 
(ii) Lead pupils to an awareness of the religious beliefs and 
traditions of fellow-pupils and fellow-South Africans 
(iii) As far as possible, be relevant to the life-experiences of the 
pupils, and enable them to relate values to life-issues. 
 (c) The current ‘conscience clause’ will apply. 
 
Studies in Religion, is described by Krüger (1997:6) as follows: 
(a) Studies in Religion should be introduced as an optional, externally-
examinable academic discipline at secondary level. 
(b) This discipline may include the following academic possibilities: 
 (i) Religious Studies 
 (ii) Studies in African religions 
 (iii) Biblical (or Christian) Studies 
 (iv) Islamic Studies 
 (v) Jewish Studies 
 
Krüger (1997:6) closes his article by petitioning for ‘space’ to be created for 
religion in education. ‘Can our society afford not to have it? I believe not!’ 
 
5.3.2 Processes post-1994: the Bengu Committee 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, 1994 also saw the call for the ‘cleansing’ of the 
curriculum. In 1996 the National Education Policy Act was published as well as 
the South African Schools Act (No. 84 of 1996). In 1997 Curriculum 2005 
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(Grades 1-9) was published for comments as well as Outcomes-based education 
(OBE) launched. In August 1998, the Minister of Education, Sibusiso Bengu 
appointed a Ministerial Committee ‘to look into the diverse ideas, approaches and 
outcry from religious communities. Especially Christians who wanted to retain the 
previously Christian evangelical approach in most of the mono-religious public 
schools’ (Roux 2000). As Stonier (1999) reports, the resulting deadlock 
originated from not reaching agreement on whether such an education program 
should be educating learners to be religious or educating learners about religion 
and religions (Chidester 2006:67). Stonier (1999) suggests furthermore that the 
deadlock can also be ascribed to the fact that the majority of the commission 
consisted of ‘committed Christians’. Steyn (1999:67) reports that the result of this 
impasse was a decision that local schools choose from ‘a menu of options: 
teaching learners to be religious, teaching learners about religions, or a 
combination of both’. 115 
 
In January 1999, a Report of the Ministerial Committee on Religious Education 
was published. The Committee consisted of  
• Rev Elijah Mahlangu 
• Imam A Rashied Omar 
• Ms Janet Stonier 
• Ms Joey van Niekerk 
• Mr Paul Faller (Chairperson) 
 
The Report (1999:10) states that the confusion and controversies surrounding 
the issue can be attributed to two ways of understanding religious education, 
namely 
• educating learners to be religious; and 
• educating learners about religion and religions. 
 
                                            
115 When a new Minister of Education, Prof Kader Asmal took over in 2000, he did not include 
members of the Bengu-committee in his newly constituted advisory committee. This exclusion 
continued to haunt the debates surrounding the Policy.  
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The Report (1999) discusses the rationale for the inclusion of religion in 
Curriculum 2005; discusses several international trends; explores the 
implications of the inclusion of religion into the curriculum against applicable 
legislation and states ‘Directive principles for religious education policy’ (1999: 
27-45) as well as explore the role the study of religions can play in learners 
attaining a number of critical outcomes (1999:46-49).  
 
Discussions regarding the Report (1999) continued amongst different 
stakeholders and lobbies. For example, in a letter dated 9 March 1999, a group 
of Departments of Religious Studies at East Rand College of Education, the 
Johannesburg College of Education, Unisa, University of the North as well as the 
University of Pretoria was submitted to the office of the Minister (correspondence 
addressed to Mr R.D. van Rensburg (Krüger 1999).  This submission’s main 
concern was that the Report ‘is not based on a strong, consistent 
theoretical/religio-philosophical foundation, with the result that the proposal 
makes the impression of a mere juxtaposition of two possibilities … instead of 
real co-ordination and integration of the two’ (Krüger 1999:3). The submission 
also makes it clear that the Report’s critique against a pluralistic model is ‘based 
on an embarrassing lack of knowledge/understanding of what this model is about’ 
(Krüger 1999:4).  
 
5.3.3 Minister Asmal: a new draft Policy and values-education  
 
A new Minister of Education, Prof Kader Asmal was appointed in 2000 and in a 
letter to Prof Lubbe (Department of Religious Studies, Unisa) early in 2000 
indicates his willingness to meet with Prof Lubbe and his colleagues on 13 March 
2000 (Asmal 2000)116. On 6 May 2000 a Ministerial workshop on Religion in 
Public Education was held in Pretoria. As a result, a Working Document (2000) 
was formulated which proposed a model of religious education as ‘education 
                                            
116 The outcome of that meeting is not known but could provide insight in the early direction 
Asmal would give to the shaping of the processes surrounding the Policy.  
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about religion, refraining from a specific religious purpose, but led by general 
educational interests’ (2000:2). It further proposed that religious observances 
should be treated ‘as not being part of public school’s activities’ (2000:2). The 
Working Document (2000) further aimed at resolving the tension between the 
different options for religious education and with regard to the ‘conscience clause’ 
stated ‘If religion education is offered professionally in a fair and religiously 
unaligned manner, the need to invoke the conscience clause will be redundant. 
However, it remains available as a mechanism to allow withdrawal from such 
education’ (Working document 2000:37). 
 
In February 2000 Minister Asmal requested the formation of a working group on 
values in education. The formation of such a working group was foreseen to be ‘a 
starting point in what ought to become a national debate on appropriate values 
South Africa ought to embrace in its primary and secondary educational 
institutions’ (Department of Education, 2000). In July 2000 the Draft Religion in 
Education Policy was circulated and made available for public comment117. The 
Report of the Working Group on Values in Education (9 May 2000) formed the 
basis of a meeting of more than 400 people in Kirstenbosch, 22-24 February 
2001 at a ‘Saamtrek: Values, education and democracy in the 21st century’. A 
glossy and comprehensive report and proceedings was published afterwards 
(Department of Education, 2001a). One of the outputs of the ‘Saamtrek’ was the 
Manifesto on values, education and democracy (Department of Education, 
2001b).  
 
Jansen (2004) describes the Report (Department of Education 2000) that arose 
from a Working Group on Values in Education as the second ‘curriculum 
moment’. According to Jansen (2004) the most vociferous opposition to this 
                                            
117 It is important to note that there were therefore two processes running concurrently. On the 
one hand the Draft Policy was circulated in the public domain and on the other hand there were 
the processes and debates surrounding the ‘values-movement.’  In this latter movement, debates 
regarding the introduction of the study of religion in schools focused on religion as vehicle for 
moral regeneration. The Draft Policy also influenced and shaped the proposals regarding the 
study of religions as proposed by the different ‘value’ documents which followed.  
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document came from ‘progressive academics’ like Nazir Carrim and Margaret 
Tshoane (2000). These authors questioned the ‘uncritical acceptance’ and ‘blind 
following’ required in service of ‘loyalty’ to the new dispensation. They critiqued 
the discourse on morality as being ‘antithetical to democracy’, and alleged that it 
‘significantly undermines the development and consolidation of a culture based 
on human rights’ (2000:5). 
 
From these comments of Carrim and Tshoane (2000) and Jansen (2004:61) it 
would seem as if the Report of the working group on values in education 
(Department of Education, 2000) brought to the fore possible conflict between  
patriotic behaviour (as described in the document) and the duty to be 
critical, the social and economic conditions that undermine such values as 
access to education, the corrupt behaviour of prominent public servants, 
the potential divisiveness of the oath of allegiance in schools with legal 
(and illegal) immigrants, and the complexity of implementing values in the 
shadow of apartheid (Jansen 2004:61). 
 
The conflict between building a new democracy and initiatives to shape a new 
patriotism but also shaping a critical citizenry prepared the ground for multiple 
players, lobbies and stakeholders to partake in the ‘discourse of participation’ 
(Weiler 1990). In his analysis of curriculum as compensatory legitimation, Weiler 
(1990:22) highlights the ‘discourse of participation’ where ‘integrated planning 
and decision processes’…play an important role alongside intra-administrative or 
extra-administrative experts. It is this notion of ‘legitimation by procedure’ that 
opens the theoretical door to a variety of participatory arrangements in the 
making of curricular decisions. 
 
This initiative by Minister Asmal, illustrates not only Weiler’s ‘discourse of 
participation’ but also the different processes and artefacts giving gestalt to the 
legitimation of the new democracy. The Report of the working group on values in 
education (Department of Education 2000) was 
published and distributed widely, and the Minister of Education called for 
public response. The responses received took four specific forms. Firstly, 
there were published critiques and commentary in the media and in 
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academic and educational journals; secondly, individual members of the 
public and organisations responded directly to the Minister; and thirdly, 
extensive school-based research was conducted on behalf of the 
Department of Education. In the last instance, responses were submitted 
by way of the papers and inputs presented at the Saamtrek Conference 
(Department of Education 2001a:8). 
 
There are some overlaps and differences between these three artefacts, namely 
the Report of the Working Group on Values in Education, the Saamtrek 
document as well as the Manifesto on values, education and democracy.  The 
following table (Table 5.1) provides a cursory comparative overview of the three 
documents. 
 
Table 5.1: Overview of the three documents addressing values, education 
and democracy 
 
Report of the 
working group on 
values in education 
 
 
9 May 2000 
SAAMTREK: Values, education 
and democracy in the 21st 
century 
 
22-24 February 2001 
Manifesto on values, education 
and democracy 
 
 
July 2001 
Identifies six core 
values, namely  
1. Equity 
2. Tolerance 
3. Multilingualism 
4. Openness 
5. Accountability 
6. Social honour 
Although the Saamtrek took as 
point of departure the six values 
as identified by the Working 
group, it identified ten values in 
the Constitution to be the focus: 
1. Democracy 
2. Social Justice and Equity 
3. Equality 
4. Non-racism and Non-sexism 
5. Ubuntu (Human Dignity) 
6. Openness 
7. Accountability (Responsibility)
8. The Rule of Law 
9. Respect 
10.  Reconciliation 
 
 
It adopted the ten values as 
identified by the Saamtrek, namely 
1. Democracy 
2. Social Justice and Equity 
3. Equality 
4. Non-racism and Non-sexism 
5. Ubuntu (Human Dignity) 
6. Openness 
7. Accountability (Responsibility) 
8. The Rule of Law 
9. Respect 
10.  Reconciliation 
 
Nine 
recommendations: 
1. The adoption of a 
social contract 
between 
Sixteen recommendations: 
1. Outreach on SABC TV and 
Radio to publicise the values. 
2. Provincial units to be set up to 
deal with racism and values. 
The Manifesto accepted the 
sixteen strategies as proposed by 
the Saamtrek for implementation. 
The Manifesto did not have any 
‘recommendations’ of its own. 
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educators, 
administrators, 
parents, trade 
unions and 
professional 
associations to 
give gestalt to the 
above values. 
2. Pre-service and 
in-service training 
of teachers in 
educational 
inequalities and 
the need for 
equity, an African 
language and the 
performing arts. 
3. The reintroduction 
of history in the 
school curriculum 
through 
consultation with 
historians, 
archaeologists 
and human 
biologists. 
4. The introduction 
of a school based 
artist-in-residence 
and the 
strengthening of 
the performing 
arts programmes 
in schools 
5. Tougher policies 
against 
illegitimate and 
harmful 
discrimination in 
schools. 
6. Introduction of 
schools-based 
debating 
societies. 
7. Introduction of a 
national grid of 
3. Higher education institutions 
to get involved with 
performing arts outreach and 
to have artists-in-residence to 
service nearby schools. 
4. A national endowment for the 
arts to fund talented 
individuals in schools. 
5. The establishment of a 
national writing centre with 
prizes and projects. 
6. In-service and pre-service 
educator training to address 
training on values. 
7. A more deliberate pursuit of 
affirmative action to improve 
equity of access. 
8. The recruitment of teachers to 
ensure diversity in schools. 
9. A national action plan for the 
introduction of African 
languages into the schools, 
universities and adult 
education. 
10. Civics education as part of 
the new curriculum. 
11. A national conference for 
historians and history 
teachers to plan a strategy 
for teaching History and for 
the discipline. 
12. Ongoing upgrading of history 
teachers and special 
bursaries to attract students 
to study History. 
13. A national conference on HIV 
AIDS, values and sexuality 
education. 
14. Publication of the report on 
religion education. 
15. The dissemination of the 
proceedings of this 
conference to participants. 
16. The production of a revised 
document on values that 
would become the policy of 
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adult learning 
opportunities. 
8. The promotion of 
social honour and 
the embrace of 
national symbols. 
9. Research on the 
nature and scale 
of the diversity of 
learners and 
educators. 
 
the Department of 
Education. 
 
 
 
 Sixteen strategies are 
proposed: 
1. Nurturing a culture of 
communication and 
participation in schools. 
2. Role-modelling: promoting 
commitment as well as 
competence among 
educators. 
3. Ensuring that every South 
African is able to read, write, 
count and think. 
4. Infusing the classroom with 
the culture of human rights. 
5. Making arts and culture part 
of the curriculum. 
6. Putting History back into the 
curriculum. 
7. Introducing religion education 
into schools. 
8. Making multilingualism 
happen. 
9. Using sport to shape social 
bonds and nurture nation 
building at schools. 
10. Ensuring equal access to 
education. 
11. Promoting anti-racism in 
schools. 
12. Freeing the potential of girls 
as well as boys. 
13. Dealing with HIV/AIDS and 
nurturing a culture of sexual 
and social responsibility. 
Sixteen strategies are proposed:
1. Nurturing a culture of 
communication and 
participation in schools. 
2. Role-modelling: promoting 
commitment as well as 
competence among educators. 
3. Ensuring that every South 
African is able to read, write, 
count and think. 
4. Ensuring equal access to 
education. [order change was 
10 in Saamtrek list] 
5. Infusing the classroom with the 
culture of human rights. 
6. Making arts and culture part of 
the curriculum. 
7. Putting History back into the 
curriculum. 
8. Introducing religion education 
into schools. 
9. Making multilingualism happen. 
10. Using sport to shape social 
bonds and nurture nation 
building at schools. 
11. Promoting anti-racism in 
schools. 
12. Freeing the potential of girls as 
well as boys. 
13. Dealing with HIV/AIDS and 
nurturing a culture of sexual 
and social responsibility. 
14. Making schools safe to learn 
and teach in and ensuring the 
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14. Making schools safe to learn 
and teach in and ensuring the 
rule of law. 
15. Ethics and the environment. 
16. Nurturing the new patriotism, 
or affirming our common 
citizenship. 
rule of law. 
15. Ethics and the environment. 
16. Nurturing the new  
      patriotism, or affirming  
      our common citizenship. 
 
 
The most obvious differences noticeable in these three artefacts focusing on the 
nature and role of values in shaping a new democracy are as follows: 
 
1. Where the Report of the Working Group on values in education (Department 
of Education 2000) identified and worked with six values, the Saamtrek as 
well as the Manifesto identified a list of ten values. It is interesting, and may 
be significant that ‘equity’, ‘tolerance’, ‘multilingualism’ and ‘social honour’ 
were left out of the ten values identified by the Saamtrek and the Manifesto. 
These five values were replaced or expanded by ‘democracy’, ‘social justice 
and equity’, ‘equality’, ‘non-racism and non-sexism’ and ‘Ubuntu’ (Human 
Dignity).  
2. Professor Asmal promised the ‘speedy publication of the Department’s policy 
on religion education’ (Department of Education 2001a; italics mine). From 
the same document however there is ample evidence that the issue of 
religion education ‘remained thorny and unresolved’. 
 
There are various sources clarifying the delay in the publication of the promised 
Policy. It seems as if Minister Asmal firstly did not expect the delay of the 
publication of the Policy. From the Saamtrek (Department of Education, 2001a) 
report it is however clear that even during the Saamtrek concerns were 
expressed that would have warned that the issue would prove more contentious 
than at least Minister Asmal expected.  
 
The report on the Saamtrek points to certain key trends or patterns that emerged 
during discussions at the conference. The four dilemmas included  
1. Prescription vs. Dialogue: How do we root values in schools?  
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2. Frameworks vs. Mindsets: Can we change material conditions before we 
change consciousness, and vice versa?  
3. ‘Human Rights’ vs. ‘Law and Order’: Is there another way?  
4. Educating for the Market-place vs. Educating for Citizenship: Can we do 
both? 
 
The Saamtrek report refers to ‘religion’ 26 times (including the Table of contents 
and headings).  It is in the context of the second ‘framing dilemma’ that ‘religion’ 
is making its first appearance. During the discussion of ‘Religion Education vs. 
Religious Education’,  
Father Albert Nolan explained the relationship between ‘values’ and 
‘morals’ by referring to the writer Lawrence Kohlberg, who defined the 
levels and stages of moral development in the typical person. The first 
level of morality is about obeying laws to avoid punishment and gain 
reward. The second level of morality is about doing one’s duty out of a 
sense of conscience and group identity, and the third and final level of 
morality is about ‘a conscious choice of values based upon one’s 
consciousness of who one is and what life is about. Values have been 
internalised and a sense of duty has been replaced by a sense of personal 
responsibility’. While ‘a government must of course make laws and impose 
them in order to protect the rest of society from those with asocial and 
criminal tendencies, this is not how you educate people in the 
spontaneous adoption of moral values. This requires a change of 
consciousness – something which education can do’ (Department of 
Education 2001a:12).  
 
If I understand Father Nolan’s suggestion correctly it would seem as if he claims 
that real change in the values people cherish takes place only if you ‘educate 
people in the spontaneous adoption of moral values. This requires a change of 
consciousness – something which education can do’ (Department of Education 
2001a:12). The inclusion of Religion Education in the school curriculum is 
proposed to assist in doing this. In the discussion of the Conference theme, 
Rooting the new patriotism in the Constitution,  
Professor Ndebele also spoke of the need for ‘symbolic actions’ that would 
‘capture our unity as a people’, and Professor Asmal said, in his opening 
remarks, that although he was not a ‘flag-waver’ himself, he was 
impressed by the way that, in those ex-model C schools where flags were 
flown, there was a ‘sense of identification of the children when you talk to 
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them’. Nonetheless, there was a feeling, from delegates, that extreme 
caution had to be exercised in using schools as the blunt implement for 
nationalism – or, as had traditionally happened in South African schools, 
for religion. Sunday Independent Editor John Battersby felt it would be ‘too 
dogmatic and too centralised a prescription that schools have to start on 
Monday mornings with singing the Anthem or reciting the vow’ 
(Department of Education 2001a:23; italics mine)118.  
  
 
Edward Said refers to religion in his Keynote address on ‘The confluence of 
civilisations: the book, critical performance, and the future of education’. Said 
refers to religion as one element in the ‘vast communicative structure’ which the 
act of reading a book relies on. Said does not judge on the merit of ‘religion’ as 
an element in this ‘communicative structure’ but rather refers to ‘religion’ as in the 
same ‘category’ as ‘decoration', ‘love-making’ and other human activities. 
The act of reading, which used to be a complex social and epistemological 
discipline based not only on knowledge of both a classical and vernacular 
language, but on the science of philology, seems slowly to be losing 
its considerable existential density, its enormously rich web of association 
as an activity with such cultural processes such as education, ethics and 
religion. We tend to forget how the culture of book reading in nearly every 
civilization known to our planet once entailed a vast communicative 
structure of other human activities, from prayer, to love-making, to school 
instruction, to decoration, and silent meditation (Department of Education 
2001a:91). 
 
In a second reference to ‘religion’ Said refers to the role the Book (referring to the 
Old Testament) plays in different struggles about interpretation: 
The point to be made is that in all three religions the book is at the heart of 
the struggle over whether it will emerge as a regressive fundamentalism or 
as enhanced freedom, ‘the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life’. This is the 
choice posed for the reader who has the alternative of either being a 
Spinoza, a Kierkegaard, a Nietzsche on the one hand, or an inquisitor, a 
commissar, a sultan or a judge on the other. No one here needs reminding 
about canonical texts such as the Old Testament or the writings of the 
founding fathers can either issue forth in wholesale oppression or in the 
struggle for justice. Collective passions derived from uncritically 
memorised texts are the bane of human life and whether they flow directly 
                                            
118 This discussion seems to have warned against ‘using’ schools and the study of religion in the 
service of nationalism.  
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into political dogma or into simplified versions of the past, they have 
atrocious results, which it must be every teacher’s obligation, to combat 
with the weapons of criticism (Department of Education 2001a:92). 
 
Said refers here to the ‘use’ of religion to ‘issue forth in wholesale oppression or 
in the struggle for justice’. He explicitly locates it within the responsibilities of the 
teacher to ‘combat with the weapons of criticism’ the use of the ‘uncritically 
memorised texts’ in its use in political dogma or in ‘simplified versions of the 
past’, each of which ‘has atrocious results’.  
 
We find the only other reference to ‘religion’ outside the specific theme dealing 
with Religion Education, in the Keynote address by Njabulo Ndebele of the  
University of Cape Town, ‘The Social Bases of Values for South Africa: 
Prospects and Challenges’. Njabulo Ndebele explores the notion of what binds 
South Africans in their diversity and distinguishes them from other nationalities. 
I would then pose the question: if fifty thousand South Africans of various 
races, classes, ethnic groups, and religions were airlifted into New York, 
right now, what is it, once they have settled, that would make them 
gravitate towards one another? What is it that would distinguish them from 
other nationalities in such a way that their distinctiveness becomes a basis 
on which they might become economically or culturally useful to New 
York? Would the answer to this question matter if they were airlifted in one 
major operation, or if they were carefully brought to New York through a 
simulation of a migratory process over a determined period of time? Would 
they be bringing something with them, or would they evolve new forms of 
social practice, remembering mainly their geographical origins instead of 
compelling memories of the texture of organised social life? (Department 
of Education 2001a:100). 
 
 
In essence he is asking whether our classification as ‘South African’ is anything 
more but a shared origin in a specific geographical location, or whether we share 
‘compelling memories of the texture of organised social life’. If I understand him 
correctly, he seems to postulate whether there exists something shared by us all 
that somehow binds us together despite our diversity regarding ‘classes, ethnic 
groups and religions’.  
 
 272
In the panel discussion on ‘Religion, Diversity and Democracy’ the possibility was 
discussed that the study of religion in schools could actually encourage tolerance 
and ‘promoting diversity rather than entrenching chauvinism, exclusivism and 
discrimination’ (Department of Education 2001a:30). Manila Soni-Amin of the 
University of the Western Cape  
… saw in religion education the best possibilities for the promotion of 
pluralism and diversity within the classroom. She cited the American 
theologian [sic] Ninian Smart: ‘In a plural society, the need for a cultural 
contract is very vital. Moreover, to imagine that religious education should 
be biblical is presumptuous and insensitive ... But the new South Africa 
has a marvelous opportunity to reform education and to promote a plural 
society. Pluralism and openness are the heart of academic life’. Within the 
African context, the need to teach and learn about traditional indigenous 
religions was a key dimension of this (Department of Education 2001a:30). 
 
 
The three issues reported on are therefore 
• The parameters and content of Religion Education 
• How will it relate and embody the Constitution of South Africa? 
• How can it contribute to the promotion of pluralism and diversity? 
What is significant about the report on the panel discussion, is the fact that more 
than a quarter of the section is allocated to the fact that the issue ‘remained 
thorny and unresolved’ (Department of Education 2001a:30).The concerns 
reported on were 
• whether teachers would be able to maintain distance from their own 
personal convictions, and to present religion in a multicultural, multifaith 
context;  
• whether the values arising from the religions could be taught in such a way 
that they could be relevant to people who did not have religious faith; 
• the danger, too, of sanitising religion and making it purely a matter of 
intellectual knowledge or morals or ethics, without any spiritual content. 
  (Department of Education 2001a:30). 
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From the above exploration of the public discourse at the Saamtrek it seems as if 
there was agreement that certain values needed to be promoted in school 
curricula. There also seems to be consensus on which values were to be 
covered, and to a large extent consensus on how they should be introduced and 
covered and by whom. It is obvious from the Saamtrek report that the different 
constituencies and lobbies were still a far way off from having consensus on the 
inclusion of Religion Education as part of an overall strategy to define the values 
South Africans will stand for and be known for. 
 
The Manifesto’s proposal for the introduction of Religion Education in schools 
deals with the following issues: 
• The South African context 
• The role of religion in society  
• The relation between faith, culture and religion  
• The difference between Religion Education and Religious Instruction 
and Observances 
• The different responsibilities of the Constitution, the schools and the 
home 
• The approach to Religion Education and its envisaged impact 
• The need for training of educators and school governing bodies 
 
The South African context 
Referring to the context of the proposed introduction of Religion Education in 
schools, the Manifesto states, ‘South Africa is recognised as being a deeply 
religious society, and religions offer highly organised and often very effective 
moral codes upon which value systems are based’ (Department of Education 
2001b: 32). Two reasons why religions seem to be an effective vehicle for 
promoting values are the fact that religions are ‘highly organised’ and ‘often very 
effective moral codes’ (Department of Education 2001b: 32). 
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The role of religion in society  
Religions being ‘highly organised’ seem to refer to the fact that the major world 
religions are well-documented with enough doctrinal artefacts and rituals to make 
them accessible to teachers and learners. Religions are also ‘often very effective 
moral codes’ and the diversity of religions ‘impel(s) and inspire(s) society, and the 
morality and values that underpin them’. Religions are furthermore ‘resources for 
clarifying morals, ethics, and regard for others’ and religions ‘embody values of 
justice and mercy, love and care, commitment, compassion and co-operation. 
They chart profound ways of being human in relation to other humans’ 
(Department of Education 2001b: 32). 
 
The above indicates that the Manifesto presents a very positive and sanitized 
view of the role religions play and can play in society. There is no mention of the 
fact that religions also often ‘flow directly into political dogma or into simplified 
versions of the past,[where] they have atrocious results’ (Edward Said as quoted 
in Department of Education 2001a:92)119. 
 
The relation between faith, culture and religion 
‘Faith, whatever its core might be, and however public its expression, is the 
consequence of spiritual journeying that is, at heart, a voyage of intimacy. 
Religion, which expresses it, is a matter of choice in conscience’ (Department of 
Education 2001b:31-32). The Manifesto clarifies ‘faith’ as being the result of a 
spiritual and intimate journey expressed by a conscience choice of a ‘religion’ 
that embodies this journey. While religions function as ‘resources for clarifying 
morals, ethics, and regard for others’, cultural systems ‘transmit’ values. 
 
                                            
119 Although it is true that religions ‘embody values of justice and mercy, love and care, 
commitment, compassion and co-operation’ the contrary can also be claimed that religions are 
divisive, partisan in conflicts and sustaining inequality in the world. This duality in the ‘reputation’ 
of religion does not prevent it from being used as vehicle for moral regeneration. To the contrary. 
It supports the inclusion of religion in the school curriculum. The sanitisation of the study of 
religion and its implications will be a critical element or criterion in the evaluation of the Policy in 
Chapter 8.    
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From these statements it would seem as if the Manifesto sees religion as an 
integral part of broader ‘cultural systems’, which then functions as the space in 
which faith finds a specific expression. 
 
• The difference between Religion Education and Religious Education and 
Observances 
In explaining the difference between Religion Education and Religious Education, 
the Manifesto refers to the Saamtrek where Albert Nolan of Challenge ‘argued 
that while religious education was about ‘nurturing a religious consciousness’, 
and ‘should be done in churches’, the aim of ‘religion education’ was to provide 
knowledge about different religions (Department of Education 2001b:32). A 
further difference is that Religion Education falls within the specific domain of 
schools while Religious Education falls within the scope of responsibility of 
parents and the ‘home’. 
If religious education, with specific spiritual aims, is the responsibility of the 
home, family and the community of faith, then religion education, with 
clear educational aims, is the responsibility of the school. ‘Religion 
education’ is not engaged in the promotion of a religion but is a 
programme for studying religion, in all its many forms, as an important 
dimension of human experience and a significant subject field in the 
school curriculum (Department of Education 2001b:32). 
 
 
The Manifesto furthermore demarcates the scope for ‘religious observances’ at 
schools and during school hours as follows: 
According to the Constitution, schools may be made available for religious 
observance so long as it is outside of school hours, association is free and 
voluntary rather than mandatory, and the facilities are made available on 
an equitable basis to all who apply. School governing bodies need to be 
familiarised with these conditions (Department of Education 2001b:33; 
italics mine). 
 
Where weekly assemblies in the past had a specific Christian character, the 
Manifesto states 
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Weekly assemblies are a long-standing tradition of many of our schools, 
and play an important role in bonding and unifying the school community. 
Nevertheless, they should not be compulsory and should, under no 
circumstances, be used as occasions for religious observance 
(Department of Education 2001b:33). 
 
The different responsibilities of the Constitution, the schools and the home 
I have already pointed out that the Manifesto foresees different domains of 
responsibilities for schools and parents. These responsibilities give expression to 
the Constitution, which protects the individual’s right to choice as well as 
protection from coercion. The Manifesto expresses the role of the Constitution as 
follows: 
And, under the Constitution, that choice – and the observances that go 
with it - is subject to protection as one of the freedoms guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights. There is no place in the classroom, then, for an education 
that promotes any one creed or belief over any other. Yet, there is every 
reason for schools to expose learners to the diversity of religions that 
impel and inspire society, and the morality and values that underpin them. 
As has been noted, the Constitution guarantees the right to equality, to 
non-discrimination on the basis of religion, and to freedom of belief, 
thought and conscience. Schools can reinforce the Constitution by using 
‘religion education’ to reaffirm the values of diversity, tolerance, respect, 
justice, compassion and commitment in young South Africans 
(Department of Education 2001b:32). 
 
What is interesting in referring to the role of the Constitution and the rights, 
privileges and responsibilities it offers, are the two values ‘compassion and 
commitment in young South Africans’. The value of ‘commitment’ can still be 
seen to relate to either the values of ‘accountability’ or the value of ‘social honour’ 
that the Report of the Working Group (Department of Education 2000) referred 
to. The only time that the value of ‘compassion’ is referred to, is within the context 
of the values integral to ‘religion’ – ‘Religions embody values of justice and 
mercy, love and care, commitment, compassion and co-operation’ (Department 
of Education 2001b:32).  
 
In this specific section of the Manifesto discussing the introduction of Religion 
Education in schools, this reference to ‘compassion and commitment’ is 
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furthermore qualified as what is expected of “young South Africans”. Though 
‘Nurturing the new patriotism, or affirming our common citizenship’ is a specific 
strategy in the Manifesto, here it would seem as if the introduction of Religion 
Education in schools and the fact that religions embody certain values, that the 
introduction of Religion Education in schools will directly contribute to ‘new 
patriotism’.   
 
The approach to Religion Education and its envisaged impact 
There are six references to the content and approach of Religion Education 
within this section of the Manifesto. 
Adopting a multi-tradition approach to the study of religion is one way of 
achieving this [referring to the values as embodied in the Constitution], 
enabling students to examine, critically and creatively, the moral codes 
embedded in all religions, their own and others' (Department of Education 
2001b:32). 
 
This seems to indicate that the introduction of Religion Education in schools is 
directly related to ‘strengthening’ the values as embodied in the Constitution. 
Religion Education in school curricula stands therefore in the service of a specific 
description of citizenship and nationhood. 
 
A second comment resulting from the above quotation is that Religion Education 
in school curricula will specifically be a ‘multi-tradition’ approach. This excludes 
therefore explicitly single-faith or secular approaches. Religion Education is 
furthermore ‘not engaged in the promotion of a religion but is a programme for 
studying religion, in all its many forms, as an important dimension of human 
experience and a significant subject field in the school curriculum’ (Department of 
Education 2001b:32; italics mine). This statement, although explicitly stating that 
Religion Education will not promote a specific religion, what it implicitly states is 
that it will promote religion as phenomenon as ‘an important dimension of human 
experience and a significant subject field in the school curriculum’ and increase a 
‘consciousness about the role and effect of religion’.  
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The scope of Religion Education in school curricula will take on a specific format 
and scope within the further education and training band for matriculation 
purposes ‘as an optional, specialised and examinable subject’. The scope of 
Religion Education as an educational approach to the study of religions, also 
impacts all religious materials when used in assembly. This educational scope 
and function of the diversity of religions should also transform ‘assemblies from 
being occasions for imposing religious uniformity to being forums where diversity 
is celebrated, along with the values of our Constitution’ (Department of Education 
2001b:33). 
 
The need for training of educators and school governing bodies 
Lastly, the Manifesto clearly stipulates the need for training for educators and 
school governing bodies to be able to realise the educational goals of Religion 
Education. The Manifesto states 
Religion education’ should be taught by trained professional educators, 
rather than by professional clergy, who must be motivated by educational 
outcomes. …  Because ‘religion education’ should be taught according to 
educational rather than religious outcomes, educators – particularly those 
in Life Orientation and Social Studies – will require significant retraining. 
(Department of Education 2001b: 33; italics mine). 
 
This training and retraining also applies to school governing bodies (SGBs) which 
according to the Manifesto needs to be ‘familiarised’ and ‘empowered’ with the 
scope and parameters of Religion Education and the guidelines for religious 
instruction and observances (Department of Education 2001b:33). It would 
therefore seem as if the Manifesto and the Review of Curriculum 2005 were part 
of a broader strategy ensuring that the values as embodied in the Constitution 
are being addressed in school curricula and practice.  
 
5.3.4 The Review of Curriculum 2005 
 
The second element of this ‘second curriculum moment’ was the Review of 
Curriculum 2005. The Review of Curriculum 2005, the Saamtrek and the 
 279
Manifesto are all examples of a ‘discourse of participation’ (Weiler 1990) in which 
different stakeholder groups and lobbies would participate in a ‘multiplicity of 
dynamics, lobbies, and interests impacting on and shaping the curriculum’ 
(Chisholm 2005b:195). In her analysis of the Review of Curriculum 2005, 
Chisholm uses the concept of ‘lobby and/or interest groups’ as an heuristic 
device ‘to examine those social forces that impacted on the curriculum’ 
(Chisholm 2005b:195).  
 
The parameters for the Review of Curriculum 2005 were set by Minister Asmal 
and the National Department of Education (DoE). The brief‘s foci were ‘to simplify 
the complexity of the curriculum and ensure a stronger human-rights content 
within the existing outcomes-based framework’ (Chisholm 2005b:196).The review 
process entailed the establishment of eight working groups for each learning area 
as well as three cross-cutting groups dealing with human rights and inclusivity, 
qualifications and implementation. Chisholm (2005b:196) writes ‘Working groups 
developed drafts, tested them informally, and revised them. The revised drafts 
were made available for public comment, which was gathered, analysed, and 
used for further decision’. 
 
During these processes ‘distinct lobbies with defined approaches to curriculum’ 
claimed not only the right to be heard, but also the right to have the curriculum 
shaped according to their specific interests. ‘The most powerful [of these lobbies] 
included a vocational lobby, an environmental lobby, a history lobby, and a 
religious lobby’ (Chisholm 2005b:197). It falls outside the parameters of this study 
to discuss in detail the role and interests of each of these lobbies. Suffice to show 
how these lobbies linked to bigger and sometimes international discourses. For 
example, the ‘vocational lobby’ emphasised the need ‘to position South Africa as 
a leading player technologically on the African continent’ and South Africa’s 
position as a ‘modern’ economy (Chisholm 2005b:198). This lobby had the 
support of Cabinet, which saw the curriculum as tantamount in its adoption of a 
 280
‘development path that challenged South Africa’s modernisation through 
integration into a global world on the basis of markets and advanced technology’. 
 
The history lobby encountered resistance on two fronts, namely on the specific 
inclusion of history as part of the official curriculum, and then secondly, the 
content of such a history curriculum. Resistance came mainly from two fronts, 
namely an educational constructivist group and the Christian Right (Chisholm 
2005b:199). Claims against the proposed content included statements that the 
curriculum resembled a ‘Marxist agenda …[of]… indoctrination, guilt manipulation 
and propaganda’ (as quoted by Chisholm 2005b:200). 
 
In her analysis of the ‘history lobby’ Chisholm makes the succinct point by 
referring to the role teachers, material developers and textbook writers will play in 
allowing the curriculum to develop as envisaged. She states: 
The official history is one that aims at permitting the unofficial, the hidden, 
to become visible. Much, however, depends upon the materials 
developers, the textbook writers, the teacher trainers, and teachers’ own 
understandings brought to bear on these issues. History is present not 
only in the writing of the official curriculum, but also in its interpretation and 
enactment (Chisholm 2005b:201; italics my own). 
 
 
Chisholm’s remarks are valid also for the Policy and its envisaged impact. Should 
materials developers, textbook writers, the teacher trainers and the teachers 
themselves not embody the original intentions of the Policy on Religion in 
Education the envisaged impact will be hampered. I will return to this point when 
analysing the Policy (Chapter 6). 
 
The ‘conservative Christian lobby’ (Chisholm 2005b:202) campaign was ‘squarely 
focused on the aims and values that the curriculum consciously promoted’. I will 
deal with their arguments in discussing the processes leading to the Policy in the 
next section (5.3.5), but suffice to point to the common elements in their position 
namely their animosity towards what they labelled the ‘exposure of white and 
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Christian children to “pagan” faiths and cultural practices’ (Chisholm 2005b:203). 
This lobby was ‘the loudest and the most visible’ in their condemnation of the 
Draft Revised National Curriculum Statement but the revised curriculum was, in 
the end, ‘…shaped by a multiplicity of new, diffuse social forces, voices, and 
educational philosophies, much less visible and loud than the evangelical 
Christians, but also far more powerful in the new South Africa’ (Chisholm 
2005b:204).   
 
Chisholm summarises this curriculum as ‘an historical product of its time, 
representing a particular selection dependent on the multiplicity of players 
involved in its construction’ (2005b:205). As Jansen indicates (2004:62) the 
Review Committee was very clear about the partiality of the curriculum: 
Curricular content is by its very nature never neutral. It is always 
connected to a social project. This does not mean that its specification 
should be avoided, however. What it means is that we should be as clear 
as possible about the social project to be supported. This report is 
predicated on a curriculum based on the values of social justice, equity 
and development; one that seeks to foster the values of human rights, 
anti-racism and anti-sexism, relevance, critical thinking and problem 
solving. It is to a curriculum content for these values that we now turn 
(2000:48). 
 
In discussing the furore that erupted about the NCS, Jansen states ‘“most of the 
contentions lie within the Social Sciences and the Life Orientation learning areas’ 
(2004:62). Jansen continues then to state that the ‘sustained and intense 
onslaught by Christians against the curriculum makes it an historic document’ 
(2004:63). 
 
Jansen (2004:66) then summarises the development as follows: ‘This movement 
from the political accommodation of diverse values to the political assertion of 
preferred values in education and society created the most intense public 
challenge to state education since the introduction of Bantu Education (and its 
ethnic variants) in the 1950s’. Jansen continues to analyse the reaction to signify 
that the political radicalism during the struggle years ‘do not mean that a post-
 282
colonial curriculum can be installed on the grounds of radical social values’ 
(2004:66). He postulates further that the conservative Christian core ‘remained 
undisturbed despite the years of liberation struggle’; that  
conservative Christian communities that remained relatively dormant 
throughout the years of political struggle could be mobilised into action 
when official values like those concretised in curriculum statements – were 
perceived to fly in the face of dominant social values 
 
and that ‘the irony of new democracies is that the very space created by post-
colonial society for democratic practices provokes into action those elements 
(such as conservative churches) that through silence or complicity played a 
subdued role under white rule’ and ‘the conservative Christian response to the 
public curriculum is not racially exclusive – the spectrum of responses covers 
both traditionally white and conservative black churches’ (2004:66). I agree with 
Jansen’s sense that ‘The opposition in South Africa is not galvanised by feelings 
of exclusion; rather, it is the loss of privilege, the erosion of a long-standing 
dominance of Christian values in the public school curriculum, that lie at the root 
of awakening of the Christian Right’ (2004:67). 
 
In closing this exploration of the three curriculum moments as proposed by 
Jansen, he points to two distinct aspects that impact on the successful 
implementation of the Policy. The first aspect he points out is the role teachers 
will play in translating the Policy and NCS into practice in different contexts.  
There is evidence from curriculum research to show that even when 
teachers in the same national context are provided with the same 
curriculum specifications, they translate them into very different meanings 
based on who they are and also where they are in a specific school locale 
(2004:67; italics in the original). 
 
 
I will return to this aspect later in the analysis of the Policy (Chapter 6). Suffice to 
state that the successful translation of the Policy into practice will depend on a 
number of interpretations and phases. Should the Policy be based on faulty or 
misguided assumptions, successful implementation may be sabotaged from the 
start. The Policy and the NCS are also interpreted and ‘translated’ into Learning 
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Programme Guidelines (LPGs). These LPGs may misinterpret (whether willingly 
or by accident) the Policy. The next possible level of misinterpretation is when the 
Policy, the NCS and its LPGs select learning and teaching resources. At the 
same time, when teachers are trained to implement the Policy, the NCS and its 
LPGs, the trainers themselves may wilfully or by chance misinterpret the Policy’s 
intentions and applications120. What happens in classrooms may be the result of 
misinterpretation. The school classroom is a complex mix of structural, 
community and ideological nuances that impact on the curriculum. Finally, 
whether the pupil will attain the outcomes as envisaged by the Policy and 
translated a number of times - is the final ‘test’ of the Policy. 
 
The central role the teachers play in this ever-generative cycle of interpretation is 
the second aspect Jansen refers to (2004:67). He questions the fact that the 
curriculum makes the values to be attained by pupils so central without attention 
being given to  
how teachers are to change or transform their own value commitments. 
This is especially crucial if teachers are regarded as the final filter through 
which official values reach the classroom. If this position is taken seriously, 
the values debate as a learner-focused event could be regarded as a 
distraction, given the very disparate values of teachers and their 
professional identities, and how such divergence in the value bases of 
teachers influence the curriculum (2004:67-68). 
 
Jansen therefore petitions for a strategy that will transform teacher values, rather 
than learner values (2004:68). Jansen closes his exploration of values within the 
curriculum of a post-apartheid and post 9/11 society with expressing concern that 
the ‘deeply contested nature of faith, and its rooted values’ should not be 
underestimated. Jansen proposes that the writers of the National Curriculum 
Statement ‘made the crucial error of underestimating’ exactly this deeply 
contested nature and rooted-ness of values.  He therefore proposes that this 
requires  
 
                                            
120 Articles by Ferguson and Roux (2003) and Roux (2005) provide crucial insight regarding the 
preparation of teachers for the implementation of the Policy. 
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a curriculum and pedagogy that foster genuine and sustained dialogue 
within and outside schools on faith, commitment, respect and 
understanding. It requires a demonstration of the fact that learning to 
respect other faiths could lead to deepening of one’s commitment to one’s 
own faith and a broadening of one’s faith horizons. And it requires, most of 
all, a clear understanding of consequences: that dogmatism and 
demonised depictions of those who are different have no place in a human 
rights culture and can, quite literally, destroy civilisations (2004:69). 
 
I could not trace any evidence of a public discourse regarding the Saamtrek’s 
discussion of the role of religion in public education. Shortly after the Saamtrek, 
there was however a public outcry against Minister Asmal as can be seen in the 
following Afrikaans newspaper articles. ‘Asmal braak gal oor Christene’, 
(Politieke Redaksie, Beeld 22 Maart 2001), ‘Christelike toorn ontvlam teen Asmal’ 
(Politieke Redaksie, Beeld 2001) as well as ‘Groot grief oor Asmal en die 
Christene’ (Gunning, Rapport 25 Maart 2001). Although these three articles do 
not have anything to do with either the draft Policy or the Saamtrek, it signifies 
how many Christians (and Afrikaners) felt about Asmal. As Minister of Education 
and driver of the processes to formulate the position of religion in education, the 
public press presented a tainted view of Asmal121. These newspaper articles refer 
to comments made by Asmal about (according to him) an exclusionary meeting 
for Christians held on Human Rights Day in 2001. His comments were seen as 
divisive and he was branded to be the ‘Mugabe’ of South Africa.  
 
5.3.5 Public discourses and participation 
 
The public fall-out regarding Asmal’s remarks was soon to be used in casting a 
general question about his proposals for religion in education. On Saturday 24 
March, Beeld published an article written by Prof Pieter de Villiers titled ‘Asmal uit 
pas met die wêreld’ (24 March 2001:9). The article’s main thrust is to cast doubt 
about the ‘true’ intentions of Asmal. De Villiers (2001:9) states that Asmal did not 
continue the processes started by Minister Bengu when he was Minister of 
                                            
121 To what extent the specific role of Prof Asmal influenced the Policy, the processes and 
debates surrounding the Policy are difficult to ascertain. From these and other newspaper articles 
it is clear that he, in his role as Minister of Education, was considered to be controversial.  
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Education but summarily stopped the processes. De Villiers (2001:9) questions 
the fact that not one member of the previous committee under Bengu became 
involved in the advisory committee appointed by Asmal. He further alleges that 
this new committee was appointed in an atmosphere of secrecy, and that there 
was neither a public call for persons to serve on such a committee nor an 
invitation to experts to join the committee. Among a number of allegations, De 
Villiers (2001:9) states that Asmal wants to force an ‘inter-faith’ approach upon 
schools which will be value-neutral. De Villiers further casts doubt about the 
intentions of several scholars of religion who were co-opted by Asmal as well as 
their academic and research standing. De Villiers’ second argument is that 
international developments indicate that the ethos of specific groups should be 
allowed to dictate curriculum as well as how schools are run. 
 
Minister Asmal (2001) responded to these allegations in a letter to Beeld in which 
he encourages and invites debate and further refutes the allegations made by De 
Villiers (2001). Asmal (2001) states that the draft Policy is not ‘value-free’ but 
embodies the specific values ‘of being factually informed about others in an 
unprejudiced manner, real understanding of them as human beings, tolerance, 
acceptance and a spirit of co-operation between all the groups of our society’. 
Asmal continues to reiterate the implications that the government and religious 
bodies operate and should operate in two different spheres. With regard to the 
allegation by De Villiers that Asmal proposes an ‘inter-faith’ approach, Asmal 
(2001) acknowledges that dialogue between faiths should be encouraged but 
that such an initiative falls outside the responsibility and mandate of the state. De 
Villiers also made the allegation that the draft Policy (and Asmal) is out of pace 
with developments in the rest of the world. Asmal (2001) refers to the fact that 
there are a number of international examples that point to the contrary. He 
concludes that the Policy will be announced ‘at the right time’ and that the 
broader public should not ‘be misled by false rumours’ (Asmal 2001). 
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A number of articles122 in the public domain from this period indicate the intensity 
as well as content of the public discourses. In the Editorial of the Kerkblad (18 
July 2001:4) titled ‘Hoe rym veelgodsdienstige opvoeding met ons doopbelofte?, 
the Editor starts by claiming that there has been, in recent years, a deterioration 
of the role of Christianity in public schools.  The response of many Reformed 
parents was to start private schools. The Editorial suggests that there is a 
determined strategic drive to move towards a ‘faithless’ school system123. 
 
The Editorial refers to an article by Dr Roux, which was published in Beeld of 15 
June 2001 in which she motivated the drafting of a new policy. The Editorial 
accuses her of representing ‘religion neutrality’. It further states that the new 
policy does not propose neutrality as such, but rather the replacement of 
Christianity with a new ‘religion’, namely multi-religion education. The Editorial is 
strongly opposed to the policy and its roots in the World Parliament of Religions 
that took place in Cape Town, which basically stated that all roads eventually 
lead to God. 
 
In the Cape Times of 19 October, Mike Kantey analyses ‘Education in the cultural 
maelstrom of a modern South Africa’ (2001:9). The author first locates himself as 
a ‘Boerejood’ and traces his ancestors back to Jews who escaped the tyranny of 
Tsarist Russia, through to him leaving the ANC to support the Green Party.  He 
reacts to a series of letters in the Cape Times written by Sue Keegan from the 
home schooling movement, and more specifically the Pestalozzi Trust. Kantey 
(2001:9) states that there is a strong and noble history of independent schooling 
                                            
122 Articles were sourced using the Magnet database of SA Media reports during August 2007. 
The search keywords were ‘religion’ and ‘education’ and the periods demarcated were from 2007 
and 2001. Within these parameters, a number of 554 finds were returned.  Those with titles 
provided were 189. From these 189, a number was selected trying to cover English and Afrikaans 
media, from all church groups, from correspondents as well as letter columns and editorials. 
Articles that had the keywords ‘religion’ and ‘education’ but which did not refer to the Policy were 
disregarded. 
123 An analysis of the discourses in the public press shows vast misrepresentation of the draft 
Policy and the later accepted Policy. Whether this misrepresentation was due to ignorance or a 
willful and intentional misrepresentation will be discussed at the end of this chapter as well as in 
Chapter 8.  
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movements and mentions Waldorf, Herzlia, Habibiya and Montessori. He 
however takes Keegan up on her challenge of the new curriculum as being 
‘Marxist, secular, Darwinian, materialist, anti-Christian, heretical, narrowly 
political and coercive’. He shares his suspicion that ‘there is far too much 
associative thinking, and too little empiricism at work, too much criticism and too 
little critique’. After exploring some examples of the following religion has in 
South Africa, Kantey (2001:9) continues to say 
If, therefore, a tiny majority seek the privilege of instructing their own 
children according to their own beliefs, they should be entitled to do so, 
but without jeopardising their children’s future careers in a modern, secular 
world, where the preservation of faith is a private affair…. If they wish to 
opt out of the challenges that such a universalist, multi-cultural and multi-
faith opportunity provides, it is their human right and prerogative to do so, 
but they have equally less right to carp and criticise from an isolationist 
position. The correct and fitting place for future, integrated and fully 
welcome citizens of our country is in the hurly-burly of the classroom and 
the playgrounds where the true depth of faith is measured against a 
supermarket of choice.  
 
Kantey (2001:9) closes his article with the following paragraph: 
A country where Jew and Afrikaner, Christian and Canadian, Muslim and 
Somali, might wish to settle down, safe in the knowledge that their 
religious and cultural preferences will not be sown on their jackets as a 
signal to waiting cattle cars. A country where the bombs have finally fallen 
silent, and the wailing of sirens is heard no more; where learning knows no 
language, no religion, no time and no place, and where everyone is 
welcome to share in the rich bounty that has come down to us from every 
continent. 
 
Joey van Niekerk, (who was a member of the Bengu’s advisory committee), 
writes on 19 October in ‘Kerkbode’ an article titled ‘Die probleem met “multi-
religie” onderwys’ (2001:13). Van Niekerk takes position against Asmal’s new 
proposed policy. She states that the multi-religion model of Asmal is nothing else 
than a mono-religion model being forced on everyone. She then continues to 
quote from a British study, which found that very few British children really knew 
about the Christian rendition of Easter. Van Niekerk (2001:13) also has it against 
the attempts by Asmal through various public forums to sell his ‘neutral’ values. 
She states that the policy will result in Christian children knowing less about their 
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own religion. She refers to the time that Muslim and Jewish children spend 
learning about their own religion while Christian children only have one hour’s 
catechism over weekends. Van Niekerk (2001) fails to state why public schools 
must address the resultant lack of knowledge in Christian children. Although she 
refers to the strategies and action that two other religions have outside school 
hours to educate their children, Van Niekerk seems not to ‘own up’ but feels the 
state should take responsibility for the backlog in Christian children. She 
continues to explore the embarrassment Christian children will experience when 
they do not know as much of their own religion as children from other religions.  
Van Niekerk (2001) completely refuses to acknowledge that the type of 
knowledge that she refers to as being ‘foundational’ to the Christian faith like the 
doctrine of the Trinity or the two natures of Christian, should be the responsibility 
of the church and not public schooling. 
 
Between 15 August and 11 December 2001 Minister Asmal held nine extensive 
consultations with leaders from various religious organisations (as reported on in 
an Analytical resumé of discussions between Minister Asmal and religious 
leaders on the matter of religion in education, dated 13 December 2001). The 
groups covered the entire spectrum of religious leadership in the country and 
consisted of representatives from 
(a) Various (Dutch) Reformed Churches 
(b) The African Indigenous Churches 
(c) African Traditional Religion 
(d) The Catholic Bishops Conference 
(e) Various Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches 
(f) A representative body of Muslim leaders (the Jamiatul Ulama, 
Transvaal) 
(g) The South African Council of Churches 
(h) National Religious Leaders Forum 
(i) Various minority religions (Baha’i, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, 
Judaism) (Analytical resumé 2001:1) 
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The Analytical resumé (2001:3) shares that ‘virtually all religious leaders 
expressed an understanding and appreciation of the Minister’s intent that all 
future citizens should be educated about the various religions constituting the 
pluralistic national religious mosaic’. The Analytical resumé (2001:4-6) 
furthermore notes some misunderstandings and clarifies the Policy’s intention 
regarding these. The misunderstandings included 
(a)  The concern that religious observances will not be allowed. 
(b) The concern that religious freedom and choice will be affected. 
(c)  The concern that the policy may be driven by a ‘secularist’ animosity 
towards religion. 
(d) The concern that the state may be embarking on a feat of social and 
religious engineering, forcing a set of alien values on pupils in state 
schools.  
(e) The concern that teaching about religion may result in merely a ‘flat’, 
superficial inventory of information, devoid of any human or spiritual value. 
(f) The concern that such a policy might threaten the religious identities of 
young pupils, and confuse them. 
(g) The concern that the policy will result in renewed caricaturing of some 
religions. 
(h) The concern that the new policy is aimed at, or will result in, a syncretistic 
‘New Age’ mixing of religions, and that ‘inter-faith’ religious views will be 
foisted on pupils. 
 
The Analytical resumé (2001:6-8) further refutes the following conflicting 
viewpoints: 
(a) ‘The notion that allowance be made for state schools that would in their 
overall character express, and serve, the religious content of one specific 
religion (for example Christianity) or even a subgroup within a religion’. 
This would prevent any religion-based ideology like CNE to dominate 
education, or that schools become the ‘battlegrounds for religion-based 
 290
dominance’, or that schools provide a ‘captive audience for the inculcation 
of religious instruction’. 
(b) ‘The insistence that the state school must confirm and reinforce the values 
of parental homes and religious bodies’. It was emphasised that the state 
cannot be held responsible for the responsibilities of religious bodies to 
inculcate specific belief systems. 
(c) ‘The insistence that education in moral and civic values in state schools 
must necessarily rest on explicit religious foundations to which the state 
must commit itself’. 
(d) ‘The insistence that the “majority” sentiment of the public at large should 
be solicited and implemented’. This insistence was based on an 
‘insufficient understanding of the working of a democratically elected 
government’.  
(e) ‘The insistence that religion education should be optional’. The Analytical 
resumé states ‘The state cannot renege on its basic responsibility to 
educate the young in the development of knowledge, attitudes and social 
skills absolutely vital in a pluralistic society’. 
 
Very few of the articles published in the popular press of this period reflect a 
positive appreciation of the draft Policy. An example of a positive evaluation of 
the draft Policy is an article published in ‘Die Kerkbode’ by Cornelia Roux on 2 
November 2001, ‘Religieuse onderrrig: die ander kant van die munt’ (2001:10). 
Roux (2001) provides a short historical overview of the study of religion in 
schools in the previous dispensation and shares the findings of research that 
support the fact that learning about other religions does not confuse learners124.  
 
Positive interrogations of the draft Policy125 was swamped by the negative and 
distorted opinions presented in and by the popular press. Joey van Niekerk 
states in the Beeld of 12 November (2001:12) ‘U gaan kinders verwar, Asmal’ 
                                            
124 Except for this article by Roux (2001), the evidence provided by research regarding the critical 
relation between age and the curriculum is never discussed or referred to in the public press. 
125 See also Horn, N. (2002). ‘Keer dat juffrou indoktrineer’, Rapport, 20 January:30. 
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and Alet Rademeyer reports on the same day in Beeld ‘Nog teenkanting teen 
Asmal’ (2001:4). Willem Steenkamp in the Independent on Saturday (17 
November 2001:2) reports on the ‘Multi-faith studies row’ and warns that the 
national Department of Education’s plans to introduce religious and sex 
education will result in “complete social chaos” (2001:2). It continues to state that 
‘The State does not have the right to enforce its secular values on parents’ 
according to Ms Julia Swain, spokeswoman for the Concerned Communities for 
Education, ‘a broad-based organisation representing teachers, parents and 
people from various religious backgrounds’ (2001:2). The main point of 
contention seems to be that people [read parents] have ‘the constitutional right to 
have their children educated according to their choice and beliefs’ (Swain quoted 
by Steenkamp 2001:2). ‘The State will be forcing its secular values on our 
children. These values written into the curriculum are not neutral. They were 
written by people who have their own values, their own agendas. This is a clear 
intrusion into the role of parents by the State’ (Swain quoted by Steenkamp 
2001:2). 
 
In an interview with Asmal in the Rapport on 16 December 2001 Van Eeden 
(2001) (again) explains the difference between religious instruction and religious 
education, as well as emphasising the different mandates and spheres of 
responsibility between the state and religious bodies. In the interview he petitions 
that all religious groups will be treated equally. Interestingly, in the interview 
Asmal shared that he had stayed in Northern Ireland for a number of years and 
that he had experienced that religious division lay much deeper than racial 
divisions and tensions. He again invited readers to take part in the public 
discourse.  
 
5.3.6 SACRED: the process and public debates 
 
On 13 September the Sowetan (2002:2) writes ‘Religious body to advise Asmal’. 
The article reports on the first meeting of the committee set up by Asmal to 
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advise him on the new policy. Asmal is quoted to have said that the committee 
was ‘making history’. The article also quotes Mr Edcent Williams who said ‘We 
needed to get an educational viewpoint from religious organisations so we are 
able to manage religious expression in the curriculum with the required 
sensitivity’. The committee that the Sowetan refers to, although not stated, is the 
Standing Advisory Committee for Religion in Education (SACRED) as published 
in the Government Gazette Vol 448, on 29 October 2002. SACRED was 
established in terms of sections 20.2 and 20.3 of the Public Finance 
management Act, 1999. According to the proclamation (Government Gazette 
2002:3) the committee was in response to ‘Widespread consultation [which] has 
shown support for such a committee’. A number of nominations were also 
received from ‘religious and other organisations’ (Government Gazette 2002:3). 
The purpose of the committee was to ‘advise the minister in consolidating policy 
for Religion in Education’ within specific terms of reference, which the Gazette 
sets out as follows (2002:3-4): 
1. Policy implementation for Religion in Education with reference to its 
implications for initial and ongoing teacher development programmes. 
This includes the quality of religion education in schools, assessment 
standards and practices. 
2. The development, selection, procurement, supply and quality of 
learning and teaching support materials. 
3. How religious observances conducted on public school premises 
outside the National Curriculum Statement and after school hours will 
be accommodated. 
4. The organisation and conduct of school assemblies. 
5. Monitoring the quality of religious education and religion education in 
schools. 
6. Any matter referred to it by the Minister of Education126. 
                                            
126 From these terms of reference it would seem as if the rationale and content of the Policy was 
not part of the focus for SACRED, but that the committee was to advise on the implementation of 
the Policy, for example, learning materials’ development and teacher training. It would also seem 
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Table 5.2 lists the members of SACRED and their envisaged tasks (Gazette 
2002:4-5): 
 
Table 5.2: Members of SACRED 
 
Title and name Designated tasks 
Dr Daniel Maluleke Chairperson and advisor on uniting 
churches 
Ms Nokuzola Mndende Advisor on African Indigenous 
Religions 
Prof Russell Botman Advisor on Christianity and large scale 
organisational frameworks for Religion 
Sister Margaret Kelly Advisor on role of women in Religion 
Education 
Bishop Busi Kumalo Advisor on Leadership in Religion and 
on the role of women in Religion 
Education 
Mr Paul Farrell Advisor on pedagogy related to 
Religion in Education 
Prof Rambhujan Sitaram Advisor on Hinduism and its approach 
to education 
Shaikh Mohammed Faakiel Latief Advisor on Islam and its approach to 
education 
Rabbi Warren Goldstein Advisor on Judaism and its approach to 
education 
Prof Gerrie Lubbe Advisor on role of academics in 
Religion Education 
Nominee from teacher organisations Liaison with teacher organisations and 
their views on Religion in Education 
Ms Tina Joemat Liaison with the Council of Education 
Ministers 
Prof Kobus Krüger Technical Assistant 
Bishop Peter Storey Advisor on various persuasions of 
Christianity and implications for 
Education 
Dr Gustav Claasen  Advisor on Religion in Education from 
the viewpoint of the Afrikaans speaking 
churches 
Mr Edcent Williams Ex-officio member 
 
                                                                                                                                  
as if these terms of reference were taking seriously some of the public concerns and practical 
matters that were raised in the press. 
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SACRED was to meet at least three times a year for a period of three years. 
Committee members could then be re-appointed. All members participated on a 
non-remunerative voluntary basis (Gazette 2002:4). From the constitution of 
SACRED the following seems obvious at face-value: 
• Of the sixteen members two members were specifically from a Religion 
Education background, namely Prof Gerrie Lubbe and Prof Kobus Krüger. 
This is not to say that the other members did not have expertise in the 
discourses surrounding Religion Education. 
• Two members were designated to specifically represent the ‘role of 
women’ in Religion Education. Four of the sixteen members were female.  
• There was no representation from a specific non-religion or anti-religion 
viewpoint or organisation. 
 
Though SACRED oversaw the implementation of the Policy, a separate 
Curriculum Committee was set up to oversee the development of curriculum for 
Religion Education (as part of Life Orientation) and Religion Studies (Grades 10-
12). This committee consisted of representatives of different religious groupings, 
representatives from the National DoE as well as departmental experts in 
curriculum development. The committee was however only constituted after 
September 2003 when the Policy was promulgated.  
 
The second half of 2002 continuing into the whole of 2003 saw a vibrant (and at 
times almost hysterical) discussion in the public press. The following table (Table 
5.3) contains some examples of the titles of articles and letters appearing from 
the end of 2002 towards the end of 2005.  
 
Table 5.3: An overview of some published articles  
 
20 December 
2002 
Kerkbode, page 2 ‘Godsdiensonderrig op skool het 
gefaal, sê Claassen’ 
19 April 2002 Business Day, 
page 3 
‘MEC says religious element of new 
curriculum will be reviewed’ 
Linda Ensor, Political 
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Correspondent 
17 October 2002 Weekly Mail and 
Guardian, page 18 
‘Pagan values are being forced on 
our children’ 
Rob McCafferty, United Christian 
Action 
24 October 2002 Weekly Mail and 
Guardian, page 14 
‘Enough of this religious dogma’ 
Harry Sewlall, Sandton 
‘Dowsabel’ (A pagan) 
Henry Crumb, United Atheist 
Action, Cape Town 
2 April 2003 Beeld, page 12 ‘Godsdiens’, Editorial 
6 April 2003 Rapport, page 22 ‘Asmal krap weer waar dit nie jeuk 
nie. Dié keer is dit godsdiens in 
skole’ 
Tim du Plessis 
13 April 2003 Rapport, page 18 ‘Godsdiens op ‘n sinryker manier’ 
Letter from Mr Corrie Louw, 
Oberholzer 
13 April 2003 Rapport, page 18 ‘Asmal is reg met skool-godsdiens’ 
Dr Duan van der Westhuizen, Rand 
Afrikaans University, Johannesburg 
13 April 2003 Rapport, page 18 ‘Onderwysbeleid nie net uit die lug 
gegryp’, Molatwane Likethe, 
Spokesperson for the Department 
of Education 
16 April 2003 Citizen, page 17 ‘Intervening in religion is 
dictatorship’ 
Rev K. G. Webb, Benoni 
20 April 2003 Sunday Times, 
page 5 
‘State pushes policy on religion in 
schools’ 
Cornia Pretorius 
23 April 2003 Beeld, page 13 Geloof is tuis by kerk of ouerhuis’ 
Dr Gerrie Lubbe 
27 April 2003 Rapport, page 13 ‘Só kan plan gemaak word met 
godsdiens op skool’, Christo 
Lombard 
1 May 2003 Beeld, page 5 ‘Geloofsleiers en onderwys 
vergader ‘oor skoolbeleid’, Neels 
Jackson 
14 May 2003 Beeld, page 13 ‘Leer ken mekaar se God’, Joey van 
Niekerk 
17 May 2003 Beeld, page 4 ‘Onnies kan weier om godsdiens 
aan te bied, sê kenner’, Alet 
Rademeyer 
24 May 2003 Burger, page 15 ‘Die ander kant van multireligieuse 
onderrig’, Prof Cornelia Roux 
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13 June 2003 Kerkbode, page 1 ‘Nog vrae oor skolegodsdiens nadat 
Asmal sy standpunt “versag” het’ 
26 June 2003 Cape Argus, page 
21 
‘Faith in compromise’ 
Rev Keith Vermeulen, Director, SA 
Council of Churches, Parliamentary 
Office 
30 June 2003 Beeld, page 12 ‘Godsdiens’, Editorial 
30 June 2003 Kerkblad, page 17 ‘Die nuwe onderwysbeleid: aanslag 
teen die Christendom’    
Ds Naas Ferreira (Rietvallei)            
10 July 2003 Afrikaner, page 1 ‘Kaser (sic) Asmal dwing Nuwe 
Wêreldgodsdiens op skole af’ 
JB 
11 July 2003 Kerkbode, page 
16 
‘Nuwe godsdiensbeleid vir skole is 
minder voorskriftelik’ 
13 July 2003 Rapport, page 8 ‘Sê nog jou sê oor skole se 
godsdiens’, Eugene Gunning, 
Political journalist 
22 July 2003 Sowetan, page 16 Schools’ religion policies flawed’ 
Cheryllyn Dudley, African Christian 
Democratic Party, MP 
2 August 2003 Beeld, page 10 ‘Bidbeleid op die spits gedryf’, Alet 
Rademeyer 
6 August 2003 Star, page 3 ‘Main faiths to get equal opportunity 
in schools’ 
Peroshni Govender 
8 August 2003 Leader, page 1 ‘Controversial religion in education 
adopted’ 
Dan Naidu 
16 August 2003 Pretoria News, 
page 3 
‘Another first for SA education’ 
 
1 September 
2003 
Hervormer, page 5 ‘Die krisis in die onderwys: Wat kan 
jy doen?’ Dr Hannes Beukes en Dr 
Ferdinand Potgieter 
10 September 
2003 
Sowetan, page 14 ‘Education laws might promote 
religious strife’ 
Cheryllyn Dudley, African Christian 
Democratic Party, MP 
10 September 
2003 
Sowetan,  page 14 ‘Asmal sets a trend – again’, by 
Victor Mecoamere 
11 September 
2003 
Volksblad, page 2 ‘NG Kerk in VS verwelkom beleid’, 
Erika Fourie 
14 September 
2003 
Rapport, page 18 ‘Godsdiens’, ‘Religion’ 
Editorial 
5 October 2003 City Press, page 
22 
‘The new vision of religious 
education’ by Console Tleane 
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5 October 2003 Sunday 
Independent, page 
8 
‘Human values cannot be traded in 
the marketplace’ 
Kader Asmal 
20 November 
2003 
Citizen, page 3 ‘No ban on religion: Asmal’, Thulani 
Msimang 
8 December 2003 Business Day, 
page 7 
‘Religion education may face 
challenge’ 
Claire Barclay 
22 January 2004 Beeld, page 8 ‘Skoolgodsdiens ondersoek’, Alet 
Rademeyer 
16 May 2004 Rapport, page 6 ‘Skoolgodsdiens bly in kruisvuur’  
Christo Lombard 
15 June 2004 Hervormer, page 6 ‘Godsdiens op skool’, Dr Wim 
Dreyer. 
24 March 2005 Afrikaner, page 3 ‘Christelik-nasionale opvoeding. 
Aanskou die rots’ Dr Sydney 
Gregan 
6 April 2005 Star,  page 6 ‘Yarmulkes, headscarves and 
crosses are fine. Beards? Maybe.’ 
Angela Quintal 
Group Political Editor 
21 September 
2006 
Pretoria News, 
page 6 
‘New dress code guide introduced 
lines for schools’ 
Rivonia Naidu 
 
Considering that the Policy actually provides a framework for what happens for a 
maximum of 0.5 percent of the total curriculum from Reception year to Grade 12 
(Chidester 2003:273), the public outcry and intensity of the debates raise 
interesting and serious questions. Chidester classifies the opponents to the 
Policy in four different Christian positions – namely Reconstructionist, 
Protectionist, Ecumenical and Interfaith (2003:266). He discusses their different 
positions in detail (2003; 2006). Table 5.4 presents the main points of these four 
groups as explored by Chidester (2003). 
 
Table 5.4: Four different positions 
 
Reconstructionist Protectionist Christian 
Ecumenical 
Interfaith 
They claimed that 
the Policy 
promoted ‘a single 
set of values under 
They wanted to 
‘retain the 
religious benefits 
of the old system 
The South African 
Council of 
Churches (SACC) 
supported the 
This group did not 
object to learning 
about other 
religions, ‘but to 
 298
the guise of 
tolerance’ 
(2003:267).  
 
They claimed that 
the actual values 
of the Policy were 
‘relativism, 
situational ethics, 
and the equality of 
all religions’ which 
they said were 
characteristic of 
the New Age 
movement.  
 
The Policy, 
according to them, 
promoted secular 
humanism. They 
were supported 
from right-wing 
organisations in 
the USA. The 
‘home-schooling’ 
movement of the 
Pestalozzi Trust 
supported their 
campaigns. 
of religious 
education’ 
(2003:268). This 
group wanted 
‘separate 
programmes in 
Christian, Jewish, 
Muslim, Hindu, 
and perhaps 
“other” religious 
instruction… 
 
A main proponent 
of them was Prof 
De Villiers who 
made the 
assertion that 
‘Christian religious 
education can 
provide the basis 
for ‘understanding 
among faiths’ 
(2003:269). 
 
They therefore 
claim that 
Christian 
education would 
be a ‘good basis 
for dealing with 
religious diversity 
in South Africa’ 
(2003:269). 
idea that ‘it is 
important for 
learners to be 
informed about 
the various 
religious beliefs of 
the people of 
South Africa’ 
(2003:269). 
 
At the same time, 
the SACC 
supported a policy 
that would make 
provision for ‘both 
a multi-religious 
approach and for 
single-faith 
programmes’ 
(2003:270). 
the apparent 
absence of explicit 
attention to 
spirituality in the 
new policy’ 
(2003:270). 
 
They wrongly 
assumed that 
learning about 
religions is only a 
cognitive function 
and that it will not 
engage the 
affective, 
emotional or 
spiritual 
development of 
learners. 
 
As an exponent of 
this group, Paul 
Faller (Director of 
the Catholic 
Institute of 
Education) called 
for a ‘formative 
rather than a 
purely descriptive 
Religious 
Education’ 
(2003:270). 
 
While opponents to the Policy were very vocal, the Policy had support from 
‘religious leaders from a variety of religious communities’ (Chidester 2003:270), 
albeit not as vocal nor as visible in the public domain as the opponents (as 
illustrated in Table 5.3).  
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5.4 AN ANALYSIS OF PATTERNS AND TRENDS  
 
I started this chapter by locating the Policy within the context of the legitimation 
discourses of the new democratic state in its four gestalts, namely the 
constitutional state, the transformational state, the cultural state as well as the 
symbolic state (See Diagram 2). I suggested that understanding the processes, 
discourses and public participation surrounding the Policy could benefit from 
locating the Policy in these four gestalts of nationhood (in following Chidester 
2003). 
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 6) I will analyse the Policy according to a specific 
methodology proposed in Chapter 2. Before I proceed to analyse the Policy, it is 
necessary to reflect back on Chapters 4 and 5 in an attempt to identify possible 
patterns and trends that would assist firstly in understanding the Policy as a 
specific response to the context post-1994, and secondly, to identify patterns and 
trends which may assist in critically evaluating the Policy (Chapter 8). 
 
1 The distrust and accusations that the government was driving a specific 
ideologically coloured agenda of enforcing ‘inter-faith’ education was not 
as visible during the work of the Bengu-committee. With the appointment 
of Minister Asmal in 2000, the processes towards defining the Policy 
started over. Minister Asmal provided the impetus for formulating the Draft 
Policy not building on the Ministerial Committee appointed by Bengu, nor 
appointing the members of the Bengu committee. Minister Asmal’s stature 
in especially the Afrikaans press was often tainted by allegations that he 
had ‘a bone to pick’ with the Afrikaner and with Christianity in particular. 
The various allegations and accusations in the mainstream Afrikaner press 
were spearheaded by editors, members of the Bengu-committee and 
comments by political editors and reporters. The debates and articles in 
the public press were essentially political and not educational. It is on the 
one hand easy to characterise these accusations as being ‘sensational’ 
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and ‘hysterical’ (and some of the articles were) – but somehow the 
intensity of the debate requires a more thorough response and analysis.  
 
2 The articles and public participation were permeated with evidence that 
there was a Babylonian confusion in the use of  terminology and concepts. 
Contributors used terms like ‘syncretism’, ‘neutrality’, ‘democracy’, ‘multi-
religious’ and many other terms within a range of different meanings. In 
some cases one could excuse the ‘wrong’ use of a term, but in many 
cases the misuse of terms were done by people who should have known 
better. In these cases one could suspect another agenda. 
 
3 From the start of the public processes, the debates were cluttered and 
distorted by confusion regarding the roles of the state, the National DoE, 
parents, churches, SGBs, teachers and religious organisations. These 
distortions and misunderstandings (whether intentional or due to 
ignorance) were understandable when considered that in the dispensation 
prior to 1994, public consultation was not practiced and spheres of 
government overlapped. State and Christianity were synonymous in the 
previous dispensation and profoundly shaped perceptions regarding the 
roles of the various stakeholders, specifically the roles of the state, 
education as well as religious organisations.   
 
4 One cannot help but sense that the debate was ‘driven’ by persons  feeling 
disenfranchised by and in the new political dispensation. The debates 
surrounding the Policy were part of the broader legitimatisation discourses 
of the new state as well as communities of memory and forgetting. The 
previous regime consciously and deliberately characterised the ANC as 
‘Communist’, ‘heathen’, ‘atheist’, ‘satanic’ and as part of the domain of the 
‘anti-Christ’. The propaganda of the apartheid regime and misinformation 
campaigns had a profound effect on generations of Afrikaners. In many 
cases the opinions of contributors in the public press accused the new 
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government in terms that reveal the impact of the misinformation and 
propaganda of the previous regime.  
 
5 A significant part of the public debates regarding the Asmal-era was also 
driven and continuously (mis)informed by individual members and 
supporters of the Bengu-committee. Why Minister Asmal did not use or 
include members of the previous committee is open for speculation and 
misinterpretation. A possible hypothesis would be that Minister Asmal 
disagreed with the Bengu-committee’s proposals and favoured the multi-
religious approach proposed by various other stakeholders. The Bengu-
proposals were also contestable on grounds of their weak theoretical 
grounding in the discourses surrounding religion and education. The 
majority of the Bengu-committee also consisted of Christians and the 
Bengu-committee was not truly representative of all the different religious 
groupings in South Africa.  
 
6 One of the major elements in the debate was specific understanding of 
‘democracy’ almost in opposition to the implications of having a 
‘constitutional state.’  Numerous contributors demanded that the opinion of 
the majority should be taken into account, referendums to be held and 
local SGBs to decide on the ‘group-ethos’ of schools. A further element in 
the debate was feelings of entitlement and the privileging of individual and 
group rights contra the constitutional right of others and specifically 
minorities. 
 
7 There were clearly different opinions of the parameters of ‘nation building’ 
and citizenship. Accusations were common that the government drove an 
agenda where ‘we are one’ evolved into ‘we are the same’, in an inter-faith 
and cultural hotchpotch. The new regime rightly questioned the role 
Christianity, and more specifically white Afrikaans Christianity played in 
sustaining the hegemony of white superiority and crude inequalities based 
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on race and gender. Although white Afrikaans Churches confessed their 
support and formulation of apartheid as a sin, the general Afrikaans 
Christian public was unrepentant.  
 
8 There was a crucial dearth of information in the public domain regarding 
other international examples as well as on research findings regarding the 
impact of the study of religion on children during different ages. There was 
confusion regarding the content of such a curriculum as well as deliberate 
misinformation. Although the lack of correct information regarding the 
rationale and content of the Policy is fairly evident in scrutinising the public 
press, the reasons for the lack of visibility of the correct information are 
open to speculation. The fact that the debates in the public domain were 
mainly political and not educational is also reason for concern and further 
research. The lack of transparency of the early Asmal processes could 
have resulted in many of the allegations and suspicions that permeated 
the public debates later on. 
 
9 Education is never neutral and is always an expression of one or more 
ideologies or meta-narratives. It is interesting how people accused the 
government of making education ideological, forgetting how ideology 
formed the previous dispensation’s curricula. The values as found in the 
Constitution were taken to be the guiding principles for shaping the new 
curriculum and yet, allegations regarding the ‘neutrality’ of the new 
curriculum are puzzling. Could it be that the move away from CNE and the 
values and ideologies it supported, was the main concern and not 
necessarily the values of the new curriculum? 
 
10 Not only was there a determined effort to create suspicion regarding the 
motives of the government for introducing the new policy, but there were 
also a number of cases where the persona, character and scholarly 
integrity of members of SACRED were deliberately questioned and 
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tainted. Possible reasons include the exclusion of members of the Bengu-
committee from the Asmal initiatives as well as historical differences of 
opinions between stakeholders. 
 
11 Although there were constant allegations of a lack of consultation, the 
evidence points to the contrary. Not only were all possible religious 
groupings included, there were several public hearings where the public 
could have made their submissions. Minister Asmal is on record to have 
invited public participation.  
 
12 Anxiety about the availability of suitably qualified teachers and support 
staff, networks, learning and resource materials was acknowledged and 
processes put in place to address the training of teachers and prospective 
teachers.  
 
13 While satisfaction was expressed with the final policy, there was a number 
of voices who stated that the implementation of the policy should be 
monitored by parents, churches and school governing bodies. Some of 
these remarks may indicate suspicion that the government should not be 
completely trusted to abide by the policy. 
 
14. The Policy embodies a specific notion of ‘sanctioned religiosity’ and 
possibly a sanitised use of religion as vehicle for moral regeneration. 
 
 
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In the processes described in the chapter, the re-visioning of citizenship was 
shaped and impacted upon by memories and counter-memories. The debates 
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surrounding the Policy should further be understood within the context of the four 
gestalts of the state, namely constitutional, cultural, transformational and 
symbolic. These different gestalts of the newly elected state introduced and 
shaped memory and counter-memory, the re-writing of the history of South Africa 
as well as counter-narratives; name-changes and acts of lobotomy as well as 
‘memory-as-resistance’. The four gestalts of the South African state were the 
result of the impact of the ‘tectonic layers’ explored in Chapter 4, still shifting and 
moving.  
 
In Chapter 5 I attempted to understand the Policy-as-compromise on the one 
hand, and on the other hand understand the Policy-as-nonnegotiable as an 
embodiment of the protection awarded by the Constitution as well as the 
guaranteed equalities. As such the Policy is a major departure from the previous 
dispensation’s unequal treatment of religions. What the Policy and the previous 
dispensation have in common, though, is the use of religion in the service of 
particular ideologies. In the case of the apartheid regime, the Christian religion 
served an ideology of white supremacy. In the post-1994 dispensation, the Policy 
will result in learners as would-be citizens having a shared vocabulary regarding 
their own religion but also the religions of others.  
 
Chapter 5 is therefore a necessary foundation for the analysis of the Policy, 
which is to follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY  
 
6.1 PROLOGUE 
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… a perfumer, however, needs more than a passably fine nose. He needs 
an incorruptible, hard-working organ that has been trained to smell for 
many decades, enabling him to decipher even the most complicated 
odours by composition and proportion, as well as to create new, unknown 
mixtures of scent (Süskind 1986:77) 
 
 I don’t need a formula. I have the recipe in my nose (Süskind 1986:78) 
 
The above two quotes from Perfume (Süskind 1986) are situated in the first 
encounter between Grenouille, a deformed tanner’s apprentice and a perfume 
master, Maître Baldini, in eighteenth century Paris. In the encounter Grenouille 
boasts that he could mix the perfume, ‘Amor and Psyche’ using only his nose and 
intuition, while the perfume master, Baldini, claims that it is impossible to 
duplicate an existing perfume without knowing the formula. In support of his 
argument Baldini claims that it is not only necessary to be able to identify the 
different essences of jasmine, bergamot, attar of roses and cloves in an existing 
perfume; but also crucial to know the exact amounts of these essences. 
Therefore, without knowing the formula, Baldini claims that it is futile to attempt to 
duplicate a perfume. Grenouille however proves him wrong. 
 
In this analysis, at this stage of our journey, I will attempt not to judge or criticise 
the Policy but to analyse its content, its structure, its assumptions and traces of 
its belief systems. In Chapter 5 we discovered the Policy-as-response; on the 
one hand a compromised response and on the other hand an embodiment of the 
values of the Constitution. In this chapter we will explore the Policy-as-text. We 
may discover at times very clear traces of assumptions and beliefs, while at other 
times, only nuances – like the faint smell of perfume after someone has walked 
past. These traces of smells entice you to stop in your tracks and analyse the 
odours like an eighteenth century perfumer trying to analyse a new perfume. 
 
In this chapter we will engage with the Policy as a perfumer who analyses a 
perfume looking for traces of rose and clove, jasmine, bergamot and rosemary. 
While all perfumes are eventually judged by perfume masters, clientele and 
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passers by, the purpose of this chapter is to uncover and discover the unique 
elements of this Policy, its overt and covert assumptions and beliefs. 
 
6.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
 
In this chapter I will set out to analyse the Policy. In Chapter 2 I provided an 
overview of policy analysis as hermeneutic activity. I also reflected on the nature 
of policy analysis as well as the practicalities of doing a policy analysis.  
 
In the first part of this chapter (6.3) I will very briefly recapture the implications of 
opting for a post-structural approach doing this analysis. I will then continue to 
actually do an analysis of the Policy (6.4). I will start by analysing the range and 
application of the Policy (6.4.1) and continue to analyse the definitions as 
proposed by the Policy (6.4.2). This will allow me to analyse the Policy argument 
(6.5) – looking at Policy information: the policy problem (6.5.1.1), alternatives 
(6.5.1.2), warrants and backing (6.5.1.3) and Policy claims (6.5.1.4). 
 
I will then continue to analyse the Policy implications for implementation and 
evaluation (6.6) and analyse the logic of the Policy (6.7). In analysing the Policy, I 
will be specifically using Dunn’s (1994) analysis of a policy argument.  
 
6.3 A POST-STRUCTURAL APPROACH  
In a post-structural hermeneutics, the interpreter engages not only with the text, 
but also with the historical and cultural context in which the text was produced 
and in which the interpreter finds him or herself. The act of interpreting is 
furthermore not a one-way action from interpreter to text, but also from text to 
interpreter. Out of this dynamic interaction between interpreter, historical and 
cultural context and text, meaning transpires, for now. Such a post-structural 
analysis is therefore time-bound in acknowledging that the interpreter, contexts or 
even texts may change. In the following diagram, Demetrio (2001) illustrates a 
post-structural system of interpretation (Figure 6.1): 
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Figure 6.1: Post-structural system of interpretation (Demetrio 2001) 
 
In Chapter 1 I revealed my personal interests and passion regarding the research 
in an attempt to take seriously the involvement of the interpreter with the texts, 
contexts and possibilities of meaning, as implied by a post-structural approach.  
Chapters 1 and 3 provided a thorough exploration of the academic discourses 
surrounding the study of religion in the public sphere in the context of 
constitutional patriotism. Chapters 4 and 5 explored the historical and cultural 
contexts of the processes surrounding and resulting in the Policy. In this chapter I 
move to specifically analyse the Policy-as-text, acknowledging the patterns and 
trends that became visible in the first five chapters.  
 
This analysis of the Policy is also distinctly critical, against the background of my 
exploration of critical theory and critical pedagogy (Chapter 2). This critical policy 
analysis follows authors such as Taylor (1997), Dryzek (1982) and others in 
supporting critical policy analysis as an appropriate point of departure for policy 
analysis in complex and layered contexts. Taylor (1997:26), for example, refers 
to the concern expressed by Fulcher (1989) that most of the analysis done 
convey ‘no sense of the political struggles involved in developing and 
implementing policy’. These authors propose policies-as-texts as products of 
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various and layered struggles and compromises over meaning. Codd (1988:237) 
shares Taylor’s view and says:’…policy documents can be said to constitute the 
official discourse of the state’ (Codd 1985; italics added)127.  
 
According to Troyna (1994:70) the role of the analyst is to scrutinise policy for its 
use of ‘symbolic language’ and ‘condensation symbols’. I accept the nature of 
policy analysis as technical, political as well as ethical as proposed by Wildavsky 
(1987). With regard to the practicality of doing this analysis, I will first follow the 
structure of the Policy before I return to apply the steps and analysis proposed by 
Dunn (1994) and analyse the Policy argument’s elements, namely Policy-relevant 
information (I), the Policy-claim (C), the Policy Warrant (W), the Policy Backing 
(B) as well as the Policy Qualifier (Q).  
 
6.4 THE POLICY – RANGE AND DEFINITIONS 
 
6.4.1 The range and application of the Policy 
The Policy describes its ‘range’ as follows: 
 
The policy covers the different aspects of Religion Education128, Religious 
Instruction and Religious Observances, and is applicable in all public 
schools. The spirit of the policy, which is to embrace the religious diversity 
of South Africa, must also be applied at other levels of the education 
system, including District, Provincial and National level gatherings 
(paragraph 15; 2003:12; italics mine). 
 
The Policy describes its range firstly as covering three distinct concepts namely 
Religious Instruction, Religious Observances as well as Religion Education. The 
Policy further describes its range as having application on District, Provincial and 
National levels. On a third level the Policy deals with public schools and 
independent schools. 
                                            
127 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the location of the Policy within the constitutional, cultural, 
transformational and symbolic state.  
128 Please take note that the Policy here refers to Religion Education as part of Life Orientation 
(Grades R-12) in contrast to Religion Studies, as part of the FET band for Grades 10-12. Religion 
Education in the context of the definition should be read in juxtaposition to the other two concepts 
mentioned in this definition namely Religious Instruction and Religious Observances.  
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With regard to independent schools the Policy prescribes its application as 
follows in paragraph 16 (2003:12): 
 
Citizens do have the right, at their own expense, to establish independent 
schools, including religious schools, as long as they avoid racial 
discrimination, register with the state, and maintain standards that are not 
inferior to the standards of comparable public educational institutions 
(Section 29(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). 
Similarly, Section 57 of the Schools Act provides for ‘Public Schools on 
Private Property with a recognised religious character’, which also have 
the right to specify a religious ethos and character, subject to an 
agreement with the provincial authorities (in terms of Section 14 of the 
South African Schools Act). In both such institutions the requirements for 
Religious Instruction and Religious Observances would not be prescribed 
by this policy. However in maintaining the curriculum standards with 
respect to Religion Education, both independent schools and public 
schools on private property with a recognised religious character (as 
provided for in Section 57 of the South African Schools Act) are required 
to achieve the minimum outcomes for Religion Education (italics mine). 
 
Therefore, although some independent schools may have a specific single-faith 
focus and ethos, the curriculum as taught from R-9 in these schools will have to 
comply with the outcomes and assessment criteria as envisaged by the Policy 
and the RNCS129. 
 
As the definitions used in the Policy provide a particular framework for 
understanding to the Policy, the analysis of the Policy will start with the 
‘Definitions’, and then analyse the Policy’s description of its background, its 
context and its values. The analysis will then continue to look at the distinction 
the Policy makes between Religion Education, Religious Instruction and 
Religious Observances before analysing the application of the Policy as stated by 
the Policy itself.  
 
6.4.2 An analysis of the definitions used in the Policy  
                                            
129 As will be explored in detail in Chapter 7, Life Orientation (Grades R-9) is covered by the 
RNCS (DoE 2002a). Life Orientation (Grades 10-12) is covered by the NCS (DoE 2003a). The 
LPGs for Life Orientation were published in 2008 (DoE 2008a). Religion Studies (Grades 10-12) 
is covered by the NCS (DoE 2005) and its LPGs were published in 2008 (DoE 2008b).  
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In this analysis it is not the focus to evaluate or judge the definitions, but rather to 
look at how the definitions exclude and include specific elements. In this analysis 
I may also refer to some tacit or latent assumptions and the assumptions that are 
explicit. It is also clear that the definitions may include elements that may become 
clearer in the Learning Programme Guidelines (LPGs) (as interpretations of the 
NCS and RNCS), e.g. the definition of ‘religion’. The Policy and its definitions will 
therefore have to be read together with the RNCS, NCS as well as the LPGs. 
 
6.4.2.1 Religion 
 
Religion is used to describe the comprehensive and fundamental 
orientation in the world, mostly with regard to ideas of divinity, spiritual and 
non-secular beliefs and requiring ultimate commitment, including (but not 
restricted to) organised forms of religion and certain worldviews, as well as 
being used collectively to refer to those organisations which are 
established in order to protect and promote these beliefs (2003:30). 
 
This definition of ‘religion’ contains the following elements: 
• It is an orientation which is both comprehensive and fundamental. 
• This orientation mostly130 refers to ideas of divinity, spiritual and non-
secular beliefs. 
• This orientation requires ultimate commitment, includes (but not 
restricted to) organised forms of religions and certain worldviews131. 
• This definition will also encompass those organisations which sole 
reason to exist is to protect and promote these beliefs. 
 
This definition is fairly clear on what it includes. It is wide enough to encompass 
all the world religions. From the definition it is also clear that the major defining 
factor seems to be the binary of secular and non-secular. Non-secular beliefs and 
                                            
130 What exactly is meant by ‘mostly’ may be further explained in the Learning Programme 
Guidelines and will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
131 What exactly is meant by ‘worldviews’ may be further explained in the Learning Programme 
Guidelines and will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
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worldviews are included in the definition of ‘religion’132. It is not clear whether 
non-secular encompasses worldviews or whether non-secular only refers to 
beliefs. In this regard the interpretation of the RNCS and LPGs will be 
enlightening133. 
 
In the Foreword to the Policy the Minister makes it clear that South Africa is not a 
secular state. ‘We do not have a state religion. But our country is not a secular 
state where there is a very strict separation between religion and the state’ 
(2003:6). The Policy itself continues to describe its view of a secular state and 
the implications of such a state for the relationship with religion: 
A modern secular state, which is neither religious nor anti-religious, in 
principle adopts a position of impartiality towards all religions and other 
worldviews. A separationist model for the secular state represents an 
attempt to completely divorce the religious and secular spheres of a 
society, such as in France or the United States. Drawing strict separation 
between religion and the secular state is extremely difficult to implement in 
practice, since there is considerable interchange between religion and 
public life. Furthermore, a strict separation between the two spheres of 
religion and state is not desirable, since without the commitment and 
engagement of religious bodies it is difficult to see us improving the quality 
of life of all our people (paragraph 3; 2003:8). 
 
The Policy judges that a secular state is ‘extremely difficult to implement in 
practice, since there is considerable interchange between religion and public life’. 
Such a strict separation is also not necessarily desirable, since it is difficult ‘to 
see us improving the quality of life of all our people’ without the ‘commitment and 
engagement of religious bodies’. The Policy however acknowledges that secular 
worldviews are a reality in the present South African context and that tolerance 
between religions also extends to the relationship between religions and secular 
worldviews. Paragraph 14 states ‘Religion in education must contribute to the 
                                            
132 In Chapter 1 I already indicated that the Policy’s definition of ‘religion’ will be scrutinised. In my 
critical evaluation of the Policy (Chapter 8) I will return to discuss this definition of ‘religion’, and 
consider the exclusion of atheism, secularism and Satanism as examples of structures of 
meaning and meaning-making.  
133 Also see Paragraph 14 of the Policy where it would seem as if secular worldviews are 
specifically addressed.  
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advancement of interreligious toleration and interpersonal respect among 
adherents of different religious or secular worldviews in a shared civil society’. 
 
Not only will learners be taught tolerance towards religions and secular 
worldviews, the Policy also prescribes that any overt or covert ‘denigration of any 
religion or secular world-view’ will not be tolerated (paragraph 14, 2003:12). The 
Policy therefore not only acknowledges the reality of securalism, but also 
warrants that secularism, as a worldview will not be denigrated. The Policy 
however goes one step further to state that children will be exposed not only to 
different religions but also to secular worldviews. The Policy states that 
We believe we will do much better as a country if our pupils are exposed 
to a variety of religious and secular belief systems, in a well-informed 
manner, which gives rise to a genuine respect for the adherents and 
practices of all of these, without diminishing in any way the preferred 
choice of the pupil (paragraph 29; 2003:16; italics added). 
 
 
Paragraph 62 warrants that students who hold ‘secular or humanist beliefs’ will 
not be forced to partake in any activities where they may feel denigrated or 
compromised. 
The separation of learners according to religion, where the observance 
takes place outside of the context of a school assembly, and with equitably 
supported opportunities for observance by all faiths, and appropriate use 
of the time for those holding secular or humanist beliefs (2003:26). 
 
 
Paragraph 63 further warrants parity in the allocation of resources ‘with respect to 
religion, religious or secular belief’ (2003:27). Though secular worldviews may 
‘naturally’ be part of the rest of the school curriculum, the Policy specifically 
describes its inclusion of secular worldviews as a feature of how the Policy views 
Religion Education. Paragraph 29 (2003:16) refers to the fact that pupils will be 
exposed to ‘a variety of religious and secular belief systems’. The Policy 
furthermore undertakes to teach about ‘secular values’. Paragraph 30 states: 
 
 313
By teaching about religious and secular values in an open educational 
environment, schools must ensure that all pupils, irrespective of race, 
creed, sexual orientation, disability, language, gender, or class, feel 
welcome, emotionally secure, and appreciated (2003:17). 
 
From the Policy it would seem as if learning about secularism could be seen as 
being part of the scope of the Policy’s understanding of the range of the curricular 
content. From the ‘Definitions’ of the Policy (2003:30) it is however clear that 
secular worldviews may be excluded from the Policy’s range. The Policy defines 
‘religion’ as follows: 
Religion is used to describe the comprehensive and fundamental 
orientation in the world, mostly with regard to ideas of divinity, spiritual and 
non-secular beliefs and requiring ultimate commitment, including (but not 
restricted to) organised forms of religion and certain worldviews, as well as 
being used collectively to refer to those organisations which are 
established in order to protect and promote these beliefs (italics mine). 
 
The Policy’s definition of ‘religion’ on the one hand specifically includes ‘non-
secular beliefs’. It reiterates a certain openness by stating that the definition 
includes ‘organised forms of religion and certain worldviews’ (italics mine) and 
that the definition is not restricted to these. The Policy is clear that it is biased 
towards religion. Paragraph 2 states ‘we therefore promote the role of religion in 
education’ (2003:7) and ‘genuinely advance the interests of religion’ (2003:7). 
 
With regard to claims that the Policy promotes religious relativism, paragraph 68 
of the Policy illuminates the Policy’s understanding of the different truth claims of 
different religions. The Policy states 
Religion can contribute to creating an integrated educational community 
that affirms unity in diversity. In providing a unified framework for teaching 
and learning about religion, religions, and religious diversity, this policy on 
Religion and Education does not suggest that all religions are the same. 
Nor does it try to select from different religious traditions to try and build a 
new unified religion. The policy is not a project in social or religious 
engineering designed to establish a uniformity of religious beliefs and 
practices.  
 
The policy does not promote religious relativism, religious syncretism, or 
any other religious position in relation to the many religions in South Africa 
and the world. By creating a free, open space for exploration, the policy 
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demonstrates respect for the distinctive character of different ways of life 
(2003:28). 
 
The Policy refutes the notion (and allegations) that ‘all religions are the same’ or 
that the Policy attempts to build a ‘unified religion’. The Policy does not want to 
bring about ‘uniformity of religious beliefs and practices’. By refuting these claims 
or allegations, the Policy refuses to be drawn into a debate about the ‘truth’ of 
each religion or worldview compared to others. The word ‘compare’ is not used 
by the Policy at all. Neither does the word ‘truth’ appear in the Policy. Paragraph 
22 (2003:14) specifically states that the Policy chose against the alternative to 
follow a confessional approach to Religious Studies. 
 
If any accusation of ‘relativity could be entertained, it would be the allegation that 
the Policy is particularly positive about the role and content of religion. The 
outcomes for Grades 8 and 9 state that a pupil can discuss ‘the contributions of 
organisations from various religions to social development’ and that a pupil 
‘reflects on and discusses the contributions of various religions in promoting 
peace’ (Appendix to the Policy, 2003:32; italics mine). In Chapter 8 when I will 
evaluate the Policy I will return to the question whether the Policy foresees a 
‘sanitised’ curriculum.  
 
6.4.2.2 Confessional or sectarian approaches 
 
Confessional or sectarian approaches are used to describe those 
approaches to religion which take as a starting point a particular set of 
beliefs, or a particular perspective informed by these beliefs, and advance 
a position that is narrowly based on these beliefs and perspectives 
(2003:30). 
 
The ‘or’ in the title of this definition may imply that these two concepts are 
regarded as opposites or that the Policy regards these two concepts as 
synonyms. From the definition it is however clear that the title of this definition 
could have read ‘confessional/sectarian approaches’. The Policy therefore does 
not refer to the popular use of the concept ‘sect’ or ‘sectarian’, where one group 
defines the other as being a ‘sect’ implying that the other group is further from the 
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‘truth’ than they are. Teachers will encounter claims in their classrooms of 
students considering their own faith as being the ‘true’ faith while claiming that 
other faiths are sects in a negative connotation. 
 
6.4.2.3 Religion Education 
 
Religion Education describes a set of curriculum outcomes which define 
what a pupil should know about religion. Further definition is provided in 
paragraphs 17 to 19 of the policy (2003:30). 
 
From this definition it would seem as if the Policy defines ‘curriculum’ and 
‘curriculum outcomes’ as ‘what a pupil should know about religion’ (emphasis 
mine)134. This definition also refers to specific paragraphs of the Policy itself, 
namely paragraphs 17 to 19. For the purpose of coherence, I will now analyse 
paragraphs 17 to 19. 
 
Paragraph 17 
Religion Education is a curricular programme [referring in a footnote to the 
National Curriculum Statement for Grades R-9 (2002)] with clear and age-
appropriate educational aims and objectives, for teaching and learning about 
religion, religions, and religious diversity in South Africa and the world. The 
study of religion must serve recognisable educational goals that are 
consistent with the aims and outcomes of other learning areas, and like other 
learning areas in the curriculum, programmes in Religion Education must 
contribute to developing basic skills in observation, listening, reading, writing, 
and thinking. 
 
The elements of Religion Education this paragraph uses are: 
• There are clear and age-appropriate educational aims and objectives. 
• The focus is on teaching and learning about religion, religions and 
religious diversity in South Africa and the world. 
• Religion Education as part of the school curriculum contributes to 
‘recognisable educational goals that are consistent with the aims and 
outcomes of other learning areas, and like other learning areas in the 
curriculum’. 
                                            
134 In Chapter 8 I will return to this definition of ‘curriculum’. 
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• Religion Education ‘must contribute to developing basic skills in 
observation, listening, reading, writing, and thinking’. 
  
Paragraph 17 explains the interrelatedness of the outcomes envisaged for 
Religion Education as curricular programme and the broader educational goals of 
the total school curriculum.  
 
Paragraph 18 
Religion Education may also be justified by the educational character of the 
programme, which includes the common values that all religions promote, 
such as the human search for meaning and the ethic of service to others, and 
by the desirable social ends, such as expanding understanding, increasing 
tolerance, and reducing prejudice. Religion Education is justified by its 
contribution to the promotion of social justice, and respect for the 
environment, that can be served by this field of study within the school 
curriculum (2003:13). 
 
Although paragraph 18 justifies the inclusion of Religion Education in the school 
curriculum, it does not necessarily assist in ‘defining’ the concept. In this 
justification as provided in Paragraph 18, it becomes clear what is expected of 
the inclusion of Religion Education in the curriculum and how the Policy intends 
to define the concept. The paragraph describes the educational character of the 
programme as promoting values common to all religions. As examples of such 
values, the meaning and ethic of serving others as well as serving ‘desirable 
social ends’ like ‘expanding understanding, increasing tolerance, and reducing 
prejudice’. Religion Education is further justified for its promotion of social justice 
and respect for the environment. 
 
Paragraph 18 illustrates the ideological nature of policy-making, although the 
Minister (Foreword to the Policy) states that the Policy does not ‘impose any 
narrow descriptions or ideological views regarding the relationship between 
religion and education’ (2003:6; italics added). The Policy foresees an implicit 
and explicit function of the study of religions in the context of the ideology of 
constitutional patriotism and nation-building. From paragraph 18 it is clear that 
the focus will be on not only those values common to all religions, but more 
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explicitly on the positive values common to all religions. Without judging or 
evaluating this ‘sanitisation’ of the curriculum135, it suffices to state that the Policy 
embodies and translates the values as envisaged within the Constitution and the 
NCS to the extent that they are also found common in religions.  There is an 
interesting possibility for conflict here between the Policy as embodiment of the 
values contained in the Constitution and values as embodied in a specific 
religion.  
 
Paragraph 19 
Religion Education, with educational outcomes, is the responsibility of the 
school. Religion Education shall include teaching and learning about the 
religions of the world, with particular attention to the religions of South Africa, 
as well as worldviews, and it shall place adequate emphasis on values and 
moral education. In this, we re-assert the policy of the Revised National 
Curriculum Statement to offer education about religions for the purposes of 
achieving ‘religious literacy’. Religion Education is therefore an educational 
programme with clearly defined and transferable skills, values and attitudes 
as the outcomes. It is a programme for teaching and learning about religion in 
its broadest sense, about religions, and about religious diversity in South 
Africa and the world. Religion Education should enable pupils to engage with 
a variety of religious traditions in a way that encourages them to grow in their 
inner spiritual and moral dimensions. It must affirm their own identity, while 
leading them to an informed understanding of the religious identities of others 
(2003:13). 
 
Paragraph 19 deals with two issues. Firstly it locates Religion Education and 
secondly clarifies the purpose of Religion Education within the broader 
curriculum. 
 
The Policy locates the responsibility of Religion Education with the school. 
Secondly it locates Religion Education within the curricular domain of values and 
moral education. The location of Religion Education is important and significant 
as it establishes accountability and responsibility. The Policy locates the 
responsibility with the school, and not with religious leaders in the community or 
religious organisations or parents. Though all of these role players were involved 
in the drafting of the Policy and all of them may to a certain extent be involved in 
                                            
135 The sanitisation of the curriculum will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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the teaching of Religion Education, the responsibility of Religion Education is 
located with the school. This does not only make schools accountable for the 
implementation of the Policy but also require schools to translate the LPGs 
against the intentions of the NCS and Policy. 
 
Religion Education is secondly located within the curricular domain of values and 
moral education. Other options may have included antiracist or genocide/ 
holocaust, citizenship or peace education. It could also have been located in 
multicultural studies. The implications of locating Religion Education within the 
curricular domain of values and moral education will be discussed and evaluated 
in Chapter 8. 
 
Paragraph 19 further describes the purpose of including Religion Education 
within the school curriculum. Paragraph 19 states that the purpose of Religion 
Education is to entail learners’ achievement of ‘religious literacy’. Paragraph 19 
repeats the parameters as being ‘religion in its broadest sense, about religions, 
and about religious diversity in South Africa and the world’. The purpose for 
engaging learners ‘with a variety of religious traditions’ is to encourage ‘them to 
grow in their inner spiritual and moral dimensions. It must affirm their own 
identity, while leading them to an informed understanding of the religious 
identities of others’ (2003:13). 
 
The term ‘religious literacy’ as such, occurs only once in the Policy in the context 
of other literacies. Paragraph 44 states the following: 
The Revised National Curriculum Statements of Curriculum 2005 
understand literacy to include cultural literacy, ethical literacy, and religion 
literacy; creativity to include developing capacities for expanding 
imagination, making connections, and dealing with cultural difference and 
diversity; and it understands critical reflection to include comparison, 
cultural analysis, ethical debate, and the formulation and clarification of 
values. These capacities are captured in the outcome statements and 
assessment standards of the curriculum, and are obligatory for all pupils.  
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The Policy does not define or describe what it means with ‘religious literacy’, 
unless this is defined in Paragraph 19’s statement that Religion Education should 
‘affirm their own identity, while leading them to an informed understanding of the 
religious identities of others’ (2003:13). Should this be the case it would seem as 
if religious literacy has, according to the Policy, two dimensions namely to be 
firstly grounded in their own identity and spiritual growth, and secondly, to have 
an informed understanding of other religious traditions. This seems to concur with 
a definition of religious literacy provided by Prothero (2007). Prothero compares 
religious literacy to literacy in general and says: 
 
…literacy refers to the ability to use a language – to read and perhaps to 
write it, to manipulate its vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. In this sense 
religious literacy refers to the ability to understand and use in one’s day-to-
day life the basic building blocks of religious traditions – their key terms, 
symbols, doctrines, practices, sayings, characters, metaphors, and 
narratives (2007:22). 
 
He expands the parameters of his definition by referring to ‘religious literacies’ to 
not only refer to different bases for religious literacies e.g. ‘Protestant literacy, 
Sunni literacy, Zen literacy’, but also to include ‘functional capacities of religious 
literacy’ namely  
• ritual literacy (knowing the meaning and content of different rituals) 
• confessional literacy (a foundational understanding of the basic 
doctrines) 
• denominational literacy (knowing about the differences between e.g. 
Reform and Conservative Judaism) 
• narrative literacy (knowing the foundational narratives and characters 
in the major religions) (Prothero 2007:23). 
 
He compares his own understanding of religious literacies with that of Clooney 
(2002) who speaks of ‘interreligious literacy’ (Prothero 2007:24). Prothero warns 
however that ‘religious literacy cannot and should not be reduced to memorizing 
and regurgitating dogma’ but ‘It is the ability to participate in our ongoing 
conversation about the private and public powers of religions’ (Prothero 2007:27). 
This also means to ‘firm up’ students’ knowledge of their own religions (Prothero 
2007:28). 
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In Chapter 8 I shall return to the definition and description of the term ‘religious 
literacy’ and compare it to ‘religious competency’ (as described by Heimbrock, 
Scheilke & Schreiner 2001). 
 
6.4.2.4 Religious Observances 
 
Religious Observances are those activities and behaviours which 
recognise and express the views, beliefs and commitments of a particular 
religion, and may include gatherings of adherents, prayer times, dress and 
diets (2003:13). 
 
The definition of ‘religious observances’ identifies the following elements, namely 
• activities and behaviours which 
• recognise and express the views, beliefs and commitments of a 
particular religion and 
• may include gatherings of adherents, prayer times, dress and diets. 
 
The inclusion of a definition for ‘religious observances’ in the Policy has as 
purpose to address the past practices in schools where school assemblies or 
even official school time have been used for religious observances. As will be 
discussed later, the Policy specifically regulates religious observances on school 
premises. 
 
6.4.2.5 Religious Instruction 
 
Religious instruction refers to a programme of instruction which is aimed at 
providing information regarding a particular set of religious beliefs with a 
view to promoting adherence thereto (2003:13). 
 
The definition of ‘religious instruction’ clearly distinguishes it from Religion 
Education. Where Religion Education teaches ‘about religion in its broadest 
sense, about religions, and about religious diversity in South Africa and the world’ 
(2003:13; italics added), ‘religious instruction’ has as focus to promote adherence 
to a specific faith/belief.   
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6.4.2.6 Religious Studies136 
 
Religious Studies is a subject which is being proposed for the Further 
Education and Training band (Grades 10-12), in which pupils undertake 
the study of religion and religions in general, with the possibility of 
specialisation in one or more in that context. 
 
While Religion Education is the focus within the Learning Area called Life 
Orientation (Grades R-12), Religious Studies (later Religion Studies) is an 
independent subject in the Further Education and Training Band (FETB) (Grades 
10-12). From the definition the following is clear: 
• The difference between Religion Education and religious instruction is 
maintained in this subject. 
• Only during the FET phase are learners allowed to specialise in a 
specific context137. 
 
6.4.2.7 The school day 
 
The School Day entails that portion of each day in which it is compulsory 
for teachers and pupils to be at school. The seven hours of contact time 
that is expected of teachers is part of the school day, but the latter also 
includes breaks and compulsory activities, including assemblies, 
designated extra-mural activities and possible disciplinary sanctions. No 
pupil or teacher may be absent from school during the school day, without 
permission (1996:31). 
 
From the overview of the historical development of the Policy it is clear that it was 
necessary to describe the parameters of the ‘school day’. As indicated in 
Paragraph 19 and explored during the discussion of the definition of Religion, 
Religion Education is located as ‘the responsibility of the school’ (2003:13). 
Religion Education is furthermore differentiated from Religious Observances and 
                                            
136 This proposed subject is called Religious Studies in the Policy but in the NCS (Grades 10-12) 
it is referred to as Religion Studies. 
137 The Learning Programme Guidelines for the FET will give clearer guidance with regard to what 
is meant by ‘specialisation’ and ‘context’. 
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Religious Instruction. The Policy’s guidelines regarding religious observances 
during and after the official school day necessitates defining ‘the school day’.138 
 
The definition of the ‘school day’ specifically sets its parameters as 
• The period in which pupils and teachers are compelled to be at school. 
• The seven hours of contact time expected of teachers including ‘breaks 
and compulsory activities, including assemblies, designated extra-
mural activities and possible disciplinary sanctions’ (2003:31). 
• No teacher or pupil may be absent (without permission) from school 
during the school day. 
 
The definition of the ‘school day’ therefore indicates that during these hours in the 
location of the school, Religion Education (Grades R-12) is a compulsory part of 
the school curriculum for which the responsibility lies with the school. 
 
6.5 ANALYSING THE POLICY ARGUMENT 
 
In analysing the Policy argument, I will adapt the framework for a policy argument 
as proposed by Dunn (1994). Under Dunn’s definition of ‘Policy Information’ I will 
include Bardach’s (1977) steps of looking at the policy problem and the 
alternatives the policy considered.  In Chapter 8 I will evaluate the different 
outcomes and tradeoffs of the alternatives (Bardach 1996) as mentioned in the 
Policy as well as those alternatives that are not mentioned by the Policy. 
 
To reiterate, Dunn’s schema of analysing a policy argument (1994:66) includes 
the following six elements, namely Policy-relevant information (I), Policy-claim 
(C), Warrant (W), Backing (B), and Qualifier (Q). I will start by analysing the 
Policy information: how the Policy defines the problem and what alternatives the 
Policy considers. The policy itself proposes four alternatives on a state versus 
                                            
138 The previous dispensation allowed and supported religious observances during official school 
hours. It is therefore crucial for the Policy to define Religious Observances and the “School day” 
as this is a significant departure from past policies and practices.  
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religion level as well as four policy specific alternatives. I will then continue to 
look at the Policy warrants and backing and then finally at the Policy claim(s). 
 
6.5.1 Policy information 
 
Policy-relevant information (I) includes all evidence at the analyst’s disposal. 
‘Information about policy problems, policy futures, policy actions, policy 
outcomes, and policy performance’ (Dunn 1994:66). 
 
6.5.1.1 Policy problem 
 
The policy problem as defined and described by the Policy seems to be multi-
layered or multi-dimensional. The Policy tries to translate practical consequences 
flowing from the reality of the religious diversity in South Africa, the guidance of 
the Constitution with regard to this diversity as well as trying to provide a 
framework for engagement between the state and religions on the one hand and 
specific curriculum guidelines for religion education on the other.  
 
The following figure (Figure 6.2) illustrates the problem-spaces the Policy 
addresses: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The Policy problem 
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While South Africa has no history of religious conflict, our past is permeated with 
examples of unjust treatment of specific ‘others’ whether religious, race or 
gender. There are also examples where a specific race or religion was treated 
preferentially to others.  The Policy therefore attempts to take diversity as a 
characteristic of South Africa seriously. The Constitution as well as the Policy are 
aimed at preventing discrimination and ensuring equality and equity, but also to 
find ways to celebrate diversity. In the Foreword to the Policy, the Minister 
already indicates, ‘The Policy is necessary and overdue to give full expression to 
the invocation of religion in our Constitution and the principles governing religious 
freedom’ (2003:6). Paragraph 9 (2003:10) states: 
South Africa is a multi-religious country. Over 60 per cent of our people 
claim allegiance to Christianity, but South Africa is home to a wide variety 
of religious traditions. With a deep and enduring indigenous religious 
heritage, South Africa is a country that also embraces the major religions 
of the world. Each of these religions is itself a diverse category, 
encompassing many different understandings and practices. At the same 
time, many South Africans draw their understanding of the world, ethical 
principles, and human values from sources independent of religious 
institutions. In the most profound matters of life orientation, therefore, 
diversity is a fact of our national life (italics mine). 
 
 
The Policy is very explicit in moving beyond a strict ‘regulatory’ or ‘legislative’ 
prohibitive of discrimination environment to a framework where diversity is 
celebrated –  
Our diversity of language, culture and religion is a wonderful national 
asset. We therefore celebrate diversity as a unifying national resource, as 
captured in our Coat of Arms: !KeE.IXarra (Unity in Diversity) . This policy 
for the role of religion in education is driven, by the dual mandate of 
celebrating diversity and building national unity (paragraph 10; 2003:10). 
 
In dealing with the ‘given’ nature of diversity, the Policy tries to ‘translate’ and 
embody the Constitution’s guidelines regarding diversity.  In the Foreword, the 
Minister already states that ‘The Policy is necessary and overdue to give full 
expression to the invocation of religion in our Constitution and the principles 
governing religious freedom’ and ‘Following the lead of the Constitution and the 
South African Schools Act, we provide a broad framework within which people of 
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goodwill will work out their own approaches’ (2003:6). The Policy is founded on 
four principles of which the first principle is that the relationship between 
education and religion ‘must flow directly from the constitutional values of 
citizenship, human rights, equality, freedom from discrimination, and freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion’ (paragraph 8: 2003:9). 
Paragraph 11 reiterates this position and adds, ‘By enshrining these basic 
values, the Constitution provides the framework for determining the relationship 
between religion and education in a democratic society’ (2003:10).  
 
The Policy very specifically provides guidance regarding creating spaces for 
expression and personal choice, and prevention of coercion. The Policy states 
Our Constitution has worked out a careful balance between freedom for 
religious belief and expression and freedom from religious coercion and 
discrimination. On the one hand, by ensuring that ‘Everyone has the right 
to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion’, the 
Constitution guarantees freedom of and for religion, and citizens are free 
to exercise their basic right to religious conviction, expression, and 
association. On the other hand, by ensuring equality in the enjoyment of 
all the rights, privileges, and benefits of citizenship, the Constitution 
explicitly prohibits unfair discrimination on grounds that include religion, 
belief, and conscience. Protected from any discriminatory practices based 
on religion, citizens are thereby also free from any religious coercion that 
might be implied by the state (paragraph 12; 2003:10-11 – referring to 
sections 15(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). 
 
Although the Policy embodies and translates the Constitution, the Policy also 
refers to and quotes other legislation and frameworks, like the South African 
Schools Act (Act 94 of 1996), the National Curriculum Statement for Grades R-9 
(Schools) (2002), Norms and Standards for Educators (Government Notice #82 
published in Government Gazette 20844 of 4 February 2000) and the National 
Curriculum Statement and Assessment Standards for Life Orientation. 
 
In translating and embodying the Constitution, the Policy also makes visible a 
specific understanding of the relationship between the state and religion. The 
Minister of Education foreshadows the cooperative model the Policy proposes 
between state and religion by saying in the Foreword of the Policy that the Policy 
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‘…displays a profound respect towards religious faith and affirms the importance 
of the study of religion and religious observances’ (2003:6). Paragraph 5 
(2003:9) states –  
Under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, the state, neither 
advancing nor inhibiting religion, must assume a position of fairness, 
informed by a parity of esteem for all religions, and worldviews. This 
positive impartiality carries a profound appreciation of spirituality and 
religion in its many manifestations, as reflected by the deference to God in 
the preamble to our Constitution, but does not impose these. 
 
It is crucial to notice that the Policy describes the relationship as ‘neither 
advancing nor inhibiting religion’ and assuming a ‘position of fairness, informed 
by a parity of esteem for all religions, and worldviews’. The Policy describes the 
state’s position towards religion as ‘positive impartiality carries a profound 
appreciation of spirituality and religion in its many manifestations, as reflected by 
the deference to God in the preamble to our Constitution’ but also states that as 
state it would ‘not impose these’ (paragraph 5; 2003:9) 
 
The last dimension of the Policy-problem is to provide a framework for the 
relationship between education and religion that would take the previous three 
dimensions seriously. The Policy states ‘we identify the distinctive contribution 
that religion can make to education, and that education can make to teaching and 
learning about religion, and we therefore promote the role of religion in education’ 
and ‘In doing so we work from the premise that the public school has an 
educational responsibility for teaching and learning about religion and religions, 
and for promoting these, but that it should do so in ways that are different from 
the religious instruction and religious nurture provided by the home, family, and 
religious community’ (paragraph 1; 1996:7). The necessity to define the 
relationship between religion and education is also necessary in the light of the 
past. ‘We do so also in the recognition that there have been instances in which 
public education institutions have discriminated on the grounds of religious belief, 
such that greater definition is required. In many cases pupils of one religion are 
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subjected to religious observances in another, without any real choice in the 
matter’ (paragraph 2; 2003:7). 
 
The Policy is a therefore a specific response to these four circles but is also 
embedded in a wider context of education in South Africa. The Policy describes 
this context as follows – ‘This policy links religion and education with new 
initiatives in cultural rebirth (the African Renaissance), moral regeneration, and 
the promotion of values in our schools. Religion can play a significant role in 
preserving our heritage, respecting our diversity, and building a future based on 
progressive values’ (paragraph 7; 2003:9). The Policy continues 
An open, plural, historically informed, intercultural and interdisciplinary 
study of religion in public schools is consistent with international 
developments, and it is also a model gaining popularity and relevance 
throughout Africa. This approach engages religion as an important human 
activity, which all pupils should know about if they are to be deemed to be 
educated (paragraph 24; 2003:15; italics mine). 
 
The Policy therefore re-imagines a definition of what it means to be educated and 
includes “religious literacy” as a key ingredient. The Policy however goes further 
to state that the study of religions is also a vehicle for imparting morals and 
values. The Policy states –  
As systems for the transmission of values, religions are key resources for 
clarifying morals, ethics, and building regard for others. Religions embody 
values of justice and mercy, love and care, commitment, compassion, and 
co-operation. They chart profound ways of being human, and of relating to 
others and the world. Moral values are not the monopoly of religions, 
much less the exclusive property of any one religion However, when 
Religion Education is given its rightful place in our education system, the 
important process of imparting moral values can be intensified through 
teaching and learning about religious and other value systems (paragraph 
31, 2003:13). 
 
6.5.1.2 Policy alternatives 
 
The Policy distinguishes between several alternatives or options. From the Policy 
it is clear that there are three different layers of issues that the Policy considered. 
The meta-level deals with the broadest context of the relationship between state 
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and religion and explores the possible alternatives to guide this relationship. On a 
meso-level, the Policy considers different alternatives regarding the relationship 
between education and religion. Lastly, on a micro-level the Policy shares its 
framework for specific curriculum outcomes according to various education 
levels.  The following table (Table 6.2) describes the meta-alternatives for the 
relationship between state and religion as described by the Policy: 
 
Table 6.2: The meta-alternatives for the relationship between state and 
religion 
 
Alternatives 
for the 
relationship 
between state 
and religion 
(meta) 
Description  Appropriateness 
 
Theocracy 
 
 
A theocratic model identifies the 
state with one particular religion or 
religious grouping. In some cases, 
this model has resulted in a situation 
in which the state and religion 
become indistinguishable 
(paragraph 3; 2003:7). 
 
‘In a religiously diverse 
society such as South 
Africa, this model 
clearly would be 
inappropriate’ 
(paragraph 3; 2003:7). 
Repressionist At the other extreme, a repressionist 
model is based on the premise that 
the state should act to suppress 
religion. In such a model, the state 
would operate to ‘marginalise or 
eliminate religion from public life’ 
(paragraph 3; 2003:7).  
In a religiously active 
society such as South 
Africa, any 
constitutional model 
based on state hostility 
towards religion would 
be unthinkable 
(paragraph 3; 2003:7). 
Secular/separ-
ationist model 
A modern secular state, which is 
neither religious nor anti-religious, in 
principle adopts a position of 
impartiality towards all religions and 
other worldviews. A separationist 
model for the secular state 
represents an attempt to completely 
divorce the religious and secular 
spheres of a society, such as in 
France or the United States 
(paragraph 3; 2003:8).  
Drawing strict 
separation between 
religion and the secular 
state is extremely 
difficult to implement in 
practice, since there is 
considerable 
interchange between 
religion and public life. 
Furthermore, a strict 
separation between the 
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two spheres of religion 
and state is not 
desirable, since without 
the commitment and 
engagement of religious 
bodies it is difficult to 
see us improving the 
quality of life of all our 
people (paragraph 3; 
2003:8). 
Cooperative 
model 
In a co-operative model, both the 
principle of legal separation and the 
possibility of creative interaction are 
affirmed. Separate spheres for 
religion and the state are established 
by the Constitution, but there is 
scope for interaction between the 
two. While ensuring the protection of 
citizens from religious discrimination 
or coercion, this model encourages 
an ongoing dialogue between 
religious groups and the state in 
areas of common interest and 
concern. Even in such exchanges, 
however, religious individuals and 
groups must be assured of their 
freedom from any state interference 
with regard to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief, 
and opinion (paragraph 3; 2003:8). 
 
In regard to the relationship between 
religion and public education, we 
propose that the cooperative model 
which combines constitutional 
separation and mutual recognition, 
provides a framework that is best for 
religion and best for education in a 
democratic South Africa (paragraph 
4; 2003:8). 
In this manner the 
complementary, 
cooperative principle as 
regards the relationship 
between the state and 
organised religion is 
given substance in 
education, and 
optimised in the best  
interests of both 
spheres (paragraph 66; 
2003:27). 
 
The table that follows (Table 6.3) attempts to describe the meso-alternatives the 
Policy considered determining the exact relationship between education and 
religion: 
Table 6.3: The meso-alternatives  
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Alternatives 
for the 
relationship 
between 
education 
and religion 
(meso) 
 
Description Appropriateness 
Confessional 
or sectarian 
forms of 
religious 
instruction  
Religious instruction is 
understood to include 
instruction in a particular faith 
or belief, with a view to the 
inculcation of adherence to 
that faith or belief (paragraph 
54; 2003:24).  
 
Religious instruction of this 
sort is primarily the 
responsibility of the home, the 
family, and the religious 
community, and more needs 
to be done to strengthen this 
role, in place of the school. 
Religious Instruction would in 
most cases be provided by 
clergy, or other persons 
accredited by faith 
communities to do so 
(paragraph 55; 2003:24) 
Confessional or sectarian forms 
of religious instruction in public 
schools are inappropriate for a 
religiously diverse and 
democratic society. As 
institutions with a mandate to 
serve the entire society, public 
schools must avoid adopting a 
particular religion, or a limited 
set of religions, that advances 
sectarian or particular interests.  
Schools should be explaining 
what religions are about, with 
clear educational goals and 
objectives, in ways that increase 
understanding, build respect for 
diversity, value spirituality, and 
clarify the religious and non-
religious sources of moral 
values. We owe this to our 
pupils, as well as to parents, 
citizens, and taxpayers 
(paragraph 22; 2003:14). 
 
Single-faith 
approach 
…a single-faith approach to 
religious education… 
provides religious instruction 
in one religion (paragraph 23; 
2003:15).  
 
 
Multiple 
single-faith 
approach 
…provides parallel 
programmes in religious 
instruction for an approved 
set of religions (paragraph 23; 
2003:15). 
 
 
Multi … a multi tradition approach Instead of promoting a religious 
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tradition 
approach 
to the study of Religion 
Education does not promote 
any particular religion. It is a 
programme for studying about 
religion, in all its many forms, 
as an important dimension of 
human experience and a 
significant subject field in the 
school curriculum (paragraph 
23; 2003:15). 
position, a programme in 
Religion Education pursues a 
balanced approach to teaching 
and learning about religion. 
Religion Education can provide 
opportunities for both a deeper 
sense of self-realisation and a 
broader civil acceptance of 
others. It can balance the 
familiar and the foreign in ways 
that give pupils new insights into 
both. It can facilitate the 
development of both empathetic 
appreciation and critical 
analysis. It can teach pupils 
about a world of religious 
diversity, but at the same time it 
can encourage pupils to think in 
terms of a new national unity in 
South Africa. By teaching pupils 
about the role of religion in 
history, society, and the world, a 
unified, multi-tradition 
programme in the study of 
religion can be an important part 
of a well-balanced and complete 
education (paragraph 25; 
2003:15). 
 
On a micro-level regarding the specific outcomes of what the curriculum should 
entail at every level, the Policy does not share the different options it had139. It 
does provide the rationale for introducing Religious Education at an early age by 
referring to international research –  
Research has concluded that Religion Education can be introduced at an 
early age, in ways that are appropriate to the development of pupils. With 
an age-appropriate emphasis placed on living together, and without any 
overt or covert pressures, religion education can start at a very early 
stage. Pupils in the Foundation Phase could begin a study of religious 
diversity by exploring the more tangible forms of religion, the observable 
aspects of religious diversity found in churches, mosques, synagogues, 
                                            
139 Where the Policy shared the alternatives it considered on the meta- as well as meso-levels, 
the Policy does not share which outcomes it rejected, or considered in deciding stated outcomes 
at the end. Paragraph 50 states that the Policy considered research evidence with regard to the 
age-appropriateness of the curriculum. 
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temples, and other places of gathering for religious life (paragraph 50; 
2003:23)140. 
 
Table 6.4 provides an overview of the assessment criteria per level for Religion 
Education as part of Life Orientation (the micro-level of the curriculum). 
 
Table 6.4: The outcomes and assessment criteria as per Grade 
 
Grade      We know this when the learner: 
Grade R Identifies and names symbols linked to own religion. 
Grade 1 Matches symbols associated with a range of religions in South Africa. 
Grade 2 Describes important days from diverse religions. 
Grade 3 Discusses diet, clothing and decorations in a variety of religions. 
Grade 4 Discusses significant places and buildings in a variety of religions. 
Grade 5 Discusses festivals and customs from a variety of religions. 
Grade 6 Discusses the dignity of the person in a variety of religions. 
Grade 7 Explains the role of oral traditions and scriptures in a range of the 
world's religions. 
Grade 8 Discusses the contributions of organisations from various religions to 
social development. 
Grade 9 Reflects on and discusses the contributions of various religions in 
promoting peace. 
Grade 
10141 
Display an understanding of the major religions, ethical traditions and 
indigenous belief systems in South Africa, and explore how they 
contribute to a harmonious society. 
Grade 
11 
Reflect on knowledge and insights gained in major religions, ethical 
traditions and indigenous belief systems, and clarify own values and 
beliefs with the view to debate and analyse contemporary moral and 
spiritual issues and dilemmas. 
Grade 
12 
Reflect on and explain how to formulate a personal mission statement 
based on core aspects of personal philosophies, values, beliefs, 
religions and ideologies, which will inform and direct actions in life and 
contribute meaningfully to society. 
 
 
 
6.5.1.3 Policy warrants and backing 
                                            
140 For an introduction into the issues regarding the notion of age-appropriateness in relation to 
the inclusion of the study of religion(s) into school curricula, see the discussion on ‘perceptions 
regarding children’s abilities’, by Roux1998:165-168. Also see Roux (2005) Ferguson (1998).  
141 The Assessment criteria for Grades 10-12 regarding the study of religion are not indicated in 
the Policy. These assessment criteria are encapsulated in the NCS for Life Orientation (Grades 
10-12) (DoE 2003a).  
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Within this multi-dimensional problem-space, the Policy seems to make the 
following key assumptions or Policy warrants and Policy backings (Dunn 1996). A 
Policy warrant according to Dunn is: ‘… an assumption in a policy argument 
which permits the analyst to move from policy-relevant information to policy 
claim’ and ‘The role of the warrant is to carry policy-relevant information to a 
policy claim about which there is disagreement or conflict, thus providing a 
reason for accepting the claim’ (Dunn 1994:66; italics in the original). 
 
There seems to be four Policy warrants in the Policy, namely: 
• Diversity has the ability to separate but also unite 
• South Africa is not a secular state142 
• The multi-religious character of South Africa 
• Religion as vehicle for values education 
 
Warrant 1: Diversity has the ability to separate but also unite 
In the Foreword to the Policy the Minister states:  
As a democratic society with a diverse population of different cultures, 
languages and religions we are duty bound to ensure that through our 
diversity we develop a unity of purpose and spirit that recognises and 
celebrates our diversity. This should be particularly evident in our public 
schools where no particular religious ethos should be dominant over and 
suppress others. Just as we must ensure and protect the equal rights of all 
students to be at school, we must also appreciate their right to have their 
religious views recognised and respected (2003:6). 
 
Warrant 2: South Africa is not a secular state 
‘We do not have a state religion. But our country is not a secular state where 
there is a very strict separation between religion and the state’ (Foreword to the 
Policy 2003:6) 
 
                                            
142 I use ‘secular state’ here as the state being totally impartial towards religion. The Policy is the 
embodiment of the state’s positive impartiality towards religion. Though the state respects and 
maintains the separation of the two spheres (state and religion), the Policy speaks of a profound 
and explicit appreciation of the religious character of South Africa.  
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Warrant 3: The multi-religious character of South Africa 
South Africa is a multi-religious country. Over 60 per cent of our people 
claim allegiance to Christianity, but South Africa is home to a wide variety 
of religious traditions. With a deep and enduring indigenous religious 
heritage, South Africa is a country that also embraces the major religions 
of the world. Each of these religions is itself a diverse category, 
encompassing many different understandings and practices. At the same 
time, many South Africans draw their understanding of the world, ethical 
principles, and human values from sources independent of religious 
institutions. In the most profound matters of life orientation, therefore, 
diversity is a fact of our national life (paragraph 9; 2003:10). 
 
Warrant 4: Religion as vehicle for values education 
Religion Education may also be justified by the educational character of 
the programme, which includes the common values that all religions 
promote, such as the human search for meaning and the ethic of service 
to others, and by the desirable social ends, such as expanding 
understanding, increasing tolerance, and reducing prejudice. Religion 
Education is justified by its contribution to the promotion of social justice, 
and respect for the environment, that can be served by this field of study 
within the school curriculum (paragraph 18; 2003:13). 
 
As systems for the transmission of values, religions are key resources for 
clarifying morals, ethics, and building regard for others. Religions embody 
values of justice and mercy, love and care, commitment, compassion, and 
co-operation. They chart profound ways of being human, and of relating to 
others and the world. Moral values are not the monopoly of religions, 
much less the exclusive property of any one religion However, when 
Religion Education is given its rightful place in our education system, the 
important process of imparting moral values can be intensified through 
teaching and learning about religious and other value systems (paragraph 
31; 2003:17). 
 
A Policy backing according to Dunn is 
…additional assumptions or claims or rebuttals form the substance of 
policy issues… The consideration of rebuttals helps the analyst anticipate 
objections and serves as a systematic means for criticising one’s own 
claims, assumptions, and arguments (Dunn 1994:68). 
 
According to my analysis, there are two backings as well as a Policy rebuttal that 
acts as a Policy backing. The first backing refers to ‘international developments’ 
and ‘popularity and relevance throughout Africa’. The second backing refers to 
research regarding the appropriateness to introduce Religion Education even at 
an early age. The Policy rebuttal addresses what the Policy does not support 
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namely religious relativism, religious syncretism or claims that all religions are the 
same. 
 
Policy backing 1 
An open, plural, historically informed, intercultural and interdisciplinary 
study of religion in public schools is consistent with international 
developments, and it is also a model gaining popularity and relevance 
throughout Africa. This approach engages religion as an important human 
activity, which all pupils should know about if they are to be deemed to be 
educated (paragraph 24, 2003:15). 
 
Policy backing 2 
Research has concluded that Religion Education can be introduced at an 
early age, in ways that are appropriate to the development of pupils. With 
an age-appropriate emphasis placed on living together, and without any 
overt or covert pressures, religion education can start at a very early 
stage. Pupils in the Foundation Phase could begin a study of religious 
diversity by exploring the more tangible forms of religion, the observable 
aspects of religious diversity found in churches, mosques, synagogues, 
temples, and other places of gathering for religious life (paragraph 50; 
2003:23). 
 
Policy rebuttal 
Religion can contribute to creating an integrated educational community 
that affirms unity in diversity. In providing a unified framework for teaching 
and learning about religion, religions, and religious diversity, this policy on 
Religion and Education does not suggest that all religions are the same. 
Nor does it try to select from different religious traditions to try and build a 
new unified religion. The policy is not a project in social or religious 
engineering designed to establish a uniformity of religious beliefs and 
practices.  
 
The policy does not promote religious relativism, religious syncretism, or 
any other religious position in relation to the many religions in South Africa 
and the world. By creating a free, open space for exploration, the policy 
demonstrates respect for the distinctive character of different ways of life 
(paragraph 68; 2003:28). 
 
Before I continue let us just look at where we are in the analysis of the Policy 
argument.  I have explored the Policy argument so far by looking at the Policy 
Information and how the Policy described and defined the Policy problem. The 
Policy also considered several alternatives on three different levels (meta, meso 
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and micro). The Policy opted for a specific alternative on all three levels and 
provides certain ‘warrants’ and ‘backings’ for the Policy choices.  
 
If all this is in place, the Policy continues by making certain claims – describing 
what the effects and impact will be on the alternative the Policy is proposing. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates where we are in the Policy argument as proposed by Dunn 
(1994): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: The Policy argument according to Dunn (1994) 
 
 
What I have not discussed yet except for the Policy claim(s), is the ‘Qualifier’ 
proposed by Dunn (1994:68). The Qualifier (Q)’“expresses the degree to which 
the analyst is certain about a policy claim’ – expressed in the ‘language of 
probability’. My analysis of the Policy has found that the Policy does not explicitly 
qualify the probability that the Policy will result in the Policy claim(s). 
 
6.5.1.4 The Policy claim 
 
The Policy claim refers to the decision of the policy makers on how to react to the 
Policy problems, considering the Policy warrants and backings as well as after 
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evaluating the Policy alternatives. The Policy claim refers to the conclusion of a 
policy argument. The claim follows on the policy information by implying 
‘therefore…’ ‘Hence, policy claims are the logical consequence of policy-relevant 
information’ (Dunn 1994:66). 
 
The Policy claim indicates a ‘solution’ and in this case, the solution is multi-
dimensional. 
 
Claim 1:  In service of democracy and nation-building 
 
‘…we set out the policy on the relationship between religion and education that 
we believe will best serve the interests of our democratic society’ (paragraph 1: 
2003:7). In the light of the diversity, our country’s past as well as several options 
for imagining a future, the Policy claims that it will serve the interests ‘of our 
democratic society’. 
 
In serving South Africa’s notion of a ‘democratic society’, the Policy describes its 
mandate as follows: ‘This policy for the role of religion in education is driven, by 
the dual mandate of celebrating diversity and building national unity’ (paragraph 
7; 2003:9). Therefore, ‘The education process in general, and this policy, must 
aim at the development of a national democratic culture with respect for the value 
of all of our people's diverse cultural, religious and linguistic traditions’ (paragraph 
14; 2003:11). 
 
The study of religions as proposed by the Policy therefore is envisaged to 
‘contribute to the advancement of interreligious toleration and interpersonal 
respect among adherents of different religious or secular worldviews in a shared 
civil society’ (paragraph 14; 2003:11). 
 
The Policy is therefore in service of a specific view of possible futures but within 
remembering our divisive past: 
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We must move decisively beyond the barriers erected by apartheid; 
beyond the shields provided by ignorance of the other, which invariably 
breeds suspicion, hatred and even violence. It is time for all people of 
goodwill to know and understand the diversity of religious and other 
worldviews that are held by their fellow citizens. Every child has the right 
to quality education in this most important area of human development 
and social relations. By working together, everyone involved in education 
– teachers and pupils, principals and administrators, trade unions and 
professional associations, parents and communities – can benefit from the 
inter-religious knowledge and understanding cultivated through Religion 
and Education (paragraph 69; 2003:28). 
 
 
Claim 2: Translating the Constitution’s provisions regarding the relationship  
between state and religion as well as education and religion 
 
The second claim of the Policy is to translate and embody the principles of the 
Constitution with regard to the state’s relation to religion as well as how religion 
will be treated in education. ‘The Policy is necessary and overdue to give full 
expression to the invocation of religion in our Constitution and the principles 
governing religious freedom’ (Foreword to the Policy 2003:6). 
 
Claim 3: Provides and distinguishes between the constitutional roles for state,  
education, religious organisations and home  
 
In translating the spirit and principles of the Constitution into praxis, the Policy 
claims certain roles for different stakeholders: 
 
• The role of the state 
Under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, the state, neither 
advancing nor inhibiting religion, must assume a position of fairness, 
informed by a parity of esteem for all religions, and worldviews. This 
positive impartiality carries a profound appreciation of spirituality and 
religion in its many manifestations, as reflected by the deference to God in 
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the preamble to our Constitution, but does not impose these (paragraph 5: 
2003:9). 
 
• The role of schools, parents and religious communities 
The policy is not prescriptive, but provides a framework for schools to 
determine policies, and for parents and communities to be better informed 
of their rights and responsibilities in regard to religion and education. The 
policy genuinely advances the interests of religion, by advocating a broad 
based range of religious activities in the school (paragraph 2; 2003:7). 
 
Our policy for religion in education, therefore, is designed to support unity 
without uniformity and diversity without divisiveness. Our public schools 
cannot establish the uniformity of religious education in a single faith or the 
divisiveness of religious education through separate programmes for a 
prescribed set of faiths. Neither course would advance unity in diversity. In 
any event, as we have established, our schools are not in the business of 
privileging, prescribing, or promoting any religion. Schools have a different 
responsibility in providing opportunities for teaching and learning about our 
religious diversity and our common humanity (paragraph 70; 2003:28). 
 
• The role of education institutions 
‘…educational institutions have a responsibility for promoting multi-
religious knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of religions in South 
Africa and the world’ (paragraph 14; 2003:11). 
 
Claim 4: Religion as vehicle 
‘Religion can play a significant role in preserving our heritage, respecting our 
diversity, and building a future based on progressive values’ (paragraph 7; 
2003:9). The fourth claim envisages that the teaching about religions may play a 
preserving role, encouraging respect and building a future based on ‘progressive 
values’. 
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Claim 5: Affirm their own religious affiliation and grow in their own spirituality 
Religion Education should enable pupils to engage with a variety of 
religious traditions in a way that encourages them to grow in their inner 
spiritual and moral dimensions. It must affirm their own identity, while 
leading them to an informed understanding of the religious identities of 
others (paragraph 19; 2003:13). 
 
Claim 6: In service of a common humanity 
When we provide our pupils with educationally sound programmes, they 
will gain a deeper and broader understanding of the life orientations, 
worldviews, cultural practices, and ethical resources of humanity. As they 
develop creative and critical abilities for thinking about religion and 
religions, pupils will also develop the capacities for mutual recognition, 
respect for diversity, reduced prejudice, and increased civil toleration that 
are necessary for citizens to live together in a democratic society. 
Learning about themselves while learning about others, pupils will surely 
discover their common humanity in diversity, and be both affirmed and 
challenged to grow in their personal orientation to life (paragraph 21; 
2003:14). 
  
‘Schools have a different responsibility in providing opportunities for teaching and 
learning about our religious diversity and our common humanity’ (paragraph 70; 
2003:28). 
 
Claim 7: A unique South African response 
Our country has sufficient expertise and energy to meet the challenge of 
developing a distinctively South African approach to Religion and 
Education. As a matter of priority, we must deploy our intellect, 
imagination, talent, and human capacity in the work of creating and 
sustaining the relationship between Religion and Education (paragraph 67; 
2003:27). 
 
An attempt to cluster these seven claims into a main claim may result in the 
following: 
The Policy on Religion and Education is a unique South African response to 
defining citizenship and education, empowering learners to be established in their 
own cultures and religions as well as being competent and confident in being 
critically literate in an increasingly diverse and globalising world. The Policy 
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provides an enabling environment by establishing and demarcating clear and 
distinct roles for parents, religious bodies, educators and educational institutions. 
 
I have so far analysed the Policy argument. According to Dunn (1994:75) there 
are three forms of policy analysis, namely prospective, retrospective and 
integrated. This analysis is therefore in a certain sense prospective – envisioning 
how it will be implemented. The Policy itself identifies certain specific roles and 
actions in order to realise the Policy claims. Figure 6.4 provides an overview of 
the Policy argument analysed according to Dunn’s (1994) proposal: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The Policy argument 
 
6.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
 
The Policy sets out clear envisaged activities, outputs and outcomes to realise its 
claims. These activities, outputs and outcomes may suggest a linear, 
chronological development in the process of implementation. This does not 
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suggest that the different aspects of implementation do not overlap and may 
even be reiterative. In outlining the implementation of the Policy, the Policy 
clearly demarcates roles and responsibilities of the main stakeholders in the 
implementation process, but also highlights a number of possible constraints and 
challenges. 
 
Looking at the Policy’s envisioning of its implementation, the Policy focuses on 
two main foci, namely curricular implementation as well as extra-curricular 
guidelines for implementation. With regard to the curricular implementation, the 
Policy identifies the following aspects: 
• Professional educators: their roles, attitude, pedagogy, religious literacy, 
integration and creativity 
• Guest facilitators 
• The role of higher education 
• The development of resources 
• The role of religious and voluntary bodies 
• The role of school governing bodies 
 
6.6.1 Professional educators 
 
6.6.1.1  Their roles 
 
The Policy is very explicit that Religion Education is the responsibility of the 
schools and more specifically the role of trained educators. Paragraph 34 states: 
‘The teaching of Religion Education in schools is to be done by appropriately 
trained professional educators registered with the South African Council of 
Educators (SACS)’ (2003:18). Religion Education in schools is about ‘a civic 
understanding of religion’ (paragraph 28; 2003:16). Religion Education is aligned 
with the roles of educators as described by the Norms and Standards for 
Educators.  
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The outcomes identified for Religion Education fit with the competences 
required of all teachers in public schools. The Norms and Standards for 
Educators (Government Notice #82 published in Government Gazette 
20844 of 4 February 2000) require all teachers to have the skills, values 
and attitudes related to a Community, Citizenship, and Pastoral Role. This 
includes the responsibility to ‘practice and promote a critical, committed, 
and ethical attitude towards developing a sense of respect and 
responsibility towards others’. Religion Education is therefore not the mere 
technical transmission of factual information; its comprehensive role is 
demonstrated in the teacher's reflexive, foundational, and practical 
competency…(paragraph 36; 2003:19). 
 
6.6.1.2  Attitude 
 
The Policy acknowledges that the implementation thereof will require a specific 
attitude from educators. The Policy states: 
The teaching of Religion Education must be sensitive to religious interests 
by ensuring that individuals and groups are protected from ignorance, 
stereotypes, caricatures, and denigration. Professional educators will have 
to develop programmes in Religion Education that serve the educational 
mission of public schools in a democratic South Africa. Curriculum 2005 
and the Revised National Curriculum Statement for Schools (Grades R -9) 
assumes that any educator, regardless of his or her personal religious 
orientation, is called upon to teach in a pluralistic public school in which 
pupils can be expected to belong to different religions. If called upon to do 
so, professional educators must accommodate this reality, in an impartial 
manner, regardless of their personal views. However, the utilisation of 
teachers in a school is managed by the school, and as with any other 
learning area, should take account of the interests, capabilities and 
sensitivities of each teacher (Paragraph 35; 2003:18). 
 
6.6.1.3  Pedagogy 
 
Here the Policy refers to ‘International guidelines’ for guiding educators from 
‘preaching to teaching’. Although the Policy acknowledges that Religion 
Education will pose unique challenges to educators, the Policy is clear that the 
pedagogical standards for Religion Education are the same as for the rest of the 
school curriculum. 
Teachers can be assisted in developing effective teaching methods for 
Religion Education. International guidelines for meeting the challenges 
and avoiding the pitfalls of teaching Religion Education are available, 
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which encourage teachers to adopt as a basic principle the distinction 
between teaching and preaching. A Religion Education lesson requires the 
same pedagogical standards of clarity of purpose, communication, 
interest, and enthusiasm that represent effective teaching in other areas of 
the school curriculum (paragraph 39; 2003:20). 
 
The Policy also foresees that educators will adopt personalised approaches to 
pedagogy. The Policy states 
Some teachers will adopt a cognitive approach to the subject, preferring a 
method of elucidation, designed to clarify the meaning of religious beliefs 
and practices in their contexts. In this method, pupils not only learn about 
the variety of religions, but they are enabled to make free and informed 
choices about religion in their personal lives. Other teachers may 
emphasise the more affective dimensions of the subject, and adopt an 
interactive approach to teaching that attempts to involve pupils in an 
exploration of the meaning and significance of religion (paragraph 40; 
2003:20). 
 
6.6.1.4  Religious literacy 
 
Interestingly, though the Policy does not explicitly describes what it understands 
under ‘religious literacy’, the Policy does however express concern about the 
‘religious illiteracy’ of educators. 
There is legitimate concern about the widespread `religion illiteracy' found 
among teachers, who call for and deserve the support that will enable 
them to deal with religion in the classroom. Teachers do need access to 
textbooks, supplementary materials, handbooks, guidelines for teaching 
methods and student assessment, and in-service training, that will allow 
them to build and sustain their professional competence and recognition 
as teachers in the subject. Guidelines and resources will be made 
available to assist teachers in dealing with issues of religion in the 
classroom, and religious organisations will be requested to assist in the 
training of teachers. In view of the serious backlog of trained religion 
educators, this aspect is also to be addressed in training serving teachers 
for the implementation of the Revised National Curriculum Statement 
(paragraph 37; 2003:20).  
 
The Policy does not dwell on describing either the educators’ religious illiteracy or 
how it may impact on the teaching of Religion Education. The Policy immediately 
continues to state how the illiteracy of teachers will be addressed and changed to 
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a position of ‘professional competence’. The support educators will receive 
includes 
• access to textbooks,  
• supplementary materials,  
• handbooks,  
• guidelines for teaching methods and student assessment, and  
• in-service training (paragraph 37; 2003:20). 
 
This support will be supplemented by ‘Guidelines and resources will be made 
available to assist teachers in dealing with issues of religion in the classroom' 
(paragraph 37; 2003:20). The Policy further suggests that religious organisations 
will be requested to assist in the training of teachers – referring to training of 
prospective and current teachers. 
 
6.6.1.5  Integration and creativity 
 
Paragraph 38 of the Policy refers to how teachers have already dealt with 
religion. The emphasis seems to be on the integration of the subject in ‘creative, 
sensitive and educationally responsible ways’ - 
Notwithstanding the difficulties, many teachers have already found 
creative ways to integrate the study of religion. Some have focused on the 
term `religion' as an example of how concepts are formed in society more 
generally. In other cases, teachers have found creative, sensitive, and 
educationally responsible ways to include religious materials and 
perspectives in other learning areas, and the value of religion has been 
recognised for the teaching of themes in history, world history, language 
and literature, including the teaching of sacred texts as literature, art and 
art history, music, health education, and even science education 
(paragraph 38; 2003:20). 
 
6.6.2 Guest facilitators 
 
The Policy is very clear that the main responsibility for teaching Religion 
Education will be ‘trained professional educators registered with the South 
African Council of Educators (SACE)’ (paragraph 34; 2003:18). Having made that 
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clear, the Policy does acknowledge the role guest facilitators can play in Religion 
Education. The Policy states 
Representatives of religious organisations who are registered with SACE 
could be engaged, and as with other learning areas, occasional guest 
facilitators from various religions may be utilised, provided that this is done 
on an equitable basis. Such guest facilitators need not be registered with 
SACE, since they and the class remain under the authority of the teacher. 
Religious organisations are therefore encouraged to explore ways in which 
schools, especially poorly resourced schools and those in remote areas, 
could also have access to such guest facilitators (paragraph 34; 2003:18). 
 
Guest facilitators do not have to be registered with the SACE. The utilisation of 
guest facilitators is to be guided by two criteria: 
• equity between the different religions 
• guest facilitators ‘remain under the authority of the teacher’ 
 
Religious organisations are foreseen to support teachers in the identification of 
guest facilitators for occasional use in schools. 
 
6.6.3 The role of higher education 
 
The Policy envisages higher education to play a specific role with regard to 
ensuring effective implementation. Paragraph 41 describes the role of higher 
education as follows (2003:21): 
 
Since Religion Education must be facilitated by trained and registered 
teachers, Higher Education Institutions are called upon to provide 
appropriate training for prospective teachers by introducing suitable 
courses in the study of religion and religions as part of teacher education 
programmes. Such teacher education programmes in the study of religion 
and religions should be of two types:  
• General basic training in the study of religion, with attention to both 
content and teaching methods, applicable to all prospective and 
serving educators in both the GET and FET bands; and  
• Specialised training for Religious Studies teachers in the FET band. 
 
The Policy specifies the recipients as ‘prospective and serving educators’ with 
regard to the GET and FET bands, and specialised training with regard to the 
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teaching of Religious Studies in the FET band. The ‘content’ of the training is 
specified to focus on ‘content as well as teaching methods’. 
 
6.6.4 The development of resources 
 
The development of appropriate resources is foreseen to address not only the 
‘religious illiteracy’ of educators, but also assist them in building ‘professional 
competency’. Paragraph 37 states: 
Teachers do need access to textbooks, supplementary materials, 
handbooks, guidelines for teaching methods and student assessment, and 
in-service training, that will allow them to build and sustain their 
professional competence and recognition as teachers in the subject. 
Guidelines and resources will be made available to assist teachers in 
dealing with issues of religion in the classroom, and religious organisations 
will be requested to assist in the training of teachers. In view of the serious 
backlog of trained religion educators, this aspect is also to be addressed in 
training serving teachers for the implementation of the Revised National 
Curriculum Statement. 
 
Paragraphs 46 and 47 further emphasise the development of appropriate 
materials as a matter of urgency as well as stipulate who should be involved in 
the development: 
Teaching materials for Religion Education in the General and Further 
Education and Training bands shall be developed as a matter of urgency 
through the collective effort of provincial authorities, learning area 
committees, tertiary institutions, publishers, materials developers, religious 
bodies and researchers in religion education.  
 
As a call to action, Tirisano requires the combined efforts of everyone 
involved in education to work towards preserving our heritage, respecting 
our diversity, and building our capacity for the future, and to this end we 
invite representatives of religious organisations to voluntarily contribute to 
the development and distribution of suitable materials for use at all ages. 
The Standing Advisory Committee for Religion in Education will advise on 
the procurement of Learning and Teaching Support materials, to ensure 
that only credible texts with correct information are used. 
 
The Policy allocates the final responsibility for the procurement of Learning and 
Teaching Support materials to the Standing Advisory Committee for Religion in 
Education (SACRED). 
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6.6.5 The role of religious and voluntary bodies 
 
The Policy is very adamant in locating the teaching of Religion Education within 
the domain of the formal compulsory curriculum (R-12) as well as being an 
educational response by trained and registered educators. The Policy is equally 
clear about the supporting role religious bodies and other voluntary organisations 
can play in the implementation. 
 
6.6.5.1  Development of the curriculum 
 
Paragraph 49 of the Policy states that religious bodies will be involved in the 
development of learning programmes.  
The Department of Education will establish representative voluntary 
bodies to develop illustrative learning programmes in Religion Education 
for different levels. While firm on the principles and parameters of Religion 
Education; which require attention to the rich variety of religions in South 
Africa and the world, any learning programme must allow space for 
dealing with local and regional concerns, and be in accordance with the 
ethos of the school . 
 
6.6.5.2  Development of support materials 
 
Paragraphs 37, 46 and 47 states the role religious and voluntary bodies play in 
the development of support materials. For example, paragraph 37 states 
 
…religious organisations will be requested to assist in the training of 
teachers. In view of the serious backlog of trained religion educators, this 
aspect is also to be addressed in training serving teachers for the 
implementation of the Revised National Curriculum Statement (2003:20) 
 
6.6.5.3  Support as guest facilitators 
Representatives of religious organisations who are registered with SACE 
could be engaged, and as with other learning areas, occasional guest 
facilitators from various religions may be utilised, provided that this is done 
on an equitable basis. Such guest facilitators need not be registered with 
SACE, since they and the class remain under the authority of the teacher. 
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Religious organisations are therefore encouraged to explore ways in which 
schools, especially poorly resourced schools and those in remote areas, 
could also have access to such guest facilitators (paragraph 34; 2003:18). 
 
6.6.5.4  Extra-curricular involvement 
 
The Policy also provides for religious bodies to be involved in extra-curricular 
activities. The Policy encourages: 
…the provision of religious instruction by religious bodies and other 
accredited groups outside the formal school curriculum on school 
premises, provided that opportunities be afforded in an equitable manner 
to all religious bodies represented in a school, that no denigration or 
caricaturing of any other religion take place, and that attendance at such 
instruction be voluntary. Persons offering Religious Instruction would do so 
under the authority of the religious body, and would not be required to be 
registered with the South African Council for Educators (paragraph 57; 
2003:25). 
 
6.6.6 The role of School Governing bodies 
 
In the Policy process as discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 5) the role of 
School Governing bodies (SGBs) was a major bone of contention. Some 
stakeholders wanted SGBs to be involved in determining curriculum content as 
well as determining which alternative (single-faith, multi-faith, or multiple faith 
approach) to follow. The Policy allocates the determination of the practice of 
religious observances in schools as the responsibility of SGBs. In paragraph 58 
the Policy states 
 
In accordance with the Constitution, the South African Schools Act, and 
rules made by the appropriate authorities, the Governing Bodies of public 
schools may make their facilities available for religious observances, in the 
context of free and voluntary association, and provided that facilities are 
made available on an equitable basis (2003:25). 
 
The Policy ascribes to the jurisdiction of the SGBs the following: 
School Governing Bodies are required to determine the nature and content of 
religious observances for teachers and pupils, such that coherence and 
alignment with this policy and applicable legislation is ensured. It may also 
determine that a policy of no religious observances be followed. Where 
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religious observances are held, these may be at any time determined by the 
school, and may be part of a school assembly. However an assembly is not 
necessarily to be seen as the only occasion for religious observance, which 
may take place at other times of the day, and in other ways, including specific 
dress requirements or dietary injunctions. Where a religious observance is 
organised, as an official part of the school day, it must accommodate and 
reflect the multi-religious nature of the country in an appropriate manner 
(paragraph 61; 2003:26). 
 
The Policy therefore demarcates the role and responsibility of SGBs as follows: 
• It is clear that SGBs do not have any say in the curriculum content of the 
teaching of Religion Education and Religion Studies.  
• The SGBs determines and oversees religious observances in schools to 
ensure that these practices are coherent and aligned to the Policy and 
applicable legislation. 
• Religious observances may take place during the school day and may be 
part of the school assembly. 
• The SGBs will also oversee ‘specific dress requirements or dietary 
injunctions’. 
 
Whenever religious observances are part of the official school day ‘it must 
accommodate and reflect the multi-religious nature of the country in an 
appropriate manner’ (paragraph 61; 2003:26) and ‘in the context of free and 
voluntary association, and provided that facilities are made available on an 
equitable basis’ (paragraph 58; 2003:25). 
 
6.6.7 The role of school management 
 
Paragraph 56 of the Policy states that the school management is responsible to 
make provision 
for important holy days, in regard to the setting of examinations and tests, to 
ensure that pupils are not prejudiced by their attendance at religious 
observances. Similarly, the possibility of a ‘release time’ for pupils to attend 
Religious Observances or Instruction off the school property may be 
considered by schools, but in each case provision must be made to catch up 
any loss of teaching and learning time. 
 351
 
Paragraph 59 provides the interpretive framework with regard to religious 
observances. It states: 
 There are various types of religious observance implied in this instance:  
• voluntary public occasions, which make use of school facilities, for 
a religious service on a day of worship or rest (Section 15(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa);  
• voluntary occasions when the school community (teachers and 
pupils) gather for a religious observance (Section 7 of the Schools 
Act and Section 15(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa);  
• observances held in a voluntary gathering of pupils and/or teachers 
during a school break; and  
• an observance which may be ongoing, and entail other dimensions 
such as dress, prayer times and diets, which must be respected 
and accommodated in a manner agreed upon by the school and the 
relevant faith authorities.  
 
All of these fall within the ambit of the school management overseen by the SGB. 
 
The Policy further encourages public participation in religious observances using 
school property. Paragraph 60 states ‘Voluntary religious observances in which 
the public participates should be encouraged. Although such religious 
observances take place on the school property, they are not part of the official 
educational function of the public school’. 
 
With regard to school assemblies, the Policy is very clear regarding its 
implementation. Paragraph 62 states: 
 
Appropriate and equitable means of acknowledging the multi-religious 
nature of a school community may include the following:  
• The separation of learners according to religion, where the 
observance takes place outside of the context of a school assembly, 
and with equitably supported opportunities for observance by all 
faiths, and appropriate use of the time for those holding secular or 
humanist beliefs;  
• Rotation of opportunities for observance, in proportion to the 
representation of different religions in the school;  
• Selected readings from various texts emanating from different 
religions;  
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• The use of a universal prayer; or  
• A period of silence. 
 
Other forms of equitable treatment may be developed which are consistent 
with this policy and applicable legislation. Where the segregation of pupils 
is contemplated, a school must consider and mitigate the impact of peer 
pressure on children, and its negative influence on the willingness of 
children to be identified as ‘different’. 
 
Paragraph 63 states 
A school assembly has the potential for affirming and celebrating unity in 
diversity, and should be used for this purpose. Public schools may not 
violate the religious freedom of pupils and teachers by imposing religious 
uniformity on a religiously diverse school population in school assemblies. 
Where a religious observance is included in a school assembly, pupils 
may be excused on grounds of conscience from attending a religious 
observance component, and equitable arrangements must be made for 
these pupils (2003:27). 
 
Paragraph 65 further iterates the parameters of the jurisdiction of school 
management. It states: 
This policy provides a framework within which Religious Observances 
could be organised at public schools. Schools and teachers should take 
cognisance of the opportunities that the framework offers for the 
development of ethical, moral, and civic values. The policy does not 
prescribe specific ways in which religious observances at public schools 
must be organised, and encourages creative and innovative approaches in 
this area. It is our hope that schools will make use of these opportunities 
(2003:27) 
 
The Policy guidelines specific to the religious observances illustrate the Policy’s 
two main foci, namely 
• The parameters of the cooperative model between the state and religion 
and secondly the specific relationship between education and religion. 
• The Policy ‘displays a profound respect towards religious faith and affirms 
the importance of the study of religion and religious observances’ 
(Foreword to the Policy, 2003:6). 
 
Weimer and Vining (1999:396) consider three factors that influence policy 
implementation: 
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• Logic of the policy 
• The nature of the cooperation it requires 
• The availability of skilful and committed people to manage its 
implementation. 
 
6.7 THE LOGIC OF THE POLICY: IS THE THEORY REASONABLE? 
 
Weimer and Vining (1999:396) suggest thinking of a policy ‘as a chain of 
hypotheses’, the one which builds on the other in order to secure successful 
implementation. The ‘greater the legal authority the adopted policy gives 
implementators’ and the ‘stronger the political support for the adopted policy and 
its putative goals’, the more likely the success of the implementation (Weimer & 
Vining 1999:397). 
 
Weimer and Vining (1999:397) refer to the work of Bardach (1977) who used the 
metaphor of an assembly process for policy implementation – ‘… an assembly 
process involving efforts to secure essential elements from those who control 
them. His metaphor suggests the generalisation that the more numerous and 
varied the elements that must be assembled, the greater the potential for 
implementation problems’ (Weimer & Vining 1999:398). They suggest the 
following questions to be answered: 
• What … elements must be assembled? 
• Who controls these elements? 
• What are their motivations? 
• What resources does the implementor have available to induce them to 
provide the elements? 
• What consequences will result if the elements cannot be obtained either 
on a timely basis or at all? 
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Weimer and Vining (1999:399) warn ‘…even when implementors have the legal 
authority to demand compliance, they will not necessarily get it at levels 
adequate for successful implementation’. 
 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
… a perfumer, however, needs more than a passably fine nose. He needs 
an incorruptible, hard-working organ that has been trained to smell for 
many decades, enabling him to  decipher even the most complicated 
odours by composition and proportion, as well as to create new, unknown 
mixtures of scent (Süskind 1986:77) 
 
 I don’t need a formula. I have the recipe in my nose (Süskind 1986:78) 
 
In the Prologue to this chapter, I started with these two quotes and then set out to 
analyse the different elements of the Policy ‘as perfume’. In starting out I 
discovered my need for a ‘formula’, and I found the ‘formula’ provided by Dunn 
(1994) very helpful in identifying the Policy argument and its different elements. 
Although the ‘formula’ was fairly clear, I discovered that in my identification of the 
different elements, I relied on my understanding of Dunn, but also an intuition, a 
tentative ‘knowing’. I am not sure that by the time I reach the end of this thesis 
that I will be able to boast like Grenouille that I had ‘the recipe in my nose’. I am 
however sure that in my analysis of the Policy, the ‘formula’ and my intuition 
allowed me to discover the different elements of the Policy. 
 
My analysis has shown that the Policy reiterated its intention in a number of 
paragraphs to provide  
• ‘a broad framework within which people of goodwill will work out their 
own approaches’ (Foreword to the Policy, 2003:6). 
• ‘a framework for schools to determine policies, and for parents and 
communities to be better informed of their rights and responsibilities in 
regard to religion and education’ (paragraph 2; 2003:7)  
• a framework for a cooperative model which is ‘best for religion and best 
for education in a democratic South Africa’ (paragraph 4; 2003:8) 
 355
• ‘a framework within which Religious Observances could be organised 
at public schools’ (paragraph 65; 2003:27); 
• ‘a unified framework for teaching and learning about religion, religions, 
and religious diversity’ (paragraph 68; 2003:28) 
 
This framework the Policy sets out to provide to schools, SGBs, pupils, parents, 
religious organisations and the communities surrounding schools, is set within 
the framework provided for in the Constitution of South Africa.  As such the Policy 
interprets and translates the guidelines and provisions in the Constitution 
regarding  
• The relationship between the state and religion 
• The relationship between education and religion 
• The roles and responsibilities of educators, school management, SGBs 
• The relationship between religious instruction, religious observances 
as well as religion education and its implications for curriculum and 
schools. 
 
Although the Policy sets out a framework for the above, the Policy is also very 
clear that its intention is to be implemented. Before learning and teaching, 
support materials can be developed, and before in-service and pre-service 
educators trained, clear guidelines regarding the curriculum envisaged by the 
Policy have to be developed. To a certain extent the success of the 
implementation ‘depends’ on how successful the NCSs and LPGs ‘translate’ the 
intentions and guidelines of the Policy into a curriculum. 
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 7, I will analyse the RNCS, NCS and LPGs. 
CHAPTER 7 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRICULUM143 AND LEARNING  
PROGRAMME GUIDELINES  
                                            
143 This use of the term ‘curriculum’ encompasses Religion Education as part of Life Orientation 
as well as Religion Studies as separate FET subject.  
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7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In Chapter 6 I analysed the Policy-as-text and explored how the Policy provides a 
framework to guide schools, SGBs, pupils, parents, religious organisations and 
the communities surrounding schools regarding the study of religion and religious 
observances in schools. In the previous chapter (Chapter 6) I also indicated that 
although the Policy provided a framework for the development of the curriculum, 
it was left to the various curriculum committees to interpret and to provide content 
and context elements of the Policy, for example, scoping ‘worldviews’.  In this 
chapter I will analyse aspects of the various curriculum documents and 
guidelines. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the documents144 that will be 
analysed: 
 
Table 7.1: Curriculum documents  
 
LIFE ORIENTATION RELIGION STUDIES 
Revised National Curriculum Statement 
Grades R-9 (Schools), Overview (DoE, 
2002a). 
National Curriculum Statement Grades 
10-12 (General), Religion Studies 
(DoE, 2005).  
 
Revised National Curriculum Statement 
Grades 10-12 (General), Life 
Orientation DoE, 2002b). 
National Curriculum Statement Grades 
10-12 (General), Learning Programme 
Guidelines, Religion Studies (DoE, 
2008b)145. 
 
National Curriculum Statement Grades 
10-12 (General), Life Orientation (DoE 
2003a). 
 
Revised National Curriculum Statement 
Grades R-9 (Schools), Teacher’s Guide 
for the development of Learning 
Programme Policy Guidelines, (DoE, 
2003b). 
 
National Curriculum Statement Grades  
                                            
144 There were several drafts of some of these documents that were available at different times. 
The different drafts contained the input from different stakeholders. The documents in Table 1 
represent the documents available on the official DoE website on 20 May: 
http://www.education.gov.za/Curriculum/Curriculum.asp Accessed 20 May 2008. 
145 Referred to in the text as NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) 
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10-12, Teacher Guide, Life Orientation 
(DoE, 2006).  
National Curriculum Statement Grades 
10-12 (General), Learning Programme 
Guidelines, Life Orientation (DoE, 
2008a).  
 
 
 
In introducing the scope of this chapter, it is necessary to locate the analysis of 
the Revised Curriculum Statements (RNCs)146, National Curriculum Statements 
(NCSs) and Learning Programme Guidelines (LPGs) within the framework 
provided by Dunn (1994:17) that I have used in Chapter 6 (Figure 7.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The policy analysis framework (Dunn 1994:17) 
The RNCSs, NCSs and LPGs give gestalt to the intentions and guidance of the 
Policy. The Policy and the RNCS (2002b) were developed simultaneously. The 
RNCS (DoE 2002a) was adopted in 2002 and the Policy in 2003. The NCS for 
Religion Studies (DoE 2005) followed the acceptance of the Policy. The LPG for 
                                            
146 When the abbreviations RNCS and NCS are used without dates, it refers in general to the 
RNCS and the NCS as official documentation. In some cases I refer to the RNCSs and NCSs as 
well as the LPGs collectively as ‘curriculum documents’. 
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Life Orientation (Grades 10-12) as well as the LPG for Religion Studies (Grades 
10-12) were drafted and finally published in 2008. The development of these 
curriculum documents and guidelines are therefore processes that can be 
regarded to fall in the phase of ‘policy implementation’, the fourth phase of 
Dunn’s (1994) framework (Figure 7.1).  
 
The following figure (Figure 7. 2) illustrates my understanding of the interrelated 
nature of the various processes accompanying and following the formulation and 
acceptance of the Policy: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: An overview of the interrelated nature of the processes  
accompanying and following the formulation of the Policy 
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Circle 1 illustrates the concurrent development of the Policy with the processes 
surrounding the revision of Curriculum 2005147. Circle 2 illustrates the adoption 
of the RNCS (DoE 2002a) in 2002 and the Policy’s adoption in 2003. After the 
Policy was adopted, Circle 3, the NCS for Life Orientation (Grades 10-12) was 
published (DoE 2003a), the curriculum for the subject Religion Studies (Grades 
10-12) (NCS DoE 2005) was developed and NCS/LPGs formulated (finally 
published in 2008).  Circle 4 illustrates how the development of the NCS/LPG 
relates to the development of teaching and learning support materials and the 
training of pre-service and in-service educators.  
 
Circle 5 shows that what actually happens in the classroom depend on the 
successful interrelation and ‘translation’ of the previous processes. Should all the 
processes successfully translate the intentions and framework of the Policy, the 
Policy claim (Circle 6) should be realised. In Chapter 6 I concluded the Policy 
claim as follows: 
 
The Policy on Religion and Education is a unique South African response to 
defining citizenship and education, empowering learners to be established in their 
own cultures and religions as well as being competent and confident in being 
critically literate in an increasingly diverse and globalising world. The Policy 
provides an enabling environment by establishing and demarcating clear and 
distinct roles for parents, religious bodies, educators and educational institutions. 
 
Paragraph 49 of the Policy states that  
The Department of Education will establish representative voluntary 
bodies to develop illustrative learning programmes in Religion Education 
for different levels. While firm on the principles and parameters of Religion 
Education; which require attention to the rich variety of religions in South 
Africa and the world, any learning programme must allow space for 
dealing with local and regional concerns, and be in accordance with the 
ethos of the school (2003:23; italics my own). 
                                            
147 Curriculum 2005 refers to the official title of the curriculum at that stage. The revision process 
started already in 2002/2003.  
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It is important to note that the reference in the Policy to ‘learning programmes’ in 
paragraph 49 (2003:23) does not refer to the LPGs as they were developed, but 
is rather a generic reference to the involvement of voluntary bodies in the 
development of the curriculum. Figure 7.3 illustrates an overview of how I will 
proceed in this chapter: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Overview of Chapter 7 
 
I will proceed to analyse the RNCS (DoE 2002a), NCS (DoE 2003a and DoE 
2008a) and RNCS/LPG DoE 2003b) applicable to Life Orientation and then 
continue to analyse the NCS (DoE 2005) and NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) on Religion 
Studies as an independent subject in the FET band (Grades 10-12).   
 
7.2 THE CURRICULUM AND LEARNING PROGRAMME GUIDELINES FOR 
LIFE ORIENTATION148 
 
The Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS, DoE 2002b) states that the 
Learning Outcomes for the General Education and Training Band for Grades R-9 
                                            
148 It is important to note that the curriculum for Life Orientation is covered by the RNCS (R-9) 
(2002a) and the NCS (10-12) (2003a). The NCS/LPGs for Life Orientation (Grades 10-12) were 
finally published in 2008 (DoE 2008a). 
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are based on critical and developmental outcomes that are inspired by the 
Constitution. The RNCS (DoE 2002b:1-2) describes the critical and 
developmental outcomes as follows: 
 
The critical outcomes envisage learners who are able to: 
 
1. identify and solve problems and make decisions using critical and creative 
thinking; 
2. work effectively with others as members of a team, group, organisation 
and community; 
3. organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and 
effectively; 
4. collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information; 
5. communicate effectively using visual, symbolic and/or language skills in 
various modes; 
6. use science and technology effectively and critically, showing 
responsibility towards the environment and the health of others; and 
7. demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems by 
recognising that problem solving contexts do not exist in isolation (DoE 
2002b: 1). 
 
The developmental outcomes envisage learners who are also able to: 
 
1. reflect on and explore a variety of strategies to learn more effectively; 
2. participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national, and global 
communities; 
3. be culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of social contexts; 
4. explore education and career opportunities; and 
5. develop entrepreneurial opportunities (DoE 2002b:2). 
 
Religion Education (as part of Life Orientation) and Religion Studies (as subject 
in the FET band) specifically contribute to critical outcome 7 (‘demonstrate an 
understanding of the world as a set of related systems by recognising that 
problem solving contexts do not exist in isolation’) and developmental outcomes 
2 (‘participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national, and global 
communities’) and 3 (‘be culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of 
social contexts’).  
 
These critical and developmental outcomes are envisaged to be attained in four 
distinct phases namely 
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• Foundation Phase (Grades R-3)  
• Intermediate Phase (Grades 4-6) 
• Senior Phase (Grades 7-9) (RNCS 2002a:13) 
• Further education and training (FET) (DoE 2008a) 
 
The RNCS (DoE 2002a:15-16) describes the different Learning Programmes for 
the first three phases (Foundation, Intermediate and Senior) as follows: 
In the Foundation Phase, there are three Learning Programmes: Literacy, 
Numeracy and Life Skills. In the Intermediate Phase, Languages and 
Mathematics are distinct Learning Programmes. Learning Programmes 
must ensure that the prescribed outcomes for each learning area are 
covered effectively and comprehensively. Schools may decide on the 
number and nature of other Learning Programmes based on the 
organisational imperatives of the school, provided that the national 
priorities and developmental needs of learners in a phase are taken into 
account. In the Senior Phase, there are eight Learning Programmes based 
on the Learning Area Statements. 
 
In the first two phases, Religion Education is addressed under the Learning 
Programme ‘Life Skills’. During the Senior phase, Religion Education is 
addressed under the Learning Area ‘Life Orientation’. The seven other Learning 
Areas of the Senior phase are: 
• Languages; 
• Mathematics; 
• Natural Sciences; 
• Social Sciences; 
• Arts and Culture; 
• Economic and Management Sciences; and 
• Technology (RNCS DoE, 2002b:2). 
 
Life Orientation as one of the Learning Areas is envisaged as follows: ‘It guides 
and prepares learners for life and its possibilities. Life Orientation specifically 
equips learners for meaningful and successful living in a rapidly changing and 
transforming society’ (RNCS, DoE 2002a:26). Life Orientation as distinct 
Learning Area is foreseen to fulfil the following purpose (RNCS 2002b:4): 
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The Life Orientation Learning Area aims to empower learners to use their 
talents to achieve their full physical, intellectual, personal, emotional and 
social potential. Learners will develop the skills to relate positively and 
make a contribution to family, community and society, while practising the 
values embedded in the Constitution. They will learn to exercise their 
constitutional rights and responsibilities, to respect the rights of others and 
to show tolerance for cultural and religious diversity in order to build a 
democratic society. 
 
The Life Orientation Learning Area will enable learners to make informed, 
morally responsible and accountable decisions about their health and the 
environment. Learners will be encouraged to acquire and practise life skills 
that will assist them to respond to challenges and to play an active and 
responsible role in the economy and in society. 
 
Life Orientation has the following five outcomes (RNCS 2002a:26)149, but the 
content and assessment criteria for each outcome differ according to the phase 
in which learners are (RNCS DoE 2002b:7-71). The Learning Outcomes are as 
follows: 
• Learning Outcome 1: Health Promotion  
The learner will be able to make informed decisions regarding personal, 
community and environmental health. 
• Learning Outcome 2: Social Development  
The learner will be able to demonstrate an understanding of and 
commitment to constitutional rights and responsibilities, and to show an 
understanding of diverse cultures and religions.  
• Learning Outcome 3: Personal Development:  
The learner will be able to use acquired life skills to achieve and extend 
personal potential to respond effectively to challenges in his or her world.  
• Learning Outcome 4: Physical Development and Movement  
The learner will be able to demonstrate an understanding of, and 
participate in, activities that promote movement and physical development. 
• Learning Outcome 5: Orientation to the World of Work  
The learner will be able to make informed decisions about further study 
and career choices (RNCS DoE, 2002a:26). 
 
The following figure (Figure 7.4) illustrates the relation of the RNCS (DoE 2002b) 
with the eight Learning Areas and how a Learning Area (in this case Life 
Orientation) expands into Learning Outcomes, core content and concepts. 
                                            
149 The Foundation and Intermediate Phases cover only the first four Learning Outcomes, while 
the Senior Phase includes all five Learning Outcomes. 
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Figure 7.4:  The RNCS, Learning Areas and Learning Area Outcomes and 
content  
 
Religion Education falls in the second focus of Life Orientation, called ‘Social 
Development’. Social Development is described as follows (RNCS DoE 
2002b:5)150: 
In a transforming and democratic society, personal development needs to 
be placed in a social context so as to encourage the acceptance of 
diversity and commitment to democratic values. Discrimination on the 
basis of race, origin and gender remains a challenge for learners in the 
post-apartheid era. To address these issues, this Learning Area Statement 
deals with human rights as contained in the South African constitution, 
social relationships and diverse cultures and religions. 
 
                                            
150 Social development is never again described like this in curriculum documents that followed, 
e.g. the Teacher’s Guide for the development of Learning Programme Guidelines, Life Orientation 
(DoE 2003a) as well as the Teacher’s Guide, Life Orientation (DoE 2006). 
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Religion Education within the context of ‘Social Development’ is described by the 
RNCS as follows (DoE 2002b:6): 
The term ‘religion’ in this Life Orientation Learning Area Statement is used 
to include belief systems and worldviews. Religion Education in the Revised 
National Curriculum Statement for Grades R-9 (Schools) rests on a division 
of responsibilities between the state on the one hand and religious bodies 
and parental homes on the other. Religion Education, therefore, has a civic 
rather than a religious function, and promotes civic rights and 
responsibilities. In the context of the South African Constitution, Religion 
Education contributes to the wider framework of education by developing in 
every learner the knowledge, values, attitudes and skills necessary for 
diverse religions to co-exist in a multi-religious society. Individuals will 
realise that they are part of the broader community, and will learn to see 
their own identities in harmony with those of others. 
 
The Learning outcomes of the Life Orientation Learning Area are foreseen to 
equip learners to ‘live productive and meaningful lives in a transforming society. 
Their [the outcomes] focus is the development of self-in-society’ (RNCS 2002b:5; 
italics in the original). The RNCS (2002b:5) describes South African society in 
which learners will play productive and responsible roles as follows:  
The features of contemporary South Africa, and the nature of the personal 
challenges learners encounter in this society, guide the choice of the 
content of this Learning Area Statement. South African society is 
characterised by socio-political change. Prejudice, often in the form of 
racism, is still present in post-apartheid South Africa. These prejudices 
must be acknowledged and challenged if they are to be overcome. In 
addition, the country faces the challenges of socio-economic development, 
which include an increasingly global economy, unemployment and 
environmental degradation. It is necessary to develop ways of living 
together in an emerging democracy, and of enjoying hard-won civil, 
political, social and economic rights. 
 
Learners must find a place for themselves in a world increasingly different 
from that in which their parents lived. Despite political change, learners 
live in a complex and challenging environment. Crime and violence affect 
virtually every school, community and individual learner. Environmental 
issues affect the health and well-being of many communities. Within this 
context, learners have to develop a sense of confidence and competence 
in order to live well and contribute productively to the shaping of a new 
society. 
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The RNCS (DoE 2002b:5) therefore states that in the light of socio-political 
change and the different challenges facing South African society, it is ‘necessary 
to develop ways of living together in an emerging democracy’. The RNCS (DoE 
2002b:6) further considers the integration of the Learning Areas as crucial. Not 
only is integrated learning ‘central to outcomes-based education’; successful 
integration is also required due to the ‘historically fragmented nature of 
knowledge’ (RNCS DoE 2002b:6). Integration celebrates the fact that knowledge 
construction does not happen in silos or compartments but that learning takes 
place in a dynamic networking way. Though the Learning Areas each have its 
unique ‘knowledge domains’, the outcomes and foci of other Learning Areas may 
be applicable in others. The RNCS (Teacher’s Guide, DoE 2003b:22) also 
allocates specific weighting to the four focus areas in Life Orientation as follows 
(Table 7.2): 
 
Table 7.2: Weighting in the Intermediate phase (DoE 2003b:22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to remember that there are eight Learning Areas and the total 
available time to each Learning Area is therefore an eighth. Life Orientation is 
further composed of four focus areas, and although interlinked, Religion 
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Education as envisaged by the Policy is specifically allocated within the Focus 
Area of Social Development.  
 
According to Table 7.2, Social Development is allocated 27% of the eighth 
allocated to Life Orientation. In the senior phase (grades 7-9) the percentage is 
20% (RNCS Teacher’s Guide, DoE 2003b: 23) as illustrated in Table 7.3: 
 
Table 7.3: Weighting in the Senior phase (DoE 2003b:23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As part of the focus in Learning Outcome 2 (Social development), Religion 
Education has its own assessment criteria for each grade (Table 7.4): 
 
 
 
Table 7.4: Assessment criteria 
Grade      We know this when the learner: 
Grade R Identifies and names symbols linked to own religion 
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Grade 1 Matches symbols associated with a range of religions in South Africa. 
Grade 2 Describes important days from diverse religions. 
Grade 3 Discusses diet, clothing and decorations in a variety of religions. 
Grade 4 Discusses significant places and buildings in a variety of religions. 
Grade 5 Discusses festivals and customs from a variety of religions. 
Grade 6 Discusses the dignity of the person in a variety of religions. 
Grade 7 Explains the role of oral traditions and scriptures in a range of the 
world's religions. 
Grade 8 Discusses the contributions of organisations from various religions to 
social development. 
Grade 9 Reflects on and discusses the contributions of various religions in 
promoting peace. 
Grade 
10151 
Display an understanding of the major religions, ethical traditions and 
indigenous belief systems in South Africa, and explore how they 
contribute to a harmonious society.  
Grade 
11 
Reflect on knowledge and insights gained in major religions, ethical 
traditions and indigenous belief systems, and clarify own values and 
beliefs with the view to debate and analyse contemporary moral and 
spiritual issues and dilemmas. 
Grade 
12 
Reflect on and explain how to formulate a personal mission statement 
based on core aspects of personal philosophies, values, beliefs, 
religions and ideologies, which will inform and direct actions in life and 
contribute meaningfully to society. 
 
These assessment standards are in line with international curriculum 
development and research with regard to the age-appropriateness of outcomes 
(Chidester 2003; also see Ferguson 1998 and Roux 1998). Each outcome 
allocated against a grade has been done taking into consideration the 
conceptual, cognitive and emotional development of the child at each age. This 
analysis of the RNCS (DoE 2002b) and NCS (DoE 2003a) for Life Orientation 
has highlighted the small percentage of time actually allocated to Religion 
Education within the focus of Social Development.    
 
The age-appropriateness of the assessment criteria should therefore be 
compared to the assessment criteria envisaged for particular grades. The 
                                            
151 The Assessment criteria for Grades 10-12 regarding the study of religion are not indicated in 
the Policy. These assessment criteria are capsulated in the NCS for Life Orientation (Grades 10-
12) (2003a).  
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Teacher’s Guide (RNCS DoE 2003b:31) portrays the Intermediate learner (ages 
8-14); grades 4-6) as follows: 
 
• Becoming more sensitive to how their actions affect others; 
• Beginning to consider the needs, desires and points of view of 
others; 
• Able to function co-operatively in the completion of group tasks with 
increasing ease; 
• Enjoying the challenge of tackling independent tasks; 
• Beginning to reveal the desire to take control of their own learning; 
• Attempting to satisfy their curiosity about the world around them 
through active participation and critical enquiry in the learning 
process; 
• Beginning to seek more order; while still manifesting spontaneity and 
creativity; 
• Becoming more deliberate and methodical in their approach; 
• Increasingly able to apply acquired methods in new contexts; 
• Increasingly able to access, record and manipulate information; and 
• Increasingly able to investigate, compare and assess critically.  
 
The assessment criteria envisaged for Grades 4-6 are: 
Grade 4 Discusses significant places and buildings in a variety of religions  
Grade 5 Discusses festivals and customs from a variety of religions  
Grade 6 Discusses the dignity of the person in a variety of religions  
 
Compared to the profile of learners in Grades 4-6, the assessment criteria as 
envisaged by the Policy will expose learners to the differences between groups 
as they become more sensitive to the needs of others. Learners at this age are 
increasingly able and interested to ‘investigate, compare and assess critically’ 
and the assessment criteria will on the one hand stimulate exploration and also 
satisfy the curiosity of learners during this phase. 
 
During the FET phase, Life Orientation the following outcomes are envisaged: 
Learning Outcome 1: Personal Well-being 
The learner is able to achieve and maintain personal well-being. 
• Learning Outcome 2: Citizenship Education 
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The learner is able to demonstrate an understanding and appreciation of 
the values and rights that underpin the Constitution in order to practise 
responsible citizenship, and enhance social justice and sustainable living.  
• Learning Outcome 3: Physical Education 
The learner is able to demonstrate an understanding and appreciation of 
the values and rights that underpin the Constitution in order to practise 
responsible citizenship, and enhance social justice and sustainable living. 
• Learning Outcome 4: Careers and Career Choices 
The learner is able to demonstrate self-knowledge and the ability to make 
informed decisions regarding further study, career fields and career 
pathing (NCS DoE 2008a). 
 
During Grades 10-12, Religion Education is foreseen to contribute to the 
attainment of Learning Outcome 1 (Personal well-being) and Learning Outcome 
2 (Citizenship Education). I will now briefly explore some aspects of the NCS for 
Religion Education as part of Life Orientation (NCS DoE 2008a).  
 
Assessment Criterion 3 (AS3) for Learning Outcome 1 in Grade 11 states that the 
learner:  
Explores characteristics of a healthy and balanced lifestyle, factors 
influencing responsible choices and behaviour in the promotion of health, 
and the impact of unsafe practices on self and others: Concepts: balanced 
lifestyle, responsible choices and behaviours, unsafe practices and their 
impact (NCS DoE 2008a:27). 
 
Although AS3 does not mention religion specifically, the NCS indicates that life 
choices include: 
• role of parents and peers; 
• personal values and belief system; 
• religion, media, social and cultural influences; 
• economic conditions; 
• access to information (NCS DoE 2008a:27; italics added). 
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Under Learning Outcome 2 (Citizenship Education) for Grade 11, Assessment 
Criterion 2 (AS2) states that the learner ‘Formulates strategies based on national 
and international instruments for identifying and intervening in discrimination and 
violations of human rights: Concepts: strategies and instruments for dealing with 
human rights violations’. Religion is specifically addressed when learners will 
‘Define the discrimination and violation of human rights, including what causes it 
(e.g. race, class, creed, rural/urban, HIV and AIDS status, religion, ethnicity, 
xenophobia, gender, language, prejudice)’ (NCS DoE 2008a: 28). 
 
In Learning Outcome 2 (Citizenship Education), the Assessment Criterion 4 
(AS4) for Grade 10 states that a learner: ‘Displays an understanding of the major 
religions, ethical traditions and indigenous belief systems in South Africa, and 
explores how they contribute to a harmonious society’ and covers the following 
concepts: major religions; ethical traditions; belief systems; harmonious society 
and 
• Major religions (e.g. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
African religions) 
• Ethical traditions/ religious laws 
• Indigenous belief systems 
• Religious diversity in South Africa and how each religion contributes to 
harmonious living (NCS DoE 2008a: 28). 
 
Here it is noteworthy that AS4 focuses on ‘how each religion contributes to 
harmonious living’ (italics added). The same Assessment Criterion (AS4) for 
Grade 11 (Learning Outcome 2, NCS DoE 2008a:29) states that a learner: 
‘Reflects on knowledge and insights gained in major religions, ethical traditions 
and indigenous belief systems, and clarifies own values and beliefs with the view 
to debate and analyse contemporary moral and spiritual issues and dilemmas'. 
AS4 covers the following concepts: ‘major religions, own values and beliefs, 
moral and spiritual issues’ and suggest that learners 
• Analyse contemporary moral and spiritual issues such as sex, marriage 
and divorce; abortion; death penalty; crime and punishment; genetic 
cloning; etc. within the context of at least 2-3 major religions studied in 
Grade 10 
• Analyse and clarify own values and beliefs concerning the above issues 
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• Prepare for/ engage in debates/ discussions in which own values and 
beliefs are used to support one’s position on an issue/ dilemma (NCS DoE 
2008a:29). 
 
In Grade 11 learners are more critical than when younger and therefore AS4 
proposes the analysis of some controversial issues such as abortion and the 
death penalty. AS4 is furthermore an example of the study of religion by the 
Policy as critical organic study (as proposed by Wood 2001). Learners are 
encouraged not only to analyse issues like abortion and the death penalty but 
also to formulate their own opinions regarding these.  
 
The inclusion of the study of religion in Life Orientation takes a specific 
ontological and reflexive turn in Assessment Criterion 4 (AS4) for Learning 
Outcome 2, Grade 12 (NCS DoE 2008a: 29) which stipulates that the learner: 
‘Reflects on and explains how to formulate a personal mission statement based 
on core aspects of personal philosophies, values, beliefs, religion and ideologies, 
which will inform and direct own actions in life and contribute meaningfully to 
society’. AS4 covers the following concepts: ‘personal mission statement; life 
actions; responsible citizenship’ and suggests the following guidelines: 
• Awareness of own personal views, values, beliefs, religion, ideology 
• Vision – what you want to achieve in life; link to context of South African 
society explaining how aspirations will impact on society 
• Own mission statement for life – philosophies, values, beliefs, religion and 
ideologies 
• How one’s vision impacts on: one’s actions in life and one’s immediate 
community (NCS DoE 2008a: 29) 
 
The above is an example of how the Policy and NCS move beyond a mere 
theoretical exploration of religion to explore reflexively personal opinions and 
mission statements.  
 
Another example of how the NCS (DoE 2008a:29) foresees critical engagement 
is Assessment Criterion 2 (AS2) for Grade 11. AS2 foresees that the learner:  
Formulates strategies based on national and international instruments for 
identifying and intervening in discrimination and violations of human rights’ 
and covers the following concepts: strategies and instruments for dealing 
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with human rights violations; define the discrimination and violation of 
human rights, including what causes it (e.g. race, class, creed, rural/urban, 
HIV and AIDS status, religion, ethnicity, xenophobia, gender, language, 
prejudice) (NCS DoE 2008a: 28). 
 
My initial concerns that the study of religion in Life Orientation will remain on the 
level of ‘heroes and holidays’ have been found wanting. Even though the time 
allocated to Life Orientation is very little, the lack of time does not correlate with a 
lack of critical engagement. The contrary is true – learners will have ample 
opportunity to interrogate their own beliefs and assumptions as well as the beliefs 
and assumptions of religions and different worldviews. 
 
I now turn to an analysis of the NCS (DoE 2005) for the subject, Religion Studies 
(Grades 10-12) as well as the NCS/LPG for Religion Studies (DoE 2008b). 
 
7.3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRICULUM AND LEARNING PROGRAMME 
GUIDELINES FOR THE SUBJECT – RELIGION STUDIES152 
 
The NCS for Religion Studies (Grades 10-12) (DoE 2005:9) defines the subject 
of Religion Studies as follows: 
Religion Studies is the study of religion as a universal human phenomenon, 
and of religions found in a variety of cultures. Religion and religions are 
studied without favouring any or discriminating against any, whether in 
theory or in practice, and without promoting adherence to any particular 
religion. Religion Studies leads to the recognition, understanding and 
appreciation of a variety of religions within a common humanity, in the 
context of a civic understanding of religion, with a view to developing 
religious literacy (DoE 2005: 9).  
 
The Policy defined the subject Religious Studies153 as follows: 
Religious Studies is a subject which is being proposed for the Further 
Education and Training band (Grades 10-12), in which pupils undertake 
the study of religion and religions in general, with the possibility of 
specialisation in one or more in that context (bold in the original). 
                                            
152 The two main documents for this analysis are the NCS for Religion Studies (DoE 2005) and 
the NCS/LPG for Religion Studies (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b). 
153 The subject as envisaged by the Policy is called Religious Studies and in the NCS (DoE 2005) 
the subject is proposed and discussed as Religion Studies. 
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Religion Studies (NCS DoE 2005: 9-10) is foreseen to have the following 
purpose:   
 
Religion Studies enhances the constitutional values of citizenship, human 
rights, equality, freedom from discrimination and freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion. Religion Studies contributes to the 
holistic development of the intellectual, physical, social, emotional and 
spiritual aspects of the learner. The purpose is to enhance knowledge, 
skills, values and attitudes necessary to enrich each learner, interpersonal 
relationships and an open and democratic society. 
 
It is important to notice that Religion Studies is seen to be in service of ‘the 
constitutional values of ‘citizenship, human rights, equality, freedom from 
discrimination and freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion’. 
Religion Studies is further foreseen to contribute to the ‘holistic development’ of 
learners to enable them to have the necessary competencies required from 
citizens in ‘an open and democratic society’. 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005:10) foresees that Religion Studies will enrich and empower 
learners by  
• increasing knowledge and understanding about the multiplicity of 
religions; 
• contributing to an understanding of religions as sets of historically 
interrelated yet unique systems, intertwined with social, economic 
and political systems; 
• encouraging analytical, critical and constructive thinking and debate; 
• fostering creative thinking about the perennial religious concerns of 
humanity; 
• stimulating reflection on values, morals and norms; and 
• encouraging informed and responsible personal choices. 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005:10) encourages an understanding of the ‘multiplicity’ of 
religions and worldviews, ‘interrelated yet unique’, and ‘intertwined with social, 
economic and political systems’.  In engaging with religion in its interrelated 
character, learners will be encouraged to think in analytical, critical, constructive 
and creative ways about the ‘enduring concerns of humanity’. This will stimulate 
reflection on values, morals and norms resulting in ‘informed and responsible 
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personal choices’. The teaching of Religion Studies is therefore responsive to the 
contexts of religions and learners but also seeking responses from religions and 
learners. 
 
Religion Studies is further foreseen to enhance interpersonal relationships of the 
learner by: 
• cultivating sensitivity and respect across a range of religions; 
• building confidence to deal positively with differing views; 
• exploring the range of symbolic, conceptual, linguistic and other 
means of communication; and 
• encouraging the ability of individuals and communities to co-exist and 
collaborate with people of various religious persuasions in a variety of 
ways (NCS DoE 2005:10). 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005: 10) further demarcates the scope of Religion Studies as 
follows: 
• Variety of religions (Learning Outcome 1) 
• Universal dimensions of religion as a generic and unique 
phenomenon (Learning Outcome 2) 
• Topical issues in society (Learning Outcome 3) 
• Research into religion as a social phenomenon, and across religions 
(Learning Outcome 4) 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005) foresees on the one hand that learners will be capable of 
‘cultivating sensitivity and respect across a range of religions’ as well as the 
‘confidence to deal positively with differing views’. ‘Dealing with different views’ is 
part of the challenges facing humans living together. Often different views based 
in organised religions can become divisive and confrontational. The claims 
religions often make to represent the ‘truth’ or ‘the only way’, and that the 
acceptance or rejection of their claims have eternal consequences, considerably 
raises the stakes. The study of religion as ‘a human phenomenon’ (the first 
principle; italics mine) however opens the way for ‘dealing positively with differing 
views’. At least from an educational perspective, a different viewpoint from my 
own is ‘just’ another view. This does not imply that the differences are not serious 
or that ‘all paths lead to Rome’. The contrary is true when learners consider the 
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claims of a religion for its own sake and deal with the resultant ambiguity and 
often perplexing complexities154. 
 
Dealing with difference successfully is at the core of peaceful and productive co-
existence. A prerequisite for such co-existence is the ability to not only deal with 
difference but also to be able to communicate across differences using a ‘range 
of symbolic, conceptual, linguistic and other means of communication’. The 
‘beauty’ of the purpose of the Religion Studies as envisaged by the NCS (DoE 
2005) is that it does not prescribe ways of co-existence. Rather than prescribing 
‘the way’, it encourages individuals and communities to ‘co-exist and collaborate 
with people of various religious persuasions in a variety of ways’. 
 
Religion Studies also contributes to an open and democratic society by: 
• allowing the voices of all religions to be heard in the public domain on 
the basis of equality and nondiscrimination; 
• respecting and promoting the human rights and responsibilities of 
people of all religions in South Africa, Africa and the world; 
• stimulating the positive acceptance and appreciation of religious 
diversity in South African society; 
• developing the skills to communicate meaningfully and constructively 
across religions in a diverse society; and 
• reflecting on and critiquing the contributions of religions to the moral, 
social, economic and political regeneration of society (DoE 2005:10). 
 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005) for Religion Studies is clear about its intention to break 
from past practices and create new possibilities for understanding and co-
existence. The NCS (DoE 2005) posits ‘all religions to be heard in the public 
domain on the basis of equality and non-discrimination’. As such the NCS (DoE 
2005) and the Policy charter a total new dispensation from the pre-1994 
dispensation where only one religion was heard (literally in the domain of 
education and public broadcasting). The teaching of Religion Studies presents 
therefore a clear break not only from the past but also from continued pressure 
                                            
154 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of dealing with different claims to ‘truth’ in a postmodern 
context (Biesta 1995, 2004).  
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from different bodies for single-faith education. The Policy and the NCS (DoE 
2005) not only celebrate the fact that all religions will be awarded the space to be 
heard, but also that the voices of all religions will be heard.  
 
These voices will be heard in the context of respect and the promotion of ‘human 
rights and responsibilities of people of all religions in South Africa, Africa and the 
world’. Again the NCS (DoE 2005) moves beyond ‘tolerance’ to ‘positive 
acceptance and appreciation of religious diversity’. This move beyond tolerance 
is an interesting notion. The NCS (DoE 2005) describes its understanding of 
tolerance in the assessment criteria for Learning Outcome 1 – The learner is able 
to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of a variety of religions and how 
they relate to one another. The assessment criteria include the following – 
‘Analyse the notions of tolerance, respect, dialogue, conflict, fundamentalism, 
pluralism, propaganda, indoctrination and syncretism with reference to religious 
interaction’ (NCS DoE 2005:16). 
 
The last way in which the teaching of Religion Studies will contribute to an open 
and democratic society will be by encouraging learners to reflect on and critique 
the contributions of religions to ‘the moral, social, economic and political aspects 
of society’. Interestingly (and importantly) in line with the ninth principle of 
‘criticality’ learners will not only reflect on the contributions of religions to the 
moral, social, economic and political aspects of society, but will also be 
encouraged to critique these contributions. The notion of critique is also 
encouraged in critical outcome 4 as envisaged by the RNCS (DoE 2002b:2). I will 
return to the critical nature of Religion Studies throughout this analysis as well as 
in the next chapter. 
 
The outcomes as envisaged by the NCS (DoE 2005:14) for Religion Studies are 
as follows: 
1. The learner is able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of a 
variety of religions. 
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 2. The learner is able to analyse, relate and systematise universal 
dimensions of religion.  
3. The learner is able to reflect critically and constructively on topical issues 
in society.  
4. The learner is able to apply skills of research into religion as a social 
phenomenon and across religions. 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005) therefore envisages that should learners attain these 
outcomes, they would have developed a ‘religious literacy’ as foreseen in the 
NCS (DoE NCS 2005:9). It is important to note that according to the definition of 
Religion Studies (DoE NCS 2005:9) the purpose of the subject is ‘the recognition, 
understanding and appreciation of a variety of religions within a common 
humanity, in a civic understanding of religion’ (DoE NCS 2005:9). 
 
The NCS for Religion Studies (DoE NCS 2005: 12) continues to outline ten 
principles that ‘are activated, even if they function in various ways in the different 
Learning Outcomes’. These ten principles are important in providing information 
about the details of the understanding of the Policy and the NCS (DoE 2005) 
regarding Religion Studies.   
 
According to the NCS, Religion Studies: 
1. studies religion as part of culture and civic life;  
2. is constructed;  
3. educates learners as members of the human family and citizens of the 
world;  
4. is situated in the South African and African context;  
5. affirms the learners’ own religions, as well as those to which they do not 
belong;  
6. facilitates inclusive historical understanding;  
7. develops high order skills of discovering relationships and dealing with 
complexity;  
8. is socially relevant and transformative;  
9. is critical;  
10. is creative (DoE 2005:12). 
 
The NCS (DoE 2005: 13) illustrates these ten principles as follows (Figure 7.5): 
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Figure 7.5: Principles structuring the attainment of understanding in  
Religion Studies 
 
While the NCS (DoE 2005) lists these principles, the NCS/LPG for Religion 
Studies (DoE 2008b) provides a description of each of these principles. These 
descriptions provide a rich framework for the interpretation of the Policy and the 
implementation thereof. The description of the ten principles in the NCS/LPG 
(NCS DoE 2008b) provides a window on how the compilers of the Policy saw 
Religion Education in its ultimate gestalt. 
 
I will therefore continue with analysing each of these ten principles. The principle 
as described by the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) is bordered and indented, followed 
by my analysis and comments. 
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a) Studies religion as part of culture and civic life The subject deals 
strictly with religion as a human phenomenon. Religion is therefore studied 
as constructed and experienced by humans. The subject is about humans 
and how they construct the world. Religion Studies is situated in the civic 
context: it is about how humans live together, and the role that religion 
plays in that context (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:8). 
 
This first principle states explicitly what the Policy intended the study of religion 
as a ‘human phenomenon’ and not as a revelation. The NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) 
clearly opts for the study of religion as part of the way humans construct the 
world and respond to challenges, phenomena and the unknown. Although 
different religious groups consider their religion as based on revelation, the study 
of their beliefs and experiences proceeds from the basis that religion is a human 
response and construction.  
 
b) Is constructed Religion Studies is a member of the family of subjects 
making up the Learning Field of Human and Social Sciences, and is 
conducted according to the same general rules of scholarship. Its 
knowledge is therefore constructed in accordance with accepted academic 
procedures. It does not present final, unchallengeable truth, nor expect the 
mere reception of established opinion, or subscription to any academic or 
religious dogma. At every stage each Learning Outcome is to be achieved 
by way of drawing learners into, and empowering them to participate with 
confidence in active investigation and discovery (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:8). 
 
 
The NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) continues by locating the study of religion(s) as an 
‘academic procedure’ – implying that the result of the educational study of 
religion is not ‘faith’ but knowledge and understanding. This principle states that 
the study of religion(s) has as purpose not the establishing of ‘final, 
unchallengeable truth’. The teaching of the subject also does not involve ‘the 
mere reception of established opinion, or the subscription to any academic or 
religious dogma’. This principle makes it very clear that the purpose of the 
subject is not to produce followers or ‘better’ followers of any specific religion. 
Learners will not be required to subscribe to any dogma or belief. This stands in 
stark contrast to the previous dispensation prior to 1994 where only one religion 
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was taught and learners were often prompted to subscribe to the dogmas and 
beliefs of Christianity. 
 
This principle further states that the teaching of the subject will draw learners 
into, and empower them to participate in active investigation and discovery’. This 
principle gives gestalt to the OBE principle of active participation in the 
construction of knowledge and understanding. A critical and transformative 
pedagogy differs dramatically from traditional teaching practice, which resembles 
what Freire called ‘banking education’ (in Giroux 1983:284). Freire compared 
traditional education to a banking process – the teacher ‘deposits’ the knowledge 
in the learners. ‘Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and 
makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize and repeat. This 
is the “banking” concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the 
students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing deposits’ (Freire in 
Giroux 1983:284)155.  
 
c) Educates learners as members of the human family and citizens of 
the world All four Learning Outcomes presuppose and promote the 
understanding that South African learners live in a wide human context. 
The Learning Outcomes are achieved by educating the learners to exist in 
that large human horizon with confidence and sophistication. They are 
educated to develop a mental map of the entire world of religions, to 
discern features common to all religions and to investigate and 
communicate across religions (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:8). 
 
The third principle allows learners to locate themselves in the ‘wide human 
context’. It is as if this principle gestures that the teaching of the subject will open 
the window for learners to get a sense of how different peoples throughout the 
ages made sense and constructed meaning. Freire (1976, 1987) claimed that the 
best way for learners to learn is by allowing them to ‘name’ and classify 
experiences and constructs. The subject of Religion Studies will therefore allow 
learners to look through the window at the whole plethora of human meaning-
making and name these experiences and their own, for themselves in an 
                                            
155 Also see the discussion on critical pedagogy in Chapter 3.  
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academically responsible way. As such the principle envisages that the subject 
will allow learners to participate in the human quest for meaning with ‘confidence 
and sophistication’. This principle further foresees that the subject will allow 
learners to develop ‘a mental map of the entire world of religions’. It is important 
to notice that the map will not be provided but learners will develop their own 
map. Learners will further ‘discern features common to all religions’ and 
‘investigate and communicate across religions’.  
 
d) Is situated in the South African and African context All four 
Learning Outcomes are achieved to the extent that Religion Studies is 
rooted in South Africa and Africa, in which African religion and tradition is 
affirmed. When studying the variety of religions, the unique position of 
African religions will receive attention. Features common to all religions 
will include manifestations in Africa. Topics of social concern and research 
focus on South Africa (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:8). 
 
Throughout the Policy and the NCS (DoE 2005) there is a clear sense that the 
Policy and NCS (DoE 2005) locate the subject, the teachers and its learners 
within the context of Africa and South Africa. Although the subject will open the 
window for learners to see the wider range of human sense-making, the subject 
will allow learners to firstly make sense of the uniqueness of African religions but 
also allow learners to find ‘features common to all religions’ as manifested in 
African responses.  
 
This principle further establishes that the study of religion(s) is embedded in 
broader social issues and research into these issues. Learning outcome 3.1 for 
Grade 10 (NCS/LPG 2008b:39) for example foresees that learners will explore 
‘abortion, euthanasia, crime and punishment, genetic cloning, suicide, capital 
punishment, gender relations and equality, poverty, etc.’ Learning outcome 3.2 
for Grade 12 (NCS/LPG 2008b:39) encourages learners to seek solutions for 
inter alia HIV/Aids, substance abuse and poverty.  
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e) Affirms the learners’ own religions, as well as those to which they 
do not belong This implies that learners appreciate and respect their own 
traditions and the traditions of their fellow citizens. One imperative cannot 
be achieved without the other. Self-respect demands respect for others. 
This principle requires that Religion Studies educate learners to 
communicate meaningfully, constructively and effectively across religions 
(NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:9). 
 
The Policy foresees that learners are firstly located and affirmed in their own 
religious traditions. From this secure position learners will also learn to appreciate 
and respect other religious traditions. The principle is clear that ‘One imperative 
cannot be achieved without the other’. This implies that learners will while being 
affirmed in their own religious traditions also learn to appreciate and respect 
other traditions. This principle clears any possible misunderstanding that Religion 
Studies may turn into a one-faith only experience. Although learners may 
specialise in a specific religious tradition (as envisaged for Grades12), this 
principle ‘requires that Religion Studies educate learners to communicate 
meaningfully, constructively and effectively across religions’. 
 
f) Facilitates inclusive historical understanding Religion Studies 
develops the ability to locate religious phenomena in the field of human 
development. Training to discern, understand and use the concepts of 
change and continuity is central. This orientation in time concerns the 
past, present and future. It also relates to different religions existing at the 
same time. The Learning Outcomes will be achieved to the extent that 
learners are encouraged and empowered to interrogate religions across 
the barriers of time (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:9). 
 
This principle establishes again the phenomena of religion as human response. 
As such humans and groups of humans responded differently throughout the 
ages and continue to develop and change. Although religions are examples of 
some unique continuity throughout the ages, the academic study of religion also 
explores the changes that took place among traditions and within traditions. 
Therefore learners will not only be exposed to the whole range of religions across 
the world, but also be given a historical understanding of these traditions in their 
historical developments. 
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Continuity of religious traditions plays a very important role in religion, and 
although some religions have changed more than others through time, it is 
important for learners to discover a historical understanding in religion as human 
phenomena. 
 
g) Develops high order skills of discovering relationships and 
dealing with complexity Religion Studies promotes the ability to discover 
relationships in a variety of ways, with respect to a variety of phenomena. 
The subject is about discovering correlations, analysing complex 
configurations, systematising seemingly unrelated things, organising 
information and constructing coherent arguments (NCS/LPG DoE 
2008b:9). 
 
One of the central claims of OBE is the fact that it encourages knowledge to be 
constructed by and in the dynamic interrelationship between learners, educators, 
and context. As such OBE celebrates non-reductionism in education and rather 
opts to introduce learners to the complexities of phenomena without trying to 
reduce these phenomena to understandable ‘chunks’.  This principle further 
embodies a system-thinking approach to education where phenomena are 
studied as part of the bigger whole and as part of often complex relationships. 
 
Religion may be viewed (and taught) as ways in which humans throughout the 
ages have tried to reduce complexities and the unknown to some central beliefs. 
The teaching of Religion Studies according to this principle will attempt to 
discover religion(s) as ‘complex figurations’ opposed to systems of meaning-
making that ‘simplify’ life156. Geertz (1973) explored the complexities of cultures 
and stated ‘Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And worse than that, the 
more deeply it goes the less complete it is’ (1973:29). He continues by referring 
to the work of Lévi-Strauss who said ‘scientific explanation does not exist, as we 
have been led to imagine, in the reduction of the complex to the simple. Rather, it 
consists, he says, in a substitution of a complexity more intelligible for one which 
                                            
156 Also see my discussion of Goodenough’s (1959) proposals for Religionwissenschaft in 
Chapter 3.  
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is less’ (1973:33). Geertz also refers to the statement by Whitehead who said, 
‘Seek simplicity and distrust it’ (Geertz 1973:34). Geertz therefore proposes: 
We must, in short, descend into detail, past the misleading tags, past the 
metaphysical types, past the empty similarities to grasp firmly the essential 
character of not only the various cultures but the various sorts of 
individuals within each culture, if we wish to encounter humanity face to 
face (1973:53). 
 
This principle’s dedication to introduce learners to the complexities of religions, 
counters what Lange (quoted by Geertz 1973:99) said that humans ‘cannot deal 
with Chaos’ and that humans’ ‘greatest fright is to meet what he (sic) cannot 
construe…’. 
 
h) Is socially relevant and transformative Religion Studies is designed 
to improve the quality of life of people as individuals, members of the 
human family and the family of all living beings. It has a practical 
orientation, aiming at empowering learners to apply their insights to 
changing and problematic conditions in life (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:9). 
 
This eighth principle claims a particular intention in the teaching of Religion 
Studies. The intention is not for learners to only ‘know more’, but to live 
differently157. The principle states that it intends to ‘improve the quality of life’ of 
three groups of people, namely individual learners, these learners as ‘members 
of the human family’ and thirdly improve the lives of its learners as ‘members of 
all living beings’. 
 
There are two striking elements to this principle. The first striking element is the 
fact that the teaching of Religion Studies intends to locate learners also as part of 
the broader non-human family of living beings. This is a continuation of the 
previous principle in that it locates learners as part of a bigger and complex 
system. What is unique in this principle is its relativisation of human life in the 
context of other living beings. Where education in general takes place from a 
anthropocentric perspective, Religion Studies attempts to move humans from 
                                            
157 This principle brings Religion Studies in line with Religion Studies as critical organic practice, 
as proposed by Wood, (M.D) (2001). See Chapter 3.  
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being in the centre of the universe to being one of the living beings in the 
universe.  
 
The second striking element of this principle is that there is not only the intention 
to improve the quality of lives of learners and the broader family of living beings, 
but also a dedicated ‘practical orientation, aiming at empowering learners to 
apply their insights to changing and problematic conditions of life’. 
 
While this principle’s dedication to transformation is aligned with the principles of 
transformative OBE, the explicitness of its dedication is heart-warming. 
 
i) Is critical Religion Studies is question rather than answer oriented. 
Learning Outcomes are achieved when learners ask critical questions 
rather than repeat prescribed answers. All conclusions are treated as 
provisional and questionable. In addition to social relevance and 
transformation, the critical dimension extends to the practical side of life, 
including the questioning of behaviour and social structures. The subject 
therefore develops the learners’ confidence in raising questions (NCS/LPG 
DoE 2008b:9). 
 
The ninth principle is on the one hand a perfect fit for the study of religion(s) and 
on the other hand the most awkward fit. This tension is to some extent resolved 
by emphasising that religion is studied as a ‘human phenomenon’ (the first 
principle), it is further not presented as ‘final, unchallenged truth’ (the second 
principle) and studied according to accepted academic procedures (second 
principle). 
 
Religion from a confessional perspective may emphasise final, eternal truths and 
final answers to life questions. Teaching religion with the aim of increasing faith 
sometimes requires the rejection of questioning and ‘child-like’ acceptance of the 
‘final’ answers of religion. 
 
In stark contrast to such a confessional approach is this principle, which treats 
conclusions as ‘provisional and questionable’ and encourages learners to 
question. Learners are encouraged to ask questions, not only to ‘know more’, but 
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to ‘know and live differently’. This principle seems to imply that learners will be 
encouraged to question ‘behaviour and social structure’ and to increase in 
confidence in doing so. 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 8 when I critically evaluate the Policy and the 
curriculum documents, this element of the subject of Religion Studies embedded 
in the whole Policy, is the feasibility and appropriateness of critical thinking as 
part of a broader pedagogical framework for the inclusion of the study of 
religion(s).  
 
Though the Policy and the curriculum documents make it clear that learners will 
be introduced to religion as an educational enterprise, religion and critical 
thinking (at least on school level) do not necessarily go well together. Though 
religion will be studied as ‘human constructs’ (first principle), there are enough 
examples of how irrational elements in the public discourse can be and become 
when they deal with interpreting statements or comments about religion. The 
cartoon debacle of 2005 (Bonde 2007; Running & Schmidt 2006), and the 
naming of a teddy bear ‘Mohammed’ in Sudan are examples (Crilly 2007; 
Weaver 2007)158 of how innocent comments can be interpreted by religious 
communities. The NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) suggests ‘content guidelines’ and 
learners are given ample freedom to choose topics for investigation. Advice from 
teachers and possible involvement with the religious communities in question 
may prevent an ‘innocent’ but critical educational project exploding for the 
learner, the teacher, the school and immediate communities. 
 
Jensen (2002:84), currently General Secretary of the International Association for 
the History of Religions (IAHR), asks a number of questions about the role of 
Religion Education in a secular context. Some of his questions are: 
• Is RE not meant for liberation rather than domestication? 
                                            
158 In 2007 a newly arrived English teacher, Gillian Gibbons caused an international diplomatic 
incident by allowing six and seven year olds in her class in Khartoum to call a teddy Mohammed.  
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• If families and the religious institutions take care of familiarising their sons 
and daughters with their religious traditions, then may we take it that the 
aim of the school subject RE must be to de-familiarise the inherited, 
normative notions of religions?... 
• Are RE-teachers put on this earth to help pupils and students find answers 
to “existential questions” and develop their “spiritualities”? Or should they 
leave that to the pupils themselves and instead help them develop to 
deconstruct past and present discourses on religion and personal and 
cultural identity? 
 
The defamiliarising character of education is seen as an integral and essential 
part of effective teaching (e.g. Doll 1986) and a critical approach to the study of 
religion, appropriate to the level and context may present unique challenges to 
teachers, schools and religious communities. 
 
j) Is creative Religion Studies is an open-ended journey in which the 
powers of imagination and creative thinking are encouraged to emerge. 
This includes the ability to elicit new information from written or oral 
sources and to interpret material in new ways (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:9). 
 
Together with the previous ninth principle, the tenth principle celebrates ‘not-
knowing’ and not accepting traditional answers on the basis of traditional 
authority. This principle encourages learners to ‘elicit new information from 
written or oral sources and to interpret material in new ways’. This results in the 
study of religion as educational project to continually be renewed and 
rejuvenated as new insights and positions are generated by an ever-increasing 
religion literate citizenry. 
 
7.3.1 The profile of the Religion Studies learners 
 
The NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b:13) continues to outline the profile of the learner who 
registers for Religion Studies. The NCS (DoE 2005) firstly addresses the 
’learning assumed to be in place’ as well as which skills are assumed the learner 
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has after successfully reaching this stage. It is important for the NCS (DoE 2005) 
to clarify this – it may assist learners who contemplate whether or not they have 
the foundational competencies in order to be successful in this subject. These 
‘assumptions’ are also very important markers for teachers and assessors. 
 
The NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b:13) describes the learners as having proven 
themselves in the following outcomes in Grades R-9. Each learner 
 
•  identifies and names symbols linked to own religion  
•  matches symbols associated with a range of religions in South Africa  
•  describes important days from diverse religions  
•  discusses diet, clothing and decorations in a variety of religions in South 
Africa  
•  discusses significant places and buildings in a variety of religions  
•  discusses festivals and customs from a variety of religions in South Africa  
•  discusses the dignity of the person in a variety of religions in South Africa  
•  explains the role of oral traditions and scriptures in a range of the world’s 
religions  
•  discusses the contributions of organisations from various religions to 
social development  
•  reflects on and discusses the contributions of various religions in 
promoting peace.  
 
Except for being a very useful point of reference to teachers, assessors and 
learners alike, the reiteration of the outcomes as envisaged for R-9 as part of Life 
Orientation emphasises the importance of the successful teaching of the study of 
religions as part of Life Orientation. Learners are assumed to have a basic 
understanding of the following concepts by the time they register for Religion 
Studies: 
• religion  
• similarity, identity and difference  
• self and other  
• individual, community and society 
• justice, peace and conflict  
• democracy and social transformation  
• human rights and responsibility  
• gender and race (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:14) 
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‘Competencies’ as they are understood within the OBE framework consist of 
knowledge, skills, values and attitudes. After describing specific knowledge and 
skills that learners enrolling for Religion Studies should have, the NCS/LPG (DoE 
2008b:14) also makes it clear what values are considered to be in place by 
stating ‘By the end of Grade 9 the values of civic acceptance and appreciation, 
and the social skills of communication across religions will have been developed 
to an appropriate degree’. 
 
‘Acceptance’ and ‘appreciation’ (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:14) seem to imply that 
learners will move ‘beyond tolerance’. The values that learners will be assumed 
to have by the time they reach Grade 9 are ‘civic acceptance and appreciation’ 
(italics my own). Civic acceptance encompasses tolerance, but ‘appreciation’ 
goes further than acceptance. Acceptance and appreciation are further 
strengthened by ‘social skills of communication across religions’. The NCS/LPG 
(DoE 2008b:14) acknowledges that although these competencies are envisaged 
for every learner to have been attained, the NCS (DoE 2008b) acknowledges 
‘there is no uniformly typical learner entering Religion Studies in Grade 10. 
Learners come from a variety of linguistic, social, cultural and religious 
environments’ (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:14). 
 
Learners do not only come from different environments, but are confronted with 
different contexts. The NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b:14) describes the contexts learners 
will face as follows: 
The learner is part of at least four concentric contexts: local, national, 
continental and world wide. The local environment may be quite 
homogeneous, but is surrounded by a heterogeneous national and 
international environment, which applies also to religion. In many ways (for 
example, the media) the complexities of contemporary life will have 
impacted on the learner in rural areas, and to a larger extent in urban and 
peri-urban areas. The Grade 10 learner in Religion Studies is a young 
person on the threshold of a complex, challenging world, confronted by a 
host of difficult questions, in need of reliable information and the skills and 
values to exist in and make a contribution to a pluralistic world.  
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Although learners’ local context/environment may be homogenous, learners are 
and will be confronted ‘by a heterogeneous national and international 
environment, which applies also to religion’. Learners in urban, rural and peri-
urban environments will also face different challenges. In these communities 
religion may play ‘harmonizing, integrating, and psychologically supportive’ roles, 
or ‘disruptive, disintegrative, and psychologically disturbing roles’ (Geertz 
1973:143). In these societies religion may ‘somehow [be] the center and source 
of stress, not merely the reflection of stress elsewhere in the society’ (Geertz 
1973:164). 
 
Geertz gives an interesting analysis of the challenges inhabitants in a Javanese 
‘kampong’ faced during a burial rite (1973:153-169). Inhabitants as well as 
observers were confronted by the fact that traditional symbols and rituals had 
now ‘both religious and political significance’, which ‘were charged with both 
sacred and profane import’ (Geertz 1973:165). The reason I find the analysis of 
Geertz appropriate in this specific context, is his analysis of how (in the Javanese 
context) ‘economic reconstruction, religious reform, artistic renaissance’ became 
‘submerged in a diffuse political ideology’ (Geertz 1973:166). During the 
revolution to obtain freedom starting in 1945 ‘most aspects of life had become 
intensely ideologised’ (Geertz 1973:166). In the Javanese society, the ‘effect of 
this development has been to cause political debate and religious propitiation to 
be carried out in the same vocabulary’ (Geertz 1973:167). 
 
Religion Education as part of Life Orientation (R-12) and Religion Studies as 
subject in the FET phase are foreseen to give learners the necessary 
competencies to not only know about these symbols and cultural markers, but 
also be aware of their changing uses and influence. 
 
7.3.2 Ways to attain the outcomes 
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In the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b: 16-17) for Religion Studies there are also ten 
suggestions to teachers on ‘how to’ attain the outcomes envisaged for the 
subject. While the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) hints that what it suggests are practical 
ways of reaching the outcomes, the suggestions are actually principles –‘Religion 
Studies Learning Outcomes are achieved by following a number of principles 
informing the teaching practice in the classroom’ (DoE 2008b:16). It is not clear 
from the document how the principles at the beginning of the document 
(‘Principles structuring the attainment of understanding in Religion Studies’, 
NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:7-9) relate to the principles ‘informing the teaching practice 
in the classroom’ (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:16). It does seem that the first set of 
principles inform the rationale and curriculum while the second set of principles 
are provided to inform classroom practice. 
 
The two sets of principles in table format look as follows (Table 7.5)159: 
 
Table 7.5: The two sets of principles proposed by the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) 
 
 Principles structuring the 
attainment of understanding in 
Religion Studies 
Principles informing teaching 
practice 
1 - studies religion as part of culture 
and civic life 
Neither promote nor undermine any 
religion 
2 - is constructed Do not confuse Religion Studies with 
Religious Instruction 
3 - educates learners as members of 
the human family and citizens of 
the world 
Know and accept the learners 
 
4 - is situated in the South African 
and African context 
Take into account the level of 
emotional and intellectual maturity of 
learners taking Religion Studies at a 
certain stage of their lives 
5 - affirms the learners’ own 
religions, as well as those to which 
they do not belong 
 
Neither hide nor flaunt own religious 
views 
 
                                            
159 Presenting these principles in a tabular format may create an impression that the principles in 
each row directly correlates with one another. This is not the case. The tabular form does provide 
an overview of both sets of principles at a glance.  
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6 - facilitates inclusive historical 
understanding 
Explain all religions in such a way 
that their adherents are happy with 
the way it is done 
7 - develops high order skills of 
discovering relationships and 
dealing with complexity 
Use the learners’ backgrounds as a 
resource 
 
8 - is socially relevant and 
transformative 
Encourage learners to speak freely 
and confidently about their own views 
and about issues 
9 - is critical Encourage and organise firsthand 
experience of various religions 
10 - is creative Use a large range of support 
materials 
 
Table 7.5 allows us to look at both sets of principles at a glance. Unfortunately 
the ‘table format’ also gives the impression that the intention is to ‘compare’. The 
second list (in the right hand column) seems to be more practical and concerned 
with pedagogy while the first set of principles (in the left hand column) seems to 
be on a ‘meta’ level and refers to curriculum-level analysis. I am however not 
sure that this possible rationale for two sets of principles hold for all ten of them in 
each of these sets. Maybe one list of principles with implications for both the 
curriculum and pedagogy (classroom praxis) may have been clearer? At the 
moment these twenty principles may be ‘too much’. This does not take away that 
these principles are very helpful and provide critical insight into the intentions of 
the Policy and the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) for Religion Studies. 
 
I will now turn to analyse the second set of principles – ‘Principles informing the 
teaching practice in the classroom’. These principles are foreseen to inform 
‘teaching, learning and assessment’. 
 
(a) Neither promote nor undermine any religion  
Religion Studies is religiously non-aligned. Teachers may not use the 
subject to further the cause of or to discredit any particular religion. This 
also applies to Grade 12, Learning Outcome 2, where the learner 
specialises in one religion and one worldview (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:16). 
 
An important aspect of the implementation of the Policy is the training of pre-
service and in-service teachers. The personal beliefs of the teachers do not have 
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to impede his or her ability to teach the study of religions without promoting his or 
her own or undermining any other religion. This has however, as seen in Chapter 
5, been a very emotional aspect of the public discourse in the Policy process. 
The second part of the argument surrounding the role of the personal beliefs of 
teachers – has been the claim that one cannot ‘teach’ about another religion if 
you are not a follower of or adherent to that particular religion.  
 
Jensen (2002:86) discounts these claims as follows: 
Veterinarians do not have to be cows to attain knowledge about cows. 
Knowledge making it possible, say, to diagnose a cow-disease and to 
prescribe the medicine for a cure does not require experiencing life as a 
cow. Likewise, psychoanalysts do not have to share the idiosyncrasies of 
their patients, gynaecologists do not have to be women, and political 
scientists do not have to be members of a party and supportive of the 
political ideology in question to analyse and understand a political party or 
ideology, nor politics in general. 
 
This principle is not firstly about the personal beliefs or preferences of teachers. It 
is, however, about professional conduct as an educator.  Jensen therefore states 
(2002:87): 
All we can do, however, is to trust that he or she has received an 
education that complies to the rules and regulations of the academic study 
of religions and does his/her best to inform about religions in an ‘objective, 
critical and pluralistic’ manner in line with this and with the executive 
orders and guidelines for RE modelled upon such academic studies.  
 
If I understand Jensen correctly, it would seem as if his assurance against the 
partisan teaching of religion is that teachers are academically trained in the 
subject and furthermore ascribes to the general rules and regulations of 
professionalism. 
 
As the incident in Khartoum has shown (see the earlier of the ninth principle) 
parents and religious communities may not be present in the classroom, but the 
stories children tell about class often provide a necessary check-and-balance.  
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(b) Do not confuse Religion Studies with Religious Instruction  
The Religion Studies class is not the occasion for religious nurturing, 
religious confession or religious conversion of learners. This is also the 
case where there is a degree of specialisation in one religion and one 
worldview in Grade 12. Yet teachers should realise that through this 
subject the lives of learners as human beings and citizens are enriched, 
and that it contributes to the maturity of learners’ personal views of life 
(NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:16). 
 
Religion Studies and the study of religion(s) as part of Life Orientation do not 
have as outcome an increased spirituality of learners in the religion of their 
choice. The spiritual growth of learners in specific religious traditions falls within 
the domain of Religious Instruction and not Religion Studies. As part of the 
general educational project specifically as envisaged by the National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF) and Outcomes-based education (OBE), Religion 
Studies will enrich the lives of learners as human beings and as citizens and 
contribute to ‘the maturity of learners’ personal views of life’. 
 
(c) Know and accept the learners  
Religion Studies is about the religions of people. Learners of whatever 
religious or non-religious background should be accepted in the classroom 
on an equal footing, without any discrimination, and treated with kindness 
and empathetic understanding (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:16). 
 
Though this principle embodies and translates various aspects of the Constitution 
and the Policy, it further reiterates that in this education project of the study of 
religion(s), the focus is not on religion as revelation, but as human experience 
(aligned to the first two principles of NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:8). 
 
(d) Take into account the level of emotional and intellectual maturity 
of learners taking Religion Studies at a certain stage of their lives  
Teachers should be led by the needs and abilities of the learners. 
Teaching must be age appropriate. By Grade 10 learners can relate to 
sophisticated ideas critically and creatively. However, they are typically not 
able to construct their own independent, integrated system of beliefs and 
values. Teachers of Religion Studies should take into account that 
learners at this stage may be rebellious and conformist, confused and 
doctrinaire at the same time (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:16). 
 
(e) Neither hide nor flaunt own religious views  
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This principle does not mean that teachers should secretively hide their 
own views. They are also expected not to promote their own views. It is 
possible to declare one’s own religious position wisely, honestly and 
sincerely, as a situation may demand, in a manner making it clear that 
such a position does not amount to prejudice, and does not interfere with 
the rules of the academic enterprise of Religion Studies (NCS/LPG DoE 
2008b:16). 
 
(f) Explain all religions in such a way that their adherents are happy 
with the way it is done  
For the purposes of this subject, not only adherents of a certain religion 
have the right or the ability to explain it adequately. Religion Studies 
teachers need to explain a religion to which they do not belong, in such a 
manner that its adherents will be satisfied with the factual information, the 
empathy and the level of understanding with which it has been presented 
(NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:16). 
 
 
One of the Policy warrants (as discussed in Chapter 6) of the Policy is that the 
study of religion(s) is not only in line with many international and African 
examples but also in line with research findings. The outcomes as envisaged by 
the Policy and the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) have taken into account these 
international practices as well as research findings to demarcate specific 
outcomes appropriate to specific age groups.  
 
(g) Use the learners’ backgrounds as a resource  
Learners bring a wealth of information and perspectives into the classroom 
and these should enrich the teaching process. Teachers should not think 
of themselves as the sole source of information. Teachers and learners 
can learn much from such divergent backgrounds represented by the 
learners in the classroom (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:17). 
 
(h) Encourage learners to speak freely and confidently about their 
own views and about issues  
Religion Studies represents a definitive step away from authoritarian 
teaching, towards a co-operative style of teaching and learning and the 
free exchange of ideas. Teachers therefore need to create the atmosphere 
and opportunity for dialogue and discussion, both between themselves 
and learners, and among the learners (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:17). 
 
(i) Encourage and organise firsthand experience of various religions  
Apart from the research assignments connected to Learning Outcome 4, 
teachers should make sure that learners do not only learn from books, but 
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gain direct knowledge of a range of religions. Learners will need to be 
encouraged and helped to discover things for themselves. This should not 
only happen in the Assessment Standards dealing with research. 
Firsthand experience can be obtained in various ways, such as taking 
learners to religious places, and by introducing them to responsible 
representatives of different religions, either at venues outside the 
classroom, or by inviting the representatives to the school as occasional 
guest facilitators. Let religions speak for themselves (NCS/LPG DoE 
2008b:17). 
 
These principles are in line with the work of Freire (1976, 1987; Giroux 1983)160 
and the principles of constructivism as embodied in OBE.  In his work on 
management education, Watson (2001) speaks of ‘negotiated narratives’ as 
principle for managers learning together. He proposes that students and lecturers 
share ‘manager stories’ and negotiate a shared understanding of the story by 
also tapping into theory and research. 
 
(j) Use a large range of support materials  
The subject Religion Studies affords the learner the opportunity to 
understand religions. A variety of learning and teaching support materials 
can be used including posters, audio-visuals, newspapers, maps and 
photographs. A teacher should allow space for learners to be aware of 
learning through all the senses, in terms of understanding religion 
(NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:17). 
 
 
7.4.3 Challenges to meaningful Religion Studies teaching and learning 
 
The NCS/LPG for Religion Studies (DoE 2008b:28) shares the following 
challenges regarding teaching and learning Religion Studies in the FET phase: 
 
• Classes may include learners from a variety of religions, which poses 
unique challenges. Educators should ensure that they are informed 
about the religious profiles of each class and plan accordingly.  
• When classes consist of learners from one religion only learners 
must be stimulated to take an interest in people and cultural 
expressions in the wider context.  
                                            
160 Also see the discussion of critical pedagogy in Chapter 3.  
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• Assessment Standards in all grades require visits to religious places 
and persons outside the school, and financial implications should be 
factored.  
• Site visits should take into account the needs of all learners.  
• Resources and curriculum materials should be expanded to cater for 
all learners. 
• Review the perception of the subject by the school and the wider 
community. How best can the policy on Religion Studies be 
promoted?  
• In Religion Studies, the policy of multilingualism / multiculturalism 
must be adhered to. 
 
These challenges seem to address mainly three issues. Firstly, knowing the 
learner profile of the class will assist the teacher to adapt lesson plans and 
teaching strategies as well as be sensitive for minorities or even majority issues. 
The second ‘cluster’ of challenges refers to resources and site visits which should 
include all learners. The third group of challenges include advocacy for the field 
of Religion Studies as well as the broader policy framework. 
 
The next part of the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) that allows us some insight into the 
Policy is Annexure 2, which contains a ‘Content framework for Religion Studies’ 
(NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:32-39). It is from this ‘content framework’ that the 
parameters of the Policy become visible. 
 
7.4.4 Content guidelines for Religion Studies 
 
The four outcomes for Religion Studies are as follows: 
Learning Outcome 1:  
The learner is able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of a 
variety of religions and how they relate to one another. 
Learning Outcome 2:  
The learner is able to analyse, relate and systematise universal 
dimensions of religion. 
Learning Outcome 3:  
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The learner is able to reflect critically and constructively on topical issues 
in society from a Religion Studies perspective and apply such insights. 
Learning Outcome 4:  
The learner is able to apply skills of research into religion as a social 
phenomenon, and across religions. 
 
The content framework (NCS/LPG 2008b: 32-42) is organised around these four 
outcomes envisaged for the subject of Religion Studies and around the three 
years of the FET phase. In this framework specific content and guidance are 
prescribed for each year of the FET phase. I will now attempt to analyse the 
content framework without going into the finer detail of the content guidelines. I 
will not discuss all the outcomes and content guidelines but will attempt to point 
to or highlight where the content framework provides significant insight into the 
intentions of the Policy or where there seems to be a disjuncture between the 
Policy and the content framework. 
 
In Grade 10, the first outcome reads as follows: The learner is able to 
demonstrate knowledge and understanding of a variety of religions and how they 
relate to one another. This outcome unfolds in four distinct but interrelated 
‘content’ parts (LO1.1-1.4). 
 
In LO1.1 Various clusters of religions, learners are introduced to the religions 
using the world map as geographical point of departure. Learners are therefore 
introduced to religions in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas and Australasia and 
the Pacific. Different points of departure could have been a historical timeline or 
clustering religions according to the mono or plural character of the religion in 
focus. A geographical starting point may provide learners with a ‘safe’ and known 
starting point from where to start to explore the ‘world’ of religions. As a result of 
globalisation the traditional geographical distribution of religions has changed 
immensely. Such a ‘map’ may provide the opportunity to not only discuss the 
spread of the religion from the countries of ‘origin’ to it being represented 
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worldwide. This provides learners the necessary background for LO1.2 which 
entails a Historical overview of origins of a number of religions. 
• Distinction between BCE (Before Common Era) and CE (Common Era)  
• Calendars of various religions  
• First signs of religion  
• Early archaeological findings about religion in Africa and other continents  
• When and where the clusters of religion developed  
• Origins of religions in South Africa (DoE 2008b:32) 
 
The first issue that is noteworthy is the fact that learners will be defamiliarised 
(Jensen 2002) by introducing them to use a different time categorisation than 
they may have been used to. Many teachers have grown up using the 
designation of Before Christ (BC) and After Christ (AD). Many parents have been 
taught that way. The move towards using the terminology of Before the Common 
Era (BCE) and the Common Era (CE) may disrupt, but it is a necessary 
disruption. Education is not only about learning but also about un-learning161. 
This Learning outcome with its historical and anthropological approach to the 
study of religions immediately locates the study of religion as an educational 
project and religion as a human phenomenon. Learning Outcome 1 further 
expands (to LO1.3) to explore the ‘statistical situation concerning various 
religions’ which explores not only religious categorisation and how statistics are 
obtained, but also the reliability of statistics, problem areas in using statistics, and 
finding solutions. The statistics are contextualized as well as interrogated to 
illustrate the geographical location and spread of clusters of religions (DoE 
2008b:33). The spread of religions resulted in contact between religions and the 
formation of various (sometimes dynamic) interrelationships. In LO1.4 learners 
are introduced to ‘analysis of religious interaction’ and the following notions are of 
importance in the interaction between religions and need to be clearly 
understood, namely tolerance, respect, dialogue, conflict, fundamentalism, 
pluralism, propaganda, indoctrination, and syncretism (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:33). 
 
                                            
161 See Doll (1986) as well as Edwards and Usher (2000) for discussions on education as causing 
disequilibrium and (dis)location. 
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One of my initial concerns in engaging with the Policy, due to the intense 
reactions that accompanied the debate surrounding the Policy, was that the 
content of the study of religion(s) would be a sanitised version and that only the 
positives regarding religion would be discussed. Learning Outcome 1 for Grade 
10 already indicates that the study of religion(s) as envisaged by the Policy is 
anything but a sanitised version. The content immediately challenges accepted 
notions and introduces learners to the academic discourse of the study of religion 
appropriate to their context and age. 
 
Another example is how the same outcome (LO1) unfolds in the next year, Grade 
11. Here the Content guidelines ask, ‘What are the distinctions between 
important concepts such as mission, evangelism, proselytisation, revitalisation, 
ecumenism, syncretism and religious colonialism or imperialism?’ (DoE 
2008b:33). Learners are furthermore introduced to what religions claim to be 
unique about themselves and their attitudes and interpretations of other religions 
(LO1.3 Grade 12 and LO1.4 Grade 11). 
 
Learning Outcome 2 has as focus: The learner is able to analyse, relate and 
systematize universal dimensions of religion (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:34). This 
outcome unfolds over the three years of the FET phase into six parts (for Grade 
11 in five parts). In this outcome learners are introduced to the purpose (and 
history) of defining religion(s) and how it relates to other concepts such as: 
worldview, ethical system, indigenous knowledge system and belief system. In 
Grade 12 learners explore how the term ‘teaching’ differs from belief, doctrine, 
dogma, parable, myth, ideology. This will allow learners to engage in the 
discourses of a particular religion and really critically explore fundamental beliefs 
and concepts. 
 
 In Grade 12 learners can choose one religion and study different components of 
their choice of religion. These components include: 
• The nature of divinity  
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• The nature of the world  
• The nature of humanity, with reference to community and the 
individual 
• The place and responsibility of humanity in the world  
• The origin and the role of evil  
• The overcoming of evil  
• Life after death (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:34). 
 
This will provide a huge challenge to teachers whether teachers are adherents of 
the particular religion or belief or not. For teachers who are adherents in the 
learner’s choice of religion, the challenge would be to continuously shy away 
from religious instruction but to remain within the study of religions as an 
educational project. Whether teachers who are adherents of the faith of choice 
will be willing and able to give guidance to learners to engage with religion as a 
human construct will have to be seen162. The other challenge would be for 
teachers who are not versed in the learner’s choice of religion. The Policy 
provides for well-developed learning support and teaching materials to assist 
teachers. Teachers are also allowed to arrange with the particular faith 
community for assistance and guidance. In these circumstances the demarcation 
between religious instruction or theology and the study of religion may become 
difficult. 
 
One of the main characteristics of the Policy is to provide guidelines for the 
educational study of religion(s). In this educational project the Policy and the 
NCS/LPG Content Guidelines (2008b:35) are very clear that the subject is not 
looking for truth and judging whether someone’s beliefs are ‘real’. The Content 
Guidelines are very clear that the subject encourages an understanding of 
religions ‘from the point of view of the adherents’ (Learning Outcome 2.3 in 
Grade 10; NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:35). This is furthermore entrenched in LO2.5 in 
Grade 10 where learners are exploring ‘How various religions began’ – the roles 
of the founders, prophets and reformers. LO2.6 (Grade 10) provides for an 
                                            
162 In this regard the guidance in the teaching and learning support materials will provide crucial 
information and security for teachers. See the discussion of Ferguson and Roux (2003) on the 
role of teachers in ‘facilitating beliefs and values in life orientation programmes’. 
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engagement on the ‘role of social forms, institutions and roles in religions’. The 
social forms that will be discussed are monarchies, oligarchies, democracies and 
the division of power between central and local organisations. 
 
One of the aspects that I personally felt was left in the air in the Policy is some 
clarity on what the Policy meant by ‘secular worldviews’. In the Content 
Guidelines for LO2.6 (Grade 12; NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:36) the Guidelines state 
•  Any secular worldview with reference to the definition of religion 
and universal dimensions of religion, for example: atheism, 
agnosticism, humanism, materialism, etc. 
•  The origin, purpose and influencing factors behind the worldview 
(e.g. founder, world events, etc.) (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:36). 
 
 
This would allow learners to engage with often ‘excluded’ concepts in a very 
broad definition of ‘religion’163. Should learners choose for example atheism or 
capitalism, the challenge would be firstly, for the teacher to provide support and 
where possible guidance, but secondly, to find an ‘expert’ to assist the child or 
even be a guest facilitator as allowed for in the Policy.  While calling on expertise 
when dealing with organised religions is fairly straightforward, finding ‘experts” to 
guide and assist would be far more difficult (if not tricky) in the case of ‘difficult’ 
student choices. When learners elect to focus on ‘sensitive’ examples of 
worldviews for example atheism or Satanism and they have not clarified it with 
their parents and respective religious communities, public perception regarding 
such a study of atheism may prove difficult to foresee and manage164.  
 
The Policy itself refers to ‘secular worldviews’ (in the context of the principle of 
tolerance), ‘secular world-view’ (in the social honour context of respect for other 
views), ‘secular belief systems’ (in the context of exposing learners to the rich 
diversity of beliefs) and ‘secular values’ (which learners will be taught). In Grade 
                                            
163 The NCS/LPG (2008b) is not clear to what extent students will have freedom of choice 
regardless of the specific character of the school and/or surrounding community as well as the 
level of expertise of the teacher to effectively accompany learners.  
164 The role teaching and learning support materials will play not only to provide guidance to 
teachers cannot be underestimated.  
 404
11 ‘secularism’ is discussed in LO3.1 Relationships between religion and the 
state at various times.  
 
The critical nature of the Policy and the LPG becomes even more visible when 
learners in Grade 10 (LO3.1) are encouraged to explore how specific topics 
manifest themselves in religions. These topics can include euthanasia, crime and 
punishment, genetic cloning, suicide, capital punishment, etc. It is often in 
exploring a specific belief system’s views on such topics that learners, teachers 
and the communities surrounding the learner are ‘defamiliarised’ (Jensen 2002) 
to what they thought they knew or expected. Learners at this age (Grade 10) are 
very critical of traditional role models and institutions (like their parents) and 
discovering what their particular belief system or religion states about, for 
example, abortion, may cause considerable disequilibrium for learners, teachers 
and their communities. The educational study of religion may then lead to a 
confessional crisis for the learner or even his or her families and/or teachers. 
 
Wardekker and Miedema (2001) differentiate between religious education as 
transmission and as transformation. Their differentiation between these two 
concepts is not new to the educational discourse. Transformative education has 
a long and layered history ranging from the work of Mezirow (1991, 1995, 2000), 
education as liberation (Freire 1976), education as transgression (hooks 1994) 
and education as (dis)location (Edwards & Usher 2000). What may be novel is 
the way Wardekker and Miedema apply the distinction to religious education. 
Their use of transformative religious education may sound as if they have in mind 
a confessional type of religious education aiming to convert or deepen belief. 
This is however not the case. They state: 
In the transformative view of education, the acquisition of knowledge and 
skills, and of norms and values as modes of being, knowing, feeling and 
acting is not taken in the dualistic subject-object way but in a holistic and 
transactional way. In such a transformation conception of education, 
learning is defined as the growing capacity of students to participate in 
culturally structured practices (Wardekker & Miedema 2001:27). 
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Outcomes-based education is philosophically founded in and on education as 
transformation. Transformation happens when perspectives change (Mezirow 
1991), when learners experience moving from stable beliefs and assumptions to 
disequilibrium where they are encouraged to question their assumptions and 
knowledge and return to a state of (temporary) equilibrium but to a different 
place, different beliefs or also, reconfirmed beliefs. 
 
Therefore criticality is embedded in South African education since 1994 as a 
critical component of the educational project. Education in South Africa is 
transformative within the broader framework of the Constitution. Criticality as 
integral element of transformative education does, however, not mean to disrupt 
learners’ beliefs and assumptions in a careless manner. While life has as 
character these unexpected and many times unwanted ‘disruptions’ education is 
a carefully planned and executed project in the service of a more compassionate 
and just society as envisaged by the Constitution. 
 
Teachers, but also parents and religious communities should therefore provide 
safe environments where learners may explore and experience disequilibrium 
and transformation. The Policy and the curriculum documents provide a 
framework for teachers and learners. How students’ critical investigation and 
experiences of (dis)location may be viewed by parents and/or religious 
communities fall outside the jurisdiction or control of the Policy and the curriculum 
documents. This however does challenge the pre-service and in-service training 
of educators to prepare teachers also to become more at ease with the 
ambiguities and (dis)location that they may also experience165. 
 
A further aspect that was not clear from the Policy was how socially relevant or 
sanitised the teaching of the study of religion would unfold. Although the Policy is 
                                            
165 Teachers may often experience something of a ‘permanent’ (dis)location regarding their own 
belief systems and those of learners – which reminds of the article by Boellstorff (2005) on how 
gay, male, Muslim men cope with the permanent incommensurability of the aspects living in 
Indonesia.   
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very clear about the expectations that the inclusion of the study of religion would 
contribute to nation well-being, it is only in the NCS/LPG (DoE 2008b) and 
specifically the Content Guidelines for the FET band (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b) that 
it becomes very obvious that the study of religion is envisaged as a multi-layered 
and facetted human construct166. In Grade 10 for example, LO3.2 deals with how 
religions ‘come to decisions regarding social ethics’ (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:37), 
and in Grade 11 (LO3.2) the relationship between religion and politics are 
explored. In Grade 12 this ‘hands-on approach’ to the study of religion unfolds 
when learners are required to develop a strategy ‘seeking a solution for a major 
social problem’ (LO3.2, NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:37). The social embeddedness of 
the study of religion(s) (and illustrated in Diagram 6) as envisaged by the Policy 
further becomes visible when the relationship between religions and economics 
at various times is explored (Grade 10, LO3.3); religions in their relation to the 
natural environment (Grade 11, LO3.3), ‘co-responsibility and cooperation of 
religions in the improvement of the quality of life’ (Grade 11, LO3.4, DoE 
2008b:38) and the ‘role of the media in presenting and influencing public opinion 
and attitudes with respect to religion’ (Grade 12, LO3.3, NCS/LPG DoE 
2008b:38). 
 
The ‘range’ of the study of religion(s) also prepares learners to evaluate research 
into religion(s) already in Grade 10 and prepares them for critical engagement 
with concepts like objectivity, neutrality, insider and outsider perspectives, etc. 
(LO4.1, NCS/LPG DoE 2008b:39). The attainment of this Learning Outcome will 
prepare them for LO4.1 in which learners will design structured interviews 
regarding the relationships between religion and gender (LO4.1) and explore 
‘relaxation and leisure from an ethical point of view’ (LO4.2, NCS/LPG DoE 
2008b:39). In Grade 12, the final year of the FET phase, learners explore the 
relationships between religion and peace initiatives and explore ways in which 
                                            
166 This raises an interesting question about the extent to which a Policy provides only a 
framework and other documents interpret the Policy in its finer details. The important issue is that 
the documents accompanying the Policy (in this case the NCS and LPGs) cannot move outside 
of the intentions and principles embodied in the Policy.   
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religion is part of the problem (LO4.1). Learners also explore the relationship 
between religion and the natural sciences (LO4.2) with reference to views of 
creation and evolution. 
 
From these Content Guidelines (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b) the intentions and vision 
of the drafters of the Policy became clearer. In Outcomes-based education one of 
the principles is to ‘design down’ – meaning that one should plan the educational 
journey with the end in mind. This principle is also inherent in various planning 
strategies and cycles. Once the end goals are clear, the steps leading to the 
attainment of these goals become clearer. In looking at the curriculum of Religion 
Studies as it unfolds in Grades 10-12, there is a clear correlation between the 
‘end’ and the beginnings in the Policy. Planning and evaluation cycles like the 
Kellogg’s Logic Development Model (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2001) postulate 
that the eventual impact of a programme or action plan depends on how clear the 
envisaged impact and outcomes are167. The clearer the picture of the end-result, 
the easier it is to plan the different steps and progressions. It would seem as if 
this principle can mean that teachers across the spectrum, especially in Life 
Orientation, should be exposed to where Religion Studies is headed. The 
purpose should be twofold. Firstly, once teachers have a clear picture of where 
the study of religion(s) is headed, then they may have a better grasp of how the 
different outcomes in the Life Orientation phase (especially R-9) can prepare 
learners accordingly. Secondly, having an understanding of the end-results of 
Religion Studies may enthuse teachers with creative ideas and resources in 
empowering learners attaining the ‘earlier’ outcomes. The outcomes for Grades 
R-9 of the aspect of the study of religion(s) as part of ‘Social development’ are 
stepping stones towards religious literacy, Once teachers and learners have a 
clear picture of what and how the Policy sees religious literacy as end result, they 
may have a better understanding of the rationale for and purpose of the inclusion 
                                            
167 Also refer to Chapter 2 where the implications of the implied linearity of the Kellogg’s Logic 
Development Model (2001) were discussed.  
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of the study of religion from Grades R-12, whether as part of Life Orientation or 
as a specific subject in Grades 10-12. 
 
 7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The Policy reiterates in a number of paragraphs that it sets out to provide  
• ‘a broad framework within which people of goodwill will work out their own 
approaches’ (Foreword to the Policy, 2003:6). 
• ‘a framework for schools to determine policies, and for parents and 
communities to be better informed of their rights and responsibilities in 
regard to religion and education’ (paragraph 2; 2003:7)  
• A framework for a cooperative model which is ‘best for religion and best 
for education in a democratic South Africa’ (paragraph 4; 2003:8) 
• ‘a framework within which Religious Observances could be organised at 
public schools’ (paragraph 65; 2003:27); 
• ‘a unified framework for teaching and learning about religion, religions, and 
religious diversity’ (paragraph 68; 2003:28) 
 
In this chapter, I analysed the RNCS (2002b), NCS (2003a) and NCS/LPGs 
(2003b, 2008a) for Life Orientation and the NCS (2005) and NCS/LPG (2008b) 
for Religion Studies. I also explored how these documents, and especially the 
Content Guidelines (NCS/LPG DoE 2008b) translate the intentions of the Policy 
into clear Learning Outcomes and Assessment Criteria. 
 
At the start of this chapter I explored the interrelatedness and interdependency of 
various processes preceding and following the acceptance of the Policy. In the 
beginning of this chapter, Diagram 2 illustrated the place of the different 
documents and processes in relation to the Policy. At the start of this chapter I 
stated that the different curriculum documents ‘translate’ the Policy. Now that I 
have analysed the Policy as well as the various curriculum documents I propose 
that these different curriculum documents do more than ‘translate’. The different 
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curriculum documents and guidelines interpret the Policy and provide context, 
content and guidelines for application/implementation.  
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 8, I will critically evaluate the Policy. If I had to 
critically evaluate the Policy without looking at the curriculum documents, I would 
have had much more questions and concerns. Concerns, not because I doubted 
the intentions of the Policy, but concerns because the Policy is not specific 
enough on how it envisages religious literacy. 
 
After analysing the curriculum documents and guidelines, the intentions of the 
Policy are much clearer, especially for the subject Religion Studies. With regard 
to the NCS/LPG’s for Life Orientation and specifically Religion Education as part 
of Social Development, I am at this stage not clear or sure whether teachers in 
Life Orientation will grasp the ‘bigger picture’ of what religious literacy entails and 
can be168. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
168 The amount of time allowed for Religion Education in the Social Development phase of Life 
Orientation would maybe not have allowed a deeper exploration of religion than for example 
encountered in Religion Studies. It is also a question of how appropriate a deeper exploration of 
religion would have been taking into account the critical relationship between content and the 
learners’ age.  
 410
CHAPTER 8 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE POLICY 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
At the start of this journey I specifically located this study in the discipline of 
Religionswissenschaft or the study of religion. This critical evaluation of the 
Policy is firstly grounded in an intellectual understanding of the scope and 
content of the study of religions, but also embedded in a personal understanding 
of criticality. Critical theory and critical pedagogy profoundly shaped my 
understanding of the role of education in envisioning new possibilities for co-
existence in a society dreaming of justice and compassion.    
 
This thesis’ central concern and focus is the question – How does the Policy 
contribute to the shaping of a critical and autonomous citizenry? I proposed that a 
critical and autonomous citizenry means a citizenry who has a certain Mündigkeit 
in understanding their own religiosity and those of others. This Mündigkeit also 
assumes that religion as phenomenon is the result of a dynamic and complex 
interplay of various societal factors (religion as a social construct) and was and is 
constructed as responses to socioeconomic, political, cultural and historical 
developments. The sedimentation of these developments in a specific religious 
phenomenon results from and perpetuates power- and meaning-making systems 
and structures that impact and shape citizens’ beliefs and engagements in the 
public sphere.  
 
The following sub-questions guided my exploration of the Policy:   
• What were the context-specific socioeconomic, educational and political 
histories and processes shaping our new democracy and its educational 
policy framework? 
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• What are the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings and assumptions 
of the Policy argument? 
• How does the Policy understand religion and the study of religion? 
• How does the Policy understand the study of religion as a compulsory part 
of the curriculum in preparing learners for citizenship? In other words, how 
will the study of religion prepare learners not only for citizenship in the 
national sense but also for an increasingly cosmopolitan citizenry? 
 
The interesting assumption of the research question is not whether the Policy 
intends to shape prospective citizens, but how the Policy intends to contribute to 
the shaping of a critical and autonomous citizenry. The historical development of 
education has shown that education is embedded in ideology and shapes society 
according to dominant beliefs and assumptions. No education is neutral. Within 
this context it is therefore taken for granted that the Policy will shape and impact 
on learners. It is important to notice that the Policy also is embedded in the 
broader context of OBE and NCS which explicitly intends to contribute to the 
shaping of learners through the curriculum and specifically in the attainment of 
the critical cross-field outcomes. The Critical Cross-field outcomes embody the 
South African vision for a competent and compassionate citizenry who will shape 
society according to the values contained in the Constitution169.  
 
The Policy assumes and proposes religious literacy as a crucial ingredient in the 
broader curriculum mix towards attainment of the critical cross-field outcomes. In 
this critical evaluation I will evaluate the rationale for the inclusion of religious 
literacy in the curriculum ‘mix’, as well evaluate whether the content of the 
curriculum as embodied in the outcomes, assessment criteria and LPGs will 
result in a religious literacy (as envisaged in the Policy).  I will also interrogate 
what type of religious literacy will result in an important ingredient for Mündigkeit. 
 
                                            
169 In Chapter 7 the relations of Religion Education (as part of Life Orientation) as well as of 
Religion Studies to the critical cross-field outcomes and developmental outcomes were 
discussed.  
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This critical evaluation will proceed in the following sequence: 
 
1. I will postulate a description of what I consider to be characteristics of a 
critical citizenry – with a specific understanding of Mündigkeit as 
foundation. How does the Policy understand the study of religion as a 
compulsory part of the curriculum in preparing learners for citizenship? In 
other words, how will the study of religion prepare learners not only for 
citizenship in the national sense but also for an increasingly complex 
postmodern, postsecular and globalised world? 
 
2. I will then continue to briefly reflect on the context-specific socioeconomic, 
educational and political histories and processes shaping our new 
democracy and its educational policy framework as discussed in Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5. 
 
3. I will also briefly reiterate the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings 
and assumptions of the Policy argument. It is crucial that we examine the 
Policy’s understanding of religion and the study of religion. 
 
I will then propose my final arguments regarding the research question, namely 
‘How does the Policy contribute to the shaping of a critical and autonomous 
citizenry?’ 
 
8.2 MÜNDIGKEIT AS CRITICAL CRITERION 
In Chapter 3 I have explored Mündigkeit within the context of critical theory’s 
appropriation of the term. I acknowledged Mündigkeit’s historical roots in the 
discourses in and surrounding the Enlightenment170. In this section I set out to 
formulate a personal understanding of Mündigkeit as well as locate Mündigkeit 
within the broader discourses of postmodernity, postsecularism and the study of 
religion(s). 
                                            
170 Also see French and Thomas (1999) and Uljens (2006).  
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Mündigkeit can be translated as ‘autonomy’, ‘adulthood’ and ‘self-sufficiency’171. 
Various cultures have different ways to describe the processes and moments 
when a young adult is considered to be an adult. In the account by French and 
Thomas (1999) of an interview between Adorno and Becker in 1969, Adorno 
referred to Kant’s use of the opposite of Mündigkeit, namely Unmündigkeit. 
Unmündigkeit was seen to be synonymous to subordination, tutelage, being a 
child and being like a ‘beast of burden’ (French & Thomas 1999: 12).  
 
Becoming an adult or mündig are culture or context-specific and change the 
person’s standing in the community as response to the community’s change in 
understanding of who the individual is. Becoming ‘autonomous’ in general means 
having increased rights and privileges, but also an increase in responsibilities. 
‘Autonomous’ literally means to be allowed the right to self-government and is 
often used as opposite to heteronomy172. The person to whom autonomy is 
conveyed is considered by his or her immediate community to have ‘grown up’ 
and that she or he can be ‘trusted’ with having a sound enough foundation and 
critical abilities to be entrusted with the freedom to make his or her own choices, 
but also to accept responsibility for these choices. It is important to note that 
‘autonomy’ without a surrounding and responsible community is unimaginable. 
Without a community and other people surrounding an individual, the notion of 
‘self-government’ is a non-issue. It is only within the realm of inter-personal 
relations and communities that the right to govern one-self becomes a possibility. 
The right to ‘self-govern’ is embedded in inter-personal trust of one another that 
the good and benefit of the community is linked to the individual’s self-
governance173. 
 
                                            
171 An example of the exploration of ‘autonomy’ outside the debates surrounding Mündigkeit, see 
Winch ( 2006) who discusses autonomy as an outcome for education from and within the specific 
context of critical rationality.  
172 See Child, Williams and Birch (1995). 
173 For an interesting discussion on Levinas’ exploration of ‘autonomy’ and ‘heterenomy’ see 
Child, Williams and Birch (1995).  
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Autonomy as notion describing a certain status with rights and responsibilities 
within a specific community is therefore neither an alienable nor eternal right. 
Autonomy can be withdrawn or lost under certain conditions. Privileges can 
normally be withdrawn in cases where either the freedom of choice is misused or 
abused, or where the person has shown not to be trustworthy or/and competent 
in fulfilling the role autonomous persons in his or her context can be expected to 
fulfil. Awarding autonomy to a person normally means putting on hold concerns 
that the person will or can abuse the awarded freedoms and rights. Autonomy is 
to a certain extent always provisional. 
 
Education plays a crucial role in preparing children and young adults for 
autonomy and adulthood. The responsibility to prepare children for autonomy is 
shared by the state, parents and immediate surrounding communities. Education 
does not only prepare children to be able to contribute to their own fulfilment and 
the economy of their country but also to fulfil a variety of roles in the public 
sphere. Autonomy is ‘awarded’ to young adults, depending on the context, when 
the child has either reached a certain age, or has proven him- or herself to be 
competent and trustworthy. The readiness for autonomy therefore refers to the 
readiness of the individual incumbent and the community. Though the focus on 
the readiness of accepting autonomy is often on the individual’s capacities and 
values, the community accepting this autonomous individual must also be ‘ready’ 
for his or her new status. 
 
In preparing children and young adults for autonomy, society has a specific idea 
of what the characteristics for and content of autonomy are174. Curriculum is 
therefore the sedimentation of a specific community’s beliefs, hopes, dreams and 
fears. The community assumes that once a child or young adult has been 
exposed to a certain curriculum for a number of years it is very likely that the 
individual would have attained the minimum requirements to be considered 
                                            
174 In the South African context, the critical cross-field outcomes provide a particular picture of 
adulthood, maturity or Mündigkeit. 
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mündig. Mündigkeit often encompasses struggles and upheavals as many a 
parental home would testify. In these struggles it is not only the readiness for 
autonomy that is often contested, but also the parameters and phases of 
autonomy. Mündigkeit is a readiness to accept responsibility for oneself, others 
as well as one’s temporary citizenship of the planetary constellation. Mündigkeit 
is at the same time a claim by an individual and an award and recognition by a 
community. 
 
Personally, even after describing my understanding of autonomy, I still feel that 
Mündigkeit and autonomy do not quite refer to the same concept. Autonomy, for 
me, can result in abuse and misuse175.  The concept reminds of communities and 
individuals who acted autonomously, as ‘laws unto themselves’. Autonomy also 
loses something of being accountable in a certain context or community. There 
are many examples of autonomous acts, by individuals and groups which have 
impacted negatively on others. The self-sufficiency and arrogance of the human 
race using and abusing the environment in a celebration of autonomy, is a case 
in point. Despite international concerns about climate change some 
governments, organisations and individuals continue to act autonomously. 
Autonomy as concept speaks of the self without the other, an anthropocentric 
celebration of subjectivity. 
 
Mündigkeit on the other hand ‘feels’ different. Mündigkeit implies something of an 
individual’s status in a community. I realise Mündigkeit can also be misused. 
Mündigkeit can also describe a process where individuals become a law onto 
themselves. The word however does describe a competency and literacy on the 
side of the individual, as well as the acknowledgement of a person’s Mündigkeit 
by his or her immediate community.  Mündigkeit, as I understand it, also contains 
an acknowledgement of our ‘planetary citizenship’. Planetary citizenship 
describes a citizenship based on the premise that the Earth and the constellation 
of planets around us will continue regardless whether and/or how humans 
                                            
175 See also Child, Williams and Birch (1995).  
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survive. Planetary citizenship states something of the awe, tremendum and 
respect for our temporarily being part of this larger constellation. Planetary 
citizenship acknowledges being a steward or custodian of the Earth knowing that 
our stewardship is temporary; knowing that the Earth and the constellations 
around us have been here before humankind developed and will be there even 
when humanity has stopped existing or has evolved further. Adorno (French & 
Thomas 1999) titled the topic of the interview with Becker as ‘Education for 
maturity and responsibility’. I am quite comfortable in using Mündigkeit as 
implying both maturity and responsibility. For the sake of situating Mündigkeit in 
the contexts dealt with in the previous chapters, let us briefly look at the gestalt of 
Mündigkeit in a postmodern, postsecular and globalised world. Then I will 
postulate certain ‘requirements’ of Mündigkeit in preparation for my critical 
evaluation of the Policy. 
 
Mündigkeit in a postmodern context implies the ability of a person to deal with the 
ambiguities, uncertainties and the dynamic interaction between personal identity, 
community and cultural identities and the surrounding contexts. Individuals and 
communities need to make sense in a world where many of the traditional 
signposts and markers have been discarded or covered with graffiti. Mündigkeit 
implies a being at home in a world where permanence is temporary and feelings 
of (dis)location reign. In these spaces Mündigkeit requires the ability to negotiate 
with and accept the permanence of the incommensurability of different aspects of 
personal and community lives. Risk and the dealing with risk has become the 
signature of our times. Personal religious beliefs, worldviews and assumptions 
can therefore assist individuals and communities to construct meaning not only in 
the liquidity of these times, but also in being confronted with the tremendum in its 
various guises. Mündigkeit however also implies critically interrogating authority 
and claims to truth in a hermeneutics of suspicion. Though it was presumed that 
the disillusionment and critique of the grand narratives of our time would have 
resulted in the demise of religion, the secular thesis has been discounted by 
many.  
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Mündigkeit in a postsecular society implies the ability of a person to navigate and 
make personal choices in response to an increasingly diverse menu of ways-of-
making-meaning. These ways- and structures-of-making-meaning include 
traditional religions but also a range of eclectic non-permanent and often-
changing mixes. As various authors (Chapter 1) have postulated, personal 
identity and beliefs in these postmodern times have become a celebration of 
choice and a reenchantment of the world.  
 
Mündigkeit in an increasingly globalised world will require of individuals and 
communities the capacity to engage with cultures, beliefs and assumptions totally 
different from their own. Globalisation will also mean an increased competition for 
vital resources and markets. The cost of and waste implied by the various 
processes of globalisation will require a Mündigkeit of individuals, communities 
and governments. In a world where the global has become local, and the local 
has become global, individuals and communities will face opportunities and 
challenges unthinkable of twenty years ago. As immigration and emigration have 
become part of the lives of individuals, workers, families and communities, 
nation-states also rethink citizenship and patriotism. Citizens will need the critical 
ability to recognise and uncover ideologies that claim universal or particular 
validity. Individuals will increasingly need to critically evaluate different claims on 
their identity, cultures, assumptions and beliefs. Mündigkeit is therefore a critical 
ingredient for citizenship in the 21st century.  
 
Mündigkeit within the context of the above descriptions of Mündigkeit requires a 
vocabulary to engage with and critically interrogate different ways and systems of 
meaning-making. Mündigkeit implies accepting responsibility for my own choices 
and respecting different choices from other peoples and communities. Mündigkeit 
requires the ability to fulfil my epistemic duties to translate what I personally 
believe and to encourage the Other to assume their epistemic duties towards me 
and those outside their specific communities and belief-structures. Humans 
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throughout the ages have mapped their ways of making meaning. These maps 
are embedded in vocabularies waiting for translation, not defending.  
 
Mündigkeit also requires a critical self-reflexivity. This reflexivity does not only 
entail thinking about my own beliefs and assumptions but also to critically 
interrogate these beliefs and assumptions and their impact on my life and the 
lives of others. Reflexivity as a key characteristic of Mündigkeit requires living 
mindfully engaged in a permanent hermeneutics of suspicion and appreciation, 
righteous anger and hope. Such a critical citizenry has the willingness to engage 
and not look or shy away from difficult and often ambiguous spaces and 
conditions.  
 
Mündigkeit necessitates the acknowledgement that power is always present in 
different gestalts fulfilling different functions. No-one and no meaning-making 
system are exempt from the tentacles of power. This is not necessarily a 
negative. Confronting and changing unjust and unequal distributions of power 
requires the use of power. Accepting responsibility to engage with and in a world 
where inequality is consciously sustained by different role players and 
stakeholders requires not looking away and a willingness to dirty one’s own 
hands.  
 
Mündigkeit requires different knowledges, from technical know-how, practical 
application of knowledge as well as emancipatory knowledge that will allow 
individuals to act rationally and to be self-determining and self-reflective. This 
requires a strategic combination of knowledge, attitudes, values and skills in the 
process of being consistently aware of the subjective conditions that make these 
different knowledges possible and to engage with overt and covert constraints in 
structures of social action, meaning-making and speech. 
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8.3 THE POLICY AS CONTEXT-SPECIFIC RESPONSE 
 
A critical policy analysis as proposed in Chapter 2 necessitated a careful 
examination of the Policy as a context-specific response. The following five 
pointers summarise and evaluate the Policy-as-response. 
 
8.3.1 South Africa as pluralistic society 
 
The Policy makes it very clear in its Foreword as well as throughout the Policy 
that it firstly responds to the reality of religious plurality in South Africa, and 
secondly, to the reality of religious adherence in South Africa. The majority of 
South Africans consider themselves to be religious. The Policy translates the 
principles and values as embodied in the Constitution with specific reference to 
on the one hand guaranteeing freedom for religion and on the other hand 
prevention from coercion or compromise. Especially in the light of the protection 
and advancement of a specific religion by the previous dispensation, the new 
democracy required a response that would take seriously the role religion plays 
in South African society without privileging one religion above others.  
 
I would further speculate that even if religious plurality was not a characteristic of 
South Africa or even if South Africa was totally secular, then the increasing role 
and visibility of religion in the international public sphere have required a specific 
educational response in South Africa.  
 
As such the Policy is an appropriate and much needed response to national and 
international developments.  
 
8.3.2 The impact of globalisation  
 
Globalisation, whether in its geopolitical, socioeconomic or cultural gestalts is a 
reality. The dictum that local has become global and the global has become local 
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necessitates an educational response where learners are prepared for dealing 
with diversity. Learners in their life-time will more than ever before encounter 
people from totally different backgrounds and religious and cultural foundations. 
Not only will they be required and have the opportunity to translate their own 
beliefs and assumptions to others, they should also encourage others to fulfil 
their epistemic duties by translating their beliefs and assumptions. 
 
8.3.3 Postsecularism and religion in the public sphere 
 
Although religion played a significant role in the international public sphere before 
9/11, since the attack on the World Trade Centre and the ‘war on terror’, the 
visibility of religion in the public sphere has increased immensely. In this context 
forming an opinion comes ‘natural’ and people take sides. How closely these 
opinions and perceptions concur with the facts about the context is open to 
doubt. The Policy prescribes a Religion Education curriculum that will at least 
give a minimum religious literacy to all learners completing Grades R-12.  
 
As indicated in my analysis of the curriculum and LPGs in Chapter 7, the 
curriculum proposes more than a minimum literacy, and also encourages a 
critical interrogation of religion in the reality of learners’ daily lives.  
 
8.3.4 The function of religion in the lives of individuals and communities 
 
The Policy recognises that religion in its various formats does play an important 
role in the lives of South Africans – whether in the lives of individuals or/and in 
the communal lives of communities. Throughout the previous regime where 
apartheid impacted adversely on millions of people, religion has played an 
enormous role in supporting these communities in very difficult and tiring times. 
Various churches and religious groups supported the struggle against apartheid. 
These religious groups rallied opposition on various international forums against 
the previous regime. Religion gave them voice but also a vocabulary. The 
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struggle was often phrased in terms of the vocabulary of God’s people’s 
oppression in Egypt and how God delivered them176.  
 
The Policy acknowledges the role religion played and can play in the lives of 
individuals and communities. The Policy further wants to rally the support of 
religion as a vehicle for transformation. Knowing more about the content and 
function of religion can give learners a critical sense of location where religion is 
part and parcel of the plurality in South Africa and continues to play an important 
role for the majority of South Africans.  
 
8.3.5 Religion as vehicle for moral regeneration and values education 
 
The Policy expresses the state’s attitude of ‘positive impartiality’ towards religion 
and the teaching of religion. In recognition of the contribution religion made and 
can make to the need for a moral regeneration in South Africa, the Policy 
foresees that the inclusion of Religion Education and Religion Studies in the 
school curriculum will support and sustain the regeneration of the values as 
embodied in the Constitution.  
 
Though learners will learn about religion and worldviews and the way these 
religions and worldviews support the values as embedded in the Constitution, this 
calls forth the question of a ‘sanitised curriculum’. It is an accepted fact that 
religion has contributed immensely to the enrichment of humankind throughout 
the ages. There are many narratives to support the claim that religion is a force of 
good in the world. Unfortunately, there may be just as many claims and 
narratives claiming the inherent divisiveness of religion throughout the ages. 
Interestingly, the fact that religion has a track record of good and bad does not 
support the exclusion of Religion Education from the curriculum. On the contrary.  
 
                                            
176 Interestingly, as we explored in Chapter 4, the same narratives and claims were used by the 
Afrikaner to formulate their own notions of racial superiority.  
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The role religion and/or worldviews played in humankind’s history necessitates 
learners to have the vocabulary and literacies to engage in interrogating and 
celebrating the possibilities of good in religion and/or worldviews and petitioning 
and guarding against its misuse and abuse. The curriculum for Religion 
Education allows for critical interrogation of the role and function of religion and 
worldviews in various societal issues like abortion, gender inequality, etc. Though 
the emphasis is on the role of religion and worldviews in promoting harmony in 
communities, this ‘partiality’ does not prevent learners and teachers from also 
engaging in critique.  Another critical factor in interrogating the alleged ‘sanitised’ 
nature of the curriculum proposed by the Policy and the NCS, is the criterion of 
age-appropriateness177. While critical interrogation and a hermeneutics of 
suspicion are crucial ingredients for and in tertiary education, the appropriateness 
of such critical interrogation for younger learners can be seriously questioned. In 
Religion Education and Religion Studies learners will be stimulated to think 
critically about religion and investigate their own choices of issues. The depth of 
criticality will depend on a dynamic interplay between the learner, the teacher, the 
parental home and the context. Except for the importance of age-appropriateness 
as criterion in evaluating how ‘sanitised’ the curriculum should be, another factor 
to consider is the amount of time allowed for Religion Education in the curriculum 
of Life Orientation (Grades R-12). As such I will support an emphasis on 
empowering learners with the basic vocabulary and concepts to prepare them 
sufficiently for critical engagement in the debates, controversies and questions 
that may follow later in life.  
 
In the next section I will interrogate the assumptions of the Policy. I will then 
return to the alleged ‘sanitation’ curriculum. 
 
 
 
                                            
177 See the discussion in Chapter 6 as well as Chidester 2003; Ferguson 1998; Roux 1998). 
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8.4 THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
POLICY 
 
In the previous section (8.3) I have considered to what extent the Policy is an 
appropriate response to a specific context. Considering the context of the Policy 
(as explored in Chapters 4 and 5) the Policy is a necessary and timely response. 
In this section I will evaluate the appropriateness of the Policy-as-response 
considering the Policy’s own assumptions and theoretical framework. 
 
Given the context of the Policy, the question is whether the Policy’s ‘positive 
impartiality’ towards religion is appropriate. It is also necessary to consider the 
Policy’s definition of religion, interrogating what the definition includes and 
excludes. I will first evaluate the latter, and then return to consider the ‘positive 
impartiality’ of the Policy towards religion. 
 
I find the analogy of Goodenough (1959) as explored in Chapter 3 very useful. 
He describes Religionswissenschaft as humankind’s response to the tremendum, 
to the ultimate unknown. Throughout the ages humankind has at times dared to 
venture behind the curtains of confessional belief and dogma to face and 
experience the tremendum. Most often though, the study of religion has stopped 
in front of the curtains and painstakingly described the paintings and designs on 
the curtains.  
 
In my personal reflection on and interrogation of religion as construct, I am at 
ease with a definition that explains religion and the study of religion as 
descriptions and explanations of the tremendum. These descriptions and 
explanations gave and give rise to different meaning-making structures. As these 
structures became and become embedded in sociocultural, economic and 
political relations, so did these structures claim universal and at times particular 
validity. I am also at ease with these different claims to validity, whether universal 
or particular. What I am uncomfortable with is the seeming exclusion (or 
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perception of exclusion) of equally valid and legitimate responses to the 
tremendum.  
 
I propose that an antithesis of a thesis can co-exist alongside with a thesis 
without attempting a hasty synthesis. I am comfortable with an antithesis and a 
thesis to coexist in a liminal space that is different from a forced, polite and often 
comfortable synthesis. This implies that although I am comfortable with the 
different theses describing and explaining the tremendum, I am equally 
comfortable with propositions that question or negate the tremendum or phrase it 
in terminology outside the accepted canons and vocabularies of talking about the 
tremendum.  Continuing the analogy of Goodenough (1959) I do believe that 
there are also meaning-making structures that venture behind the curtains of 
traditional religions’ descriptions of the tremendum to claim that there either is no 
tremendum or that it resembles an antithesis to the ‘accepted’ theses provided 
with more traditional structures of meaning-making. A case in point is atheism, 
Satanism and certain worldviews178. 
 
Atheism’s rejection of the claims of all the curtains (in the analogy proposed by 
Goodenough 1959) as well as the space ‘behind’ the curtain needs further 
exploration. The fact that atheism rejects the tremendum is not a rejection of the 
awe of encountering the unexplained. On the contrary. Atheism’s rejection of 
traditional notions of the tremendum is a claim to face the unexplained without 
the ‘securities’ of the curtains. Atheism seems to pull down the curtains and live 
and celebrate not-knowing everything. Atheism, at least for me personally, 
means walking the tightrope of non-belief in the belief that it is the only possible 
rational and existential response to not knowing everything. This position is often 
portrayed of not taking life and death seriously. The contrary is true. Atheism is 
living in the permanence of the tremendum, not necessarily the negation thereof.  
 
                                            
178 In Chapter 1 I have already revealed my personal history regarding my own journey of making 
sense. I have acknowledged and want to again acknowledge my biases. 
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Satanism is another case in point, although even more controversial than 
atheism. Satanism seems to be a system of belief providing an antithesis to the 
main theses provided by traditional religions. Satanism is an example of a 
counter-narrative, an oppositional narrative that is, for some people, a valid and 
legitimate response to the tremendum. 
 
I do not propose that these antitheses like atheism, Satanism and paganism 
should necessarily be included in the curriculum. Such inclusion may neither be 
age appropriate nor possible in the time allowed for Religion Education. In the 
subject Religion Studies learners may be more ready to engage with atheism or 
Satanism179. This is however not the issue. The issue at stake is that the Policy 
possibly includes structures of meaning-making as equally valid human 
responses to the tremendum. In Chapter 7 I pointed to the possibility that certain 
valid ways of making meaning may be excluded from investigation in the 
classroom on the basis of public mores and norms. The issue at stake, at least 
for me personally, is the acknowledgement that there are other equally valid and 
responsive ways of making meaning180.  
 
I suspect that the public outcry about the Policy that surrounded the current 
Policy would have been nothing compared to the public outcry should the 
possibility have existed that Satanism, atheism or paganism as belief-systems 
would have been explicit possibilities in the curriculum. The inclusion of these 
‘ways of making meaning’ would however have been academically defendable 
and even appropriate considering the reality of the existence of these structures 
                                            
179 See my discussion in Chapter 7 on the implications of students’ choices within the context of 
classroom context, the expertise of the teacher, the ethos of the school and its surrounding 
communities and parental beliefs and assumptions.  
180 From the processes resulting in the Policy it is clear that all major religious groupings were in 
agreement with the Policy in its final format, including representatives of secular humanism. An 
interesting aspect of the Policy and the deliberations that surrounded it is the notion that some 
alternative ways of making meaning would have protested against being included in a broad 
basket of the study of religion. The processes surrounding the Policy also seem to have 
necessitated careful strategic consideration of the implications of defining ‘religion’ in an even 
more open manner. The question whether nihilism can be considered a way of making meaning 
also provokes further contemplation.  
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of meaning in the international and national domains. With the increased 
publication of works and authors dealing with and defending non-traditional ways 
of making-sense, learners may be at loss of not having a vocabulary or literacy to 
critically engage with these debates. 
 
The ‘positive impartiality’ of the Policy toward religion as vehicle for the promotion 
of identified values, may create the impression that religion per se is a more 
‘trusted’ vehicle than , for example atheism. There is enough evidence to propose 
that the values as proposed by the Constitution are also treasured and promoted 
by atheists, pagans and agnostics. Although the Policy itself does not ‘demonise’ 
non-traditional ways of making meaning, the experience and expertise, 
assumptions and beliefs of teachers, the ethos of a particular school as well as 
parental beliefs may create the impression that only traditional religions are 
‘trustworthy’ vehicles for values. The Policy and curriculum documents are clear 
that the Policy also celebrates certain worldviews.  
 
8.5 FINAL EVALUATION 
 
I would like to start these final evaluative remarks on the Policy by referring to 
two authors whose exploration of the tremendum really impacted on this study as 
well as on my own ways of making meaning. These two authors are Goodenough 
(1959) and Krüger (1995)181.  
 
In the essay by Goodenough (1959:91) he petitions for scientists of religion to 
face the tremendum ‘with quiet eyes, astonished, reverent, but unafraid’ 
(1959:91).  He continues 
For we can hardly call ourselves scientists of religion if we systematically 
define religion so as to leave out this great approach to the tremendum 
going on all about us, and refuse ourselves to share it. In the mid-twentieth 
century we will seem ridiculous to our generation if we call ourselves 
scientists, but do not examine our data in the same factual and calm spirit.  
 
                                            
181 I have explored both these authors’ works in Chapter 3. 
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The historical religions, according to Krüger (1995:59), ‘are concretised forms of 
these frontier experiences; the landmarks, through many millennia, of human 
beings’ intuitions of ultimate reality, truth, beauty and goodness. There is 
therefore every reason to treat such forms with great respect’.  
 
I have no doubt in my mind that the inclusion of study of religion as envisaged 
and proposed by the Policy will contribute, in the context of the broader 
curriculum, to increasing the Mündigkeit and the potential for Mündigkeit in 
learners. Religion Education (Grades R-12) will provide learners with more than a 
basic religious literacy that will prepare them sufficiently for participation as 
citizens in the public sphere, nationally and internationally. Heimbrock, Scheilke 
and Schreiner (2001:9) define ‘religious competence’ as follows: 
Religious competence means being able to deal with one’s own religiosity 
and its various dimensions embedded in the dynamics of life-history in a 
responsible way but also to appreciate the religious view of others. It 
includes active tolerance, competence to act in ethically oriented ways, 
readiness for dialogue on religious matters. It includes also the ability to 
deal with religious pluralism and differences in a constructive way.  
 
 
It is clear from my analysis of the Policy and curriculum documents that the study 
of religion(s) will contribute to learners growing in religious competence, as 
envisaged by Heimbrock et al. (2001).  
 
Although the time allocation for Religion Education within the context of Life 
Orientation is very limited, an increase in the allocation would necessarily mean a 
decrease of time available for other Learning Areas. It is also furthermore very 
difficult to determine how much time will be considered ‘enough’ if the current 
allocation is deemed as lacking. Considering the holistic approach proposed by 
the RNCS and NCS, Religion Education will fulfil a crucial role in preparing 
learners to engage in a postmodern, postsecular and increasingly globalised 
world. Religion Studies (Grades 10-12) as envisaged by the NCS embodies a 
wonderful example of the study of religion as critical organic praxis.  
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Although outside the scope of this study, it is necessary to mention that 
successful implementation of the Policy will further depend on the training of in-
service and pre-service teachers, quality learning and teaching support materials, 
as well as authentic and valid assessment182.  
 
The Policy and resulting various curriculum documents propose the study of 
religion as engagement with religion as ‘concretised forms of [these] frontier 
experiences; the landmarks, through many millennia, of human beings’ intuitions 
of ultimate reality, truth, beauty and goodness’ (Krüger 1995:59). The Policy and 
curriculum encourage teachers and learners to face the tremendum ‘with quiet 
eyes, astonished, reverent, but unafraid’ (Goodenough 1959:91).   
 
8.6 (IN)CONCLUSIONS 
 
As shared in Chapter 1, the ‘why’ of this research was grounded in my personal 
history and interests, as well as in my curiosity about the academic discourses on 
the role of religion in the public sphere in a postsecular age. Now, at the end of 
this journey, I am satisfied that I have somehow also successfully resolved the 
‘how’ of my research.   
 
Discourse analysis as ‘the act of showing how certain discourses are deployed to 
achieve particular effects in specific contexts’ (Terre Blanche & Durrheim 
1999:154) allowed me to plot several patterns and trends that shaped the Policy. 
These patterns and trends were like the ‘tectonic layers’ described by the 
character of Michael who said ‘The tectonic layers of our lives rest so tightly 
against earlier events in later ones, not as matter that has been fully formed and 
pushed aside, but absolutely present and alive. I understand this. Nevertheless, I 
                                            
182 It is important that the training of teachers as well as the development of teaching and learning 
support materials should also provide academic and pedagogic guidance to teachers being 
confronted with learners’ interest in non-traditional ways of making meaning. 
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sometimes find it hard to bear. Maybe I did write our story to be free of it, even if I 
never can be’ (Booth 1999:260) 
 
The Policy was not only shaped by ‘tectonic layers’ but the implementation of the 
Policy will also continue to experience the movement and impact of these layers. 
The Policy can and will never be free of them. In facing this reality it is crucial to 
take into account what Booth (1999:259) proposed regarding memory and 
forgetting:  
Forgetting and memory both seem vital to our common life, and it is equally 
possible that we may have too much of either. An excess of forgetting would 
turn us into leaves to be scattered by the winds, mere neighbours passing 
one another by in little more than a community of interests. Too much 
memory would be lead in our wings, denying us a future and closing off the 
possibility of openness to others who are not part of our community of 
memory. 
 
The Policy and resulting curriculum to a certain extent provides a clear picture of 
the role the study of religion can play in re-envisioning and reshaping South 
African society. The Policy and its implementation stand as testimony of a 
‘maybe’.  
‘Maybe’ comes with no guarantees, only a chance. But ‘maybe’ has 
always been the best odds the world has offered to those who set out to 
alter its course – to find a new land across the sea, to end slavery, to 
enable women to vote, to walk on the moon, to bring down the Berlin Wall. 
 
‘Maybe’ is not a cautious word. It is a defiant claim of possibility in the face 
of a status quo we are unwilling to accept… (Young in the Foreword to 
Westley, Zimmerman & Patton 2006) 
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EPILOGUE TO THE THESIS 
 
The central figure in the carnival as explored by Bakhtin was the fool, the clown, 
the idiot-savants and savant-idiots (Hiebert 2003:116) who in the blasphemous 
hilarity of the carnival could comment on sacred and profane structures, beliefs 
and institutions. The fool also translated the untranslatable, commented on the 
incommensurable and often provided a new vocabulary or language for engaging 
with the serious and often traumatic of everyday-life. Nothing was sacred. 
Everything was.  
 
As I confessed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, I assumed various identities in 
performing this thesis as carnival in an age of carnival. At times I was parrot, 
‘enacting someone else’s voice’ (Hiebert 2003:118), repeating what others have 
said, often out of context. During this thesis I was also the organ-grinding 
monkey, ‘dressed in a dapper little costume and trained to collect money from 
passers-by’, and conditioned ‘to perform; conditioned out of the possibility of 
subversion’ (Hiebert 2003:118). In this heteroglossic carnival, I was also medium 
– possessed with and speaking with many voices, often speaking in voices I 
didn’t understand. I performed this thesis as a glossolalic and often xenoglossic 
act in a xenoglossic world.  
And the result is a carnivalesque nonsense. Not a meaningless nonsense, 
but an uncertain, gestural participation in which nothing makes sense, yet 
the gesture towards the unintelligible is all that matters (Goodman quoted 
by Hiebert 2003:123). 
 
This thesis may be nothing more than a ‘gestural participation’ in the debates and 
future debates and discourses surrounding the Policy. This study provided some 
pointers to the possibilities and opportunities the Policy missed and the 
possibilities the Policy encompasses. Towards a ‘maybe’.  
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